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Friday, July 10, 1885

GENERAL G. ERSKINE, Member of Council, in the Chair.

WHAT CAN THE VOLUNTEERS OF ENGLAND DO TO RENDER THEMSELVES FIT TO TAKE THE FIELD?

By Colonel R. HARRISON, C.B., C.M.G., R.E., &c.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, it is with great regret that I have to announce that Lord Wemyss is prevented from being here this afternoon, and from taking the chair as he had intended to do, in consequence of urgent business in the House of Lords. I am sure it will be a matter of very great disappointment to all who have attended to hear this paper, that Lord Wemyss is not here to give us the benefit of his advice and criticism.

THE circumstances of the last few months have once more stirred up the feeling that the force chiefly relied on for the defence of England—the Volunteers—are not as ready to take the field as they might be. But no one, as far as I know, has yet attempted to detail what requires to be done, or how to do it.¹

The object of this paper is to endeavour to throw some light on this subject.

The process of turning a *peace* army—i.e., a number of men, horses, guns, and other stores—scattered about where most convenient for purposes of subsistence or custody into a *war* army concentrated at certain strategical points is called *mobilization*.

Every nation in Europe except England has I believe thought this matter out. It has settled what portion of its available peace army shall be made a movable one capable of taking the field, and what part shall be equipped for garrison duty only; it has made elaborate tables showing what has to be done at each military district, and at each place of concentration as soon as the order to mobilize is issued; it has prepared all the necessary clothing, equipment, and transport, or, at all events, has arranged how and where to lay hands on them; and it has made up its mind how to obtain the required number of Staff and Departmental Officers.

All this might be done for England and her Colonies without spending a penny of the taxpayers' money. All that is required is that a few of the able Staff Officers, of whom the country possesses so many, shall be told off to do the task.

¹ The paper by Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley on "The Volunteers in Time of Need," in the "Nineteenth Century" for March, was discussed for three days, and the discussion is reported in full in No. CXXX of the Journal.—Ed.

But it requires *time*. It is the sort of work that cannot be done in a hurry and in the excitement immediately preceding a war.

This process of preparation cannot be done by the Volunteers, so I will say no more about it than to express a hope that it may be undertaken before it is too late. Unless it be done before an enemy sets foot on our shores, all that may be brought about by individual effort to fit the Volunteers for war will be simply thrown away.

But I will turn at once to the question, What is it that the Volunteers can do to make themselves more ready to take the field than they are now? and the answer I give is that they can do two things—they can provide themselves with *personal* equipment, and they can obtain instruction in the art of war.

No doubt a large proportion of the Volunteer Force will be employed in what is called garrison duty—that is, they will act on the pure defensive in the neighbourhood of their native towns and villages. Some, however, will be in a position to leave their homes for an indefinite period, and these latter will be available to be organized into war battalions, and to form a portion of the moving army. But whether employed in garrisons or in the field one and all require a personal equipment, and it would be better for simplicity of supply if all were equipped in a similar manner.

I have used the word *personal* equipment, and I have done so advisedly, because when we talk of equipment generally we mean all the paraphernalia required to enable any body of men and horses to take the field. This includes the equipment of the individual soldier, the equipment of the regiment, and the equipment of the brigade or the Division. It is the equipment of the individual soldier which is our present concern. What then is an English Volunteer likely to require in the field; what is the use of each article, and how is it to be carried? I will take them in the following order:—First, the clothes in wear, then the arms and accoutrements; and, lastly, any other articles thought necessary.

In settling the cut and material of a coat, as in everything else, success is only attained by working on some fixed principle. Now, the principles to bear in mind when we are considering what should be the dress of the soldier are, I think, these—taken in the order of their importance—its fitness for war purposes, its fitness for garrison duty, and its appearance.

In considering the dress of the Volunteers we are relieved from one of the difficulties attending the question as it affects the regular Army, inasmuch as the Volunteers are not intended for service elsewhere than in the British Isles, whereas the regulars are liable to serve in every climate under the sun: and we have to deal only with the limited question, what is the best dress for war and peace for a soldier in England.

Bearing in mind the first principle laid down—the fitness of a soldier's dress for war—I cannot but think that a great mistake is made when an inferior material, to wear a short time, is issued instead of a good material to wear a little longer. This is done no doubt for the sake of appearance, because a new coat, especially

when men don't own the clothes they wear, and consequently are not over-careful of them, looks better than an old one. But when an army goes on a campaign, and when food and ammunition are rightly sent to the front before anything else, it is often months before men can be supplied with new clothes, and the shoddy coats and trousers go to pieces, and leave the wretched soldiers with nothing but rags to protect them against wet and cold.

What the colour of the Volunteers' dress should be is too big a question to deal with here. A good deal has been written and spoken on this subject, and opinions are much divided. If there were, as there used to be, two descriptions of infantry—heavy and light—I should say that the heavy infantry should have one colour and the light infantry another, which would be a great help to Commanders and Staff in the field. But when, as is the case now, all infantry are equipped in the same manner, and have similar duties to perform (the only difference between them being that what are called rifle regiments have a different drill with the rifle), I do not think it matters a jot whether so-called rifle regiments have a dress of a different colour to others or not.

As to the shape of the dress, I should say, speaking generally, that we cannot do better than stick to the Austrian tunic which we have adopted the last few years, and to which the eye has got accustomed. But in matters of detail this dress requires, I think, a good deal of alteration to render it fit for war.

Let me go a little more into detail. I think that a suitable dress for the Volunteers of England would be as follows:—

A tunic of good material fitting the back and waist, with a pleat on each side of the breast buttons so that there shall be ample play in front, an upright collar to protect the neck, loose sleeves fastened at the wrist by a strap, cartridge holders to hold ten cartridges stitched on the breast so that they shall not interfere with the accoutrements, breast pockets inside, and the badge and number of the regiment a little below the point of the shoulders so that it can be seen from the side. A *waistcoat* with sleeves to be worn under the tunic in cold weather. *Pantaloons* made to fit at the knee, but quite loose from the knee upwards, with pockets at the sides.

Leather gaiters fastened by string loops.

Shooting boots which can be tipped and heeled before a campaign.

A felt hat, looped up at one side, and ornamented by a feather.

A flannel shirt.

Hand-knitted socks.

A pair of gloves or mitts.

A flannel belt.

A pair of braces or a thin leather belt.

The advantages which, I think, the above-named dress possesses over the dress which is now generally worn by Volunteers, can only be tested in war, or in circumstances as like war as possible. You must have the hot march on a dusty road in the midst of a crowd of your fellow-men; you must have the heavy shower of rain to endure; the ford to cross; the ploughed field to pass over; and you must

bivouac under a hedge, or by the side of a hastily made trench; and, lastly, you must know what it is for the fate of your company, or your battalion, to depend upon the rapidity with which you can fire a few well-aimed rounds, before you can say whether the dress you wear is one really suitable for war or not.

But to resume. Our next consideration of the articles of personal equipment of the Volunteer are his arms and accoutrements.

In the case of these, just as in the case of dress, the important point to bear in mind is fitness for war. A soldier's rifle must not only be able to carry a bullet with extreme accuracy to a distance almost out of sight, but it must be of such a weight that it can be carried easily in addition to other necessary articles by a man of average strength, and it must be simple in construction, so that it shall not be put out of order by the rough usage that it is liable to in the field. The ammunition must be as light as possible consistent with being really serviceable.

While on this subject let me say a word regarding the change that is now being talked about in the Martini-Henry ammunition. Already the ammunition that we carry is heavier than that of any other European nation, and when we bear in mind that every ounce of extra weight carried by the soldier decreases his marching and fighting powers, and every pound of extra weight carried in the transport wagons decreases their power of bringing up supplies, we should, before making any change, consider most carefully whether the advantage gained is sufficient to counterbalance the disadvantage that would arise should any extra weight be thereby imposed on the marching army.

The question of bayonet or sword bayonet should be considered in connection with that of the intrenching tool, and nothing should be adopted without careful trial under circumstances as nearly like war as possible. It must be remembered that anything in the shape of a spade hanging to a soldier's waist is a great impediment to him when marching, and my own impression is that the best thing for the Volunteer to carry in the field would be a trowel fitted into a case which also holds the bayonet. The trowel can be constructed to cut brushwood as well as to make a kitchen, or trench for a bivouac, or riflepit for a sentry. When it is required to make regular fieldworks, the intrenching tools that are carried in regimental transport can always be made available.

The scabbard for the bayonet should be of leather, as at present, and the whole thing, viz., case, trowel, and bayonet, can be so made as to be easier carried and less of an impediment to the soldier than the sword bayonet with steel scabbard now carried by the Royal Artillery. Ammunition pouches must be sufficiently large to hold 100 rounds if required. The usual number of rounds carried in the field is sixty in the two pouches and ten in the cartridge holders on the coat.

The waistbelt must be considered in conjunction with the rest of the accoutrements. By itself it cannot support the weight that a soldier has to carry when he is completely dressed and equipped for

FIG. 1.



FRONT.

FIG. 2.



FRONT.

FIG. 3.



RIGHT SIDE.

FIG. 4.



BACK.

FIG. 5.



BACK.

FIG. 6.



LEFT SIDE.

war, and consequently it has to be supported by braces. The braces, as used by the infantry soldier in the regular Army, are so arranged that they carry the valise behind and support the ammunition pouches in front. In the latest pattern valise equipment they can also be used to support the belt when the valise is not carried, the great coat rolled and strapped to the waistbelt behind acting as a counterpoise to the ammunition pouches. When it is borne in mind that the knapsack or valise is never carried by the soldier on the march in modern war, there seems no reason why our Volunteers should be burdened with one, and I would suggest their being provided only with waistbelt, ammunition pouches, and braces, as supplied to the regular infantry in the latest pattern valise equipment.

