



The Military Organization Best Adapted for Imperial Needs

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Farquharson C.B., R.E.

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MILITARY PRIZE ESSAY.

THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION BEST ADAPTED FOR IMPERIAL NEEDS.

By Lieutenant-Colonel J. FARQUHARSON, C.B., R.E.

—
"Beware in time."
—

Author's Note.—The writer of this Essay made, 20 years ago, in a paper published at the time, proposals for a Military Organization based generally on the same principles as those proposed in this Essay. The only, or at least the principal, difference was that he proposed then that the term of service with the colours should be 1½ years for infantry and longer periods for other branches of the service.

The following are the books from which the notes on history, &c., have been derived:—"Gentleman's Magazine," 1756, &c.; "Hallam's Constitutional History;" "Macaulay's Essays;" "Alison's History of Europe;" "Russell's Modern Europe."

The statistics quoted have been partly from the above works and partly from the Army Estimates for the current year, and from the Annual Return of the Army for 1891.

The figures as to the relative strength of the Navy and Army for the years 1801 and 1813 are taken—for the Navy, from James's "Naval History;" and for the Army, from a "Comparative Statement of the Military Forces and Population of the British Empire, for every year since 1801," prepared at the Topographical Branch of the War Office.

October 29, 1892.

CHAPTER I.—*The Reasons of the Apathy of Englishmen as to Military Organization.*

THERE is perhaps no point in the history of our times that will more exercise the minds of future historians of Europe than the incapacity of the present generation of Englishmen to strike out for

themselves a military organization suited to the wants of their Empire. It cannot be said for them that they are without guidance from the events of the previous history of their country. Up to within the last thirty or forty years England held a prominent place among the military powers of Europe, and she had been so reckoned for some 150 years. It is true that her strength as a military power was somewhat overshadowed by her supremacy as a naval power; but that she held a high place among the nations strong for offence or defence on land is indisputable. Marlborough and Wellington have been in the first rank of European generals; indeed it is a question whether, after Napoleon and Frederick, they have not been at the head of the first rank. English soldiers can claim that in Continental warfare they have suffered fewer defeats in comparison with the victories they have gained than any other European army; and they can claim that while they have largely or mainly contributed to win victories like Blenheim and like Waterloo, they have suffered no crushing defeat like Jena, or like Austerlitz, or like Friedland, or like Sedan; while within the present century it was a soldiers' and not a sailors' victory that gave England for forty years the leading place among the nations of Europe.

But if there could be anything more astonishing than the present incapacity of the English nation to work out for itself a military system suited to modern requirements, it would be the still more astonishing fact that the country seems calmly to acquiesce in its present, by comparison, military impotence. Our fathers and our grandfathers looked upon the English Army as a factor fit to be called upon at any time to take an important share in either maintaining or altering the face of Europe. We, on the other hand, of the present day, are told by foreigners that the English Army is for all Continental warfare to be reckoned as a *quantité négligeable*; and, strange to say, we accept the opinion without objection and without protest; stranger still, we resign ourselves helplessly to this state of things and admit that it is by our Navy, and our Navy alone, that we must stand or fall.

That this apathy is new has been already stated; that it is most dangerous it is not difficult to show. Its fruits have already been frequently apparent. We are bound by Treaty obligations to maintain the independence of Belgium; many Englishmen declare openly that we should from military weakness make no effort to fulfil what we have undertaken. We desire to extend the scope of our commercial interests by occupying new territory in Africa; we desire to maintain our communications with India and our Colonies; we desire to prevent other powers from ousting us from territories where our commercial interests have been already established; we desire to prevent other powers from establishing monopolies of their own trade in foreign lands to the detriment of ours; but as soon as any direct action is necessary to carry those desires into effect we shrink back in helpless alarm, and are told by the newspapers, and even by responsible statesmen, that the military strength of the Empire is already "strained to the cracking point." On the West Coast of

Africa, on the East Coast of Africa, in Egypt, in India, in New-foundland, while every other power is putting forward to our detriment every claim, just or unjust, which it thinks it can make with any chance of success, our Foreign Office, our India Office, our Colonial Office, are at their wits' end how best to stave off—feebly, and admittedly only for the time—every pressure brought to bear upon them by other countries essentially far weaker in all the conditions which lead to successful warfare, provided those conditions were properly taken advantage of. And why? Simply because we ourselves—not our enemies, but we ourselves—say openly that we have insufficient power, not merely for extending our Empire or our trade, but actually for maintaining the Empire and the trade which are already ours.

It is interesting to inquire what are the reasons for this great change in the position of Great Britain among the powers of the world,—the change, namely, from being the boldest to being the most hesitating and vacillating, from being the most enterprising in advancing her commercial interests to being the most feeble. It cannot be the want of men, for her population, since she fought single-handed many or most of the countries of Europe, has increased in a proportion much greater than that of her neighbours; it cannot be the want of money, for her wealth has increased in a proportion much greater than even her population.

I believe that the reasons lie partly with the country itself, partly with the administrative Government of the country as a whole, and partly with that section of the Government which is responsible for the military administration.

The country has become too rich, and with its riches has come selfishness, and with its selfishness want of true patriotism. That the great body of the people is far better off, is better housed, better clothed, better fed, than their ancestors is unquestionable. But that they are more restive under taxation is equally unquestionable. It may be true that the evil of party strife exaggerates the difficulty of taxation, but if the feeling of the country were sound this would have comparatively little effect. The truth seems to be that money and the objects to be attained through money, namely, greater comforts and greater luxuries, have now a higher value in the eyes of Englishmen than they formerly had. Take for example the case of taxation. Compared with Continental countries the taxation of England can only be described as extremely moderate. The average incomes of the people of France and Germany are notoriously far below the average incomes of the people of England. Yet France raises annually the enormous revenue of £126,000,000, and has within the last twenty-two years spent an average annual amount of £28,000,000 upon her Army. Germany, the poorest country of the three, raises a revenue of about £80,000,000 a year, and proposes in the future to spend some £20,000,000 a year upon her Army. England, the wealthiest country of the three, raises a revenue of about £90,000,000, of which about £17,500,000 goes to the cost of her Army. Yet, when some new tax is proposed, such as the "wheel tax" of some

years ago, there arises a clamour from the particular class affected, quite irrespective of whether the tax is just or unjust, and merely because the class objects to all taxation. So also if a remission of taxation is proposed, the clamour for relief is universal, and quite irrespective of whether the class claiming to be relieved has any just claim to the relief. So also if public money has to be disposed of, there is immediately a rush from all sides to the Exchequer for a share of the plunder. Class attacks class, profession attacks profession, trade attacks trade, from sheer selfishness only and to enable one class, profession, or trade, to pay less or receive more than some other class, profession, or trade. It is the same even with the members of those professions and those trades which are employed in the service of the country itself. It may fairly be questioned whether their efficiency is greater than, if indeed it is equal to, that of their predecessors. What is certain is that their regard for their emoluments, their desire for higher pay, their desire for less work, are far greater than in the case of their predecessors. Soldiers, sailors, Civil Service clerks, postmen, excisemen, policemen all have the one quality in common, that they are at all times agitating for more pay; and, what is much worse, the form their agitation takes is, just as often as not, ruinous to all discipline and to the efficiency with which the public service is carried out. Nothing is now more common than that a body of public servants should combine to introduce in this country the most dangerous form of election bribery. Pressure is brought to bear on Parliamentary candidates to use their influence to obtain higher pay or other advantages for public servants who have votes in a constituency. If they yield to the pressure, which they are only too likely to do, they are guilty of the meanest description of bribery. Those of our forefathers who sought seats in Parliament bribed at their own risk and with their own money. The modern candidate who stands for a constituency largely composed of public servants has every temptation put in his way to bribe with the money of the general taxpayer. When such cases as these occur, it is not possible to throw stones at the more humble artisan or miner, when he enters upon a possibly calamitous strike with a view to retain or to increase his daily wage. The course he takes is at least honest, inasmuch as a certain amount of discomfort and risk to himself personally is involved. But in his case as in the others, the general interests of the country are entirely ignored; his whole attention is permanently directed to his own personal emoluments, and those only.

