

VI.—PHENOMENALISM IN ETHICS.

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THE most characteristic feature of present-day metaphysics is the distinction which is being made more and more conspicuously between the "inner" and the "outer" meanings of a given fact, its aspect as phenomenal and its aspect as noumenal. The very considerable efforts of Prof. Royce and Mr. Bradley, for example, have had at least this effect even among unbelievers:—that the latter are indebted for greater clearness of conception and truer insight into the meaning of the *phenomenal*. A defence of phenomenalism in Psychology published in MIND from the pen of Mr. Bradley has inspired largely the thought of this following article. In general our thesis will be: that the outer meaning of an act, even in the cautious thought of Prof. Royce, and much less in the confessedly unknowable sense of Mr. Bradley—the outer meaning of an act is never operative in producing that act. The meaning of the act as a present event with its psychological flurry of associates, it is this which is the vital, telling feature of the act, and not its completed meaning as it appears when set consistently into a monistic whole. Any interpretation of an act in terms of a greater world-theory is an account of that act which either (1) refers it to a conception merely writ larger than its own simple meaning and yet of precisely the same order of fact, or else (2) falsely counts as operative that which is merely the metaphysical condition of complete thinking about the act and not the actual condition under which the act may be, and almost always is, performed. In a word, a metaphysic which proposes a completed reality has no motor quality and so is non-ethical.

We may define phenomenalism provisionally in the words of Mr. Bradley as "the confinement of one's attention to events with their laws of co-existence and sequence. It involves the complete abjuration of any attempt to ask in psychology for ultimate truth or consistency, and it involves the adoption

as relative truth of whatever serves best to explain the detailed course of facts or those particular ways in which things happen."¹

Thus it will appear that there are two widely differing attitudes which one may assume toward experience. One of these Mr. Bradley has just expressed for us under the name of phenomenism. The other of these is that which Mr. Bradley esteems to be the metaphysical attitude *par excellence*. In this latter case one attempts an explanation of experience not in its character as a present event which involves a past or future content not at all, except in terms of "dispositions," the hypothetical laws of a given moment of consciousness; this latter attitude on the contrary attempts an explanation of a given experience in terms of what we have called its "outer" meaning and involves an extension of the meaning of the experience to the point where it gets an appropriate setting in a metaphysical whole of experience. Thus, a moment of time considered phenomenally would be merely what C. Lloyd Morgan describes somewhat loosely when he speaks of the "moment of consciousness"; that is, a moment for phenomenism is merely any given state of consciousness with a past and future involved in it only in the form of "dispositions"; here there is no inconsistency in alleging that the moment both has and has not duration because, forsooth! we do not allege all this in the name of metaphysics but merely in the name of a phenomenistic psychology. Now on the contrary a moment of time when viewed metaphysically—let us say noumenally—is at once infected fundamentally and in its inner core by this foregoing contradiction which *phenomenally* was of no import. Our thought of a moment of time is not metaphysically complete until somehow we have reconciled the fluidity of the passing moments with the rigidity of a time which does not pass.

This distinction between the attitudes of phenomenism and that of noumenism is closely allied to, if not identical with, the more common distinction between the *naïve* and the reflective attitudes towards the world. The *naïve* mind, for example, has no troubling difficulty with the fluidity of passing time until in reflexion upon the alleged eternity of time it experiences that "ache" of the mind which caused Emerson to prefer infinite depth of life to infinite length of it. And why should the mind in its strains after a completed reality experience this ungrateful ache? The explanation is

¹ See *MIND*, N.S., vol. ix., No. 33, p. 26. The italics are ours.

not far to seek. We have just said that the two possible attitudes in philosophy are closely related to the attitudes in our common experience which we know as, the one *naïve* and the other *reflective*. And now we may say further that *no reflexion can complete itself upon the naïve materials of experience*. In other words these two attitudes of mind represent in fact two fundamentally disparate worlds, the one the world of all actual or possible experience, the world of phenomena; and the other the world which is inevitably the metaphysical condition of final thought about the world of phenomena, but which is never by any device of language or thought converted into a world of possible experience. Our meaning will become clearer in another connexion. Meanwhile the purpose of this paper may now be expressed as an attempt to indicate that the sanctions, the impulses of our moral life are dependent, not upon any reference of this moral life to a metaphysically completed world-life, but at the very most upon a large, though not absolute, extension of this world of actual or possible experience to the point where we should have a world of moral experiences made actual but with a reality nevertheless which would still be phenomenal.