I would, however, provide every Volunteer with a waterproof bag, similar to the one used by sailors, which will hold the articles of kit in excess of what the men carry on their backs. This bag would be left at the place of assembly of the regiment when the men marched away to take the field. It would be useful to them for the days or weeks that they remained there, and it would enable them to start away with everything they had on clean and in good condition. The bag is fastened at the top by a piece of cord, and can be padlocked if thought advisable. It can easily be carried a short distance on a man's shoulder.

The best water-bottle that I have seen is a galvanized iron one, enamelled inside, and covered with felt outside. It has a cork stopper. It should be made to hold $1\frac{1}{2}$ pints. If larger it is too heavy for a man to carry on the march. It should be made with a strap, to suspend it from the shoulder, this strap being useful also to enable it to be filled from a well or river. It should have, moreover, a cloth strap to fasten it to the waistbelt, and thus keep it steady.

The haversack should be sufficiently large to hold three days' biscuit or bread. It should be waterproof outside, and have an inner coating of linen, which can be taken out and washed from time to time. It should be carried by a linen or canvas strap over the shoulder.

An oil bottle will be required for the rifle. I should like to see this as well as the necessary cleaning kit, &c., carried in a small pan in the butt of the rifle, as is done frequently in sporting rifles. In default of this, it must be carried in one of the pouches.

Lastly, we will consider the other articles which it is thought a Volunteer should possess to fit him for war.

The first of these is the great coat, which should be considered in conjunction with the cape. The real object of a soldier's great coat is to keep him warm, while that of the cape is to keep him dry. An old soldier doing a day's march on a wet day will prefer not to wear his great coat, for he knows that if he does it will add immensely to his labour, and before long the wet will penetrate it, and the result will be that when he arrives at his journey's end he will not have a dry thing to put on. But a soldier under the same circumstances would be glad to wear his cape if it were made sufficiently long to protect his accoutrements, because it would keep him fairly dry and would not hamper his movements.

The remarks that I have already made about material apply with even greater force to the great coat than they do to the tunic.

I am of opinion that the Volunteer should be provided with a great coat of really good woollen material, not too thick, and not coming down below the knee, because thickness and length mean weight. It should have a roll collar which can be turned up when required. It should have straps at the wrists to enable the sleeves to be tightened there, and the skirts should be made to button back, and he should be provided with a cape to be worn either with or without the coat. The cape to be waterproofed, and to reach down as far as the waist. The cape should, I think, be carried by the Volunteer on all parades, rolled and strapped to the waistbelt behind, where it lies in the hollow of the back quite out of the way. On marching order parades when the great coat is fastened to the waistbelt, the cape might be carried "en banderole" over the left shoulder, where it would be in a position for immediate use whenever required.

The Volunteers cannot do better than adopt the old pattern infantry canteen, which is made of just sufficient size to carry a man's messing when vegetables are added. It will cook for two men in the field, so that a man and his comrade have a spare canteen for their tea or water.

If the Volunteers are provided with the hat I have mentioned, which is light and comfortable, they would not require a forage cap. But they should have a woollen night cap for field service, which could be used when convenient in garrisons.

A field "dressing" is supplied to every man before starting for active service. This should be issued to Volunteers when they assemble previous to taking the field.

Every Volunteer should be provided with a small book in which should be recorded his description, service, clothing, payments, &c., in fact, everything concerning his life as a soldier.

The remaining articles which I think he would require, and which could all be carried easily in his waterproof bag, are as follows:—

A second pair of pants.

A second tunic.

A pair of strong shoes.

A pair of canvas gaiters to fit over the shoes.

A hold-all fitted as a house-wife, and containing a fork, spoon, and comb.

A clasp knife and tin opener with lanyard.

Cleaning kit and materials, carried in a small linen bag.

2 pairs of socks.

2 flannel shirts.

2 towels.

A small Testament and Prayer Book, and

4 silk pocket handkerchiefs, which can be used as neck handkerchiefs when required.

When a Volunteer takes the field, the following articles only will probably be taken by him. All the remainder of his kit should be

packed away in his waterproof bag and left at the place of assembly of the regiment or wherever else may be ordered at the time.

Description.	Weight not to exceed.	Remarks, and how carried.
	lbs. ozs.	
Clothes in wear	12 2	
Accoutrements	4 0	
Arms	10 9	
Ammunition	8 0	{ 60 rounds in pouches and 10 in cartridge holders.
Canteen	1 9	
Haversack	1 0	On top of great coat.
Water-bottle	0 6	By strap over right shoulder.
Balance of day's rations, say (including tea in water-bottle)	2 0	By strap over left shoulder.
Knife and lanyard, say	0 6	{ In canteen, haversack, and water-bottle.
Field "dressing" with needle and thread	0 2	
Great coat	4 0	In pocket of tunic.
Cape	1 0	{ Rolled and strapped to waistbelt behind.
Reserve ration, say	0 12	
Towel and soap	0 8	{ <i>En banderole</i> over left shoulder.
Small book	0 2	
Woollen nightcap	0 3	{ In canvas bag on belt behind.
1 pair socks	0 5	
Grease pot	0 4	{ In one of the pouches.
Oil-bottle	0 2	
Total weight	47 6	

Everything taken in the above list should be as good as new in the matter of wear.

Additional rations will occasionally have to be taken. When this is the case they will probably consist of biscuit and cheese, and they must be carried in the haversack.

* * * * *

I have now, in as much detail as is probably necessary, gone through the various articles of personal equipment which I think are required to be in possession of the Volunteers of England to render them fit to take the field. But the question may arise how are all these things to be provided, and who will bear the cost; and I don't feel it right to lay down my pen until I have given my answer at least to these questions. It has been, I understand, for some years the custom for the Commanding Officers of the Metropolitan Volunteers to meet together and discuss certain questions concerning the corps they command; and it seems to me that this custom has only got to be extended a little to create a Central Association, which shall consider not only equipment but other matters affecting the Volunteers

throughout the country. No action would of course be taken on the deliberations until the sanction of H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War had been obtained. The funds to maintain such an Association could be provided by contributions from all corps who were willing to join, and who, in right of their subscription, should be allowed to send a representative to all meetings of the central body.

The business of the Association in the matter of equipment would be to consider what articles should be provided for Volunteers, and what should be the nature of each article. The result of these deliberations might be circulated to all the Volunteer Corps who had joined the Association.

I am aware that it is the opinion of some, if not many, members of the Volunteer Force that the War Department should provide them with all necessary equipment, if not clothes. With this opinion I am at variance. The position originally taken up by the Volunteers was, I believe, that they were entirely independent of Government aid. The feeling that prompted them was that every man, in return for his rights of citizenship, owed some personal service to the State; and that while the poor man could enter the ranks of the Regular Army or the Militia, the well-to-do citizen could enrol himself as a Volunteer, or at least could find funds to enable some one to do so in his stead.

I am aware of the patriotism that influences most members of the existing Volunteer Corps, and I know of the large sacrifices in time and money made by many. Nevertheless, I cannot help expressing it as my opinion that as a matter of principle the Force should never have accepted Government aid except when embodied, and except for the provision of arms and ammunition and drill-grounds.

There is, I believe, no question that when the Volunteer movement was first started the amount of money received was sufficient for all needs. I presume that although *individuals* may give more now the subscriptions are not so *general* as they used to be. Perhaps the reason of this is that the need is not made known. Whatever may be the cause, at all events I would urge a general statement being circulated in districts where the headquarters of Volunteer Corps are established before any further help is asked for from the Government. Should any of those appealed to shrink from their obvious duty as citizens, it may be well to remind them that the ranks of the Militia are far from being full, and that should the Volunteers fall off in numbers or efficiency it is more than probable that sooner or later the ballot will have to be applied in order to obtain men for the first-named force. If the appeals fail to obtain the necessary funds, there will be nothing for it but to go to the Government and say, "We have done all we can; if you wish us to be really efficient you must give us a grant to enable us to provide ourselves with personal equipment."

But in any case each Volunteer corps, under the guidance of the Central Association, should be held responsible for obtaining a *personal* equipment such as I have described; the actual pattern and the manner of purchase being left to local choice.

* * * * *

I have already stated that the Volunteers have it in their power to do two things to make themselves more ready to take the field than they are at present. They can provide themselves with *personal* equipment and they can obtain instruction in the art of war—and I have described in some detail what their *personal* equipment should consist of.

Before dealing with the second part of the subject—the instruction for war—it may be well to say very briefly what equipment other than personal will have to be provided for such of the Volunteers as may be required to march with the active army. This equipment, as previously stated, is divided into that of the regiment, and that of the brigade or Division. All of it must be provided at a time of need by the Government of the country, and the more carefully the Government consider what are the stores which are absolutely necessary, and where they can best be obtained when wanted, the cheaper and easier will be the eventual process of “mobilization.”

It need hardly be said that a battalion of infantry mobilized for war is a very different thing from a peace battalion such as we are accustomed to see at our parades and sham fights. The latter is merely an assemblage of some 500 men, while the former consists of 1,096 men of all ranks, as well as 70 horses and 15 carts and wagons. Of the number of men in a war battalion, it is assumed that when the necessary *dépôt* is formed at the base of operations, 1,000 men will still be available to march forward against the enemy, and for this number regimental transport has to be provided. The description of transport that an army takes into the field varies with the nature of the country in which the campaign is about to take place. Sometimes it consists of wagons, sometimes of *carts*, sometimes of pack animals, and sometimes even of boats. Whatever its description, however, the same system holds with regard to the supplies and stores which it carries. Thus ammunition is taken in special carts, or on special mules to the extent of 30 rounds a man. A fixed number of intrenching tools are taken on a cart designed for the purpose, or on mules. One wagon, or a certain number of pack animals, are detailed for headquarters, and the same for every two companies. Two wagons are detailed to carry with the battalion the daily Commissariat supplies, and three wagons the tents if they are ordered to accompany the force.