It is only natural that this craving for more money, for being paid more and for paying less, should be coincident with a decline of patriotism. History has always proved this to be the case. Everything is judged solely by what will be the immediate pecuniary result to the individual; the general policy and general interests of the country are entirely overlooked and disregarded. On this point also a comparison of the England of the present day with Continental countries is by no means to the advantage of the former. Take France. The French press and the lower-class Frenchman are

rabidly patriotic. A French ministry which surrendered a just claim or a colony in the most remote part of the world would be at once hurled from power with little prospect of ever regaining it. If an English ministry acted in the same way there would no doubt be a party cry raised against them, but their Parliamentary majority would probably be in no way affected; and at the next general election the question of whether they would or would not remain in power would probably be determined according as they might or might not be able to offer some material bribe to the constituencies. Their action as to colonial or foreign affairs would have little or no effect on the result. Similarly if two candidates for Parliament presented themselves to a constituency, one of whom proposed to hand over Malta to France, but was able to bring influence to bear upon adding to the material prosperity of the town or district, he would to a certainty be elected member in preference to the man who had no influence in local affairs but took his stand upon the maintenance of the Empire. The fact that without Gibraltar or Malta the country might run the risk of its trade being greatly damaged would not be appreciated or understood by the average country voter.

But although the nation itself is mainly at fault as to the apathy with which the national defences are regarded, yet there can be no doubt that successive Governments are to blame when they pander, as they generally do, to the sordid objections raised against incurring necessary expenditure for military purposes. The country looks to its statesmen to lead; and the point now in question is peculiarly one upon which it is the duty of Governments to lead. They alone have the means of being sufficiently aware of the numbers and efficiency of the hostile forces with which England may at any time have to deal; and to them the country may fairly look to propose a sufficient strength on our side to meet those forces. The recent strengthening of the Navy by a Conservative Government is an instance—unfortunately a rare and exceptional one—in which the administration acted in the interests of the nation without much pressure from without. Even party malignity has been unable to find much fault with the action thus taken. There is little doubt that if their successors now in office initiated and carried out a well-considered scheme for increasing the military strength of the country without unduly or unnecessarily adding to the cost, their action would be received not only with toleration but even with gratitude.

As in the case of the people of England generally, so also in the case of the English Government, the apathy shown as to national defence is in marked contrast to the action taken by the Governments of European Continental powers. The latter never hesitate to propose any expenditure they may deem necessary or desirable. In the case of France, indeed, the action of its Government can only be considered to point in the direction of preparation for attack, and not merely for defence. A country which deliberately faces an annual deficit of £2,000,000 cannot avoid coming under this suspicion. Its enormous military expenditure may be held to be justified by fear of attack from Germany. Not so with its naval expenditure. The French

Navy is far superior to that of any other Continental power,—and it can be only with reference to the naval strength of England that the expenditure on the French Navy is regulated. But England is notoriously a non-aggressive power. The extravagant expenditure by France on its Navy must therefore be either pure waste or must be intended for aggression. Yet the numerous French Governments which have existed since 1870 have all uniformly proceeded on the same lines, and have all without scruple called upon their country to endure burdens which no English Government would have ventured to propose in the case of England. The Governments of Germany, Austria, and Italy have, under the pressure of necessity no doubt, but still without hesitation, followed the lead of France. The Government of England tardily acknowledged the existence of a serious national danger by a recent increase of her fleet; but still, although by far more able to sustain the burden than any Continental power, takes no steps to place her military strength for defence on a satisfactory footing.

But although the nation itself, and the Government as a whole, are no doubt mainly to blame for the want of a military organization suitable to the requirements of the country, yet it is impossible to acquit of blame that section of the Government which is more immediately responsible for military administration. It is twenty years since the nation became fully sensible of its military weakness, as compared with the strength of other European powers. An era of so-called military reforms was then inaugurated. The whole history of these "reforms" is a history of vacillation and change, with little improvement in our real strength, or, at least, an improvement far less in proportion than the increase which has taken place in Army expenditure. It is easy to say, and it is often said, that the strength of the Army entirely depends on the money voted by Parliament. This is by no means necessarily true, and the country does not believe it to be true. A great deal depends upon the way in which the money granted by Parliament is spent. It is an unfortunate fact that the country does not believe that, in spite of the numerous "reforms" which have been carried out, the strength of the Army has increased in proportion to the increase of expenditure; and the military administration cannot expect to be relieved of the blame which naturally results from this state of things.

The first and most important objection to what has been done since 1870 is that it has been entirely haphazard. No scheme of Army organization or of Army strength has ever been laid down, much less followed up and carried out. Yet so long ago as January, 1871, Earl Russell in a letter to "The Times" defined the objects for which England requires military strength.

They were:—

1. The United Kingdom should be defended against invasion.
2. The colonies and dependencies of the United Kingdom should be protected by our naval and military forces against a foreign enemy.
3. The engagements of the Crown and of our country with foreign powers should be fulfilled.

4. When our honour or our interests are deeply involved in some national dispute, they should be firmly maintained.

No attempt has ever been made by our Army administration to lay down clearly for the information of the country what military strength would, as a minimum, be necessary to carry out those objects, or to devise any scheme which would at a moderate cost bring the Army up to the strength required.

The system actually adopted certainly had the merit of simplicity. It consisted in tacking on a nominal system of short service to the conditions of English Army service. Short service had been in 1870 found a success in the German Army, which had to provide no Indian or colonial garrisons, and had to engage in no little wars. It was therefore considered necessary to adopt some imitation of it for the English Army, half of which served in India and the Colonies, and which had to furnish men for a little war every few years. The result has naturally been a hybrid system which neither fulfils the objects of a real short-service system, nor supplies, as our old Army did, a sufficient number of men fit at once to take the field on minor expeditions. Nor has the numerical result been at all commensurate with the additional cost. In 1870 we had in England some 105,000 Regular Troops, nearly all of whom were fit for immediate active service. We have now about 104,000 men with the colours, with about 69,000 in the Reserve. If the Reserves were called up we should thus have about 173,000 men. But admittedly at least half the strength with the colours, or about 50,000, are unfit from immature age to take the field, and the real strength of our first line is thus only some 123,000 men, or about 18,000 more than in 1870, while the Army Estimates have in the meantime increased by some two or three millions. The unpractical methods of our Army administration continue down even to the present day. "Army Corps" are successively kept in readiness for foreign service in case of war, and are numbered first, second, and so on. "Mobilization schemes" for home defence are successively brought out. On only two occasions since 1815—the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny—have the military requirements of Great Britain for active service reached the number of an Army Corps, and in the case of the latter the organization of an Army Corps for service in India would have been quite unsuitable; while in the case of a European war with a country like France or Russia, the Army Corps arrangements would have to be at once upset by that reinforcement of our Colonial garrisons which would have to be the first military step to be taken. They would also be entirely upset by the not uncommon occurrence of one of our "Little Wars."

It is impossible under these circumstances to feel surprised that the country is dissatisfied with its military administration for the last 20 years. It has seen a considerable increase to the Army Estimates, accompanied by attenuated home-service battalions, composed of immature youths; it has seen on more than one occasion the permanent unreadiness of the Army for minor war operations actually exposed; and it is aware that the numbers of men in

Reserve are entirely inadequate to form what would even be a sufficiently strong first line for military offence or defence in case of a great European war. There can be no doubt that this distrust in the capacity of its military administration has led to considerable hesitation on the part of the country in sanctioning any addition to military expenditure. Theoretical "Mobilization Schemes" and hypothetical "Army Corps" add nothing to the real defensive power of the Empire.

CHAPTER II.—*The relative Strength and Functions of the Sea and Land Forces of England.*

It has been indicated in the last chapter that the true way to work out a military system adapted to the requirements of the British Empire is first to lay down the objects to be attained, and then to devise a system which would best attain those objects at the smallest additional cost.

There has, however, recently come into prominence in the country a new theory, which seems to lay down the principle that little or no military strength is required by Great Britain at all; that ships are our only effective defences; that armies and what are called "fixed defences," or, in other words, fortifications, are comparatively of no value; and that if our naval power collapses or is even temporarily eclipsed, further resistance is hopeless, and Great Britain may at once surrender her Empire; the natural conclusion of this argument being that instead of adding to or even keeping up the present expenditure on her Army, the country should double or even treble her fleet. It is necessary, therefore, before entering on any discussion of the best steps to be taken for increasing or organizing our military forces that this argument should be dealt with.

