

beginning, must have been a social being; otherwise, articulate speech would never have been formed.

WASHINGTON.

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Philosophy of Mind: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology. G. T.

LADD. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. XIV

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It is a little more than a year since Professor Ladd ended the preface to his *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, with a promise to deal in a later work with the philosophical problems which empirical psychology suggests. This promise is fulfilled in the volume before us. The field covered does not include all the questions to which psychology gives rise—it would need a system rather than an 'essay' for that—but the author selects for treatment a number of topics which are intimately connected with current discussions, and which possess an abiding interest. The standpoint from which these are considered is that of the 'empirical science of mental phenomena.' As Professor Ladd says (p. 82):

"Indeed, this essay in the philosophy of mind is deliberately based upon previous long-continued researches into the facts and laws of a scientific psychology. * * * And it is the author's controlling wish that the validity of the following speculative conclusions should constantly be brought face to face with the conclusions of the empirical science of mind."

Here, whether it agrees with Professor Ladd's views or not, the psychological world will be a unit in according him the praise which is due the patient endeavor to base metaphysics on the only secure foundation. No one among us has more earnestly studied or more carefully sifted the data and the outcome of scientific psychology than Professor Ladd; no one, therefore, is better entitled to claim for his results the consideration which of right belongs to thinking of such a character.

Further, as psychologists are already acquainted with the author's empirical conclusions, so they will find his metaphysics familiar almost at a glance. In general it is distinctly Lotzean in tone; while Professor Ladd's special opinions have been foreshadowed in his earlier works, including his *Introduction to Philosophy*. Both these points are evident from the metaphysical preludes with which many of the chapters of the present work begin, as well as in the conclusions reached. For instance, reality is thus defined (p. 120):

"Every real being is known as a self-active subject of states, standing in manifold relations to other beings, and maintaining its right

to be called real by acting and being acted upon,—only, however, in obedience to certain laws (or uniform modes of its behavior as such a being and no other)."

Again, concerning the consciousness of identity, it is argued (p. 151):

"Every x (every 'Thing' whatsoever), in order to be entitled still to be called x (or the 'self-same' thing) must in its changes run only through series such as can be indicated by $x, x^1, x^2, x^3, x^4 \dots x^n$; or on occasion of its coming into other relations with different beings, the series may be that indicated by $x, x^a, x^b, x^c, x^d \dots x^m$."

And it is concluded:

"The real identity of any thing consists in this, that its self-activity manifests itself, in all its different relations to other things, as conforming to an immanent idea." Similarly unity in anything whatever is held to imply 'the presence of some ideal in the very being of the thing' (p. 191), and self-consciousness, in its unitary development, to yield the best, if not the only conception of what a unit-being is; permanency in things and minds alike is deemed a matter of inferred rather than of direct knowledge, and the permanent being of mind is believed interrupted when consciousness lapses, except for the modicum of existence which consists in 'a certain abiding relation to all reality' or 'the world-ground' (p. 392).

The interest of psychologists, therefore, will centre about the way in which these two familiar elements of Professor Ladd's thinking are combined and the results to which his inquiry leads him. The book opens with two chapters on 'Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.' The chief thesis here is the impossibility of divorcing psychology and philosophy altogether. This will be admitted by all—as to the latter end; for that psychology issues in the problems which philosophy discusses, is not susceptible of doubt. That psychology as a science actually does, and of necessity must, include metaphysical assumptions in its course, should be equally clear; although, no doubt, many will question the truth of the proposition. It is an easy task for Professor Ladd to show that the natural science, on the level of which our 'new psychology' delights to stand, is itself 'shot through' with metaphysical elements; and just as easy, though the work is rather more novel, to prove by examples—Höfding, James, and Flournoy are cited—that the professed rejectors of metaphysics are among the chief offenders against their own first principle. The nerve of the argument appears, however, in the conclusion that the only legitimate choice left for the

psychologist is between the uncritical dualism of common life and the adoption of 'some definitive metaphysical point of view' (p. 42) of his own selection, as has been done by Volkmann and Wundt. This may be the alternative in the present transitional condition of psychology. But surely history points toward a better ideal for the future, namely, the critical—though not always reflectively critical—determination and adoption by all of such principles as will best subserve the progress and the exactness of the science. It was in this way that the rising sciences of the modern era threw off the trammels which formed their heritage from Aristotle and the mediævalists; thus physics, to take a more special example, has in our own time been criticising some of its fundamental concepts, although to students of philosophy its advance may seem painfully hesitating and slow. So also psychology is still in the throes of its new birth. And when the happy time shall come for us to be fitted out with even as good a set of *working principles* as that which the physical sciences of the day enjoy, we shall be secure from the vagaries of the 'psychologies without a soul' on the one hand, and the necessity of constant re-discussion of our primary assumptions on the other. But on any view of the case, it must be regretted that Professor Ladd's polemic manner lags behind the material force of his arguments. The use of horrible examples is always a dangerous expedient in a technical treatise; and the psychological world will unite in deploring the characterization of Höffding's introduction of metaphysics into his psychology as a 'covert effort' (p. 22) and James's positivistic attitude as the 'position of materialism' (pp. 28, 39).