A priori phenomenalism in ethics is based upon the conviction that *isolation* is the very inner nature of things, as we do or may ever find them by experience.

A posteriori this phenomenalism takes account of the fact that the agent is unaware that his every moment is so tightly bound up with a metaphysically complete world, that his every step is trembling the universe to its very foundations, the sound thereof echoing and re-echoing into the remotest corners and most distant corridors of the world. The man in the street will deny that any spot in the world is thus intimately identified with other spots either phenomenally or metaphysically, and this denial we take to be adequate to invalidate at least the metaphysical presupposition of completed reality as operative in regulating any partial reality. On these grounds,—and the foregoing evidence of common experience would alone be sufficient support of the supposition,—phenomenalism rests its claim upon a conception of this world of experience as a multiverse of isolated facts, at least *ethically* as well as psychologically, whatever may be Reality metaphysically.

We may best indicate further what we signify by these two differing attitudes toward experience by introducing at once two illustrations of them.

In the matter of freedom for example. Mr. Bradley restricts the meaning of phenomenalism so that one confines

his attention to "events with their laws of co-existence and sequence". Here obviously the possibility of freedom among events is by definition excluded. Phenomenalism thus narrowly—and as it seems to us arbitrarily—conceived would involve one in determinism. There could be therefore no ethic of phenomenalism in any true sense; and one would be forced beyond the region of phenomena "with their laws of co-existence and sequence," in order to secure a freedom and a consequent ethic. It is quite obvious that freedom is the presupposition of any hortative ethic and equally so that determinism is the presupposition of psychology. We need not question whether psychology can proceed with its theories in a world where the possibility of freedom is not at least *ex hypothesi* ignored. A world in the degree that it is free is in that degree capricious, and caprice would make our results in psychology for ever uncertain and indeterminate. But it is important to note in passing that this presupposition of absolute causality in the world of experience is a mere *conventional* device—i.e. is merely a conventional agreement which in actual experience here and there may turn out to be a fictitious agreement; but it is nevertheless an agreement which in spite of its possible fictitious character is quite legitimate since it serves the worthy purpose of securing psychology upon the modern pedestal of the exact sciences. But this conventional presupposition of causality among the events or phenomena that are for psychology is quite different from the presupposition which extends the same determinism to cover descriptively *all* phenomena or events. If there is a problem of freedom at all it is a problem which concerns itself with a certain class of *phenomena*, or to be more precise it is a problem which concerns itself with a certain attitude toward *phenomena*. The *phenomenal* character of the individual's activity would not in any way be disguised or transcended by the infusion of freedom into his acts. And the act or the phenomenon in its true sense would be merely an *isolated* event; the question of its causation would so far remain abrupt. So far as *phenomenalism* is concerned the manner of sequence among "events" is unimportant though this would be of prime significance for the interests of psychology. This is not an attempt to define or to defend freedomism; such an attempt would conspicuously exceed the limitations which are promised by the title of our paper. Our point is merely this: that any genuine freedom is to be found among phenomena and that in some sense there must be for the purposes of ethics a freedom in phenomenalism. If this freedom is of such a sort as to

make certain events capricious or unpredictable then the field of psychology as a natural science is limited, and the phenomena of psychology are not inclusive of all phenomena. Or if—which is our own view of the matter—freedom among phenomena is merely a certain attitude toward them which is assumed for the purposes of practical living, an attitude which curiously enough would have an entirely adequate psychological description—if, we say, freedom is of this latter sort the same world of phenomena has a different aspect and meaning, in the one case when being scrutinised by psychology and in the other case when being expressed, and even in a legitimate sense caused, by the pulsating living of them.¹