It is based primarily on the assertion, which its advocates take for granted, that if the English fleet is destroyed the country must be starved out. It may be answered that in the first place the assumption is a most improbable one; and that in the second place the conclusion can by no means be admitted.

As to the assumption that the English fleets can be destroyed, or even that they can be so much weakened as to allow an enemy to close all the English ports, it is surely only necessary to point out that even after, in the early part of this century, the French Navy had been driven from the seas and the naval supremacy of England had been established beyond dispute, yet at no time was it possible for the English Navy to prevent large numbers of French vessels from entering or leaving French harbours. If effective blockades were difficult then, they are in these days of steam impossible now. The assumption that Great Britain would be starved out, therefore, implies that it would be possible for from 2,000 to 3,000 miles of coast line to be guarded so that no food could pass through to a country in which, after being landed, it could be distributed by a network of railways. All the fleets of the world would be insufficient to carry out such an operation. That there would be hardship is

undoubtedly true; whether the people would have the necessary endurance and tenacity to continue at war under such circumstances may, as was indicated in the earlier part of this paper, be doubtful; but it is certain that if the same endurance and the same tenacity belong to the present generation of Englishmen as belonged to their ancestors of 100 years ago, no amount of naval power on the part of their enemies could "starve them out," so long as money remained in the country to buy imported food. That money would be required is no doubt true; but of that, so long as the military defences on land could be maintained, there should be plenty available, and so long as money, and mechanical skill, and coal and iron remain in England, not only the provision of the necessary food, but the recovery of her naval strength, should be perfectly within her capacity. If not, nothing could save her from defeat, humiliation, and impoverishment under any circumstances; her people must have lost their old fighting qualities. One weak element in this theory of "starving out" is that if it is possible to imagine that the present fleet of England, which is admittedly superior to that of any other country, could be so utterly destroyed as to admit of a continuous blockade round all her coasts, it is equally possible to imagine that a doubled fleet would meet the same fate; for it is manifest that a catastrophe of this kind could only befall ships inferior as a class, or men inferior as a class; and it would be of comparatively little consequence to an enemy whether he had to destroy half or the whole of this inferior *matériel* and *personnel*. He would then have the advantage of finding the English coasts stripped of military defences in order to double the strength of the Navy, and of being able to march into London with no one to bar his approach; an operation which even "The Times" must admit would be more decisive and rapid than the starvation of England by blockade.

I do not, however, wish to be misunderstood. That the Navy must be the first element in the defences of an insular country goes without saying; but that any country can remain great without land forces and fortified points is refuted by all the teachings of history, ancient and modern. Greatness supported only by power at sea can never be anything but unstable and ephemeral.

Of this fact, Carthage, and the States of ancient Greece, are undoubted examples, but it is unnecessary to go back so far as ancient history for the necessary proofs. They are amply supplied by the history of modern communities.

In the middle ages the earliest examples are the commercial States of Italy.

Pisa was the leading commercial power in the Mediterranean in the thirteenth century. She established herself on land in the Balearic Isles, Sardinia, Corsica, and Elba. But in 1284 her Navy was destroyed by Genoa in the battle off Meloria. Thenceforward her power both on sea and land declined, and the city itself ultimately fell under the yoke of powers which had the control of stronger land forces.

To Pisa succeeded Genoa, the leading naval power of the earlier

part of the fourteenth century. She established herself in Corsica. In 1261 she acquired and fortified Galata, a suburb of Constantinople, expelling Pisa and Venice, and commanding from this post the whole trade of the Bosphorus and Black Sea. Towards the end of the thirteenth century she defeated in the Sea of Marmora the combined fleets of Venice, the Catalans, and Greece; but a century later she was defeated in attempting a blockade of Venice, and thenceforward her power declined. Her fortified colony of Galata fell with Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The helplessness of sea power unsupported by land forces was in this case illustrated. During the siege of Constantinople the Genoese defeated the Turkish fleet at the entrance of the Bosphorus; but their sea victory was fruitless to postpone the fall of Galata to the Turkish land Army. By 1500 Genoa itself had fallen into the hands of France.

Venice succeeded Genoa as the leading naval and commercial power of the Mediterranean and the Levant. This famous community first rose into prominence in the thirteenth century. She established herself at numerous points on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, from which she controlled the commerce passing from Asia to the western countries of Europe. Until the middle of the fourteenth century she had no land territory in Italy; but by 1404 she had acquired Padua, Verona, and Vicenza, and by 1508 her land possessions extended from the Lake of Como to the middle of Dalmatia; but in 1509 she was entirely dispossessed of these by a combination of land powers, including the Pope, the Emperor, France, and Spain. From the fifteenth century her power declined, and, although she maintained a long struggle for her Mediterranean possessions with the Turks, the combined land and sea forces at the disposal of the latter brought about the inevitable result of her ultimate expulsion. With the loss of her colonies her commerce decayed, and Venice itself fell ultimately at various periods into the hands of France, Austria, and now of Italy.

The one point common to all these commercial and naval communities of Italy is that they had no land power capable of supporting their sea power; and they all thus ultimately had to succumb to nations which were stronger on land. Even at the most splendid periods of their history they were dependent for land defence on mercenary troops. Personal military service by the native members of the States was commuted for money payments, which the wealth obtained by commerce enabled the population to endure; but the principle of entrusting national defence to foreigners must always have the same result as followed in the case of these Italian States. Their navies secured their commerce, and added immensely to their wealth, but could not, unsupported by land strength, either permanently retain that commerce or that wealth, or even preserve the independence of the communities to which they belonged.

The history of Spain teaches the same lesson. At the end of the sixteenth century Spain was the leading power of Europe. The Empire of Philip II extended over great part of Europe, and his fleet was, before the despatch of the Armada, superior to that of any other

country. Macaulay thus describes the origin of the ascendancy of Spain at this period ("War of the Succession in Spain") :—

"The ascendancy which Spain then had in Europe was, in one sense, well deserved. It was an ascendancy which had been gained by unquestioned superiority in all the arts of policy and war. In the sixteenth century, Italy was not more decidedly the land of the fine arts, Germany was not more decidedly the land of bold theological speculation, than Spain was the land of statesmen and of soldiers. The character which Virgil had ascribed to his countrymen might have been claimed by the grave and haughty chiefs who surrounded the grave of Ferdinand the Catholic and of his immediate successors. That majestic art—*premere imperio populos*—was not better understood by the Romans in the proudest days of their Republic than by Gonsalvo and Ximenes, Cortes and Alva. The skill of the Spanish diplomatists was renowned through Europe. In England the name of Gondomar is still remembered. The sovereign nation was unrivalled both in regular and irregular warfare. The impetuous chivalry of France, the serried phalanx of Switzerland, were alike found wanting when brought face to face with the Spanish Infantry."

Spain then had a standing army of 50,000 troops, a number greatly in excess of the land strength of any other European country. But during the seventeenth century her power on land rapidly declined. She lost a great part of her European territory; and, in 1703, French, English, and German armies were contending for the mastery in the heart of her kingdom. Soon after, she lost Gibraltar and Minorca to England. Yet, although her land strength had disappeared, her power at sea remained considerable for another century. At the beginning of this century Napoleon valued alliance with Spain as a naval power. Nevertheless, she had never been reckoned as a first-class European power since her land strength practically disappeared some 200 years ago; and with the loss of her principal Colonies her wealth and her commerce have been mainly transferred to other nations.

But it is not necessary even to go to foreign countries for proof of the fact that strength on land is a necessity of the existence of a power of the first class. The history of England itself teaches the lesson perhaps more effectively than that of any other country. The long struggle between England and France for empire both on land and sea may be said to have seriously begun in 1756, and to have continued with various breaks until 1815. The first period of war lasted some six years, from 1756 to 1762. When it began, the Navy of Great Britain cost some $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions annually, while the Army cost only some $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions. By 1760 the cost of the Army had risen to about 6 millions, while that of the Navy was only between 4 and 5: that is, the proportion of cost and strength between the sea and the land forces had been during those years practically reversed. Yet these figures take no account of the subsidies granted to European powers for their assistance in maintaining the struggle on land with France, and which, therefore, form essentially a part of England's

military expenditure. The period was probably the most glorious in English history. The whole power of the nation was directed by the ablest War Minister who has, since the days of Cromwell, appeared in English history; and the energies of the elder Pitt were, like those of Cromwell, directed as much (if not more) to the development of the land strength of the country as of its naval strength. France was driven by English troops from North America; her power in India was shattered; her Colonies in the West Indies were without exception attacked, and were in most cases subdued; Spain was driven from Portugal, and her Colonies of Manilla in the East Indies, and of Havanna in the West Indies were occupied. It is true that all this could not have been effected without successful naval warfare; but it is equally true that in every case success was attained by combined land and sea operations, and that without a powerful Army the victories at sea of Hawke, Boscawen, and Rodney would have been absolutely barren.

