

The Classical Review

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CAR>

Additional services for *The Classical Review*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)



Gaye on Plato's *Conception of Immortality* The Platonic *Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas*. By R.K. Gaye. Pp. x + 259. London: C.J. Clay and Sons. 5s. net.

R. G. Bury

The Classical Review / Volume 19 / Issue 03 / April 1905, pp 160 - 162
DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00000196, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00000196

How to cite this article:

R. G. Bury (1905). The Classical Review, 19, pp 160-162 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00000196

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

TWO NOTES ON *THE VERRINES*.

Cic. Div. in Caec. § 25.

Huic ego homini ium ante denuntio, si a me causam hanc vos agi volueritis, rationem illi defendendi totam esse mutandam, et ita mutandam ut meliore et honestiore condicione quam qua ipse vult imitetur homines eos, quos ipse vidit amplissimos, L. Crassum et M. Antonium, qui nihil se arbitrabantur ad iudicia causasque amicorum praeter fidem et ingenium adferre oportere.

With part of the above (the doubtful clause *et ita mutandam*) I have dealt in a previous note, *C.R.* vol. xviii. p. 208. That something was felt to be wrong with what follows may be inferred from the variants reported, e.g. *condicione sit* Pseud. Asc. and Lg. 45, *esse vult* Par. 7776 (p), G¹, Par. 7822, and the dett. A better line of emendation is suggested by the fact that in the three leading members of what I propose to call the Y family of MSS., viz. Par. 7776 (p—11th cent.), Lg. 29, and Harl. 2687 (which I cite together as pqr), before *imitetur* we have *ut*. If to this *ut*, we add the letter *i*, on the supposition that it may have fallen out in front of *imitetur*, and so read *uti*, construction and meaning alike become quite clear: *rationem . . . mutandam . . . ut meliore et honestiore condicione quam qua ipse vult uti imitetur* etc. Hortensius, if left to himself, would be at his old tricks; but he is hereby warned that he will have to rely in this trial, as Crassus and Antonius always did, on his own *fides* and *ingenium*..

In Verr. ii, 1 § 149 (Muell. p. 194, 36).

Iste quid ageret nesciebat; si in acceptum non rettulisset, putabat se aliquid defensionis habiturum: Habonium porro intellegebat rem totam esse patefacturum. Tametsi quid poterat esse apertius quam nunc est? Ut uno minus teste haberet, Habonio opus in accep-

tum rettulit quadriennio post quam diem operi dixerat.

The above is given as in Mueller's text,—eliminating, however, the ridiculous German commas (e.g. between *post* and *quam*) which have so long vexed our classical texts. But Madvig, in his *Epistola Critica ad Orellium* (pp. 89–90), had already shown a better way of punctuation, which is followed in the main by Jordan in the Zürich edition. What Madvig failed to see is that, on any explanation, *haberet* is an impossible reading. In place of *haberet*, it is natural to suggest *ageret*, such interchanges being of not infrequent occurrence. For example, in his *Actio Prima* (Mueller, p. 133, 36) all the MSS. give *secum habere* for *secum agere*. For the construction, compare § 117 *uno signo ut sit minus*,—though the *ut* there is not a final *ut*, as here.

We ought to return, therefore, to the punctuation suggested by Madvig, and read *Iste . . . esse patefacturum—tametsi quid . . . quam nunc est?—ut uno minus teste ageret, Habonius . . . dixerat*. Habonius was the fraudulent guardian, who wanted a quittance for his contract. Verres saw that if he declined to give such a quittance, he might be able to enter some defence of the charge now brought against him: on the other hand (*porro*) he saw that such a refusal on his part would lead Habonius to make a clean breast of the whole business (just as though anything were needed to complete the exposure!) and so, in order that he might shut his partner's mouth (*ut uno minus teste ageret*), he gave him the quittance asked for four years after the date he had set for the completion of the work.

W. PETERSON.

McGILL UNIVERSITY,
MONTREAL.

REVIEWS.

GAYE ON PLATO'S *CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY*.

The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas.

By R. K. GAYE. Pp. x + 259. London: C. J. Clay and Sons. 5s. net.