If we agree, therefore, that phenomenalism has no necessary issue in determinism; that if there be freedom at all it must be a freedom which in some sense and in some way frees *phenomena* from their “laws of co-existence and sequence,” the question at once persists, “What is this freedom?” And here one may assume either of the two attitudes with which this article was introduced, one of which we called the phenomenalist or *naïve* and the other the noumenalist or reflective.

Assuming this latter attitude and asking how a phenomenon can be essentially free we shall be forced into a world not of phenomena but of some sort of reality which is intended to relieve the inconsistency of the *phenomenal*. This world we may provisionally call the noumenal, the world made so familiar by Kant as the world of things-in-themselves. The reality of supreme worth is the moral life. This must be saved at any cost, and so we find Kant astonishing beyond credibility his philosophical contemporaries by his apparently arbitrary postulation of these great realities of the moral life which had been analysed away in his previous essay in epistemology. It is exceedingly doubtful if this apparent caprice of the great philosopher has ever been understood. We must not here exceed the limits of our article by making another contribution to the extensive literature of the subject. It will be sufficient for our purpose to indicate that there are two possible interpretations of the world in which freedom has a supreme reality. One of these is the *completely reflective* view which gives us a disguised freedom in a world of completed experience or reality where all appearance has *disappeared*, and where we are se-

¹ This view will of course be recognised as closely allied to that of Prof. Hugo Münsterberg.

cure in all sorts of logical consistencies and ethical beatitudes which are incredible and even inconceivable in this world of phenomena ; phenomenal partiality, the inner and outer inadequacy of the phenomena,—all these maimed phenomena are made whole ; partial ignorance has been found to be one aspect of absolute knowledge ; error mysteriously becomes the highest truth, evil becomes partial good, etc. In the midst of these transformations our passing experience which seems to come to us with the guarantee of reality and which indeed seems to be in exclusive possession of the stamp of reality—this luminously real of passing experience is found to be mere appearance. The sportive dwarfs of our momentary experience are merely tolerated good-naturedly and *for the sake of a psychology of experience* ; real and absolute life being quite different and that in such a way as to invest the passing moment with the *insignia*—not its own—of eternal reality. Now saying nothing of the inconceivability of this alleged real world of metaphysics, we have insisted that it is in any case a world disparate from any world of possible experience. We are reliably informed by our inner consciousness of the inevitable partiality of experience. It is incredible, for example, that this inner consciousness of mine, which has so conspicuously and so inevitably the stamp of privacy, can be *wholly* taken up into a consciousness of a higher order, however largely it may be a spark in this larger flame ; again it is incredible—to make the point more general—that in experience the world of particulars will ever be found to be completed by the same order of facts ; *in experience* the centre of a stone for example will always be merely the just disappearing last particle of it ;¹ or the outer limits of the world of experience will be inevitably the largest possible experience merely. This world of the reflective or noumenalistic attitude is not the world of *real experience*. Obviously freedom in a world of this sort would be as unreal as all the other alleged furnishings of such a world.

But though it is true that so long as we examine reflectively experiences in their character as events we may require a logical postulate which in the last analysis is *merely* a logical device ; it is nevertheless true that viewed naively, or in their character as data for the moral life, these same experiences become suffused with a very different sort of reality. Freedom, for example, requires no greater verity than this : that it should be *felt*. What boots it that a free act is an isolated act, or even that such an act is inconceivable to a certain

¹ Mill calls this the "*minimum visibile*" (see *Logic*, p. 148).

attitude, so long as it stubbornly clings to its previous reality as being merely a phenomenal characteristic of experience? After this somewhat disproportionate introduction we may neglect the problem of freedom with the thought that *phenomenally* freedom is felt to be a characteristic of the passing experience, of the phenomenal event which as material for psychology has one kind of reality and as material for the moral life has a reality of a quite different sort, our present point being that in both cases we are legitimately within the boundaries of phenomenalism.