All wagons, and carts, and batches of mules have certain special articles of equipment told off to them, which they carry independently of any other stores that they may be required to convey with the battalion. The headquarter wagon and the company wagons carry between them one day's *reserve* rations, a blanket per man, the regulated amount of baggage for Officers, and such few books and special tools as it is thought are absolutely necessary in the field.

Similarly, when pack takes the place of wheel transport, a certain number of mules or ponies are detailed to headquarters, and a certain number to each company to take the same stores as would be contained in the wagons.

Each corps in an army, if properly equipped, should have

sufficient regimental transport to take with it similar stores to those which are above named as being taken with a battalion of infantry. Thus a battery of artillery, besides its guns and its special stores of ammunition, tools, books, &c., should take a blanket and a reserve ration per man, and should be provided with a separate cart to carry the daily supply of Commissariat rations. The same with the engineers, in addition to their pontoons and telegraph stores, and their special supply of tools and materials. The same with the Commissariat Corps, in addition to their bakery and butchery columns; and the same with the Medical Staff Corps, in addition to their field hospital and bearer equipment.

The equipment of a brigade or Division consists of that of the various corps of which it is composed, together with such extra equipment as the probable necessities of the campaign suggest.

It would perhaps be sufficient for a campaign in England, where it is presumed the railways would be available to a certain extent for purposes of supply, if the columns that followed the moving army contained only a reserve of ammunition to supplement the regimental reserve, and a reserve of two or three days' rations.

But it is unnecessary to pursue this subject any further here. It was introduced to show how necessary *previous* preparation is, if a country wishes to be in a position to make use of the material she possesses to create a field army.

We will now turn to that portion of the subject which more immediately concerns the Volunteers themselves, and proceed to the inquiry how they can obtain instruction in the art of war.

The answer that naturally suggests itself is, by books—and one wonders why, in these days of much writing and rapid printing, no text-book of instruction for Volunteers has yet appeared. Perhaps the reason is that no one knows how much to extract and how much to omit from the numerous books that have been published in England on the subject of the training of infantry.

I venture to think that it would make the task of preparing a text-book an easier one if the object of military training were kept constantly in view in its compilation—and if everything were omitted that did not conduce to that object.

Evidently the primary object of all military training should be to prepare men for war—and, as the time that Volunteers can give to this training is necessarily limited, it would probably be well if the whole of the time that they can give up to drill were devoted to the primary object.

All the circumstances of war may be comprised under three heads, viz.: the *march*, the *bivouac*, and the *battle*. In each of these circumstances there are two tactical formations, which are technically called "orders," *i.e.*, the close order and the extended order. Thus on the march the troops forming the main body are in what is called column of route, or close order, while those detailed for the protection of the force are in extended order. In the bivouac the soldiers by their camp fires are in close order, while the camp guards and outposts are

in extended order, and in the battle the fighting line whether in attack or defence is in extended order, while the reserves are in close order.

It is frequently stated that a good deal of drill is necessary, not as a preliminary instruction for field movements, but simply as a means by which discipline shall be taught. No one doubts the necessity for discipline in an army. But many think that it may be learned in the home, in the school, and in the workshop, as effectively as in the recruits' squad. Whether this be so or not it is hardly to be denied that it can be acquired by a well-educated middle-class man who devotes himself from motives of patriotism to the profession of arms with greater facility than by the average agricultural labourer who dons the soldier's coat as a means whereby he may earn his daily bread—and I argue that even if drill which has for its object only the teaching of discipline and rendering a man what is called *smart* is considered necessary when the rustic from the plough has to be turned into a soldier of the line, it is not an essential in the case of the Volunteer; all that he requires being the drill necessary to train him for war.

The conclusion arrived at is that the Volunteer can obtain instruction in the art of war *first* by the preparation of a text-book extracted from the authorized books of instruction; *secondly*, by practising carefully in the field the manœuvres that the text-book contains; and *thirdly*, by a regulation that no one shall be considered efficient until he has passed through a prescribed course of *practical* training.

I do not propose to describe more in detail than I have done already what the text-book should contain. But I think that it should be as short and simple as possible, and that while it laid down absolute orders for drill movements, it should contain such plain rules for tactical manœuvres that no essential divergence should be possible when two or more battalions practised them together. The book might be divided as follows:—Part I. The Instruction of the Volunteer Recruit. Part II. The Instruction of the Volunteer Soldier. Part III. Miscellaneous.

Part I would comprise all the necessary instruction in marching, shooting, &c., to enable a Volunteer to take his place in the ranks.

Part II would be the school of the company, and would contain all that the great majority of Volunteers would be required to know; and

Part III would contain miscellaneous instruction, such as orders for wearing dress and equipment, orders for railway travelling, details of the annual course of drills, instructions for inspections and reviews, instructions for funerals, &c., and perhaps the few essential movements in the drill of a battalion and a brigade.

If a good book were prepared on the lines above laid down, it would go very far with an intelligent body like the Volunteers to prepare them for practical instruction in the art of war.

The practical instruction itself would be the conclusion of their training. It should be given at every opportunity, on ground provided by the Government, to men who have gone through the whole of the drills contained in Parts I and II.

This subject could be continued at much greater length than has hitherto been attempted, by citing examples of the practical training which it has been suggested should be the invariable wind-up of the Volunteers' book-study and barrack-drill.

But knowing as I do that each example requires careful and continuous study if it is to be useful or even amusing, I have decided that it will be best not to introduce one in this paper.

I have now shortly, but I hope clearly, answered the question with which I started, and explained what in my opinion is required to make the Volunteers fit to take the field.

I have, moreover, indicated how far the business can be done by the Volunteers themselves, and what must be left to be carried out by the Government.

Whether the Government will do their share of the work or not I cannot say, but I feel sure that the Volunteers, who have so nobly initiated themselves as the bulwark of defence of their country, and who have stuck so zealously and persistently to the business, will, as far as they are able, complete the work they have begun: and if what I have said helps in however small a way to bring about such a result, I shall be well content.

Colonel LONSDALE HALE, late R.E. : My friend Colonel Harrison has approached this important question from more than one point of view, but I am glad he has not dwelt too long upon that much-trodden platform, which I may call the greatcoat and equipment platform, of which we have heard a great deal lately. Doubtless greatcoats and equipment are of importance to the Volunteer force collectively and individually, but at the same time it is simply a side issue, because we may be perfectly certain that if the nation were convinced that the Volunteer force, by which I mean the 250,000 efficient, were absolutely efficient in every other respect, it would never stop at the simple matter of supplying them with greatcoats and equipment. If a man has spent nineteen shillings and eleven pence three farthings on an object which he thinks worth a sovereign, he does not think twice over the last farthing. But there appears to be some little scepticism in the mind of the nation as to what the efficiency of the Volunteer force is. Colonel Harrison has boldly stated, in the title of his lecture, that he does not consider the Volunteer force able to take their place in the field, and he has also indicated what that place is; how times have changed since the Volunteer force was originally organized, and how at the present day the part that they would take in the field is changed, and is now twofold; for when the Volunteer force was first organized it was looked upon as a reserve intended to hold garrisons and relieve the rest of the regular Army, but now-a-days, as Colonel Harrison has stated, we shall find not only a large force of Volunteers in reserve, but a large number of them in the front line, where they will have to meet the first shock of invasion, and the question which has to be considered is, Do we honestly and really believe that these 250,000 men are able to meet the first shock of invasion in the front line? Against what? No Power who attempted the invasion of this country would send any one on that desperate and hazardous mission but the flower of her troops, and we may be perfectly sure that if Germany sent a force against this country she would send three or four Army Corps of picked men, picked soldiers. Bearing in mind, then, the imperfect training of our 250,000 Volunteers; bearing in mind their indifferent shooting; bearing in mind the absence of continuity of habits of discipline; bearing in mind the composition of the corps of Volunteer Officers, and remembering whom they would be opposed to, can any one conscientiously say that these 250,000 men as a mass are ready at this moment to take their place in the front line to resist an invasion? Speaking on this point, a Volunteer Officer said to me, "But that does not matter. In six weeks I could