MR. GAYE'S Essay, which obtained the Hare

Prize in 1904, deals with an interesting and important aspect of Platonic speculation. For the questions raised in it concern not merely immortality and the Ideas, but also the Platonic doctrine of the soul in general and its relation to body. Beginning with

a brief, but sufficient, sketch of pre-Platonic views of immortality, Mr. Gaye proceeds to discuss the views of Plato as developed successively in the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Phaedo*. Then follow two chapters in which the results of this discussion of these 'earlier' views are summed up, and the changes which mark the later Platonic doctrines are indicated. Next, we have an examination of the teaching as to the soul and its immortality in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*; and the book concludes with three chapters on 'Immortality and the later Platonism,' 'the Degeneration of Souls,' and 'the Place of Immortality in Plato's Philosophy.' It will be seen from this table of contents that the ground is well covered; and it may be gathered also that Mr. Gaye is an adherent of that theory of Platonic development of which Dr. Henry Jackson has been for years past so able an exponent. Indeed, as is stated in the *preface* (p. vii), this Essay is 'based throughout on the assumption that there was some such modification of Plato's philosophical doctrines as they [*i.e.* Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer-Hind] hold to have taken place.' Accordingly our estimate of the value of this Essay as a contribution to the study of Platonism, must depend largely upon our attitude towards this fundamental assumption of an 'earlier' and 'later' theory of Ideas. Personally, I am inclined to believe that the Ideas remained Ideas, naked and unashamed, to the end of the chapter, and to disbelieve that the 'Parmenides' hints at reformatory fig-leaves. But it would be irrelevant here to argue the point the Essayist assumes. There is, however, another side to this dependence upon the conclusions of the scholars named, and that is the almost complete omission of any reference to the work of Platonic scholars outside Cambridge. A continental reader could not fail, I imagine, to be surprised at what he would regard as a characteristic display of insularity. For example, Mr. Gaye discusses at some length the order and dates of composition of the *Symposium*, *Meno*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*. These matters have been discussed already *sescentiens*; there is a large literature dealing with them. Yet, strangely enough, Mr. Gaye takes no account of any theories other than those of Dr. Jackson, Dr. W. H. Thompson, and Mr. E. S. Thompson. His remarks are chiefly directed against the view of the last named scholar that the *Symposium* is to be classed with the *Phaedo* and dated after the *Meno* and *Republic*; and

he has little difficulty in showing that the arguments by which this view is supported are 'flimsy' in the extreme. It is much more natural, as Mr. Gaye maintains, to class the *Symposium* with the *Phaedrus*; and Mr. Gaye may also be correct in his view that the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Symposium*, as to which opinions seem to be about equally divided. Rather more important is the question as to the order of the dialogues *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, *Phaedo*. M. Lutoslawski, in his 'Plato's Logic,' has 'collected a good many arguments and opinions in favour of the view that the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Republic*, and the *Republic* later than the *Phaedo*. If Mr. Gaye believes it possible to arrive at a fixed order for these dialogues, it would have been well if he had taken account of M. Lutoslawski's statements, especially such a statement as that 'the proofs of the soul's immortality in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* are posterior to the *Phaedo*. They show a greater certainty, an advance in the form of expression, carried further in the *Phaedrus* than in the *Republic*'; and again, 'Plato laid great stress on the immortality of the soul in the *Laws*, and out of all his arguments in favour of this doctrine he selected the proof given in the *Phaedrus* as adequate (*ικανόν*)' (p. 335). In view of these statements, and the literary references by which they are supported, it is difficult to understand how Mr. Gaye can write (p. 73): 'No one, so far as I am aware, has attempted to ascertain the relation in which the *Phaedo* stands to the *Republic* by examining and comparing the respective proofs of immortality contained in the two dialogues, and the general attitude towards the question which Plato adopts in each of them.' Possibly no one has yet succeeded in ascertaining the truth as to these matters; but that is another thing. And I venture to doubt whether Mr. Gaye himself will produce conviction in the minds of those not already convinced. In fact, one may ask whether Plato intended any of his proofs to carry logical demonstration, or to serve as more than provisional supports for what was his personal belief; and one may reasonably suppose, as Prof. Shorey has put it, that 'the logical obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal immortality were as obvious to him as they are to his critics.' Mr. Gaye evidently thinks that the final argument in the *Phaedo*, and it alone, was entirely satisfactory to Plato's own mind; but this implies that Plato was the victim of a fallacy, and it leaves unexplained the

fact that in the *Laws* he chooses another proof rather than this one.