We may now introduce very briefly our second illustration of these two attitudes towards experience and of what we have considered to be the two disparate worlds in which these two attitudes inevitably issue, the one the world of rigid reality which is merely the background for the other, the world of fluid-experience. What would be the *self* corresponding to these two methods of viewing experience? It will be claimed by some that phenomenalism gives us a Self too composite, or too partial, etc., to be suitable for ethical purposes; that the moral life can be made intelligible only by the importation into it of some metaphysic of the soul that will give it a substance more unifying and more universally identical and permanent than such devices of psychology as "Apperception," "Teleological Memory," etc. But here again we insist that for *naïve* experience the feeling of identity, the content of mind at any given moment with its connexions with past experiences in the form of "dispositions"; that the feeling of "warmth" and "intimacy" which shifts perceptibly with the shifting of the mental content of which it is the self-consciousness but which nevertheless possesses a "functional" identity—we insist upon it that this interpretation of the self is adequate alike for psychology and ethics; that the ethical life is not the absolutely completed or interpreted life but that it is peculiarly the life of phenomenal movements; that any conception of it from the point of view of absolute sanctions, absolute ends, absolute organisations, etc., makes impossible the act of appropriation which, as we shall see later, is the distinctively ethical act. This self which Mr. Bradley accepts as adequate for psychological purposes and which we appropriate as being also adequate for ethical purposes has been so admirably presented in the article already referred to that we need give no further analysis or description of it. Our point is merely that here as elsewhere in experience the phenomenalistic attitude alone can bear fruit; that the absolutist attitude can give at most a self which has no motor

quality and which is merely the logical background of the phenomenal self, the self of Ethics.

With these two illustrations in mind we may say that the important word in Mr. Bradley's preliminary sentence is not "sequence," etc., but is "events". By "event" one may mean for the purposes of phenomenism merely that which in actual experience is cut off from what precedes and from what follows; in a word that which does not require a completed world-theory for its interpretation. It is an experience complete in itself and only metaphysically a part of any absolute whole. Thus for the purposes of this discussion we consider the essence of phenomenism to be expressed as the "complete abjuration of any attempt to ask in psychology¹ for *ultimate truth* or consistency" or "the adoption as *relative truth* of whatever serves best to explain the detailed course of facts". Questions which will seem to force the issue into the field of metaphysics—as for example the question of phenomenal connexions—will inevitably arise but they will not be such as to strike at the very roots of this doctrine of phenomenism in ethics. This latter attitude in ethics is essentially a practical method, proposing a theory of relativity which for the purposes of actual motor life will resist the insidious advances of a monistic metaphysic; a theory which is content, when applied in ethics as well as when applied in psychology, not to interpret events, acts, phenomena, etc., by absolute standards; standards which become at once impossible tests or explanations because incommensurate with the simple, isolated phenomena which are to be interpreted. The plea of these phenomena, these isolated events which populate the whole world of possible experience—their plea that they bring with them their own interpretation, their own full meaning, their own test of reality—this plea is to be respected.

The ethical significance of the distinction which metaphysics is making between these "inner" and "outer" meanings of a phenomenon, a bit of experience, is in the last analysis found in the distinctions between monism and pluralism, the latter of which we consider to be the legitimate issue of phenomenism. Is an act good in the degree that it is rational—rational, *i.e.*, in the monistic sense? Or is an act good in the degree that it commands a more emotional, a more inner sanction? Are we or are we not reliably assured by our inner consciousness that the appropriation of smallness, privacy, or what not, is the ethical act *par excellence*?

¹ And we may now say "in ethics".