get my battalion as good as any battalion in the line." But we shall not have the six weeks; we cannot rely on the six weeks; we must have our Volunteers, if they are to be ready at all, to be ready at the very moment of attack. Now in answer to the question I have put I quite agree with Colonel Harrison in saying that they are not ready. He makes an assumption, however, from which I differ entirely, that the Volunteers can, by any voluntary effort of their own, make themselves fit for the post in the front line. I am talking now of the whole 250,000 Volunteers. Let us think for a moment what are the opportunities which they have, with the time at their disposal, for making themselves fit. We have the Saturday afternoon drills, which I dare say in the quiet seclusion of the rural districts may be very valuable, but any Commanding Officer who lives near a big town where he has to drill his battalion knows what a small amount of instruction he can put into the time at his disposal amidst the shouting and shrieking of the howling mob around him. Then with regard to the shooting. Have our Volunteers any means whatever at their disposal of getting practice sufficient to enable them to cope with the men I have indicated as landing on these shores—these Germans, who are trained to shoot at 1,000 or 1,200 yards or more—what facilities have our Volunteers of learning to shoot in order to meet on an equal footing men who are trained in that way? We have these so-called "camps of instruction," of which we hear a great deal, and in the hospitality of which many of us have partaken. To an outside observer these Volunteer camps may appear to be so organized that the men come when they like, stay as long as they like, and go away when they like, thus rendering any systematic instruction during the time the battalion is there absolutely impossible. And now I come to speak of what may appear to be a delicate subject, but I have no delicacy in touching upon it at all, the subject of the constitution of the corps of Volunteer Officers. I can only speak of them from what I know of them, of the many friends I have among them. They are men who have been noble and generous enough to open their purses widely, and to give up all the time at their disposal for the benefit of their country. They, perhaps, liked to take to soldiering, but it was in fulfilment of a duty that they took their place at the head of what was really a great national movement. They are men who, like myself, have other occupations, they have their duties in their professions, they have their duties to their families; they have to look after the question of home supplies; and, therefore, you cannot expect a Volunteer Officer to give up more of his time to his military pursuits than that which is left from his other, and, to him, far more important duties. And yet it is an axiom among military men that the weaker, the less-trained your rank and file are, if you want those men to hold their own, and to be well disciplined in the field, the stronger must be your corps of Officers. Never was that shown more clearer than during the war of 1870, when hundreds and thousands of brave Frenchmen were put into the field ready to fight to the last, but with the trained Officer element wanting. Therefore we must have a force of Officers of somewhat better training than the body of the Officers of the 250,000 men. Now, gentlemen, is there any chance of these 250,000 men giving more, either of their time or money, as has been suggested, to the further progress of the Volunteer movement? Remember, the only way in which you can possibly train Reserve forces for the field is to do it in the way it is done abroad. Let us cast aside for once our excessive insular conceit and military self-confidence, and believe that after all foreigners do know something about military training and military affairs. We shall find that they bring their Reserve forces for a series of years, for a month or six weeks at a time, together, and that they officer them most carefully, and then they are able to keep up a well-trained and thoroughly disciplined body of reserve troops, ready if need be to act in the front line. Until we have our Reserve forces going in this way into camps for several weeks at a time for four or five years in succession, and properly officered, we shall never be able to have Reserve troops of the required standard. But can you expect 250,000 men to do that? I emphatically say you cannot. You cannot ask these 250,000 men to meet the demands on their time which are required, and I do not see why you should ask them for more money; but is it not possible that out of that great force of 250,000 men, bearing in mind

the double duty which, as Colonel Harrison indicated, Volunteers would have to perform, the Reserve duty which they have at present, and their position in the front line, would it not be possible to further yet the principle of volunteering and ask whether among that 250,000 men there is one-tenth part of them—a corps of 25,000 men—who would be willing simply to give up more time to their country? Would it not be possible to get among the young men of England 25,000 men who will say—"Yes, we will engage for the next four or five years regularly for a month or six weeks in the year to come into a camp and undergo the severest training, in order to make ourselves fit for the defence of the country as 'Volunteers of the Line'?" Then extend that to the Officers. Go among the regular Officers and say, "Will any of you volunteer to belong to that corps?" Many men would if the expenses were decreased, and then you would be able to officer your corps with as strong an infusion of the Regular element as of the Volunteer element. I imagine if a corps of that class were formed, you would have within a very few years a corps of 25,000 very fairly trained men to which it would be a man's greatest pride to belong, and they would be the "Volunteers of the Line." It would not interfere in the slightest degree with the reserve Volunteers, who would be as they are now, and the Government would be able to lay its hand upon a body of 25,000 English Volunteers who would be also 25,000 English trained soldiers. Gentlemen, I ask you whether the time has not come when the Government of this country should not make a fresh bargain with the Volunteer force. When it was first originated the Volunteers came forward to the Government and said, "Here, gratuitously, we give you our services," and the Government accepted them. By degrees the servant found his services becoming more valuable, and he comes to his master and says, "Now you must pay me in kind and in money." The master agreed for a time. The servant became still more efficient, and now master and servant are at a deadlock. The servant says he can become more efficient yet, but he wants more payment, and the master says, "In the first place I cannot afford to pay all you 250,000 men, and in the next place should I accept you on your terms you must do me more duty." Well, let us strike a fresh bargain. Let the Government say to the Volunteers, or to the 25,000 men, "We merely want your time; we will relieve you of every single expense, we will even pay you while you are in camp, because we know what a cheap force you will be when we have really trained you." Let us make this distinction between the "Volunteers of the Line" and the "Volunteers of the Reserve," instead of trying to deal with this huge, almost unmanageable, question of equipping and training 250,000 Volunteer soldiers, let us begin by dealing with 25,000 only. We have heard from the lips of a dead hero that we ought not to study minor tactics, but read Plutarch's "Lives," because there we shall find how men died for their country. We have got 250,000 men in the Volunteers who are ready to die for their country. Now we want to get from that number the pick of them, the 25,000 men who are not merely ready to die for their country, but ready to spend their lives in its service also.

Colonel DAYES, Assistant-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General Southern Division: I am sure not only the Volunteers but probably a great many Officers of the regular Army, who take a great interest in the Volunteer movement, will be deeply indebted to my friend Colonel Harrison for the interesting paper he has read to us, and for bringing this important question forward. I hope, as I belong to the latter class, that I may be allowed to say a few words. Sir George Willis has begged me to express his very great regret that he is not able to attend on this occasion to take part in the discussion of a subject in which he is so deeply interested as the question of the organization of Volunteers. With regard to the transport, it is a matter on which I should like to say a few words. At the beginning of this year, Sir George Willis, being desirable that, if possible, the Volunteers in the Southern District should be quite independent as far as transport was concerned, desired me to issue a memorandum pointing out that it was very desirable that they should be perfectly independent of the Government in regard to transport in the case of mobilization, because, if they were mobilized, probably all the military transport would be taken by the regular Army, and they would be obliged to scramble for what they could get with the Militia—for any extra trans-

port not required for the Army. It then goes on to point out what he considered might be necessary, and hoped it might be obtained with little or no expense to the Volunteers. It pointed out that if a battalion was about 800 strong, it would probably want three ammunition carts, and it suggested that these might be got from butchers, bakers, and others who had covered carts, which would make very good ammunition carts with two horses, one hooked in front, which might be used as a pack animal to carry the ammunition where the carts could not go. There should also be another cart with one horse for the intrenching tools, and eight wagons to carry the baggage and provisions, each with two horses; and for this purpose it suggested that carriers' vans might be used. This I dare say seems a very small number of horses, but the transport would not have to move any great distance, and only on good roads such as we have in this country. Therefore, they need not be horsed in the same proportion in which we find wagons are horsed for field services in other countries. With regard to ambulance, it suggested that they might utilize omnibuses and cabs; and it also suggested to the Commanding Officers of the Southern District that they might ask owners of this sort of transport if they would not show the same patriotism as was shown by the other members of the Volunteer force, and come forward and furnish their wagons at a regulated price, and that they should be asked to come out in the case of camps of instruction and, on a few occasions, for marches. If this was done, Sir George thought that the War Office might very properly be asked to allow the owners and drivers of these transports to become members and earn the capitation grant; and also that if the Volunteers organized this transport it would be quite fair to ask the War Office to supply camp equipments—tools, greatcoats, water-bottles, &c., for the Volunteers. Nearly all the Commanding Officers in the Southern District acquiesced in it and promised to do their best to work it out, especially Colonel Everett, Colonel Stuart, and Sir William Humphery. Afterwards it was considered that it should be brought forward, if possible, by the Officers commanding the Volunteer corps generally, as they were much in favour of it. Sir George Willis asked some of them to put forward a scheme, which they did, and I will just read a few notes which I have taken from that scheme. Colonel Stuart foresaw little difficulty in organizing such a transport as was suggested by Sir George Willis. At the same time he thought it would be rather difficult to get carts for ammunition, &c., strong enough for the work. Colonel Everett immediately asked permission to organize this transport. He proposed that there should be a payment made of 5s. a day for each horse employed, and he made out that the expense would come to 54l. 10s. for the three days which he proposed to use them during his encampment. I do not know whether he is here to-day or not, but first of all he has made an error in figures of 11l., and in the next place he asked for 53 horses instead of 29; therefore, according to Sir George Willis's scheme, if he paid 5s. for a horse, it would only come to 21l. 15s., and if there was a capitation of 30s. for each man, that would be 22l. 10s. Sir George Willis is particularly anxious that in any scheme for transport, very little expense should be thrown on to the Volunteer corps. He wishes to get people to come forward and furnish the transport at a moderate rate. Sir William Humphery has taken it up still more keenly. He immediately asked permission to organize and use this transport in his camp at Ovington Park, Winchester, on the 25th of this month. He asked also whether a capitation grant could be given, but of course it was needless to say that it could not be given this year. I am happy to say, however, that Sir William Humphery, with his usual liberality, has determined that he will have the transport this year at his own expense, and therefore at his camp he intends to have all this transport for his battalion. I am quite sure that any gentleman who takes an interest in this subject has only to go down there, and Sir William Humphery will be pleased to show what he has done. It has been taken up so much by Commanding Officers of the Southern District, that I am sanguine enough to hope that next year all the corps in the district will have got transport, and with very little expense to the Volunteers. I should like to say one word on the question of drill. Colonel Harrison says something about drill, and he rather led one to believe that there was too much drill, and that Volunteers could make themselves efficient with little or no drill. There I entirely differ from him. I think they must have a certain amount of

drill like other men, though they do not want the same drill as the ordinary soldier. If he alludes to marching past, I think Officers may waste too much time in trying to make their men march past well; but it is imperatively necessary that they should have a certain amount of close-order drill, and very careful drill in extended order. If anybody thinks men can fight in extended order without very careful drill, he is very much mistaken. I maintain that we want more drill in this than they used to have in the old days, when you might have a number of inefficient men in the battalion who did not know their drill, and they would be carried along with the others who did know their drill; but now each individual man must be drilled, and if you do not teach each man to keep his proper distance and direction in extended order if they are fighting with a large body of men, I am sure they will get into hopeless confusion. Therefore I think they want a good deal of drill. They want a good deal of drill, too, in outpost duty, and I hope that the Commanding Officers of Volunteers will turn their attention to this very important matter, which has not been taken up very much at present. I hope that no mischievous doctrine will get abroad that people now-a-days do not require drill because we fight in extended order.