In connexion with the doctrine of immortality in the *Phaedo*, Mr. Gaye has an interesting, and I think novel, discussion of the reasons which may have led Plato at this date to attach so much importance to immortality. He supposes that while in the *Republic* Plato still hopes for direct cognition of the Ideas, in the *Phaedo* he has given up this hope and resorts to the doctrine of immortality as affording to the philosopher 'his only ground for hoping that he will sooner or later attain direct cognition of the ideas.' That Plato was for so long deceived as to the possibility of obtaining 'absolute knowledge' in this life it is not easy to believe; nor does it follow that because he attached importance to immortality we must find a reason for it in his despair.

Another problem of interest, upon which Mr. Gaye joins issue with Mr. Archer-Hind, is this: 'Does Plato in the *Phaedo* admit the possibility that souls exist in a state of complete separation from body?' Mr. Archer-Hind had answered this question in the negative, partly on the strength of *Phaedr.* 246 c, but Mr. Gaye sets aside that passage as a piece of 'conscious allegorizing' and insists on pressing the sense of such phrases as *χωρὶς σωμάτων* (*Phaed.* 76 c, 114 c) to the utmost. However, it still remains to be proved that Plato purposed any definite answer to the question, or meant *σῶμα* to be construed in its widest sense. It would seem that he is mainly concerned to assume a condition of soul where its energizing is pure from all bodily *πάθη*, whether or not we ascribe to such a condition entire immateriality. The object of Mr. Gaye's polemic is, however, not to destroy but to fulfil Mr. Archer-Hind's account of the 'earlier' theory, by showing that in it *ψυχαί* correspond in all respects to *εἶδη*, as equally *χωριστά*. He displays the zeal of the son of Zadok, who, by the way of the plain, 'overran Cush,' but the tidings he brings from the battle are, after all, much the same.

We find the same zeal in overrunning the conclusions of the first exponents of the 'later theory' in Mr. Gaye's exposition of the *Timaeus*. He criticizes Mr. Archer-Hind's interpretation of c. xiv from the standpoint that here he 'has not carried far enough the principle of interpretation which has guided him in his treatment of the Dialogue as a whole'; which means that he has confused allegory with history,

symbol with fact, logical with chronological sequence in his comments on the *πρώτη* and *δευτέρα* *γένεσις*. And I think Mr. Archer-Hind could hardly deny that Mr. Gaye's suggestions admirably serve to complete the consistency of his account of the philosophy of the *Timaeus*: *νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών!*

In another point also Mr. Gaye diverges from Mr. Archer-Hind. He believes that the 'later theory' allowed ideas of the four elements, as well as of 'natural kinds,' although 'Mr. Archer-Hind seems loth to admit that this is so.' And he is dissatisfied also with a phrase of Dr. Jackson's which speaks of the 'later' ideas as 'only hypothetically existent.' Against this Mr. Gaye argues that 'the idea must always be existent because it is an external mode of absolute thought.' Here, too, I think consistency is on the side of Mr. Gaye, who certainly, throughout this Essay, shows much ability and perspicacity in applying his formulae. For the 'later' Platonism these formulae seem to resolve themselves into these two: 'The ideas are thoughts of God: that is to say, they are permanent modes of the operation of supreme *νοῦς*. Individual souls are the creatures of God: that is to say, they are permanent determinations of supreme *νοῦς*.' And thus, in short, Plato explained the world as the self-evolution of absolute thought. It is true that this seems a nicely-rounded system of idealism; but, had it not been for Hegel and his kind, who would have thought of imputing it to Plato? Can it be said that this super-Berkeleyian idealism is not imported into the language of the *Timaeus*, rather than legitimately extracted from it? Or can it be denied that the exponents of this later Platonism are gifted with a philosophico-historical imagination which leads them, in their desire for *τὸ ἰκανὸν καὶ τέλειον*, to be wise above what is written?

But whatever prejudices we may entertain against the view of Plato's thought and its development which Mr. Gaye adopts, we cordially congratulate him on the scholarly, lucid, and interesting manner in which he has expounded his theme. A dissertation of this quality on such a subject is, in this country, a rare achievement. And one cannot but observe that in the attractive *format* of the book we have a *σῶμα* appropriate to its *ψυχή*: for in the book-world a *ψυχή* *αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν* is by no means a desideratum.

R. G. BURY.