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Suggestions on the *Nicomachean Ethics*

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conception of Euripides therefore appears to have been that only one of these three¹ could take Admetus' place. This limitation, furthermore, seems not to have been an innovation by Euripides. In the *Bibliotheca* of Pseudo-Apollodorus the same restriction is found (1, 106 Wagner) ἡγήσατο παρὰ μοιρῶν ἵνα, ὅταν Ἀδμητος μέλλῃ τελευτᾶν, ἀπολυθῇ τοῦ θανάτου, ἂν ἐκουσίως τις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ θνήσκειν ἔλθῃ [πατὴρ ἢ μήτηρ ἢ γυνή] ὥς δὲ ἦλθεν ἢ τοῦ θνήσκειν ἡμέρα, μήτε τοῦ πατρὸς μήτε τῆς μητρὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ θνήσκειν θελόντων, Ἀλκίσις ὑπεραπέθανε. This is repeated again in Hyginus (*Fab.* 51): et illud ab Apolline accepit, ut pro se alius voluntarie moreretur. *Pro quo*

¹ The children of Admetus were left out of account obviously from their youth.

*cum neque pater neque mater mori voluisset, uxor se Alcestis obtulit et pro eo vicaria morte interit.*²

The received form of the myth, the antecedent conditions of the play, and the manuscript tradition then all make for the retention of v. 16. If we feel it to be bathetic, as Hayley claims it is, we are not therefore warranted in rejecting it, but must rather recognise frankly Euripides' artistic fault.

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² Hayley quotes in part both passages, but in each instance he stops short of the essential words: μήτε τοῦ πατρὸς μήτε τῆς μητρὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ θνήσκειν θελόντων, and 'pro quo cum neque pater neque mater mori voluisset.'

SUGGESTIONS ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

1. 1139 a 3 πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δὴ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετόν. Nothing is here said of the way in which the higher part of the ἄλογον can claim to be λόγον ἔχον. This is a strong but hitherto unnoticed argument in favour of this book's belonging to the Nicomachean treatise. For while the Nicomachean 1st book speaks of τὸ ὁρεκτικόν as ἄλογον in the first place (1102 b 13), and only afterwards allows it, and then with some reservation (οὐ κυρίως), some title to be called part of the λόγον ἔχον, the Eudemean 2nd book on the other hand refers to it from the first as λόγον ἔχον, with only a slight reservation in favour of the Nicomachean view (1219 b 28). The reference here made, πρότερον ἐλέχθη κτλ, is therefore much clearer to the Nicomachean passage: for here there is no suggestion that the ὁρεκτικόν could possibly be considered as anything but ἄλογον, which goes a little beyond even the Nicomachean passage, but is entirely inconsistent with the Eudemean. Observe that the reference here is in a form that shows it is not an interpolation as many references may be.

2. 1139 a 15 ληπτέον ἂρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔστι· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. This punctuation seems to hide the sense. I should place a full stop after ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου. For ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον has

nothing to do with what precedes, and a great deal to do with the whole of the following chapter, which is devoted to discovering the ἔργον of each of the two intellectual faculties with a view to discovering the ἀρετὴ of each thereby. This is quite clearly brought out by the conclusion 1139 b 12 ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

3. The following re-arrangement of the text of 1139 a 21-b 5 (the only important passage in the 6th book which at all seems to require re-arrangement) is I think new and has some advantages over others—(i.) (as at present) a 17 Τρία δὲ ἔστιν . . . a 20 πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν: (ii.) a 31 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις . . . a 35 ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἔστιν: (iii.) b 4 διὸ ἡ ὁρεκτικὸς νοῦς . . . b 5 καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπος: here would appropriately follow the foot-note b 6 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονὸς . . . b 11 ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσ' ἂν ἡ πεπραγμένα: (iv.) a 21 ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις . . . a 31 τῇ ὁρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ: (v.) a 35 διάνοια δ' αὕτη οὐθὲν κινεῖ . . . b 4 ἢ δ' ὁρεῖς τούτου: (vi.) the last two lines, b 12-13, of course keep their place. The advantages of this arrangement are as follows: 1. All the passages dealing with προαίρεσις are brought together and arranged in their natural order. 2. The discussion of θεωρητικὴ διάνοια is properly separated from that of πρακτικὴ, which is