Colonel RIDGWAY: The subject of the present paper by Colonel Harrison purports to be confined wholly to "What the Volunteers of England can do to render themselves fit to take the Field;" therefore, it is entirely beside the question for us to enter into the matter of their equipment or of any proposed changes, whether local or otherwise, in their dress. That disposes at once of the greatcoat and water-bottle question. What the Volunteers themselves can do to render the force effective in the field appears to me to be a matter of sufficient importance in itself to cause us in the present discussion to confine ourselves to that point. The action a Volunteer can take is two-fold: first as a soldier, and secondly as a civilian. As a soldier, his duty is plain and simple. It is not to propose or invent according to his own crotchets new systems of dress, new systems of equipment, or new systems of drill and discipline, but simply to learn and do his duty as a soldier and to obey the orders of his superior Officers. With reference to the remarks of the last speaker, I may be permitted to point out that Colonel Harrison's expressions did not refer to a considerable amount of drill being unnecessary; but that it was unnecessary to have such a large amount of discipline, which drill was mainly intended to produce. On the other hand, it does seem to me that it is the great aspiration, as well as the duty of the Volunteer, to acquire strict habits of discipline, and in that as well as in every other way to make himself, as far as possible, as like the regular Service as can be. Even in his equipment and drill and headgear he must seek to make himself efficient in the Regulation Articles, and I doubt very much whether it would be for his advantage that he should have a soft hat looped up at one side and ornamented with a feather, unless it should be decided by the authorities that this was the best headgear for the regular Service also. The time has gone by when the Volunteer wished to dress in fancy gear. He is desirous now simply to do his duty, and he is willing to do that duty without stint of labour or zeal; but I think the line of what is to be expected from him should be drawn at the point where it would be necessary for men such as the Volunteers are now composed of—viz., working men, to put their hands in their pockets to eke out the bare capitation grant. I am sure that in all branches of the Service it will be found that where the capitation grant is from favourable circumstances found sufficient, there the Volunteer Service is efficient, and that where the capitation grant is not sufficient for all demands, there it will to a certain degree pine and languish unless it is supplemented by other means. Nothing, however, can be more certain than the fact, that no reliance can now be placed upon voluntary contributions; these have entirely gone by. And upon this point I feel bound to insist, because local support and action appear to be the most salient point in Colonel Harrison's remarks. He seems to think we should go back to the time (which is in my recollection) when volunteering was a matter of private subscription and amateur soldiering, and when Officers and even the Adjutant were elected by the men. I remember well a country lawyer, a very excellent man in private life, being selected as an Adjutant, and the men selected their own clothing and their own form of weapon, and organized matters very much in their own way.

In the present day this is not the model of what ought to be; the most prosperous, the largest, and most efficient corps are not in any way of a pedantic character, but are simply sound working according to the lines of the regular Service, and endeavouring to show themselves in drill, in discipline, in personnel, and in material as much like the regular Service as they possibly can. Now as to the other point, the way in which a Volunteer can as a civilian aid in rendering the force capable of taking the field. Although as a soldier he is precluded from teaching the authorities how to improve his own equipment or drill, he has, in his civilian capacity, the opportunity of influencing public opinion, and the action of Parliament in order to induce a much more liberal treatment of the Volunteers in matters of finance, and a much easier treatment of them in regard to many minor details. And while the Volunteer has the freedom of the civilian to act in this way, he also has the advantage, to a certain degree, of military information and experience to guide his action, from his acquaintance with military requirements and of the changes of opinion among civilians on military matters. He knows well, for instance, that the bugbear of the Militia ballot is simply a bugbear, and is aware that perhaps the most important means whereby Volunteers may be fitted to take the field, and a large increase of that force as well as of the Militia may be obtained, is to prevent any more annual Acts of Parliament suspending the Militia ballot. If the Militia Ballot Act were allowed to take its course, the Volunteer ranks would be immediately filled with men doubly interested in fitting themselves for service, while it would also secure the filling up of the ranks of the Militia by ballot. But at the best, the Volunteer, whether as civilian or soldier, can do but little more than he does with his present means to enable himself to take the field. The Government can of course do a great deal more, and it is for them to consider what he is to take the field with, and how he is to keep it. The subject deserves to be considered as something more than one of Volunteer infantry only. There is no zealous and honest artillery Officer of the regular Service who will not say that the brigades of Volunteer artillery are perfectly fit to man our forts and coast batteries, and to do thoroughly good service as trained artillerymen. As far as the artillery Volunteers are concerned, they have been, by their organization, their zeal, and the peculiar nature of their drill, enabled to become more perfect than might have been expected from auxiliary soldiers. It is not exactly the same with the Volunteer infantry, whose duties are not so specific. If you have 250,000 Volunteer infantry you may send them into the field to-morrow, thoroughly equipped with greatcoats, water bottles, and all the paraphernalia which you choose to set down in an article as showing what they ought to be fitted with, but if you send those men into the field without a proper proportion of cavalry and field artillery, transport, and commissariat, you may just as well keep them at home. However much a Volunteer may do to render himself fit to take the field, it will be useless, unless the cavalry and field artillery of our regular Service are very largely increased. It would seem, therefore, if this be the case, that it be the duty of the Government to fit them in this respect, for it cannot be the act of the Volunteers themselves. In the meantime, so far as the Volunteers can fit themselves by their own action for taking the field they are progressing very satisfactorily; and the only means by which they can be expected to increase the pace at which they are now going will be by increasing the capitation grant where required.

Major the Hon. SCOTT NAPIER: I consider that, as at present constituted, the Volunteer force, although an excellent school for training and discipline, a loyal and generously constituted force, is absolutely and utterly incompetent to carry out what General Hamley and several other gentlemen have allotted to it—that is to say, the defence of our coast against organized invasion. How can anybody in his senses, after examining the question coolly, believe that these 200,000 men would be forthcoming in time of need? How can we believe that regiments recruited from dockyards and arsenals, telegraph, railway officials, and post-office officials will suddenly be liberated to go into the field and desert their employment? Such disorganization is impossible to my mind. I think a Saturday afternoon, at a quarter before six o'clock, is, perhaps, the only time when such an idea could be realized. Now, as regards the subject of equipment, I think it is one of the most important subjects in connection with the soldier, for on service a man is absolutely helpless if he has

not got a proper means for carrying his ammunition and accoutrements. At the same time I think it would be utter waste of money and an unnecessary waste of energy to go into the question of equipping an army, a large proportion of which is not to be relied on for efficient service. Again allowing the possibility of mobilizing the Volunteers as an organized body, are they, taking them as a body, the men with whom you would confront the veterans of the German Army? This is another absurdity which ought to be banished from any calculation as regards the defence of this country. Not a word would I like to say against the Volunteers; they are doing their best, and they are doing useful work. It is a loyal, conservative, and manly institution, and long may it live and prosper! But were I a military authority, making my calculation of the force at my disposal, I should not count on any one regiment that I know of in the Volunteer force as a complete unit. I should merely count on so much mixed material having been created, which might be made use of in case of ballot for the Militia, or in case of a general conscription. So far as that goes, the Volunteer movement and its system of training are excellent in their way. When Colonel Harrison says: "Let us consider what the Volunteer can do for himself," I say that he is willing to do more than he is allowed to do. He is very ready to shoot; there are hundreds of Volunteers who have been ready to shoot all through last summer, when the Wormwood Scrubs ranges were closed. They are very ready to drill. There is no proper place in London for them to drill in. Colonel Harrison talks about the Government supplying Volunteers with open ground to drill on. He may not be aware that 90 per cent. of the drilling done by the Volunteers is done under cover and by gaslight, for there are only dark hours available for Volunteers during winter. Colonel Harrison should draw a distinction between a man being paid for his services, and a man being given facilities for carrying out services that he offers gratuitously. Colonel Harrison infers that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Volunteer movement were Volunteers to accept money for accoutrements and arms. This morning, a Volunteer, one of the best shots in England, came to me, and said he would be very glad to shoot for the Queen's Prize, but he was an artisan, and he could not afford to buy a pair of regimental trousers, required by regulation. A brother Volunteer immediately lent him a pair. This shows that there are men who are willing to give services and time, but who are not able to pay for their necessities and equipment. I consider that the accoutrements should be supplied gratuitously by the Government, if not the uniform; that every facility should be given to the Volunteer to practise with his rifle, and to drill, and then you might perhaps say, "What will the Volunteer do for himself?" Until then the question is, "What will the Government do for the Volunteer?" I think the best way in which we can realize the number of Volunteers on whom we could really lay our hands in the time of war, and with whom we could confront the invader, whether French or German, would be for the Government to offer an additional capitation grant for those men who are prepared to sign a contract, binding themselves to appear when called upon to do garrison duty, and also to attain certain higher standards of efficiency in shooting and drill. Then, if that extra capitation was granted, 20 per cent. of the present number might be made thoroughly efficient, and you would be able to realize your force by grouping these reliable men in companies, equipped, and organizing separately from the rest of their corps. I think it would be an invidious thing to have two separate Volunteer forces, it would not be popular; but let there be one or two companies in the regiment, composed of men of the same regiment, who have bound themselves to turn out efficient for a certain number of years, who have passed the first class in shooting, who are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country, then we should know a great deal more than we do know now. I must apologize for the imperfect way in which I have given vent to my feelings on this question, but having had four years' experience of the Volunteers I do not think I should set my faith in the Volunteer force as it now appears on paper. I believe you might really get a dozen regiments that would turn out very well, but it would be impossible to count upon the great majority.