The second period of the great struggle with France dates from 1776 to 1783. The great War Minister of 20 years earlier was no longer in the height of his power or of his vigour. The fatal element of incompetence at the head-quarters of the country and in the direction of its affairs intervened. French and Spanish fleets rode in the Channel. English armies surrendered to their own kinsmen in America, and a great and powerful confederation of English Colonies broke away from the mother country. Minorca fell after a six months' siege; France attacked, although not with uniform success, the insufficient English garrisons in the West Indies; while the victories of Rodney at sea, the successful defence of Gibraltar by Eliott on land, and the operations of Sir Eyre Coote in India are the only relieving points in a long series of failures; and these occurred only towards the end of a war generally calamitous to England. The reverses thus sustained have been attributed solely to a decline of sea-power; it would be far more just and far more true to attribute them to a contingency to which every country has been and will be liable; to the temporary incompetence, namely, of the directing authority at head-quarters, and to the temporary incompetence or feebleness of its subordinate officers. For the failures were not at sea only, but equally, if not in a greater degree, on land also. The Admirals and Fleets of England, and the Generals and Armies of England, were successful or unsuccessful in this war entirely in proportion to the means provided for them from head-quarters and to their own competence or incompetence in employing them.

The last and most severe contest between England and France began in 1793, and may be considered, for all practical purposes, to have continued until 1815. The naval part of it practically closed in 1805, when the supremacy of England on sea was established at Trafalgar. If, as we are now told, sea-power alone is necessary to a country, there was no reason why, so far as England was concerned, the war with France should not have been at once closed after Nelson's victory. Her fleets commanded the seas, the home country was secure, she had only to guard her coasts with her Navy, and to

leave the Continental powers to settle their quarrels as they pleased. How differently our ancestors thought is clear from their course of action. During the years from 1805 to 1815 they expended enormous sums of money and the lives of many brave soldiers in aiding the Continental powers to destroy the land forces of Napoleon; and they never rested until that destruction was complete. As in the case of the war of fifty years earlier, the development of the military strength of the country during this war was far greater than the development of its naval strength. Yet the strength of the Navy was enormous. In 1809 there were 698 English ships in commission, with 130,000 seamen and marines—a naval force greater than the world had ever seen. The increases between 1801 and 1813 of the naval and military strength respectively are indicated by the following figures:—

English Navy.

Year.	Seamen and Marines.	Cruisers in Commission.	Naval Estimates.
1801	135,000	472	£ 16,577,000
1813	140,000	570	20,096,000

English Army.

Year.	English Regular Troops for General Service.	English Regular Troops for Colonial Service.	English Regular Troops for Service in India.	Foreign Troops.	Embodied Militia for Home Defence.	Total European Embodied Troops.	Military Expenditure.
1801	154,000	3,000	23,000	13,290	70,650	263,940	£ 20,316,000
1813	239,000	5,000	36,000	33,000	62,000	397,000	36,779,000

(The "Military Expenditure" of 1801 probably includes subsidies of £634,000; and that of 1813 subsidies of £11,291,216.)

Besides the above land forces there were in 1801 nearly 140,000, and in 1813 about 186,000, native Colonial and Indian troops in the service of the Empire.

By 1810 France had no Colony left in her possession, either in the West Indies, or in the Indian Ocean, or on the West Coast of Africa: in 1798 Minorca was captured by General Stuart, and in the same year Malta was blockaded by the British fleet. The latter is the only instance during the French wars of an important fortress being captured by naval operations only. But they lasted for two years, the place not having fallen until 1800.

It is clear from the above instances of British history, that our

ancestors at least cannot be claimed as advocates of the theory that naval power alone is sufficient for the maintenance of the British Empire. And their descendants of the present day can hardly say that they did not know how to make war; for England has ever since reaped the fruits of their efforts.

The evidence furnished by the history of the Italian States, of Spain, and of Great Britain itself, thus all points in one direction. The wealth which follows commerce, manufactures, and the possession of colonies, can only be obtained and retained by the maintenance of a powerful Navy. But naval power without land power can never have the element of permanence. It may exist for a time on sufferance; but if attacked it must be supported by a numerous and warlike native population, trained to warfare on land, depending as it does upon fixed points from which it can be protected or renewed in case of a reverse. If such points do not exist, or are not held in sufficient strength, a naval country has nothing to fall back upon while her fleets are being re-formed and reorganized, and the whole power of the country collapses. Nor can a struggle for existence between two powers be finally decided except on land. The naval strength of Napoleon was practically destroyed ten years before he finally succumbed to the combined land forces of the European powers. The fleets and wealth of England contributed largely, if not mainly, to his downfall; but alone and unaided they could never have brought it about.

CHAPTER III.—*The Military Organization of the Empire should provide Greater Strength for Active Operations Abroad.*

In the previous two Chapters I have endeavoured to show,—

1. That before devising a satisfactory military organization it is necessary that the nation and its public servants should have a clear idea of the objects for which the organization is likely to be required.

2. That the wealth of nations is usually dependent mainly on the extent of their commerce, of their manufactures, and on their colonies or settlements abroad.

3. That the maintenance of the wealth of a nation is thus dependent on its possession of a powerful Navy; while on the other hand the existence of the Navy is dependent on the home country and its colonies or settlements abroad being strongly held as fixed points for its protection or support.

4. That therefore in the last resort powerful land forces must be the mainstay even of Naval powers.

I must here guard myself from its being supposed that in this paper it is advocated that England should keep up the enormous establishments of troops which the Continental powers now maintain. I believe she could do so if she pleased; her population has doubled since the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when it has been shown that she had nearly 400,000 European troops at her disposal for land warfare, while her wealth has increased in a much greater pro-

portion. She is far from being in the same position as the Italian Republics, which never had a sufficient native population of their own to support on land the widely extended fabric of commerce they had raised. But it is quite unnecessary, and would be an unjustifiable waste of money, that the land armaments of England should approach those of Germany, or Russia, or France. The power of her fleet must go for something. The Channel itself prevents her being overwhelmed, as France was in 1870, by half a million troops pouring across her frontier. There ought, therefore, to be no difficulty in a nation of some 38,000,000 population providing the comparatively moderate land strength she requires. The danger is, and always has been, that conscious as she is of being always fairly secure as to the power of her fleets and of a very moderate land force to maintain the safety of the kernel of the Empire—Great Britain itself—she neglects the necessity of providing for the security of those distant possessions which are as essential an element of her prosperity, and even of her existence as a great power, as the home country itself. For the essential distinction between the British Empire and the Continental powers of Europe, is that the foreign possessions of the latter are a luxury, while the foreign possessions of Great Britain are now a necessity to her. Without the commerce and manufactures which follow upon the possession of settlements abroad, her population could not exist. I have disclaimed belief in the fantastic theory that a foreign country could at once starve out Great Britain after a decisive naval victory. But it is impossible for any thinking man not to see that if the Colonies of Great Britain were wrested from her, and her foreign trade destroyed—an operation far more difficult and likely to be far more prolonged than several naval defeats—her population at home could not live. She must then yield to the enormous ransom which would undoubtedly be imposed, even although the shores of the United Kingdom might have been maintained intact. The mistake, therefore, which appears now to be made by the country is in not treating the defence of the Empire, as a whole, on exactly the same footing as the defence of the United Kingdom itself. The number of her troops available for the defence of the United Kingdom is probably sufficient for all reasonable requirements; the number of her troops available for the maintenance of her Empire abroad is miserably inadequate.