only mentioned again to make the nature of θεωρητική plainer by contrast, no new fact about πρακτική being mentioned. 3. a 35 seq. carries on the contrast smoothly from the end of the sentence a 30 τῇ ὁρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ: and then, in the light of the now sufficient discussion of both πρακτική and θεωρητική, ποιητική is properly discussed and put in its place. 4. The transition from a 20 πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν to a 31 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις is clear and natural, while the present continuation at a 21 is highly obscure. 5. The meaning of ἀρχή, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, is given earlier, and so close to a 18-20 that it serves to explain the use of ἀρχή there too. 6. It would be absurd, after the assumption of the truth ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρεῖς βουλευτική in a 23, to write later on b 4 διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ὀρεῖς διανοητική, the statement being the grand conclusion of the whole argument: but on the other hand from the conclusion b 4 διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς κτλ (a conclusion that follows naturally enough from a 31-35) the remark a 23 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὀρεῖς βουλευτική follows quite well as a recapitulation of an already proved statement. With regard to such a re-arrangement as the above I would say what Professor Stewart says of his own re-arrangement of another passage in this book, 1140 b 3-30: it 'is offered, not as a reconstruction of the text as it may have originally stood, but as an attempt to make the meaning of the passage, as we now have it, clearer.'

4. 1139 a 23 δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ δῶκεν. No editor has pointed out, I think, that the above sentence expresses two different requirements, and not the same requirement in two different forms. Professor Stewart (see his note on 1139 a 24) says 'ὀρεῖς is ὀρθή when it seeks (δῶκεν) what λόγος or διάνοια affirms (κατάφασις) to be good, and shuns (φυγή) what it denies (ἀπόφασις) to be good.' But the harmony of reason with appetite is not the same thing as the goodness of either. It is true of vicious προαίρεσις, where the λόγος is false and the ὀρεῖς morally bad, that ὀρεῖς seeks and shuns respectively what λόγος affirms and denies. What is wanted is not merely the harmony of reason and appetite—not merely that both should have the same object—but the harmony of right reason with good appetite, so that both are rightly active with regard to the same object. Now the rightness of reason depends on the truth of its affirmations and

negations, and not at all on the character of the appetite, and the goodness of appetite depends on the goodness of its pursuits and avoidances, and not at all on the character of the reason. For every προαίρεσις, good or bad, it is necessary that the reason and the appetite should be concerned with the same object: otherwise there is merely an opinion, right or wrong, about one thing, and a desire, right or wrong, about another, and no προαίρεσις can occur. For good προαίρεσις it is necessary that both reason and desire should be good in themselves, and if they are good, and refer to the same object, it must follow in the nature of things that both feel attraction (κατάφασις and ὀρεῖς) or both repulsion (ἀπόφασις and φυγή). It has been shown that this harmony of attraction with attraction and repulsion with repulsion also exists in vicious προαίρεσις, where both reason and appetite are bad in themselves. Two other kinds of bad προαίρεσις, are possible, where this harmony does not exist: when the reason is bad and the appetite good, and when the reason is good and the appetite bad: then there exist the two states considered in the last two chapters of this book, the baneful development of natural moral virtue, which is nameless, and the baneful development of natural intellectual virtue, which is πανουργία. The two requirements stated in this passage are, then, (1) that reason and appetite should combine to form purpose by being directed to the same object, (2) that their relation to the object should be good in each case: and my point is that these two things required are causally independent of each other.

5. 1139 b 15 ἔστω δὲ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι . . . τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς: ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδестhai.

Professor Stewart says 'Νοῦς is infallible as the immediate perception of ἀδιαίρετα or ἀπλά,' implying that the perception of ἀδιαίρετα or ἀπλά, i.e. of simple concepts as distinguished from propositions, is the whole function of νοῦς. He is obliged to suppose therefore that the words τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι are only loosely applied to νοῦς, since they imply the making of propositions, which νοῦς does not do. I can find no evidence that other editors disagree with this view.