In general, monistic constructions have resulted from an emphasis of the speculative attitude rather than of the practical attitude toward experience; not what the experience is on its own account or in its own phenomenal character, but what its presently real meaning *implies* has been the consideration taken as representative of its genuine philosophical significance. For long it has been tacitly assumed in certain philosophical circles that the rational is synonymous with that which is (at least conceptually) complete; in one case completely blocked, in another case completely organised. Now, that neither case represents the actual fact, it is the purpose of what Prof. James defends as "radical empiricism" to prove. It is the object of this paper incidentally to indicate in its latter portion that an empirical organisation somewhat more pretentious than that which is necessary in Prof. James's system is the presupposition of the moral life; but chiefly that this organisation falls short of the concrete monism of Hegel; the latter representing in a situation that which is logically implied in it but which is ineffectual. The situation is logical, the act is mostly allogical.

Our meaning will be clearer if we give brief notice to two types of monistic interpretation.

The first of these, with which we shall have little concern as it denies the validity in any sense of pluralism, is the abstract Monism¹ of Spinoza and in general of Hindu thought. In this abstract monism there is but one reality, all particularity being illusion. The one may be identical with the whole of Reality; this is the view of the Vedantist system of religious philosophy and of Spinoza's *Ethics*. "Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived" (Prop. xiv.). The logical outcome of this view is absolute rigidity; or put more softly it is a "rest" in God which is taken as the highest blessedness, but which is essentially the renunciation of all participation in life. Witness the word of the sweet singer and mystic Thomas à Kempis: "Above all things and in all things, O my soul, thou shalt *rest* in the Lord always, for He is the everlasting rest of the Saints". Another type of this Abstract Monism identifies the One with the Nothing. Such is Buddhistic Nihilism if we accept the common view of this system. The Sankhyan system seems to partake of the character of both varieties of Abstract Monism. We are but slightly concerned with this

¹ "Henism" has been suggested as a suitable designation of this type of Monism.

type of Monism ; for it will be found that in those cases where it has seemed to issue not in rigidity and consequent insipidity, but in some sort of active functioning of the agent, it has in fact taken on the character of the concrete type of Monism which we are about to consider. A consistent adherence to Abstract Monism is a moral impossibility. And it is the special object of the remaining pages to prove that it stands no otherwise with concrete monism, our only expedient therefore being a resort in ethics to radical pluralism, the only legitimate issue of phenomenism.

Let us consider therefore what has been called the "Concrete Monism" of Hegel, for example. By a certain type of interpretation which the writer accepts but which need not be described in this connexion, the world of Kant's *Kritique of the Practical Reason* would be of this concretely monistic sort, though the more popular and inaccurate interpretation of this world of the "Practical Reason" relegates it unsympathetically to a region of things-in-themselves quite apart from this region of partly experienced phenomena. But that Kant in his second *Kritique* and in his *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* intended merely a certain attitude assumed for the purposes of the moral life toward an otherwise causal world of phenomena—that Kant meant merely the twofold attitude toward the same Reality we are assured. Our present point in passing is merely that in his conception of Perfection, for example, Kant has become involved in the difficulties of Concrete Monism.

By the fundamental position of his Concrete Monism it is alleged that the real is co-terminous with the rational and that the ethical, moreover, is completed rationality.¹

The first of these presuppositions we must call in question, if by "real," as identical with the rational, is meant the real of actual or possible *experience*. The world of our thought is dichotomised into the facts of actual or possible experience which have merely a phenomenal reality and on the other hand those rational devices—not contentual—by which the world of phenomenal experiences gets its absolute interpretation, but which have only this ideational reality.

