

ent is known in those conscious experiences which it conditions, we may again turn to physical science and analyze the knowing experience of the physicist. Such an analysis discloses the following constituents: First, a consciousness of symbols; second, the meaning or 'content' of these symbols, present as imaged or not-imaged, either above or below the threshold of consciousness, and developing relations which are not given in perception; and, third, the object known or the transcendent, which is 'in,' as known, and yet 'beyond' the meaning, forming with it a differentiated unity. The transcendent is known, then, as a necessary term in the alogical relations of scientific knowing; with its distinctive characteristics of permanence, independence, causal regularity and difference in kind it constitutes the ground for the validity of knowledge.

Finally, this transcendent manifold, which, together with individual experience may indifferently be called an 'absolute,' but is not therefore to be considered as homogeneous, is not only the fundamental condition of successful alogical knowledge but also the origin of the need of success.

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*Image, Idea and Meaning.* R. F. A. HOERNLÉ. *Mind*, 1907, XVI., 70-100.

"There is no idea . . . which is wholly meaningless. An idea always carries with it a relation to something other than itself. . . . Even 'square circle' is not meaningless. . . . This refusal of the elements to be joined is an experience as distinct and definite in its way as the experience of the blending of 'equilateral' and 'triangle' (p. 75). "In ordinary thinking our attention is not directed towards or even mainly to the ideas but primarily to their meanings. And it is only when we fail to understand, that the idea itself (the word or image) becomes prominent in consciousness" (pp. 75-76).

Both the idea and the meaning, Hoernlé says, must be presented to consciousness (p. 76). Lipps says the whole is perceived but only some parts of it are apperceived. Bosanquet says that in the logical use of the idea part of the meaning as well as all of the existence of the idea is crushed out. So Bradley. James says that the meaning is the fringe of the idea. But this just reverses what introspection reveals to us, viz., that the meaning is the focal thing in consciousness except when for some reason it fails us, when we bring the image into the focus for the sake of more adequately getting the meaning.

Hoernlé holds that the meaning is a peculiar element which ever

eludes introspection and thus description, and that therefore the consciousness of the meaning of a thought is never identical with the consciousness of the word or image or other sensational element which serves as the sign or cue to the meaning. Meaning, he says, can never be pinned down, and the same is true of feeling. For this reason he opposes James' analysis of emotion into organic sensations and his analysis of the activity experience into kinæsthetic sensations. The experience of 'love,' for example, is something more than what you find in your consciousness, the sound of the word, some definition that might occur to you, etc. All introspection reveals is the empty shells which contained the meaning which has fled (p. 78).

But Hoernlé gives no explanation of what this peculiar element is or what is meant by its elusiveness. He cites with approval James' reference to it as the transitive phase of consciousness, as opposed to a substantive phase of which an image would be an example. But he does not work out the implications of this idea of transition, and this may have something to do with his deliberate abjuration of all metaphysical issues in his discussion.

What is the meaning which as such never comes to consciousness and yet which somehow maintains the unity and continuity of the experience, but the fact of habit? And what is the significance of its elusiveness except that as long as it is functioning adequately there is no occasion for its being brought to consciousness, whereas, when it is brought to consciousness by reason of its inadequacy as habit, that very fact involves its transformation into something else (image) in order to make it adequate. Meaning, accordingly, never comes to consciousness as such, because when quite adequate as meaning it is perfectly habitual or automatic. If it be objected that this is just what one would regard as a *meaningless* experience, if it is insisted that meaning must be conscious, then the relatively adequate or *meaningful* experience would be the emotional experience which represents the culmination of the reflective process. What is in consciousness at the moment when as in ordinary experience we are conscious of the object (rather than as psychologists, conscious of the image) is that feature of the object or situation which is the handle to all the rest. The consciousness of meaning, therefore, must be in terms of image of some sort, though it may be so vague and total in character, so suffused by emotion and so imperfectly articulate, that it would not be readily identified as the same in function as the more clearly describable image of the psychology books.