Colonel HOPE, R.C.: I find myself obliged to differ from almost everyone—from Colonel Harrison and everybody else—except Colonel Ridgway; and before I touch on any other point I wish to express my difference with Colonel Lonsdale

Hale in the strongest possible manner. It is perhaps hardly a case for *ex uno disce omnes*, and my experience is limited, more or less, to the men I have commanded, and I may possibly be more fortunate in those I have commanded; but all I can say is, that I command the largest corps of any kind in the whole Metropolis, namely, the City of London Artillery of 16 batteries; and that corps I unhesitatingly state is, as a matter of fact, ready and fit to take the field to-morrow. When I say "take the field," we cannot take the field because we have no guns to take the field with, but we are ready and fit to go to work if they give us guns—we are ready to man the coast batteries, and the men are thoroughly efficient gunners in every sense of the word. Many of my own commissioned Officers have had 10, 12, or 15 years' service, and they are in every respect as good as the non-commissioned officers of the Royal Artillery. There are many gentlemen present to whom I am not known, therefore I may mention that I was a year in the Crimea—a great part of the time under artillery fire, and I know what that means. I say that my men—and I think I can also speak of the 2nd and 3rd Middlesex Artillery—are ready and fit to-morrow to defend the coast with any guns that may be given to them to defend the coast with. It is true there are no guns in the country—but that is not the fault of the Volunteers, and that is not the fault of the military authorities, that is the fault of the House of Commons and of the party politicians, who are the curse of this country—who will not go to the House of Commons and tell the truth and ask for the money that the country does not grudge. Neither the country nor the House of Commons ever grudges the money if the case be fairly put before them, and it is explained to them that the money is *bonâ fide* required for the defence of the country. But the party politicians cry "Peace, peace!" where there is no peace—or at least where there are no guns. I saw the other day someone was kind enough to suggest that as the original Armstrong field pieces were now wholly useless they might be turned over to the Volunteers. I altogether protest against those guns being handed over to the Volunteers. If we ever meet any troops at all it will be, as Colonel Lonsdale Hale well put it, the finest troops in Europe, and the finest artillery in Europe, and we ought to be given the best guns that the richest country in the world can produce. At present the Volunteer Artillery are armed with Snider carbines. I think that is a mistake—"Penny wise and pound foolish." Now, Sir, with regard to the subject of dress, which was the first point in the paper; many of Colonel Harrison's suggestions for useful dress in time of war I think are exceedingly good, but I think it would be a fatal mistake to dress Volunteers in any dress that could be distinguished at a great distance from the regular Army. It would expose them to very great disadvantage. They cannot be too alike in general appearance to the regular Army. If there are good equipments, let them be given to the regular Army and not to Volunteers only. Then as to the question of funds. I formerly commanded the 1st Surrey Artillery, and I now command the City of London, and, therefore, I have a double experience, and when I had the honour of being appointed to command the 1st Surrey I sent out a circular in the form of a begging letter to the Lord-Lieutenant, and all the magistrates, and everybody we could think of or hear of. That circular produced 10*l*. When I was appointed to command the City of London I sent out a similar letter, and that, I am glad to say, produced a little more. The Merchant Taylors' Company and the Drapers' Company, I think, each gave us 10*l*. 10*s*. a year for prizes, and I think somebody else gives us 5*l*. 5*s*. That is the extent of the assistance which the largest corps in the whole Metropolis, comprising 16 batteries and 1,200 men, receives from the richest city in the world. But I do not see why private persons should be expected to contribute to the national defence, and if I seconded the amendment of Captain Price, R.N., the other day at Willis's Rooms, at a meeting where it was proposed to get up a subscription fund for the Navy, it was because I think it is the duty of party politicians to incur the odium of asking for the money which is necessary for the defence of the country. It would not take so very much for the Volunteers. Even 10*s*. a year might, perhaps, be sufficient, in addition to what we now receive; certainly 15*s*. or 20*s*. would be sufficient. We ought to have uniforms and a certain amount of equipment, greatcoat and gaiters given by the country. As regards transport, I think that might be left in abeyance, because in this country there are so many

horses and so many vehicles of one kind and another for the limited area of the country, and so many bridges and railways and appliances of civilization, that we do not require the same sort of equipment that is required by the Reserve forces in many other countries. I agree with Major Napier to a certain extent, but when he says that the 250,000 men are not available, I think he and Colonel Lonsdale Hale both forget that after all these men are *enlisted* and are *bound* to come out, at whatever inconvenience, in case of invasion. But I certainly agree with Major Napier that such a corps as an artillery or rifle corps of the Arsenal is an absurdity, because those men employed in the Arsenal certainly could not go out in case of invasion. There are several corps of the same kind that I think might be usefully suppressed, and the money now expended upon them saved to the country. Similarly—I am afraid Colonel Harrison may perhaps disagree with me there—I regard the Volunteer Engineers as a waste of money. This country has more engineers, more contractors, more gangers, more navvies, more fitters than all the rest of Europe put together, and if a railway bridge were suddenly to break down I fancy that a railway contractor would repair it more quickly than an Officer of the Royal Engineers. I really think these 10,000 military engineers in this country are a waste of money. They are taught all kinds of military engineering work—making fortifications, pontoon bridges, and all that sort of thing; but such work as this, in my judgment, would not be required in this country in case of invasion, and therefore it is a waste of money. There are plenty of Engineer Officers and Staff Officers who could direct the engineers, contractors, gangers, and navvies to whom I have alluded, in the throwing up of anything resembling a permanent fortification, and for hasty work, the infantry and artillery might be trusted to make those protections for themselves. When Colonel Harrison says the Volunteers have it in their power to provide themselves with personal equipment, I can assure him that is not so. He evidently is under the belief that a large proportion, if not the majority, of the Volunteers at the present day are composed of these well-to-do middle classes who no doubt formed a large proportion of the first Volunteers. That certainly is not so in my own corps; it is a very small proportion indeed of middle-class men who are in the ranks. The vast majority—80 or 90 per cent.—are artisans and shopmen—men whose average earnings I should think do not exceed a couple of pounds a week, and therefore it is impossible to expect them, in addition to giving up their time, also to supplement the grant which the rich country whom they serve thinks enough for its soldiers. As regards the amount of drill that Volunteers go through—speaking again of my own corps—it is not an uncommon thing for a man to put in 100 drills in the year, and when you find that that man has done so for perhaps half-a-dozen years continuously, it is impossible to doubt that that man is an efficient soldier. This year, for instance, I went to Dover with my corps, and took 646 men—a large number—some of whom were there for a week, some a day over a week, and no one less than three or four days. They carried out their garrison duties exactly as if they had belonged to the Royal Artillery. With regard to Officers I agree entirely with the statement that you can hardly have Officers too good for the auxiliary forces; but where are they to come from? We must do the best we can with the men we have got; and although certainly some of my Officers are not just what I could wish, I have others who are exceedingly good, and a certain portion have passed through the School of Gunnery. I have just tried the experiment of writing a memorandum for the information of the junior Officers, to the effect that I would not again recommend any Officer for promotion to the command of a battery who had not passed through the School of Gunnery at Woolwich, and I am delighted to say, so far from that being taken ill, it has been taken very well indeed. And when you consider that that gives a month's training to a certain extent in the theory, and still more in the practice, of artillery, I think it is impossible to doubt that a man who has passed through the School of Gunnery, and also has served some years in camps of instruction and so forth, is reasonably fitted for his duty.

Colonel HOWARD VINCENT: The hour is late, and I should therefore only like to add my assurance to Colonel Harrison's, that no further assistance towards the Volunteers can be now obtained from the public than is obtained. I think there is hardly a Volunteer Commanding Officer who has not already anticipated his

suggestion that a general statement should be made to the inhabitants of a district in which their headquarters are situated. I may mention it as a matter of fact I did so myself within a very few weeks, and in response to fifteen letters of appeal to very wealthy persons the net result was a subscription of five guineas. I am afraid that is not a very encouraging thing to lead us to expect anything more. The title of this paper, for which I am sure Volunteer Officers are much obliged to Colonel Harrison, is "What can the Volunteers of England do to render themselves fit to take the Field?" I would venture respectfully to say I think they can do exceedingly little without further assistance on the part of the Government. The Government at the present moment gives us no drill grounds, no rifle ranges, and although we have facility, as far as funds are available, afforded us, still we cannot get on as we are at present. I can but express my individual hope, and I feel sure it is shared by many Officers here, that the Government now in power may do what their predecessors did in 1878, and grant a Departmental Commission of Inquiry into the needs of the Volunteer forces.