Now Professor Stewart admits that νοῦς here means what it means in chapter 6, where is said εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης. But deductive science cannot start from simple concepts: it must start from proposi-

tions. Chapter 6 therefore shows that νοῦς makes propositions. This does not prevent its also perceiving simple concepts, according to the doctrine of *Metaphysics* 1051 b 24: though it is probable that the author is not thinking of νοῦς in that sense anywhere in this book—which need cause no surprise, since, as it is, he uses the word in at least four different senses in this book. Professor Stewart himself admits that the doctrine that the principles of knowledge are reached by νοῦς is not inconsistent, in the author's view or in the view of the writer of *Posterior Analytics* 100 b 3 *seq.*, with the doctrine that the same principles are reached by induction (ἐπαγωγή). Clearly induction cannot be concerned entirely with ἀδιάρητα.

But in what sense then is νοῦς infallible? In just the sense in which the other four virtues are infallible and ὑπόληψις and δόξα fallible. It is a matter of names. In so far as a man is deceived, his ἕξις διανοητική is not truly any of the five virtues mentioned, but only in so far as he is right. ὑπόληψις and δόξα are fallible in the sense that they are either good or bad states—the names are not confined to virtues but may be applied to vices. They are not distinct from the five virtues as things mutually exclusive are distinct; for all five virtues are ὑπολήψεις of a certain kind, see 1140 b 13 where φρόνησις is, it is implied, a ὑπόληψις, b 31 where ἐπιστήμη is called a ὑπόληψις, 1142 b 33 where φρόνησις is called a ὑπόληψις; and δόξα is at least a part of φρόνησις, which is twice called the virtue τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ μέρους. This infallibility then, which has caused the editors so much trouble, is a notion brought in, rather clumsily perhaps, to distinguish between the names of virtues and the names of states that may be good or bad.

6. 1140 a 20. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητική ἕξις. In this book τέχνη is used in two senses, one good, the other in itself neither good nor bad. These two senses are conveyed by the phrases (a) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική (b) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. The former sense occurs in two other places in this book, where the above definition has been forgotten: 1140 b 22 τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἐστίν, and 1141 a 12 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν. In these two places τέχνη is perhaps not really thought of as a ἕξις at all, but as an activity or process or body of rules or something that is not a

quality or fixed condition of the mind of the τεχνίτης. If it is thought of as a ἕξις, the words τέχνης ἐστὶν ἀρετή cannot mean that τέχνη can have an ἀρετή so much as that τέχνη can be an ἀρετή. In any case these two passages are inconsistent with the above definition of 1140 a 20, where τέχνη is clearly said to be a virtue, and has its vice ἀτεχνία opposed to it. Τέχνη in this sense can no more have an ἀρετή than φρόνησις can. It would have been an excellent thing if the word εἰτεχνία—which occurs in Hippocrates and Lucian but not in Aristotle—had been in common use enough to have displaced τέχνη here. How far the author clearly distinguished in his own mind his double use of τέχνη is doubtful; but as he does not generally mention intellectual vices, probably he had the neutral sense of τέχνη in his mind at 1140 a 20, and mentioned ἀτεχνία on purpose to show that it is not the neutral but the good sense that is there intended.

7. 1141 a 3 εἰ δὲ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα . . . ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ κτλ. Why is τέχνη left out of the list? Many reasons have been given: (a) we may have the list of another editor here (Stewart): (b) the omission may be a pure accident (Burnet): (c) τέχνη was shown in chapter 5 to be a ἕξις ἧς ἐστὶ λήθη (Stewart): (d) τέχνη is included in φρόνησις, both being περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν (Eustratius): (e) τέχνη may be included in ἐπιστήμη (Stewart): (f) τέχνη may be included in σοφία, which is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης (Burnet). Now Ramsauer well says that Aristotle does not mind going without formal symmetry and precision so long as his meaning is plain. But the meaning is quite plain. τέχνη had its proper place in the argument at 1140 b 34 τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις κτλ. It is therefore probably left out of the formal list because there is no possibility of confusing the use of τέχνη with the use of νοῦς, whereas it is easy to see that νοῦς might, in certain connections, be used as a synonym of either ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις or σοφία. Another striking instance in this book of carelessness about the formal completeness of a list occurs at 1143 a 26 λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. Here εὐβουλία is not excluded of set purpose. Professor Burnet thinks it is, on the ground that the four ἕξεις mentioned here all apprehend their objects immediately, that