We may illustrate the distinction by reference to the epistemology of space-conceptions. If one introspect his experience when he perceives a certain quantum of space, he will find that this spot of space is being perceived iso-

Thus it is that we find "goodness" defined as "the Identity of Idea and Existence" (see Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, especially chap. xxv.).

latedly and that it is only in reflexion upon the experience that he becomes involved in what the late Dr. Martineau called an "ontological apprehension" of an infinitude of space in which the finitude gets its setting. In a rigidly metaphysical sense it is unquestionably impossible to image a spot of space without relieving the inner and outer incompleteness of it by the conception of an infinitude. But it is important meanwhile to notice two points which are reported to us by our common experience and by our inner consciousness of the nature of experience. (1) No additive process, however long continued, can group any number of finitudes into an infinitude of space.¹ So in ethics no summary of acts, each an improvement upon its predecessor, can give us completed perfection; and no enlargement of a partial organisation of the world can be adequate to the conception of completed organisation. And yet each of these absolute completions is the inevitable, metaphysical condition of its appropriate finite term. (2) Our second point, closely related to the foregoing, is: that just as an infinitude of space, though the metaphysical condition of thought about a finitude of space, is quite insignificant to the naïve, unreflective mind in its perceiving of space and space-relations; so of the ethical act, the agent can perform it and assess it in virtue of its own inner meaning in the passing experience, being only metaphysically and not phenomenally involved in a race toward a constantly receding goal.

Take the mathematical series:—

$$1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} \dots 2.$$

Here we have as the limit of the series the definite, conceivable number 2. But meanwhile, though it is true that the series can have a completed meaning only in reference to its limit 2, it is also true—and this is important—that the series never reaches its limit 2; or, to put it otherwise, the limit 2 never gets directly into the series in such a way as to saturate the series with its own meaning.

Now let us represent parts of the phenomenal world, the apparent world, as "A," Appearance; and let us represent the noumenal world, the real world in the monistic sense, as "R," Reality. Then, letting "*n*" represent an unknown

¹ See Spencer's *First Principles*, e.g., pp. 26 *et seq.*; also Martineau's *Essays*, etc., essay on Mansel's *Limits*, etc., pp. 134, 135 *et seq.*, also essay on *Science, Nescience and Faith*, pp. 203 *et seq.* Our only point of disagreement with Dr. Martineau is in his assertion that this "ontological apprehension" represents a reality in things; i.e. a reality of possible or actual experience.

increment-factor of Appearance, we might have some such series as:—

$$A + 2 \frac{A}{n} + 4 \frac{A}{n} \dots R.^1$$

Now just as in the case of the mathematical series (I.) the series implies its limit 2, but (II.) is never directly suffused by its limit, or in a word never reaches its limit; so in the case of the world-series there is no possibility that the terms of the series can ever be coloured by any direct contact with the noumenal Reality which each of its terms implies.

We have taken this as specially illustrative of the Kantian system.² If we let the terms of the series represent the ever changing movements of the agent as he deliberates and chooses what his life shall be at any given moment,³ the question arises, "In what sense, if at all, is a given term in the series determined by the limit of the series?"

The series is only conceptually determined by its limit. Any given term in the series is determined by the inner meaning of the series itself and not by any outer meaning which it must have in reference to its limit. This inner meaning of the series in the illustration from mathematics was the constant $\frac{1}{2}$. What is the meaning of the ethical series which determines each accretion or decrection?

The clue is to be found in that ambiguous word borrowed

¹ It is of course obvious that no particular series in the moral order would proceed with this graphic regularity.

² The lettering in the system might be appropriately changed as follows: letting "s" represent partial selfhood and "S" noumenal selfhood; whence the series: $s + 2 \frac{s}{n} + 4 \frac{s}{n} \dots S$. Or letting "p" represent partial perfection, the perfection of Appearance and "P" noumenal perfection; whence the series: $p + 2 \frac{p}{n} + 4 \frac{p}{n} \dots P$.

