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100. Bugbear Gods.

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in such a manner that, while it is carefully preserved from decay by an exterior covering of wood and iron, its interior presents as much as possible the original character which its designers intended. The only marked innovation has been the elevation of the carved walls on a plinth two feet above the original level, so that the eye of the visitor, when standing up, may be at the same elevation as if he were sitting on the floor of the house in its original state, according to the usual native custom. For the purpose of lighting the interior the reeding which originally filled the spaces between the pillars at one end of the house has been removed and replaced by stained glass.* The total interior length of this house is 43 ft. 8 ins. and the width 18 ft. ; the original height of the walls was 4 ft. 8 ins. and the apex of the roof 12 ft. above the floor, but now 7 ft. and 14 ft. 6 ins. respectively.

The side walls contain 32 figures elaborately carved in solid Totara wood, 4 ft. 6 ins. high, 2 ft. wide, and 6 ins. in thickness. The end walls, of 20 pieces of carving, are of a different character and size according to their position, the central carvings, 12 ft. in height, supporting the ridge pole at each end, being the most elaborate in the building. The ridge pole is a huge triangular beam of wood in two pieces, with one end projecting six feet beyond the building and over what originally formed the porch. Besides the supports at each end there were originally two posts supporting this beam in the interior of the house, and from each side panel a plank, with a carving at the lower end, reaches to the ridge. The interspaces were originally filled in with the Kakaho or toe-toe grass, and this has been supplied by an imitation in wood of the fluted surface as being more durable and cheaper of construction than the original material. The position and form of the original window and door have been preserved, and the entrance to the building from the museum has been effected by swinging one of the panels in the side on hinges.

In this house occurs a peculiar form of figure which has not, I believe, been published elsewhere. When going over the house with Sir James Hector in 1897 he drew particular attention to this. I have figured two of these from a photograph kindly taken expressly for me by Mr. Percy Smith. It will be noticed that these ancestors are depicted as passing their hand through the back of their heads and out of their mouths. This is a feat which no ordinary man could accomplish, and it was Sir James Hector's opinion that consequently these particular ancestors were *tohungas* or priests, and that the carvers had adopted this plan of distinguishing them from the rest.

J. EDGE-PARTINGTON.

Religion.

Lang.

Bugbear Gods. *By Andrew Lang, M.A.*

In Mr. N. W. Thomas's review of my *Magic and Religion* (1901) in **100** MAN, 1902. 90, he says that I have "dragged in Baiame and other 'high gods' of Australia to enforce my point." My point, or one of my points, was that Baiame and Co., and the evidence as to them, could not be *ignored* in a discussion about Australian religion. That is why I "dragged them in," just as I would "drag in" the Deity if a writer on Catholic religion ignored Him. Moreover, I shall continue to "drag in" such evidence as to "high gods," or anything else, as writers whom I am criticising may be ignorant of, or, knowing, may ignore.

Next, as far as Messrs. Spencer and Gillen tell us, Twanyirika, the "great spirit" (so styled by them) of the Arunta, is regarded by the adult males of the tribe as a bugbear to frighten the women and children—a thing on a level with our old friend Mumbo Jumbo. The women are told that the sound of the bull-roarer is his voice, and

* This is of a dull yellow colour, so as, as nearly as possible, to give to the interior its original appearance.—J. E.-P.

that he carries off the young initiates. We are told no more about Twanyirika. Mr. Thomas suggests that, as to my other Australian superior beings (Baiaime and the rest), "it is at most a mere hypothesis that they were in the beginning any more than bugbears," and he observes that I—in *Magic and Religion*—"do not even consider the possibility that the high gods are, or were, mere bugbears." Now, elsewhere, and earlier, I *did* "consider the possibility" (*Fortnightly Review*, June, 1899, pp. 1017, 1018).

As I do not believe, any more than Dr. Durkheim does, that the Arunta are "primitive," or represent "man in the chrysalis stage," and as they have a special and very neat metaphysic, which leaves no room for a maker, like Baiaime and Co., I rejected in my own mind the notion that Twanyirika is the pristine form of Baiaime, and in *Magic and Religion* I did not discuss the question. I regret the omission, and bow to the rebuke of Mr. Thomas. But how does this invalidate my argument, that believers in Baiaime have in their creed an unselfish element? They *have*, if we believe Mr. Howitt, Mr. Ridley, Mrs. Langlon Parker, and others. I do not in the least hold that Baiaime was originally a bugbear, and that Twanyirika represents the pristine form of Baiaime. But it is a theory worth discussing, when we know more about Twanyirika. As to my theory of totems, Mr. Thomas, I hope, will presently have an opportunity of criticising it, as set forth in a new work. A. LANG.

REVIEWS.

Psychology.

Hobhouse.

Mind in Evolution. By L. T. Hobhouse. London: Macmillan & Co., 1901. 101
23 × 15, pp. vii-406. 10s. net.

Mr. Hobhouse has already—in his *Theory of Knowledge*—thrown much light on what may be called the "inner" side of mind; in the present work he takes it up from the other standpoint, its "outer" side, what it does in the world, how it shows its presence, how it grows in the individual, the species, the race, and what is the perfection or end towards which it is tending. The work is a valuable contribution to comparative psychology, giving us in the place of the scattered pamphlets and detached writings on mind in this or that species of animal, or in animals as a whole, in this or that race of savages, or in the uncivilised world as a whole, a consistent view of the evolution of mental life from its first conditions (pre- or sub-conscious), in reflex action, to its highest expression in the philosopher's ideal of human progress. The detailed working out of this plan could not well be brought within the limits of a single volume. What is done in the present one is to sketch the main lines of the evolution, and to fill in the picture so far as lower animal "intelligence" is concerned, and the transition from that to human thought. Order, system, harmony, these are invariably the products of mind, and by them its presence is known. It brings things together "so that they have a bearing upon one another," organises action, adjusts it to certain ends, on the basis of relations which in past experience it has discovered or established. So, the growth or evolution of mind proceeds always towards greater comprehensiveness in the relations observed, fuller consciousness of the ends pursued, greater concentration of forces, and, therefore, increased definiteness in the actions by which the ends are attained.

The earlier chapters treat in an interesting way of the *conditions* of mind—"Organic adaptability," "Reflex-action," and "Instinct." Mr. Hobhouse refuses to regard the behaviour of organisms as purely mechanical; they differ from all possible automata by their self-maintenance; so the reflex-action, the congenital response of a part of the organism to a definite stimulus, is not independent of the state of the organism as a whole; and "Instinct" is a term applied to various forms of behaviour, from the compound reflex to more plastic modes of adjusted action, in which pure instinct is