Captain TOWN: I think what we want at the very first outset, in order to assist the Volunteer service to take the field, is not so much personal equipment, because we could go in any overcoats that the men had if it were necessary, but that we should most certainly not be fitted out with guns that are obsolete. We have carbines, as you know, that are obsolete, whilst the infantry have the Martini-Henry. Our men practise nearly three nights a week, each battery having their own Morris tubes fitted up in the drill sheds, and they do the best they can with their Snider carbines. How can they do more without the Government assisting them by giving them the very best weapon invented, and providing them with ranges for practice? There are nearly a thousand efficient in our brigade, and I will undertake that any Royal Artillery Officer having seen those men at Shoeburyness or elsewhere, will say that they are fit to go anywhere and do anything if you only give them the proper guns to do it with. I am sure the camp at Shoeburyness will be found well worth a visit by Officers of every branch of the regular Service, who have made remarks with regard to the want of discipline in the Volunteer forces. There is not a man in our brigade who could not be put on the field to-morrow if they were properly equipped, and had proper guns to go with. We will not have a paper man in the regiment. I have not a single paper man in my battery, and I do not know a single brother Officer who has a paper man in his battery. But why is this the present state of our corps? It is because we are schoolmen. We go to Woolwich and to Shoeburyness to study under the best masters and with the latest weapons for two months. We are not satisfied even with our own artillery studies and drill. We also go to the Guards for six weeks, and we go before the Board of Officers for our infantry certificate, and those who want to go into our mounted work with 40-pounders (we have no field batteries, our guns having been taken away from us on the ground that we did not understand horses, and, as one of our opponents said, the Volunteer Officers could not ride a horse two days without a sore back) must also go to the Cavalry School for their riding certificate. We must have great self-denial to put up with what we have done for the last twenty-six years in the Volunteer force, and for my own part I believe I am stronger in feeling in favour of the force now than I ever was in my life. We have gone through good report and evil report, but no man cares for the evil report if he knows that he is right himself and knows his work. But we feel this, that it is no use spending our valuable time, and we must spend a considerable amount of money, unless we are supported by the Government of the country. I blame the public. I do not blame the military authorities one bit; they have to look after their own branch of the Army. We must have certain expenses. But what I say is that our regular Army, more particularly the mounted branches, are not one-tenth of the number they ought to be considering our large possessions in all parts of the globe. I consider that the Volunteers must be trained properly, but of all things they must be armed and practised with the very best weapons in existence; they will be able alone by proper organization and equipment to defend the country without the aid of a single regular except the Staff. The Volunteers were first started about twenty-six years ago. I know one case in which a publican was elected as Officer in a regiment, because in those days an Officer might be elected by a certain number of men if he

were a jolly good fellow, and was ready to spend any amount of money, but the result was there was a great want of discipline. Now the Officers are a very different class of men; you have men who go into the work for the love of it, for their love of country, as patriots, and will study thoroughly the arts and science of war, and we have not got men with pipes in their mouths, who march about the streets wanting in discipline and dressed half military and half civilian. They have been trained for years by their Officers and sergeant instructors from the best military schools of the country, and if there is any truth in the report of the Inspectors we certainly ought to be able to go anywhere and do anything, and if we are not, then wipe us out of existence altogether. Do not have a paper man in the Service. You talk about 250,000 men; why, we ought to have millions of men. I believe every man in the United Kingdom should be prepared to defend his country, not by simply saying so, but by doing it. Any fellow can say, "I am prepared to go to-morrow to defend my country." He is simply an idiot, who would only be in the way. We want fighting men—men who will study how to fight, and the science of war. It is something like a man who says, "Oh, I have no need to learn the use of the gloves; should I be attacked I am strong, and can tackle any man." He finds his mistake out when he quarrels with and fights a man who is trained to their use, by getting a thrashing at the hands of a scientific boxer. We are simply learning to use the gloves for self-defence, and learning the science of war, and we want to be supported in that. If you do not give us the weapons to work with, what is the use of our going to the School of Gunnery, Infantry, &c., and studying with all those improved breech- and muzzle-loading guns of the newest patterns if we are not to have the guns ourselves? This last year we were served out with 20-pounders for the review and sham fight at Brighton. Now when we get before the enemy the 20-pounder is an obsolete gun, and there is no shrapnel shell manufactured for it. We concluded at once that the Government were going to give us this gun for service against the enemy; we must teach our men that there would be shrapnel shell, so we ordered them to fire as with shrapnel. We have not these guns; they were lent for the day, and returned to Woolwich. What I would say is this—never mind about greatcoats, because they can easily be obtained, but do let us be practised beforehand with field artillery, and give our men the Martini-Henry carbine. You cannot do without field artillery any more than you can do without cavalry; you cannot fight a battle without every branch of the force being properly represented, but at the present moment we are actually without cavalry and without field artillery, and when you say, as many people have said, that not only are the Volunteers inefficient, but they are also useless, and that the Yeomanry Cavalry are also useless and inefficient, it turns out after all that the reason is that their shooting irons are bad, and that they have no ranges to practise upon. The Government neglect their own Household Cavalry, for the 1st Life Guards have no ranges to shoot at. Can we therefore be surprised at the Volunteer Army being neglected? I cannot imagine how it is that the public are such fools as not to agitate on the hustings and everywhere else that a proper force should be kept up in order to defend the country, and that it should be provided with the very best weapons, and be in a state of the best possible discipline, and ready to take the field without the slightest delay.

Colonel Lord RANELAGH: It is too late to discuss any matters other than that which we have really got before us, and what I shall say will be simply half a dozen words. In the first place, I am glad to take this opportunity of thanking Colonel Harrison for his practical suggestions. In these lectures we generally hear a great many complaints, but very seldom any remedy. Colonel Harrison has put before us his practical ideas of the equipment of a soldier, and I agree with him in most of them. We have already heard an allusion to the top-hat: I think that is a mistake; the Glengarry cap is a soft cap and very much more comfortable to sleep in. The only thing I was going to say is this: I am constantly hearing of the painful state in which we are with regard to the organization of the Army. Twenty-two or twenty-three years ago I wrote a letter stating that the Volunteer force was a sham. That letter was taken most ungenerously, and I was abused in every direction. What I said was fact, and I say it again now. The Volunteer force is as fine a force as any body in Europe,—there is not a finer body of men nor

men more amenable to control, but that is all you have got. You have no organization. I say it is a disgrace to this country that we have not got into a state of organization, so that we can put our hand upon these 250,000 men and march them I won't say in twenty-four hours, but in a very short time, to any part of this country. I will now offer a practical suggestion, which perhaps some gentlemen will think of some day. We have on the diagram before us a statement that there are 50,000 agricultural horses in England, and altogether 70,000 horses that might be available at any moment. All that is necessary is that they should be organized, and I know of no man more fitted to undertake that task than my friend in the chair. I can see no difficulty in making your Lords-Lieutenant of counties a kind of district basis for this purpose. There you might have everything prepared for the central Staff. Every county should have at the office of the Lord-Lieutenant an account of the horses and men there, and in that way you might, in course of time, be enabled to get an estimate of your forces, and hope to mass your men together.

Admiral BORS: Although I am an Admiral in the Navy, I think I may claim the privilege of offering a few remarks, as I am probably the oldest Volunteer Officer in this room. I was one of those who gave their time and energies to the organization of the Volunteer force in the year 1860. In those days, we gave our services, and we gave our money, we had to pay for everything. It was owing to the Report of the Royal Commission that sat in 1862 that the present capitation grant was given by the Government. I do not quite agree with what Colonel Lonsdale Hale has said that at the commencement of the movement we gave our services as servants to our master, and that as we got more valuable we demanded more and more wages. The fact was simply this, I may instance the corps to which I belonged as a representative one. It was a small country one, fairly drilled and disciplined. We paid for everything ourselves by raising all the subscriptions from the neighbourhood that we could, and we went on very well for two or three years, but then the money dropped off, and we positively could not get on without more assistance. Had it not been for this capitation grant, the efficient battery of artillery Volunteers to which I refer, and which I believe exists now, would have died out altogether. I cannot myself agree that the Volunteers can get on without an increased capitation grant. Many hundreds and thousands give their time, and they have not got money to give. I do not understand the argument of the Officer who said that many Volunteers if they were called out would give notice of leaving their corps, because they had certain business occupations. In my day I know there was an Act of Parliament by which, when the Volunteer was called out, there was no seven or fourteen days' notice, he simply must go, or he would be a deserter.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is the case now.

Admiral BORS: I do not think under any circumstances the Volunteers would give notice when called out for service; their comrades would despise them if they did so. I have only one more remark to make, and that is with reference to raising subscriptions for the defence of our ports by purchasing torpedo-boats. I heard part of the debate to which reference has been made by Colonel Hope; he seconded an amendment, and I held up my hand in its favour. I believe it would be an absurdity to ask the country to subscribe to purchase torpedo-boats for the defence of our home ports. In the first place, the torpedo-boat is not the best defence for a mercantile port; and in the next place, I believe, in no case should the public be called upon to subscribe for the material for this purpose. I quite believe that if the wants of the Services, the Army, Navy, and Volunteers, are properly put before the House of Commons, and before the public, they will authorize the Government to expend any amount of money to provide the necessary defences of the country. I perfectly agree in raising public subscription to add to the efficiency of the Volunteers in personal equipment and other necessary expenses, but I am strongly of opinion they require a great deal more assistance from the Government than they get at present.

Lieutenant-Colonel ROUTLEDGE: I am sure every one here must have listened to the lecture with very great pleasure; as far as I am able to judge the equipment shown to us is the very best and most easily carried that I have ever seen, and the suggestion that the kit bags should be carried in carts is a very good one. I take this opportunity of protesting very strongly about the way in which the Volun-

teers have been spoken of by one or two Officers. I don't doubt that Colonel Lonsdale Hale and Major Napier were simply saying what they thought, but at the same time I think they very greatly under-estimated the value of the Volunteers. We know that we have 250,000 Volunteers on paper. Out of these 250,000 probably something like 210,000 have been seen by inspecting Officers, and the inspecting Officers' reports in most cases are that they are an efficient body of men. Major Napier says we should get no men out at all if we wanted them; now I have it on the best authority from an Officer of the highest rank, who feels sure that if the War Office were to call on Volunteers to volunteer for active service anywhere, it would get at least 30,000 men, at a very few days' notice. As to their not coming out in case of invasion, they would have to come, the Volunteer Act provides for that, and as one speaker very properly said those Volunteers who did not come forward when called upon would be scouted by their comrades and friends. There is one more question: Colonel Harrison says that the Volunteers ought to equip themselves at their own expense. This demand is not reasonable; we have done as much as we possibly can do, we have learned drill, discipline, and the use of our arms, but I am sure without the assistance of the Government we could not go beyond that. The well-to-do Volunteer, the man who is able to put his hands in his pocket and draw out his money and pay for everything himself, does not exist except in two or three battalions, and no subscriptions can now be got from the public. That source is exhausted. I believe some of the City Companies give handsome donations every year to some of the City regiments, but I do not think that they are disposed to go any further than that. We have done what we are able to do, and we are willing to do a little more if called upon to do so. The Volunteers go in large numbers with corps at Aldershot, Shoeburyness, Woolwich, and elsewhere. I am strongly in favour of their going to those camps rather than going to regimental camps, I think much more is learned from them, especially as regards discipline; it really comes to this, if we are worth having we must be further supported by the Government. Colonel Hale said that if you are prepared to spend 19s. 11½d. on an article you would not grudge an extra farthing if necessary to secure it. If we are to go on improving, are to be made more fit to take the field than we are now, we must go to the authorities and ask them to give us the extra money that we require. Let them satisfy themselves that it is spent properly, but anything more to be done must be done by Government. We will give more time, we cannot give more money. If the Secretary of State for War chooses to ask the House of Commons for an additional grant for the Volunteers to render them effective, and can make good his case, I am quite certain no House of Commons will refuse that grant. We are all deeply indebted to Colonel Harrison for the very interesting and instructive lecture he has read to us.