³ We may suggest here in passing a further difference between this moral world series and the mathematical series. If the mathematical series were not limited in its nature by definition, there might occur at any point in the series such a change that we could see that the series had reached or even passed its alleged limit. In such an event we could merely predict shrewdly that any given term will sustain a certain relation to its preceding term by observing what has been true of preceding terms. Now this is precisely what occurs in normal, imitative or habitual, responses which we make to our environment. Another point in this connexion is that we know *a priori* by an examination of the internal meaning of the moral series that, unlike the mathematical series, there can never occur such an internal disruption that the series will ever reach or pass beyond its limit. Here seems to me to lie the fundamental error of Bradleyan systems. The limit "R" does not in any way connect with the workings within the series.

from Evolutional Philosophy, the word "Development".¹ Each term of the ethical series is a development from the preceding term and determines what the following term will be, or at least ought to be in order that the organism represented by the series should get its most natural and fullest expression. The series of the moral life has its own inner meaning which requires no explanation in terms of a conceptual limit, but only in terms of the adjustment of meanings, attainments, claims, etc., in the terms of the series itself. Not only the terms of the series are found in the world of phenomena, but also the sanction therefor. Just as it is possible to proceed naïvely with the mathematical series securing each term as the preceding term multiplied by $\frac{1}{2}$, and moreover not allowing at the moment that logically the series approaches 2; so also it is possible naïvely to express each movement of the moral agent as a fragmentary outcome either of the preceding term, or (more largely) of our conception of the meaning which this phenomenal organism has.²

To summarise: there are two attitudes from which we may view the same Reality of Experience; one of these in Mr. Bradley's view is exclusively the psychological attitude; and the resulting system of psychology is to be known as phenomenalism. In this view one regards merely a present moment of consciousness with its phenomenal limitations, these latter being allowed merely for psychological purposes; a past or a future span of consciousness is involved in this psychological moment only as an element of the present moment itself and which we know merely as "dispositions," one of the working hypotheses of psychology or phenomenalism. The other attitude on the contrary would insist upon a complete interpretation of a given moment, a given experience or what not; "dispositions," could no longer remain as merely convenient hypotheses but would require for the rationalising of them that they should be traced infinitely to

¹ See articles of Antonio Llano in the *Open Court* on "Developmental Ethics," vol. xi., nos. 8 and 4. Spinoza and his followers surrender unconditionally to the impossible limit of the series.

The outer limitations of the organism are interestingly put by M. Ferrière in his recent "*Cause première d'après les Données expérimentales*". See especially the distinction between "internal" and "external" finality.

² The merely conceptual character of the monistic limits might also be illustrated by a series of concentric circles growing smaller and smaller in one direction and larger and larger in the opposite direction. The limits of this series would be, zero in the one direction and infinity in the other. In neither case would the limit be a circle; i.e., in neither case would the limit partake of the nature of the series.

their utmost lairs in the being of the Absolute. So of a given spot of experience or of reality ; so also of activity, of the self, etc. In a word metaphysics presumes to relieve the partiality of those data which for psychology may consistently remain partial ; in fact whose very partiality, it is which characterises them as the data of psychology.

Our secondary thesis throughout the foregoing discussion has been that this latter construction of metaphysics, though an absolute condition of thought about an experience, becomes however a mere fiction when it presumes to represent an Absolute Real of actual or of possible *experience* ; that the inner nature of experience is this very phenomenal character of it ; and that the metaphysical remedy of this alleged deformity of experience is merely a formal device by which we slur over experience without correcting its deformities.

But however this may be, our main thesis remains unchallenged : that the moral life is to be found and is to get its expression within the phenomenal series and that any absolute view of it must be peculiarly ineffectual in attempting to complete the series in facts of experience. Here as well as in psychology one's attitude must face the partial real of experience in the frank consciousness that it can never be made whole ; nor indeed does this moral series have the need to be made whole, for it has its own sanctions, its own motives securely within the series itself. These inner meanings which are all-sufficient in practice are to be found within the organism with its phenomenal character, its constant rewards of organic satisfactions and penalties of organic disturbances. That this organism can be defined with even greater definiteness than this we shall attempt to indicate in a following article on "The Concrete Moral Life of Phenomenalism".