For it is useless to disguise the fact that the elements of strength which could be employed against our foreign possessions by our most probable enemy have vastly increased since 1815. We say our "most probable enemy" because France alone can be considered to be the country dangerous to the existence of Great Britain as one of the great powers of the world: and because the course she has been recently following as to armaments must, as has been already pointed out, be looked upon only as a distinct menace to England. The enormous augmentation of her Army may be justified by the rivalry with Germany; but the increase in her naval strength can only be justified by rivalry with Great Britain; and such rivalry in the case of a country burdened with an enormous debt of some

£1,300,000,000, and which imposes on its population an annual taxation far greater than that which Englishmen grumble at, cannot be considered as other than extremely dangerous. It is all the more dangerous that England has latterly adopted the principle of avoiding all alliances with other powers. She calls it "keeping free from foreign entanglements." This course may have its advantages; although, considering the previous history of this country and the present state of politics in Europe, it is not easy to see in what they consist. Germany, Austria, and Italy have adopted a different course, with the result that they are unassailable by France singly, and most formidable even against a combination of France and Russia, which are admittedly at the present time the only aggressive powers in Europe. If England had joined that alliance, the peace of Europe would surely stand far less chance of being disturbed than when, as now, she stands ostentatiously aloof from the other non-aggressive powers. On the principle that gunpowder in exploding follows the line of least resistance, there is far greater temptation for France to attack England than to attack any other power. Not only so, but the essential vulnerability of England is far greater than that of any other power. Her commerce, the widely extended nature of her Empire, her want of preparation for land warfare, involve the certainty that in a war with France, even singly, she would suffer more than her assailant; for the vital part of France, namely France itself, could not without alliances be attacked at all, while the vital part of England, her Colonies and her commerce, would not only be entirely assailable, but would be in great risk of being attacked with success.

I have said that the power of France for attacking England has greatly increased within the present century. In the last century the blockade of Toulon alone absorbed great part of the Navy of England, under her ablest admirals. France has now, in addition, established herself on the south coast of the Mediterranean, in Algeria and Tunis, flanking on both sides, instead of on one, our trade route to the East, and our communications with India. The *laches* which permitted such a state of things is inexcusable; the route to the East by the Mediterranean must inevitably in case of war be either greatly impeded or entirely stopped, and our trade throttled near its very source. A parallel case would be our attempting to march an English Army through Belgium to the Rhine, with a hostile French Army on one flank and a hostile Dutch Army on the other. Professions are put forward that the Tunis Harbour is not to be fortified. Such professions are futile. A strong French garrison could in a few weeks render the place impregnable against anything short of a regular siege by a large force. Cyprus is supposed to balance Biseria. We have held Cyprus for some 14 years, and it has as yet neither a harbour nor defences. We keep a half-battalion there, apparently for the sole purpose of giving France the triumph, on the outbreak of war, of capturing a few hundred British troops.

But it is not only in the Mediterranean that French power for

offensive warfare has increased. She holds posts in the West Indies from which she can assail our Colonies and fortified posts in the North Atlantic. On the West Coast of Africa she has established herself on the Senegal, on the Niger, and on the Congo. She has occupied the East African coast opposite Aden, holds several points in the Indian Ocean and in the South Pacific, while in the far East she has established powerful garrisons close to our trade route to China. All these settlements involve a heavy loss to her revenue, for none are in themselves profitable; but in case of war they would form valuable *points d'appui* for attacking English possessions and English commerce; and there can therefore be no injustice in the inference that, like the maintenance of her powerful Navy, the establishment and maintenance of these posts have been carried out by France solely with a view to an ultimate successful attack upon Great Britain.

It is often said, and it is no doubt the opinion of many Englishmen, that in establishing garrisons abroad France is merely giving so many hostages to England, as they must at once surrender to our superior Navy. There is a story that Lord Palmerston, or the English Foreign Minister of the day, some 50 years ago, when there was a dispute between the two countries, said that if war broke out France might "relieve herself of all anxiety for the future" about her colony in Algiers. There might have been some foundation for the saying then; it would be the merest brag now. To turn 50,000 French troops out of Algiers would be considerably beyond the power even of the English Navy. And to starve them out would be equally difficult.

Even in the old wars, when steam was unknown, and when the English fleets were far more powerful relatively than now, there was no period at which considerable French squadrons did not find means to enter and leave French harbours. If effective blockades were difficult then, they are impossible now. We are told that coal is a necessity for modern naval warfare, and that England alone has the power of supplying her fleets with coal at distant stations. But England has not a monopoly of the coal supply; before the outbreak of war it would be possible for any power to supply and store a large stock of coal; and, during the progress of the war, to renew it from coal-producing countries other than England. There are also neutral ports. Even if it were possible, which it is admitted not to be, for the English Navy to shut up all the harbours in France, and those in her Colonies or fortified posts abroad, the maintenance of such blockades would absorb so much of its strength as to leave the whole of British commerce at the mercy of a few hostile cruisers.

The truth is that the true policy of England, in reference to the foreign possessions of countries with which she may be at war, remains the same as it was in the days of our ancestors. The elder and the younger Pitt, however much they may have varied in capacity for carrying on war successfully, never varied in the policy of attacking and annexing the foreign possessions of an enemy. The results in the case of the various wars with France and Spain from

75 to 150 years ago have been already stated. By 1810 France had no colony left, and Spain had been deprived of those which it was possible to attack with success. Unfortunately Great Britain, in 1815, treated France with a magnanimity which has in some cases, such as the Newfoundland Fisheries, been badly returned. Many of her foreign possessions were restored to her at the end of the great war, and these she has since greatly added to. The work of attack would thus be far more formidable now than formerly; nevertheless, it would have to be undertaken. For, if not undertaken, in all probability the tables would be turned. Our Colonial possessions are notoriously too weakly garrisoned; it has been said that the blockade of small squadrons has now become impossible; and Franco would inevitably endeavour to utilize to the utmost her enormous preponderance over Great Britain in land forces. All these considerations point to the conclusion that, immediately on the outbreak of war, carefully-prepared expeditions would be despatched against every British outlying post the reduction of which would be within the bounds of possibility. And, under present conditions, it is impossible to say that in such warfare Great Britain would not suffer most serious injury, if she would not indeed be entirely crippled, at the very commencement of a war.

The inference, therefore, from these considerations is that it is not sufficient that Great Britain should have, as we are so often told, merely a small but thoroughly efficient Army. She wants numbers, as well as quality, at the very commencement of a great war; in the first place to double her colonial garrisons, in the second to form part of combined land and sea operations for the reduction of the colonial posts of the enemy. We have seen that her present effective strength of Regular troops at home can be reckoned, even including the Reserves, at only some 120,000 men. In case of war with France, not one man of these would be allowed to leave England, and our Colonies and posts abroad would be left to take care of themselves. The probable result cannot be described as other than fatal.

The first consideration, therefore, in devising a suitable organization for the English Army is that its strength should be immensely increased for active operations abroad. We have seen that Great Britain in 1813, towards the end of the great war with the French, had gradually raised the strength of her Army to 397,000 men. Of these, 82,000 were embodied Militia, available only for home defence. There were, therefore, 315,000 men available for the defence of the Empire abroad or for attack. She had then, however, advantages which she has not got now. Her Navy was supreme on the seas, and the Colonies and posts of France abroad had all been occupied. There were only 36,000 English troops in India; there have now to be 72,000. She was aided on the Continent by a powerful combination which diverted from England a great part of the attention of Napoleon, and much the greatest part of his land forces. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that her strength should be not less, but more, than our grandfathers thought necessary towards the close of a successful war. Yet, including the European Army in India and

our European colonial garrisons, we are now satisfied with a total strength of only some 220,000 Regular troops (including Reserves, but excluding youths and dépôts) available for the general defence of the Empire at home and abroad; and, excluding India, a total strength of only some 150,000 Regular troops for the defence of the rest of the Empire, including Great Britain itself.

Instead of "we are now satisfied" it would perhaps be more correct to say "we are now only provided" with the above forces; whatever may be the official view, recent discussions in the public press sufficiently indicate the uneasy feeling in the country on the subject.

CHAPTER IV.—*Defects of the Volunteers and Militia with reference to the Military Organization of the Country.*

It will no doubt be objected to the statement in the last Chapter of the effective land forces of Great Britain that no account is taken of the Volunteers and the Militia. The omission, was, however, a deliberate one. I believe that, should war with a great European power unfortunately break out, and should it be within the bounds of possibility that that power would have the means of invading England, the country itself would place no dependence whatever—at least at first—on the Volunteers and Militia; and, as has been already said, it would require every man of the Regular troops to be kept in readiness to resist possible invasion.