Captain MENDS: As an Adjutant of four years' standing in the Volunteers I think, perhaps, I might be permitted to say a word on this subject. It seems to me that the discussion has tended greatly to matters of detail; after all the principal object of a soldier is that when he gets into the field he should be able to use his arms. My experience of Volunteers quite agrees with that of Colonel Hale and Major Napier, that they are at present absolutely unfit in that respect. They may appear very well at inspection, they may march past fairly well and perform two or three battalion manœuvres indifferently, but the shooting is not considered in the inspection. The corps of which I am Adjutant has the reputation of being one of the best shooting corps certainly in the Metropolis if not in the country, but our figure of merit last year was considerably below the third class shots. We are a very strong corps, and I am really ashamed to say what the figure was, but it would have been disgraceful in any regiment of the line. It is all very well providing greatcoats and water-bottles and all that, but those are things that can be provided at very short notice. You cannot teach men to shoot under two or three months. It is not only shooting at a target, it is shooting at a small and practically invisible object. We all know that in sporting you cannot learn to shoot at a bird at a short distance, that you can see plainly without a considerable expenditure of ammunition and time: much less can a man be taught to shoot in the field without training. More money is wanted for the Volunteers, but their first and main duty would be to expend it in teaching the men to shoot. But to teach shooting requires time. You want more than an Adjutant and two or three sergeant instructors for a large

number of men, and you must compensate the men themselves for their loss of wages. There are a few men in every regiment who give up an enormous amount of time to shooting, but they are mostly commercial travellers or men whose time is pretty much at their own disposal; the great majority of men who have fixed hours, clerks, artisans, and others, cannot go down to the range. I have tried the experiment of shooting through every one of my recruits myself, but I found that though I could fix my own time to go to Harrow the men often disappointed me, they could not come, not that they would not, but they really could not get away, and then when they found they could make a rush off some evening they went when I was not there. Therefore I think instead of all the detail, the equipment, and perhaps the headquarters of which a great deal is thought, that if more thought was given to ranges and giving money to compensate men for the time they lose by going to the ranges, and to getting additional instruction for the men when they do go to the range, it would add very much more to the efficiency of the force. Men may be perfectly equipped, you may have magnificent headquarters, and the men may be fairly drilled, and yet when they are sent into the field if we find that they cannot shoot they are worse than an incumbrance.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is now time that we brought this discussion to a close. You will all agree with me that Colonel Harrison has read a very valuable paper; he has evidently given very great attention to the subject, and is a master of it. I therefore hope that when the time comes for completing the equipment of the Volunteers—and the sooner it comes the better—his views will not be lost sight of. Colonel Harrison in his paper made a remark well worthy of attention: he said that, without calling for a single penny from taxpayers' pockets, it is possible to add very considerably to the efficiency of the Volunteer forces. Of course, that must be done by improvement in organization, and the remark extends, in my opinion, to the other military forces of the Crown, as well as to the Volunteers. When, however, we come to equipment the case is different; then we must have an increased expenditure, and I am in justice bound to say that Colonel Harrison has not shirked that subject. It is one of great difficulty, because when you increase the equipment of the Volunteers the question arises at once who is to pay? Colonel Harrison, as I understand him, would have each corps in its own locality canvass the public for an increase of funds. Now those of us who have been connected with the Volunteer force know that that expedient has been many times tried, and generally found wanting. It is true that Colonel Harrison adds that there should be a Central Association, which would aid the separate corps in raising the funds that may be required; but, for my part, I do not see how a Central Association could give any assistance to individual corps in such a measure unless by providing funds itself, and I do not suppose that it could undertake that. It has been remarked in the paper that in the early days of the movement it was an idea very prevalent that the Volunteer should not only give gratuitous services to the country, but should also provide himself with what would be necessary for carrying on his duties properly as a soldier. If I may use such an expression, that was in the heroic period of the movement. Since then more prosaic views have come into the ascendant. It is now, I think, the ruling idea that if a man gratuitously gives his services to the country in time of peace to learn his duty as a soldier with the contingent privilege that in time of war his life may be taken in the defence of his country, he is entitled to call upon the Government to provide him with whatsoever may be necessary in the shape of personal equipment for carrying on his duty as a soldier properly. I think that this states in a few words exactly what the position is, and I must say I give my adherence without hesitation to that view. The Government of the country has now a Volunteer force of 250,000 men, and notwithstanding the pessimistic views which have been expressed this afternoon as to the state of that force, I am quite prepared to say (and I know a little of the force) that for the defence of this country it is of great value. When we say that the British Empire extends over territory on which the sun never sets, we by no means use a figure of speech, we give expression to a simple geographical fact, of the truth of which any man can convince himself by taking a terrestrial globe. Let him turn it round as he pleases, and his eye will never lose sight of British Possessions. Now when we come to provide a force to defend those vast Possessions, I think we fall very far short of the mark, and the consequence is that our regular Army is always

working at high pressure, carrying on hostilities in distant lands with a mere peace establishment. That is very hard upon our soldiers, and in many cases it leads to disastrous results; but would not the case be infinitely worse if the country had not a Volunteer force to fall back upon for the defence of its own shores? I think it would: therefore the Government is bound to provide everything that is necessary to make the Volunteers efficient. The principle of Government aid was conceded when the Legislature authorized the War Office to give a capitation allowance to the Volunteers, and now the question is merely what the amount of the grant should be. I say, in the name of common sense, that if the capitation grant is given at all, make it adequate to the purposes for which it is intended. So much for the question of equipment. Then with regard to the other point which Colonel Harrison takes up—and that in a very able manner—namely, instruction in military duties, I quite agree with him, that it would be a good thing if a manual were drawn up for the instruction of the Volunteers. He has given an outline of what such a manual should contain, and I have only one suggestion to add, which is this, that Colonel Harrison should himself undertake the duty of compiling that manual, for I am quite sure it could not be confided to better hands. Time will not permit me to follow all the criticisms that have been offered upon the paper, and also upon subjects somewhat irrelevant to it, but there is one exception I must make, and that is as to what has fallen from my friend Colonel Lonsdale Hale. Whatever he writes, or speaks, I know, from a long acquaintance with him, deserves the most serious attention, but I think he has rather unduly underrated the value of the Volunteers. Probably if he knew more of them he would entertain a higher opinion of them. But he has made a suggestion which to my mind is well worthy of consideration, whether it would not be possible to make what I may call some elegant extracts from the Volunteer force in the shape of men who have more time than their comrades to devote to military instruction, and to going into camps for a certain time every year. I am quite certain that men who would undertake such work as that would soon become very valuable soldiers, and would be fit for their duties earlier than the rest of the Volunteer force. I will not detain you longer. I take for granted that you will unanimously commission me, as your Chairman, to offer our best thanks to Colonel Harrison for giving us the benefit of his studies on a subject both important and interesting.

Colonel HARRISON, in reply, said: I must thank you, Sir, very much, and also those gentlemen who have spoken, for the way in which they have received the few remarks that I have offered to-day. I have only two or three points in the discussion to allude to. When I incidentally referred to a "hat," I carefully abstained from indicating what pattern that hat should be. But I may say that such a hat as I recommended, besides being exceedingly handsome, was used by hundreds of thousands of practical soldiers in the American War. With reference to "doing away with the *Volunteer Engineers*," I cannot allow that assertion to pass without a remark. I had thought that in these days of submarine mining, telegraphs, railways, and the various scientific appliances used in modern war, engineers were coming even more to the front than they had done in the past. At all events, the history of the railway from Suakin to Berber ought to dispose of any such assertion as the one I allude to; for, if the reports be true, the contractors' men failed in making that railway, and could not get on at all without the *Military Engineers*. With reference to the question of "money," I must remind the meeting that I said that if the money could not be got from the country, as was done in former years, it must be got from the Government. But what I advocated was getting it in the shape of a grant, and not of equipment, because I am sure that the Volunteers, if left to themselves, will provide themselves with a really good and useful equipment, more suited to their needs than one that might be supplied by the Government. Just one thing more and I have done. From Colonel Davis's remarks I gather that what I said about drill was misunderstood. When I said that certain drills were not required for the Volunteers, I did not mean that they did not want drill, I meant that the *description* of drill should be most carefully considered; and that they should not be taught one iota more than was absolutely necessary. For instance, I do not see the good of their spending hours and hours on such drill as "goose-step" and "extension motions." With these few remarks I beg to thank one and all for the kind attention given to my paper.