Meaning would thus be simply the image, the idea, at work in successfully controlling the situation, and the apparent negligibility of

a great part of the imagery, the crushing out of part of the meaning, as Bosanquet puts it, means not that it is not functioning as part of the meaning of the object or situation, but that it is irrelevant and so taken for granted in the specific situation. The fact of its being ignored may signify simply that it is so adequately playing its part as meaning that it need not be in the focus or even in the fringe of consciousness.

Hoernlé cites the account of the way in which Helen Keller first came to know that 'w-a-t-e-r' meant the wonderful cool something that was pouring over her hand, and makes a point of the fact that she had been able, even before this first consciousness of meaning as such, to associate words and acts, words and objects, words and situations. The implication is that at this point some peculiar element is introduced which was not there before. But does this signify anything more than that up to that time she had experienced meanings in connection with specific situations and had perhaps established certain meaning-habits in relation to such situations, but that now for the first time these intellectual habits come in to reinforce each other?—hence the glow of happy wonder with which she originally felt and subsequently recalls this experience: it meant a wider and firmer control of experience.

Such a psychology of meaning and of image in relation to habit would render unnecessary Hoernlé's mystical appeal to a peculiar elusive element and the resolute stand which he feels he must take on the self-transcendence of consciousness (p. 81). It is quite true that in knowledge I not only have an idea but that the idea is of something, but the only condition in which I am compelled to distinguish the meaning (the 'something') from the idea (the image) is precisely an experience in which I am not adequately getting the meaning, the 'something,' so that the distinction between the idea as image and the idea as meaning is a bifurcation which takes place within the knowledge process or consciousness and in no sense involves a self-transcendence.

Thus the truth would lie in the very doctrine which on his theory must be rejected, namely, that the meaning of an idea is to be found in the other ideas (p. 83). If images are just habits coming to consciousness for reconstruction, then the meaning of any particular image lies just in the process of mutual interaction and reorganization of these images (of these habit systems). An idea, as Professor Dewey says, is any mental state which is used for the sake of referring easily and fluidly to *any* object in *any* phase, thus freeing and facilitating our intercourse with things. "The idea as purely psychical is the object in solution, moving towards re-precipitation in some object which is more

anticipated, which thus satisfies more, and hence has increase of meaning" (*Journ. of Philos., Psy. & Sci. Methods*, March 31, 1904). Ideas are simply 'a more adequate methodological device for facilitating and controlling knowledge—that is to say, acquaintance and transactions with objects.'

Any experience in so far as it subserves this function is an idea, and apparently there is no experience which under suitable conditions may not thus serve as the handle for getting hold of other experiences, a means or instrument or intermediary to other situations.

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*La logique avant les logiciens.* A. CHIDE. *Revue philosophique*, 1906, LXII., 160–185.

The author undertakes to determine by means of a study of primitive language and the manner of its formation what is the character of the natural and universal processes of the human mind in reasoning. The specific question is whether the Aristotelian form of reasoning by the subsumption of concepts is the primitive and universal form. The theory of roots by which the earlier linguistic scholars explained the growth of knowledge was conformable to the hypothesis that this was the primitive form. On this theory language is held to have started with a few simple forms and to have attained its present complexity through the addition of the various endings in declension, conjugation, etc. This theory the author opposes on purely linguistic grounds, calling attention to the fact that it has been rejected by more recent scholars. This theory of roots implies an accompanying evolution of thought from primitive simple forms by increasing discrimination and differentiation to its present complexity. The author holds that on the contrary the development has been from early manifold and complex forms of thought and speech through gradual generalization and the formation of concepts to the present simplified logical processes. These are late products of thought and not mere transcripts from experience. To assume that these logical processes are characteristic of the most primitive thought is to impose upon the facts the results of centuries of development. There is abundant linguistic evidence which goes to show that many other relations had an earlier existence than that of subsumption, as for example the relation of quantity, the categories of number, unity and plurality, space and time, the distinction between subject and object, the sexes, etc. Therefore, the relations underlying formal logic cannot, he concludes, be primitive and universal forms of thought.

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