this is why they are *εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι*, and that therefore *εὐβουλία* is purposely excluded as being *μετὰ λόγου*. But (a) this if true would be a reason for excluding *φρόνησις* also, since *φρόνησις* is *ἕξις ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου πρακτικῇ* (1140 b 5), and (b) the bearing of *εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι* is given quite clearly in line 28 *πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον*, which is of course also true of *εὐβουλία*. It is possible that *εὐβουλία* is left out because it is so closely connected with *φρόνησις* (since it is *ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος*, οὗ ἡ *φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν* 1142 b 32) that whatever applies to *φρόνησις* applies to it also. The list is twice repeated, each time less complete than before—1143 b 7 *γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν*, 1143 b 9 *νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην*: so it may well have been incomplete to begin with. It is fair then to assume that neither *εὐβουλία* at 1143 a 26 nor *τέχνη* at 1141 a 5 is excluded of set purpose from the list, but might be put in without altering the doctrine of either passage.

8. 1141 b 29 *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστα εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα*. The author's wish to fix the meaning of important terms is so plain that it is always desirable, though always hard, to determine how far he accepts popular usages. Here is a case in point. It is worth asking if the use of the words *πολιτικῇ* and *φρόνησις* in the popular restricted senses is admitted. Does not Professor Burnet go too far in saying it is not? The author is surely ready to accept the popular usages because they are convenient and well known; but he hints in the case of *πολιτικῇ* (see 1141 b 28 *λέγουσιν*), and is at pains to show clearly in the case of *φρόνησις*, that these usages, however convenient now they have become established, sprang from mistaken ethical judgments. It is only at 1142 a 1 that this view of his about *φρόνησις* begins to come to light. By opposing *φρόνιμος* to the invidious word *πολυπράγμων* he shows that, in calling the egoist or the selfish man *φρόνιμος*, people commonly mean that such a person displays the highest sort of practical wisdom. From this view he expressly dissents 1142 a 9 *καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἀνευ πολιτείας*: showing that he does not accept the popular ethical judgment as well as the popular usage of words. Though he accepts the use of *πολιτικῇ* as meaning 'practical statesmanship,' he holds it the lower, and not like most people the higher, of the two kinds of *πολιτικῇ* (in the general sense 'statesmanship'); and though he

accepts the use of *φρόνησις* as meaning 'practical prudence about one's immediate personal interests,' he holds it the lowest, and not like most people the highest, of the three kinds of *φρόνησις* (in the general sense 'practical wisdom'). This acceptance of the popular restricted usage is not inconsistent with his demanding acceptance, as he clearly does, for the new extended usage of his own that better agrees with ethical truth. Had there been any fairly well-established names to substitute for *πολιτικῇ* and *φρόνησις* in the restricted senses, it is likely that they would have been used: since there were none, innovation in terms has been, as usual, avoided.

9. 1143 a 12 *ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλον λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς*. This passage has I believe been generally misunderstood. Ramsauer expands it as follows: *ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι ὅταν χρῆται τις τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν ἄλλον λέγοντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν ἄλλον λέγοντος*. I propose the following instead: *ὥσπερ ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ ὧν ἡ σοφία ἐστίν, ἄλλον λέγοντος, τὸ μανθάνειν καλῶς λέγεται συνιέναι: οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν ἄλλον λέγοντος τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς λέγεται συνιέναι*.

The following points have hitherto been overlooked: (a) *μανθάνειν* is appropriate only to the use of *ἐπιστήμη* and not to the use of *δόξα*. This is proved by line 16 *ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνοετο, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις*. That is, the use of *σύνεσις* to mean 'practical intelligence' has come from its use to mean 'scientific intelligence.' If *μανθάνειν* is understood (as Ramsauer would have it) in the *δόξα* part of the antithesis, surely *ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε κτλ* becomes unintelligible. (b) *τὸ κρίνειν* in the second part of the antithesis is opposed to *τὸ μανθάνειν* in the first. The formal expression is loose, but quite natural to a writer who is careless of formal precision as long as he thinks the sense clear: I have avoided the looseness by a slight paraphrase in my expansion. (c) *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* are here used in the sense not of 'the contents of knowledge' and 'the contents of opinion' but of 'the faculty of knowledge' and 'the faculty of opinion': *χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ* = *χρῆται τῷ ἐπιστημονικῷ* and not *χρῆται τῷ ἐπιστητῷ*.

χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ = χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστικῷ and not χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστῷ. Coraes and Stewart think otherwise—see Stewart's notes. (d) The emphasis is not on χρῆται and χρῆσθαι but on ἐπιστήμῃ and δόξῃ, in spite of the order. The usual Greek rule of putting emphatic words at the beginning of a sentence or phrase is not regularly observed by Aristotle as it is by Plato. To take an instance close at hand, in 1142 b 16 ἀλλ' ὁρθότης τίς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς the context shows the emphasis to be not on ὁρθότης but on βουλῆς—Plato would have written ἀλλὰ βουλῆς ὁρθότης τίς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐβουλία or the like. (e) The two meanings of *μανθάνειν* that the editors quote may be borne in mind here: but whereas one of these two meanings of *μανθάνειν* admits *συνιέναι* as a synonym of *μανθάνειν*, while the other does not, the point is that *συνιέναι* can also be used in a sense in which it is not a synonym of *μανθάνειν*.—The passage may be paraphrased as follows: 'Learning is often called "understanding," when a man uses his faculty of scientific knowledge (which is the faculty always used in "learning") to grasp what another teaches him about necessary truth: and when a man uses his faculty of discriminating judgment to grasp what another teaches him about practical contingent truth, that exercise of the judgment is by analogy called understanding, if it is of the right kind. The name understanding, in this latter sense, has been diverted from its use as the name of excellence in "learning" necessary truth from another's teaching, as may be seen from the fact that we still (perhaps somewhat improperly now the later use is established) often give the name of "understanding" to this excellence in "learning" necessary truth.'

10. 1143 a 19. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὁρθή. This section is a remarkable instance of confusion caused by the view that etymological connection between words must carry with it kinship of meaning. *γνώμη* is taken as the common element in *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμην ἔχειν*, which in ordinary language represent two completely different notions; the meaning of *γνώμη* is arbitrarily fixed as about half-way between the meanings of *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμην ἔχειν*: a vague attempt is made to reconcile the two meanings, and *συγγνώμη* is forced, by mere unproved assertion, into being a synonym of *γνώμη*. As a matter of fact *συγγνώμη* represents the notions of 'forgiveness,' 'making allowances,' 'fair kindness,' and the like: the moral element in it, as in *ἐπιείκεια*, is essential. *γνώμη* on the other hand has properly no moral significance. *γνώμην ἔχειν* can mean two things: (a) 'to have an opinion' whether a true or a false one; (b) 'to have a true opinion,' 'to be right' intellectually, 'avoir raison.' The latter meaning, where *γνώμη* = ὁρθή or ἀληθής *γνώμη*, is chosen here to the exclusion of the former. Professor Burnet would, I believe, find it hard to justify his statement that in actual speech *γνώμη* had a sense corresponding to that of our 'feeling.' Stewart's paraphrase (*Notes* ii. 89) shows well how the author attempts to unify the two different notions of *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμη*: but no hint is given by him or any one else of what I believe to be the true explanation, that the whole attempt is the result of etymological confusion.

L. H. G. GREENWOOD.

NOTES ON MARCUS AURELIUS.

A VERY large number of the following suggestions had been put into writing before the appearance of Stich's Teubner text in its second edition (1903). The text itself is (I think) quite unaltered: the only change in the book is the addition of a few things in the critical notes, e.g. some of the emendations proposed by Dr. Rendall. A careful re-reading has however given me some new ideas.

1. 6 τὸ γράψαι διαλόγους ἐν παιδί (*while a boy*).

Considering that Marcus congratulates himself more than once in this first book (§§ 7 and 17) on having given little time to σοφιστική and ῥητορική, it is somewhat surprising that he should count having written dialogues an advantage. Should we read τὸ <μὴ> γράψαι? He mentions a good many negative advantages he has to be