It is an invidious task to criticize the Volunteer force. The movement was, in its inception at least, a patriotic and meritorious one, and even now it serves a good object in promoting the physical training of the youth of Great Britain. But it is now, to say the least, doubtful whether the evils caused by it do not counterbalance the benefits it confers.

In the first place, the country in time of peace treats it as a trustworthy force, and makes it an excuse for not adding to the real defences of the kingdom; while in time of war it would as certainly, so long as it remained merely a Volunteer body, be treated as an untrustworthy force.

Its first defect is that it has no discipline, and indeed no imitation of discipline. It is not possible that men who are begged and not ordered to attend parades or drill can have anything of the nature of discipline; the mere fact that the request is made, and not the order given, is prejudicial to the very essence of discipline. The fair-weather discipline is no doubt good; it merely means that the men are generally respectable and well-behaved; and when they go out on Easter-tide marches, or to camps, or to field-days, there is no reason why they should do otherwise than maintain their usual character for good conduct for those few days. What the discipline would be under the tests of hardship, of poor fare for months, of perpetual vigilance before an enemy, is another matter altogether. And indeed there have been cases where under the pressure of even a few days of bad weather, and the consequent idleness, the usually good conduct of the men has broken down. In such cases the officers are, of

course, quite helpless. It is doubtful whether the fact that such a state of indiscipline exists in a force which claims to be really a body of soldiers does not react injuriously on the men of the Regular Army. The latter hear the indiscriminate praises now bestowed, sometimes by men in the highest military positions, upon the soldier-like qualities of the Volunteers; and it is not very surprising that they should sometimes consider themselves justified in adopting some of the methods of a force which can only be kept in existence by the "popularity" of its officers, and which has no scruple on occasions in indicating to an officer, in methods which would hardly meet acceptance in the German, or French, or Russian Armies, that he has not succeeded in meeting with their approval.

The second defect is that the important elements of cohesion and self-confidence must be entirely wanting in a Volunteer force. Men who are for all the main objects of their career civilians, whose parades and drills are merely a diversion and a change from their more serious pursuits, and who are only occasionally associated with their comrades, can never, when brought to the test of field service, get rid of the amateur feeling and treat fighting as their profession. Yet a scheme was inaugurated by the last War Minister for raising Volunteer batteries of Mounted Artillery—probably the duty which of all others requires the most thorough military training. No dependence could be placed on such a force.

The third defect is that most of the force would not be available, except possibly at enormous expense and by dislocating the business of the country, even for home defence. They could not practically be withdrawn from their civil employments as permanent garrisons of threatened points. If they were, large amounts for pay and compensation would have to be issued to them. On the other hand, if summoned to resist an invasion they would probably arrive too late; notice is hardly likely to be given by the enemy. Some corps consist of men who could not in time of war be withdrawn from their peace duties; the Post Office Volunteers and those of the Royal Arsenal, for instance, would probably have their civil work doubled in time of war. There are probably only two categories of Volunteers who could be really utilized for active service, namely, the London Volunteers and the corps who live in the seaport towns. They are on the spot, and their services can be utilized without withdrawing them from their civil work. The weaklings can be weeded out, and their training carried out with some approach to efficiency. It should, however, be made a *sine quâ non* that they should be placed under the Army Act for discipline. For there is no reason, but the contrary, why Volunteers should not, under proper discipline and training, be equal to or better than our present Regular troops; they are probably of a more intelligent class. But it is only mischievous to tell them that under present conditions they can properly rank as soldiers.

The fourth and most fatal defect of the Volunteer force is that it is not available for service abroad, or, in other words, for the general defence of the Empire. It is useless to dilate on this subject. It will have been seen, from the whole of the previous parts of this

paper, that it is considered that the main object of the military organization of this country ought to be to provide a force capable of defending our Colonies and posts abroad as effectively as the home country. For that purpose the Volunteer force, even if it were thoroughly efficient, would be useless under its present conditions of service.

On the whole, therefore, it seems to be unlikely that more than some 60,000 men out of the 220,000 belonging to the Volunteer force, could be utilized for home defence in time of war, and these should be employed behind the defensive works required for the defence of London, and of the seaports in or near which they reside. No confidence could be placed on them as a field force. Bull's Run, Chanz'y's operations, those of Faidherbe, and Bourbaki's march across France, in the Franco-Prussian War; the Guerilla warfare in Spain; the Franc-tireur warfare in France—all prove beyond question that superiority of numbers and individual bravery avail nothing to undisciplined and partially-trained bodies of men against disciplined and fully-trained troops. At first sight the case of the American Army under Washington in the War of Independence, and the case of the French Revolutionary forces in 1792-93, would appear to be exceptions, but they are not really so. Washington's troops, or a great proportion of them, had been as fully trained for war as the English troops opposed to them, and they were far better led. For several years before the War of Independence broke out, the English Government had granted subsidies to the American colonists for service against the French and against their Indian neighbours, and Washington himself had received his military training in this way. As to the half-trained armies of France in 1792-93, they were never really fairly attacked by the forces opposed to them. Valmy in 1792 was merely a cannonade, yet the French officers had great difficulty in preventing their men from running away; and the German General, for political reasons, never really pushed his attack home. In 1793 the French levies were in the beginning of the year shut up in camps from inability to take the field; their opponents sat down to besiege Valenciennes and Condé instead of moving to the attack. Time was thus given for the necessary training, and the raw French troops of the Revolution developed into the victorious armies of Napoleon.

It is impossible, therefore, under present conditions to reckon the Volunteer force of Great Britain a part of the organization best suited to the needs of the Empire. General Sherman's description of the Union Army at the battle of Bull's Run exactly applies to the Volunteers of Great Britain: "We had good organization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, no respect for authority, no real knowledge of war."¹

The Militia is a more valuable force than the Volunteers. The men have had some experience of what is the first essential in the training of either officers or soldiers—namely, they have lived in

¹ General Sherman's "Memoirs."

barracks under discipline and the Army Act, and they have had a few months' continuous drill. They can also be embodied at any time before or immediately after a declaration of war; and when embodied they at once come under the Army Act and regular training. Their efficiency thereafter entirely depends on the length of this training. They would after six months probably be fit to be placed in line with Regular troops. Their defects are, therefore, two: first, they would not have training enough to be fit to take part in the defence of the Empire immediately after a declaration of war; and, secondly, they are not available for the defence of the Empire abroad.

CHAPTER V.—*The Proposed Military Organization.*

It remains to state what in the opinion of the writer, on the principles laid down above, should be "The Military Organization best adapted to Imperial needs."

Such an organization can only be founded on a real short-service system. Wealthy as England is, she could not endure the cost of the permanent embodiment of the number of men necessary for the defence of her Empire.

I have said that the present system is a hybrid system. A real short-service system is one under which men remain with the colours only long enough to receive the necessary training and then pass to the Reserve. It is quite incompatible with foreign or colonial service in time of peace.

The first necessity, therefore, is that the Indian and Colonial armies should be entirely dissociated from the home Training Army.

The separation of the Indian Army will no doubt be vigorously opposed by many. Twenty years ago the writer of this paper advocated this step as the first preliminary to establishing a real short-service system. There were then fewer advocates of it than there are now. It may, perhaps, ultimately be carried into effect as being in fact inevitable if the country is to have sufficient means for land offence and defence; the danger is that it may not be carried into effect until too late.

