

force in the development of the ideal, moral and æsthetic sides of life. It is perhaps not pushing the matter too far to suggest also that the duality of motivation which characterizes our social system, and which we designate as *egoism* on the one hand and *altruism* on the other, is a natural result of the contrast in character between the states of consciousness originating in the struggle for food and those originating in courtship, and that the history of society on the moral and æsthetic sides is in great part the history of an attempt to make the more sympathetic attitude prevail over the more antagonistic.

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DR. MORTON PRINCE AND PANPSYCHISM.

In the last number of this REVIEW Dr. Morton Prince points out that the panpsychist doctrine of my *Why the Mind has a Body* was anticipated in his *Nature of Mind and Human Automatism* published in 1885. The interesting quotations which he makes from the latter and from an article in *Brain* for 1891 certainly bear him out in this assertion. With the book I regret to say that I was unacquainted. But I read his article some ten years ago, and I think that it contributed to turn my thoughts in a panpsychist direction. Its clear teaching that consciousness is the reality which appears as the brain-process helped to fix that hypothesis in my mind, and I have no doubt that the pages of Paulsen,¹ to which I have always felt myself mainly indebted, had a fuller meaning to me in consequence. I regret the more that, by the time when I came to write, my memory of its contents had lapsed, and I failed, rather inexcusably it now seems to me, to mention Dr. Prince among earlier expositors of the theory. Had I been acquainted with his book, I should have had a juster appreciation of his merits as a pioneer of panpsychism, and this would not have happened.

I have lately had the pleasure of reading the book, and I find that it contains an extremely clear and forcible statement of the panpsychist hypothesis. It differs from Clifford's essay on the 'Nature of Things-in-Themselves' in being not merely an exposition of panpsychism in the abstract, but a definite application of it to the problem of the connection of mind and body.² Readers who have difficulty in

¹ *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1892), see esp. pp. 77-116, 137-149, 381-85.

² Towards the close of his essay on *Body and Mind* Clifford does make a rather definite application of it to the problem, as is shown by the sentence: "If mind is the reality or substance of that which appears to us as brain-action * * *" (*Lectures and Essays*, 2d ed., p. 269).

understanding my account of the matter would do well to consult it. In particular, the pointing out of the ambiguity of the term 'matter,' the rejection of non-empirical views of mind, the definite use of the conception of mental causality, the recognition that brain-events are not merely symbols but *effects* of the 'accompanying' mental states, indicate the clearness with which the conception is grasped in all its implications. That Dr. Prince should have worked this conception out for himself, without knowledge of Clifford, simply (as it appears) by way of criticism of the views of Huxley, Tyndall, Lewes, Spencer, and Bain, is an achievement to be proud of. Should the theory triumph, he will be entitled to an honorable place among its earliest discoverers and defenders.

There is one slight misapprehension in Dr. Prince's paper which I desire to set right, and that is as regards my attitude toward Clifford. Dr. Prince seems to think that I disapprove of Clifford's views, and regard them as somehow distinct from my own. I assure him that this is a mistake. The fact that I describe my theory, in my preface, as "that which is implied in the panpsychism of Fechner and Clifford" should, I think, have made any doubt as to the nature of my feeling impossible. I presume his error is due to my having referred to Clifford as a parallelist; whereas, according to Dr. Prince, parallelism is an erroneous theory, quite incompatible with panpsychism. This is really only a question of terms. Dr. Prince understands by parallelism the assertion of a second real series, running parallel with the psychical; and this, I agree with him, is a wholly erroneous conception. But I think it is not expedient, as a matter of terminology, to pin the parallelist down to the assertion of the independent reality of matter. If the interactionist may remain still an interactionist even though he conceive the matter on which the mind acts idealistically, then the parallelist may still remain a parallelist even though he conceive that the brain-process has no existence except when an external observer chances to perceive it.¹ The essence of parallelism is the denial of causal relations between mental and physical; and this denial, as I have shown in my book (p. 345), remains still valid on the panpsychist theory.

I want to take this opportunity of calling attention to a number of other panpsychist discussions of the relation of mind and body, with some of which I have only recently become acquainted. Professor

¹ German critics of panpsychism have fallen into this error, and are prevented by it from understanding the real meaning of the theory — see Heymans' review of Busse in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Bd. 33, Heft 3, esp. pp. 217-219.

Lloyd Morgan, in his *Animal Life and Intelligence*, published in 1891, has a chapter on *Mental Evolution*, in which a panpsychist theory is sketched out (Ch. XII., pp. 464-503). The late Joseph LeConte hints at a panpsychist theory of the connection of mind and body in the remarks contributed by him to Professor Royce's *Conception of God* (1897; see pp. 67-68). Professor Royce himself, despite his early condemnation of 'mind-stuff' (see *Mind*, O. S., Vol. VI., pp. 365 ff.), appears as a panpsychist in his essay on 'Self-consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature' (published originally in *Philos. Rev.*, Vol. IV., pp. 465 ff., 577 ff., and reprinted in his *Studies of Good and Evil*—see especially pp. 229, 230 of the latter). Panpsychist principles seem to underlie Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall's acute discussion of the parallelistic view in his *Instinct and Reason* (1898, pp. 19-67). Professor Walter Smith has criticized the notion of interaction very judiciously from the same point of view in *Philos. Rev.*, Vol. X., pp. 505-514, his little paper containing all the essential ideas of my book.

Professor Stout's chapter on 'Body and Mind' in his *Manual of Psychology* I have referred to in my preface. Professor Ebbinghaus's discussion of the subject will be familiar to readers of his *Grundzüge* (pp. 27-47). Both of course are panpsychist.

No person interested in the question should fail to read Professor Heymans' article 'Zur Parallelismusfrage,' in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Bd. 17, pp. 62-105. In a capital review of Busse's recent book in the same journal (Bd. 33, pp. 216-222), Professor Heymans defends the panpsychist theory against misapprehensions, in a series of brief objections and replies which may be commended to the attention of those who think they see reasons for rejecting it.

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