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Author(s): H. W. C. Davis

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Norwich as a centre of population and trade really goes back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Lastly, did Pitt (p. 214) "later express his regret that he had opposed the (Excise) scheme"? Pitt certainly recanted handsomely with reference to his opposition to the war of 1739 and Walpole's commercial policy towards Spain and the West Indies—a very different affair. But Pitt did not enter the House of Commons until 1735, when the Excise scheme was dead and buried. In 1733 he was simply an insignificant "cornet of horse"; so far as I know no utterance of his on the burning question of the hour in 1733 exists; his patron, Cobham, lost his regiment by his opposition, and had Pitt spoken publicly the young officer would certainly have been punished by the deprivation of his commission, as happened later. Historical students would be glad to have Mr. Brisco's authority for the statement in the text.

C. GRANT ROBERTSON

*The Early Federation Movement of Australia.* By C. D. Allin. (British Whig Publishing Co., Kingston, Ontario, 1907.)

MR. ALLIN takes up his tale in 1839; he ends about 1863. It is thus a short period with which he deals. But within his chosen limits he traces exhaustively the history of the federal movement. He quotes much from authorities; and his extracts from Australasian papers are especially welcome for the light which they throw upon different phases of public opinion in the several Colonies. He gives a vivid impression of the conflicting cross-currents among which the first schemes of federation were launched; and although he avoids an artificial simplification of his highly complex subject, he suggests some valuable generalisations as to the objects of the early federalists and the reasons of their failure.

The federalists were a small party in this period. It is true that the smallness of their numbers was partly counterbalanced by the eminence of some of their leaders. Mr. Deas Thompson and Mr. Wentworth stood in the first rank of Australian statesmen; Earl Grey, slight as was the enthusiasm which his schemes elicited, extorted admiration by his grasp of the main problems which vexed Colonial ministries and legislatures. Unfortunately, however, the party was lacking in compactness. It included at least three sections, whose differences were bound to become serious as soon as federalism came within the range of practical politics. The noisiest, though probably the smallest, section injured the federal cause both in Great Britain and in Australasia

by proclaiming that they desired federation as a half-way house to secession and republicanism. Another group, equally political but less aggressively nationalist, was inspired by Liberal ideas : its members hoped, in the 'forties, to use federation as a means of obtaining representative government for every part of Australasia ; and after 1850 their interest in the federal idea declined. They had now obtained much of what they desired ; the rest they saw their way to obtain by amending the constitutions of their respective Colonies. The most important and far-seeing group of federalists was that which viewed the subject from an economic point of view. They thought it imperative for the future of the Colonies that intercolonial trade, the railways, and the postal service should be regulated by a central authority. But even within this group there was division. All desired a uniform tariff policy towards the outer world ; but while some also wished for intercolonial free trade, others were only inclined to put such constraint on the fiscal policy of single Colonies as would prevent an intercolonial tariff war.

It was the economists who first gave the movement a definite form, and their influence was paramount in the proposals of Earl Grey. He attached importance to the introduction of representative government ; but he was not inclined to stop there. The danger of a tariff war was constantly before his eyes, and he saw no other possible safeguard than a federal authority. The problem of defence, afterwards more prominent, gave as little anxiety to him as to his Colonial supporters ; in those days the Pacific was not yet a battle-ground for great Powers. Like the United States in the first period of their career, the Australasian Colonists were then free to think exclusively of developing their domestic resources. Their misfortune was that, in this happy situation, provincialism and individualism were free to assert themselves. The feeling of nationality had still to be created in the mass of the electorate. The fears of each Colony for its budget, of each trader for his next year's balance-sheet, could only be met by appeals to economic theories which neither the statesmen nor the commercial classes had assimilated. From time to time the merchants saw what they stood to gain by federation ; but these glimpses of truth were liable to be obscured at any moment by appeals to their immediate interests or their local patriotism.

Federal schemes began to take shape in 1846. Governor Fitzroy has the credit of making the earliest overtures to the home authorities ; but Mr. Allin shows good reason for thinking that Fitzroy, on this occasion, merely acted as the spokesman of Mr.