The reasons for the step are so manifest that it is extraordinary that we have taken 20 years to realize them. The first is the immense difficulty involved in recruiting men for Imperial service. For, so long as 40 years ago, the principle began to be established that the difficulty of recruiting is in direct proportion to the length of the term of enlistment. We began with the term of life service, and had to give it up. We fell back on 21 years' service, and had to give it up. We then adopted 12 years with the colours; and we have now, in general, the term of seven years with the colours and five in reserve, and shall have to give those conditions up. Englishmen of the present day will not commit themselves to periods of service which involve not only strict discipline but long periods of exile; at least, the majority will not. There will always be certain adventurous spirits who, if liberal conditions are offered to them, will

accept by choice a military career abroad ; but such men, full-grown at least, are not numerous enough to supply the numbers we require even for our present establishments. Besides, the old traditions on the subject of enlistment have not yet died out among the class which furnishes our recruits. Forty years ago a man who "went for a soldier" was looked upon as having not only lost caste, but as being cut off for life from all his relatives and friends. Such impressions die hard, and it will take the strongest measures to get finally rid of them. That they should without unnecessary delay be got rid of is manifest. Their existence amounts to a national danger. For it is sufficiently clear that to soldiering, as soldiering, the class in question does not object. It takes to Volunteering with zeal and energy—a zeal and energy unfortunately turned into a wrong channel so far as the general defence of the Empire is concerned. The first and most essential method of getting rid of this feeling as to enlistment is to make the Indian Army a separate one. For at present every man who enlists into the Regular Army is liable to undergo, and most of them have to undergo, periods of exile and exposure to more or less unhealthy climates, and they are then mostly turned adrift at too mature an age to take kindly to a trade or other useful civil employment. Such men are spread all over the country. If, on the other hand, under a long-service system, the Indian Army were to be kept apart, only some 9,000 men would be required to recruit it, and these men would, after fulfilling the terms of their Army service, fall back into civil life provided with the pensions which they would have earned.

Nor when the difficulty comes to be really faced is it possible to see what insurmountable obstacle exists. India at present pays for her garrison, and on the same principle she should pay for her own recruiting. At present she no doubt does so in some form of money payment. But she does not pay and she cannot pay, because it cannot be represented by a mere money payment, for the weakness of the defences of the Empire as a whole, including that of India herself, caused by the difficulty of recruiting a sufficiently numerous Reserve. For the ultimate defence of India herself may collapse from want of power to reinforce her garrison from home. The cost of pensions would no doubt be greater for India under the conditions of a long-service "local" army ; but that would be a perfectly fair tax upon the country. The principal objections that have been brought against a "local" Indian army are two—the medical objection and the objection on the score of discipline. Both objections would have to be removed by special measures. The term of service should not exceed 18 years, and the men should be brought home at the public cost for the sixth, twelfth, and eighteenth years of their service. They would thus have one year at home for every five years in India. That year might either be allowed entirely as furlough, or half on furlough and half on duty with the depôts. And the terms of service would have to be elastic. If a man wished to retire after the first five years' service he might be placed in reserve for the remainder of his 18 years' term ; after 10 years he might go

to the reserve with a gratuity, or with a small pension, always on the condition that a limited number only could be allowed such a privilege. After 18 years, the last year being spent in England to allow of his obtaining employment, he would, of course, receive full pension. The men should have the same privileges as to hill stations as the officers. The above conditions would nearly assimilate the service of the men to that of the officers, and would probably be necessary in modern days to render Indian service attractive. They also ought to remove all the objections made to a local Indian Army on medical and disciplinary grounds. They would, of course, involve an increase to the present Indian establishment of one-fifth for the number of men who would be at home every sixth, twelfth, and eighteenth year of their service, or about 14,000 men in all, and an addition to the strength of some 3,000 or 4,000 men for depôts in England. The total strength of the Indian Army on such conditions would thus have to be about 90,000 men, with a small reserve of 15,000 or 20,000 men who might have been allowed to shorten their colour service on the conditions above stated. It can hardly be considered that even 110,000 men is too great a European army for a country like India to have at its disposal under the conditions of military strength which now hold good in countries like Russia. But the conditions of strength and cost of their "local" Army would be entirely for the consideration of the Indian Government. What is essential is that India should no longer be the main obstacle to the development of the armed strength of Great Britain for land warfare.

The next point is to separate our Colonial Army from our Training Army.

Our Colonial Army is here held to include the troops required for service in "Little Wars." It has been pointed out in the first chapter that the theoretical arrangements made by our present military administration for "Mobilization" and "Army Corps" are liable to be entirely upset by a "Little War." Only twice since 1815 has it been necessary for England to send abroad a force of the strength of an Army Corps. On the other hand we have had in the same period very many "Little Wars;" that is, for England great wars have been rare, while little wars have been numerous during this century. Our present organization does not provide at all for these little wars. We have either to call out the Reserves, or to break up our regiments and battalions, or to send out immature boys. To call up the Reserve for such paltry wars as we have had since the Indian Mutiny is nothing short of a gross breach of faith; it is a misuse of the English language to call such wars cases of "national emergency." If it is to be necessary to disturb our Reserve men on every such occasion, we cannot expect to keep a Reserve at all; the men could neither get nor keep employment. It would have to be clearly enacted by Parliament, if a real short-service system is introduced, that the men in Reserve should not be called out except in case of imminent danger of war with one or more of the great European powers, or with the United States.

It follows that some provision must be made to have in England a small force ready to be sent abroad in case of one of these small wars. Its numbers need hardly exceed 25,000 men.

There are also our peace garrisons in the Colonies. These amount, roughly, to 30,000 men.

Our Colonial Army would, therefore, include some 55,000 men. They would be enlisted for long service—18 years, as proposed for the Indian Army. The proportion serving abroad in peace time being 30,000 men to the 25,000 men kept at home for the contingency of a small war, the men would have on an average 8 years at home to 10 years abroad out of their 18 years' service, the two forces relieving each other. It would, however, be desirable that each unit should have only 5 years abroad continuously, being then brought home for 4 years. The conditions of service should probably be similar to those proposed for the Indian service, except that the 18 years' service would be continuous instead of being broken into three periods. The usual periods of furlough would, of course, be allowed; and, as in the case of the Indian Army, the terms of service should be elastic; that is, a certain proportion of the men, confined to a reasonable number, should be allowed to go, if they wish it, to a reserve at the end of the sixth and twelfth years of their service; full pension being reserved for those men only who complete their 18 years' service with the colours. The reserve to be limited to 10,000 men.

Probably not more than 6,000 recruits annually would be required for this force.

It might be a question later on whether that number of men might not be allowed to volunteer for the Colonial Army after having completed their 2 years' service in the Training Army; but the necessity of breaking through the ideas now current about enlistment, and the danger that it might be desired to allow volunteers from the Imperial Reserve to go to the Indian Army as well as the Colonial, appear to afford strong reasons for keeping the Training Army and its Reserve entirely on home service—certainly for some time—and allowing no volunteers from it to the long-service armies.

It remains to provide for the most important part of the whole organization, namely, the Training Army and its Reserve.

It is proposed that a minimum force should first be fixed as what is absolutely necessary for the defensive and offensive operations which Great Britain would have to carry out in case of war with a great European power like France. This would be for the Government of the country to decide. The following strength is suggested merely as an instance, and as a basis for a rough estimate of the numbers of men who would have to be provided for the Training Army; of what numbers would in consequence pass into the Reserve; and of what would approximately be the cost of the whole, on the conditions above stated.

Of these 525,000 men, the distribution would therefore *at first* approximately be :—

The number of 65,000 men allowed for the dépôts would, however, be in the same category as the immature youths now found in our existing regiments; and it would be more correct to state the actual available force as 350,000 Regular Troops fit for duty at home or abroad on a declaration of war in addition to 110,000 available for service in India. We now have only, including the Reserves, some 150,000 for home and the Colonies, and about 72,000 for India.

It is proposed, in order to obtain the above strength, that the Training Army at home should be approximately of the same strength as our present home garrisons. These are about 104,000 men; the Training Army is proposed to be about 100,000 men.

It would consist of :—

	Men.
109 battalions Infantry and Rifles, at 500 each.....	54,500
9 battalions Guards	7,800
21 regiments Cavalry (Guards and Line) ..	10,700
48 batteries Mounted Artillery { 10 Horse 38 Field }	8,500
22 companies Garrison Artillery	7,800
41 companies Engineers.....	4,700
Departmental Corps	6,000
Total, including Officers and N.C.O.'s	100,000

The terms of enlistment proposed are two years with the colours and seven years with the Reserve.

Until lately the shortness of the period proposed with the colours would have been more seriously questioned than it is likely to be now that the Germans seem likely to adopt it. Twenty years ago the proposal would have met with strenuous resistance from the older school of officers who believed in nothing except the "old soldier." That belief is now far less common; Lord Wolseley and the exercise of common sense have both contributed to explode it; it is to be wished that all Lord Wolseley's opinions were as sound. It is not possible now-a-days to keep men long enough on full pay for them to acquire what are called "habits of discipline;" we might as well expect to supply them with occasional active campaigns for their instruction. If short service and a large Reserve are to be provided at a moderate cost, the "old soldier" must of necessity be given up. If we keep him, his numbers must necessarily be few, while the real defence of the Empire will have to be entrusted to half-trained and half-disciplined Volunteers. The course of providing a large Reserve of trained and disciplined men who shall be available for the defence of the Empire as a whole, instead of for home defence only, is surely far preferable to retaining only a few long-service men comparatively unsupported.