Chapters III–VI constitute the kernel of the volume. The chief positive outcome of the first of them, on 'The Concept of Mind,' is the emphasis laid on the element of self-activity in all self-consciousness. Chapter V, on the 'Consciousness of Identity and So-called Double Consciousness,' is the paper presented by the author at the last meeting of the Psychological Association; together with Chapter VI, on 'The Unity of Mind,' it advocates identity and unity as real predicates of the self, on the basis of the unity of the life of consciousness and in the sense of the definitions above cited. Chapter IV deals with a question central to the whole discussion, 'The Reality of Mind.' Noëttically, it is argued here, 'knowledge implicates reality,' and, metaphysically, all the marks of reality belong to the mind, known as a 'here-and-now-being' in self-consciousness and as a 'then-and-there-being' in memory, and inferred to be a permanent existence by reflective thought working on the data of

experience. Hence, also, it is concluded as a corollary, "The peculiar, the only intelligible and indubitable reality which belongs to Mind is its being for itself, by actual functioning of self-consciousness, of cognitive memory, and of thought" (p. 147). Yet it is with a sense of disappointment that the reader ends the chapter. The difficulty is partly one of method. In putting his most important thesis so early in his work the author has lost the advantage of the several arguments, positive and negative, which later on might have been combined into a proof of cumulative force. It is partly a difficulty with Professor Ladd's theory of knowledge, at least in so far as he has yet announced it. After diligent study of his various works, the present writer inclines to the belief that his first principle, 'knowledge implicates reality,' knowledge and reality are correlates, etc., might '*in some sort*' be acceptable to many of those not agnostics or phenomenists. But when this is used as a kind of universal major, with little or no systematic determination of subordinate criteria, especially when the psychology and the noëtics of self-consciousness are so intermingled that it is often impossible to decide on the basis of which of the two the argument is proceeding; the effect is not only confusion concerning the meaning of Professor Ladd's reasonings, but doubt in regard to their validity. But the difficulty arises partly, also, from an underestimation of the strength of opposing theories. The same failure to realize the importance of the reinforcements which have come to the cerebralists and materialists from the newer researches that marked Part III of the *Physiological Psychology*, reappears in the present treatise. And this, though the psychological world owes a debt of gratitude to Professor Ladd for the earnest defence of the reality and spirituality of mind which he has given alike in the earlier and in the later work.

Chapters VII-VIII, on 'Mind and Body,' are for the most part an elaboration of chapters XI, XXI and XXII of *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*. But chapters IX, 'Materialism and Spiritualism,' and X, 'Monism and Dualism,' are among the most successful in the book. In the former vigorous blows are dealt the materialistic theory, without yielding to the claims of spiritualism in the monistic sense of the term. In the latter a still more forcible assault is made on both the scientific basis and the metaphysical deductions of the current psychological Spinozism. In Professor Ladd's own words (p. 344):

"In brief, then, the alleged scientific principle of psycho-physical parallelism is far from being the self-evident conclusion of modern psycho-physical research which it is so often and so rashly assumed

to be. Even the simplest relations between the phenomena of the lowest order of consciousness and the concomitant cerebral activities are far too fluctuating, complicated and changeable to be subsumed under this principle. Of parallelism in space we cannot speak appropriately in this connection. Of parallelism in time there is only an incomplete and broken analogy. And when one tries to think out clearly the conception of a complete qualitative parallelism, one finds the principle soon ending in inadequacy, and finally becoming unintelligible or absurd * * *."

Nor if the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, in the fullest meaning of the phrase, were proven, would monism necessarily follow. Rather the clearest inference would be to a moderate dualism, even though it is difficult to share the author's confidence that the 'double-aspect' theory is utterly meaningless.

The remaining discussions of the 'Origin and Permanence of Mind' and the 'Place of Man's Mind in Nature' point forward to the future development of Professor Ladd's views on ethics and the philosophy of religion. These will be the more eagerly awaited in view of the value of the present volume, which, in spite of defects, is one of the most notable contributions of recent years to the literature of the subject.

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Elements of Psychology (Syllabus of Philosophy I). J. H. HYSLOP, Columbia College, New York, 1895. Pp. 130.

This syllabus is best described in Dr. Hyslop's own words: "As a time-saving instrument in my lectures on the subject, and as a guide to my students in their reading and study." It has also a personal interest in showing those who have been instructed by the author's work in other departments—logic and ethics—his general conception of the psychological area and its problems. Aside from these two uses it is hard to see what purpose it can serve. The analysis, while systematic and thorough as analysis, (excepting the chapter on emotion) does not allow one to see far enough into Dr. Hyslop's mind to warrant confidence as to one's insight into what his psychological position really is. This, of course, is a defect, if defect it be, not in execution but in original design; for Professor Dewey has recently shown in his 'Study of Ethics' the possibility of a syllabus which shall contain both outline and suggestive doctrine. The analysis is indeed so thorough and comprehensive that here at least we believe that 'the part is not worth more than the whole,' and we hope that Dr. Hyslop may see fit some time to give his lec-