Deas Thompson, his constitutional adviser. The plan which they proposed was that which Grey ultimately put into effect. But he only adopted it as a counsel of despair, and the event showed that his want of confidence in its efficacy was justified. Fitzroy merely suggested the appointment of a Governor-General who, partly by giving good advice and partly by a firm use of the veto, should bring the Colonies to a working agreement on the tariff question. Grey disliked the remedy. He preferred to rely on a federal congress or assembly which should have the power to legislate on Customs duties and some other matters. This was what his Select Committee proposed in 1849, and this was the most important innovation in his Bills of that and the following years. The fate of both measures was a proof that he had overestimated the strength of the movement in the Colonies. No doubt the first Bill was unnecessarily handicapped by a provision for the enactment of the first federal tariff by Imperial authority. But the second Bill, which was free from this objection, received more praise in England than in Australasia. As Mr. Allin shows, the consideration which induced the Government to withdraw the federation scheme of 1850 was the neutral or unfavourable attitude of the Colonists whom it was proposed to gratify.

All that survived from the wreck of 1850 was the original suggestion of Thompson and Fitzroy. In 1851 the office of Governor-General was created by the Crown; and Fitzroy, the first holder of the office, was particularly instructed to use his constitutional powers in such a way as to preserve free trade between Victoria and the parent Colony of New South Wales. But the experiment failed. The Governor-General dared not exercise his powers; and instead of bringing economic peace to Australasia he became a bone of political contention. The other Colonies were jealous of the prestige which the possession of the Governor-General gave to New South Wales. When Victoria leaped into importance through the gold-rush, her politicians claimed that the Governor-General ought to have his residence in her capital. An attempt to soothe Victoria by cutting down the powers of the Governor-General proved ineffectual. The office was allowed, after ten years of trial, to fall into abeyance. So perished the one visible symbol of Australasian unity. Ideas of federation were still in the air; and they are carefully analysed by Mr. Allin in his concluding chapter. But they made no progress in popular esteem. Mr. Allin attaches some weight to a personal cause in explaining the standstill. In 1858 Deas Thompson threw up his share in the agitation, and the party was left without a head. But the

federalists were by this time already beaten ; otherwise Thompson would not have withdrawn. The real reason of failure was the absence of any argument for federalism which, beside being cogent, was perfectly intelligible to the multitude. And the lesson of the failure seems to be that economic interests, however potent they may prove in cementing a union already established, are a poor substitute for fear or national sentiment in the period of formation.

H. W. C. DAVIS

*The New Australian Tariff.* (The Tariff Commission, London, 1907.)

THE general conclusion of the Tariff Commission regarding the effect which the new Australian tariff may be expected to have upon British trade is that "it is not likely to diminish, and may, on the whole, increase the total volumes" of British exports (p. 1).

This conclusion is merely stated, and is not supported by verbal argument. Numerous tables only, with short comments and explanations, are given, showing the imports into Australia for successive years of the principal classes of goods, British and foreign, separated, and the new and old rates of duties on British and foreign goods respectively. For 1905 and 1906 figures are given both in the old way and as corrected for country of consignment.

The only numerical estimate of the effect of the new duties is the statement (p. 8) that "Australian Treasury officials estimate the advantage given under the new tariff to British trade in competition with other trade at between £1,200,000 and £1,300,000, on the basis of the 1906 imports. Allowance being made for the expected increase of United Kingdom trade, these officials estimate that the benefit will rise to at least £1,500,000."<sup>1</sup>

Presumably the "advantage" means the value of trade transferred to British exporters. To the extent of a million and a half there will be imported from the United Kingdom goods which would have been imported to the amount of £1,200,000 from foreign sources if British goods had been given no preference in the new tariff.

In the opinion of the Commission, apparently, this gain will be just about offset by the effect of the general increase of the rates of duties. The report, however, does not state whether the

<sup>1</sup> Reuter's message from Melbourne, *Times*, August 9, 1907.