At the same time it is absolutely necessary that the strictest discipline should be maintained in the short-service "Training Army." It appears to have been recently forgotten by the heads of the military organization of this country that it is far more necessary to keep up strict discipline in a short-service than in a long-service Army. It seems to be undoubted that the discipline of British troops is not what it was. Various reasons could be given. Authority is now less regarded in civil life than formerly; the influence of a great part of the public press and of much of what is said in Parliament is undoubtedly injurious; and it is to be feared that some changes have been made in the routine of barrack life in deference to a notion that recruiting would be aided by less strictness in the details of a soldier's life. It is a fatal principle to encourage recruiting by any such means. If it is to be aided at all, it should be by relaxing the terms of enlistment, and not by relaxing the discipline of the soldier who has enlisted. "The Times" for several years published and commented on certain statistics of crime in the Army. The remarks made in discriminating between different corps were entirely fallacious; while their tendency evidently was, and was meant to be, to reflect upon the action of some Commanding Officers as compared with others in maintaining the discipline of their corps. Such comments can be nothing but extremely mischievous. However that may be, it is certain that discipline should be enforced with the greatest strictness, combined of course with that consideration which the British officer nearly always shows to his men, during the short time spent by short-service men with the colours. In the case of the old soldier discipline has time to become a habit.

It will be seen from the last page that it is proposed to increase the

Scots and Coldstream Guards by a battalion each, making in all nine battalions of Guards.

Of the 109 other battalions nine are proposed to be Rifles. The 25 second battalions of the 1st to 25th Regiments would no longer be necessary in time of peace. Their numbers could then be restored to the regiments from the 1st to the 100th, inclusive, and a battalion each could be added to the 60th and Rifle Brigade to make up the 109 Infantry and Rifle battalions. Each of the latter would have 400 short-service rank and file, with 100 officers and long-service non-commissioned officers. The numbers proposed are approximately as in the following table:—

Training Army.

	With colours. Total.	With colours. Short service.	Probable Reserve when complete.	Totals with Reserves called up.
Infantry and Rifles ..	51,500	44,000	135,000	169,500
Guards	7,800	6,600	20,000	27,800
Cavalry	10,700	9,000	27,300	38,000
Artillery, Mounted ..	8,500	7,000	21,300	29,800
Artillery, Garrison ..	7,800	6,600	20,000	27,800
Engineers	4,700	3,900	12,000	16,700
Departmental Corps	6,000	4,800	14,600	20,600
Totals.....	100,000	81,900	250,200	350,200

The necessary number of recruits would be, including an addition for the N.C.O. of long service, about perhaps from 47,000 to 50,000 a year.

The numbers of the Cavalry are perhaps unnecessarily large.

The above strength would approximately in time of war make up the following units:—

- 109 Regiments Infantry, each of 2 Battalions of 750 Officers and Men; and in Depôts a total of 30,000 Men.
- 9 Regiments Guards, each of 3 Battalions of 750 Officers and Men; and in Depôts about 7,500 Men.
- 42 Regiments Cavalry, each about 700 Officers and Men; and Depôts of 8,000 Men.
- 100 Batteries Mounted Artillery, in all 600 Guns: and Depôts of 6,000 Men.
- 90 Companies Garrison Artillery, each about 250 Officers and Men; and Depôts of 5,500 Men.
- 13,600 Engineers, Mounted and Dismounted Officers and Men; and Depôts of 3,100 Men.
- 16,500 Departmental Corps, Mounted and Dismounted Officers and Men; and Depôts of 4,200 Men.

Total in Depôts, about 65,000 Men.

Summarizing the above the strength would be, including the Indian and Colonial Armies:—

Peace Establishment.

—	With colours.	Reserve.	Total.
Training Army	100,000	250,000	350,000
Colonial Army	30,000	10,000	65,000
For Small Wars, but on Home			
Service	25,000		
Indian Army	90,000	20,000	110,000
	245,000	280,000	525,000

Giving the total number of men as stated on page 354.

Although the regimental numbers might be restored from the 1st to the 100th Regiments, the present Territorial arrangements should remain. The country should be thoroughly divided up according to population for recruiting purposes; and such anomalies as the number of regiments called Highland, but not really recruited in Scotland, should be done away with.

The arrangements as to Barracks and Brigade Depôts, and the primary change of men from Imperial to Indian Service, it would be useless to discuss in a paper of this kind.

Probable Cost.

All estimates of the cost of such a system as that proposed can only be approximate. All that can be done is to show that the additional cost would be moderate. It is necessary that this should be done, because misleading statements are often made even by officers in high authority. The following evidence appears in the Proceedings of Lord Wantage's Committee on Recruiting, &c.:—

"Q. 4411. *The Chairman.* Would the battalions as they now stand be fit for home defence?

"*Lord Wolseley.* They would be better than nothing; if you mean are they man for man as good as they ought to be, I should say certainly not; but they would be much better than Volunteers, upon whom the principal defence of the country will have to fall in the event of an invasion.

"Q. 4412. *The Chairman.* Then the Volunteer force takes a distinct position, and one which you rely upon in the defence of the country?

"*Lord Wolseley.* Yes, the Volunteer force is a most important factor in the defence of the country; in other words, if we had no Volunteer force we should have to treble the Army or else leave the country exposed to the most appalling risks."

Of all the rash and ill-considered opinions to which Lord Wolseley has given expression, I know of none more mischievous than this opinion, as contained in the answer to No. 4412. He first in answer to Question 4411 gives a sound opinion as to the relative value of

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posed Reserve could be raised by increasing the numbers and cost of the "Training Army."

The question whether the Government and people of the country are likely to sanction an expenditure even of an additional million of money with the object of doubling the offensive and defensive power of the Army has been fully dealt with in Chapter I. It is the most important part of the whole subject.

And the other most important part of the subject, next to the point last mentioned, is how far recruits are likely to come forward for a service like that proposed. The number of recruits obtained for the Regular Army in 1891 was 35,346; and the number obtained in the same year for the Militia was 39,783; or a total for both Services of about 75,000 men.

Taking 50,000 for the number of recruits required for the proposed Training Army and its Reserve, 9,000 for the Indian Army, and 6,000 for the Colonial Army, the total number required would be about 65,000 a year, or 10,000 fewer than are now obtained for the Army and Militia.

There seems to be no reason why there should be great difficulty in obtaining the number required for the Training Army, in view of the short period of service with the colours.

War Office Organization.

The organization of the central War administration at the War Office has been recently much discussed.

I do not think the subject is one of nearly so much consequence as that of providing the necessary number of fighting men for the Army. The vigorous prosecution of a war will always depend on whether we have an able and determined War Minister backed up by a strong Cabinet; and if the men and *matériel* are present, the administration will pull through.

It is possible that a War Minister specially appointed at the beginning of a war to control both the War Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty for combined operations might be advantageous. But so long as such a Minister could find no available men in the Army for active service, he would be quite helpless. He would in any case only cause friction if appointed in peace time. So far as the Army is concerned, at present the saying of the Duke of Wellington as to the soldiers' boots is entirely applicable: the first thing wanted is more men, and the second and third things wanted are still more men.

The worst feature in the War Office administration itself is the liability of an officer in a high position, who has fads as to the Service, getting the ear of the Secretary of State and monopolizing power. The only way in which this can be prevented is by having all important business submitted to a Council or Board like that of the Lords of the Admiralty; the War Secretary to be President, and the members to be—

1. The Commander-in-Chief—in charge of all the *personnel* of the Army;

2. The "Master-General" or "Surveyor-General" of the Ordnance—in charge of all the *matériel* of the Army; and

3. The Financial Secretary or Accountant-General—in charge of all the Finance and Estimates for the Army.

The consultations of such a body would obviate the complaint that a single officer has sometimes been alone consulted by a War Secretary, with indifferent results to the welfare of the Service.