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THE SPIRIT OF CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

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Friday, 6th July, 1906.

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The history of Napoleon's Cavalry affords many instances of the necessity for:—

1. High *moral* in Cavalry, both officers and men.
2. Thorough organisation and training in peace time.

Moral is a plant which is not much tended amongst British troops, except when the need for it is forcibly brought to notice by some disaster or failure.

This is only quite natural, as only great events demand a high *moral.*

Ordinary life affords us soldiers few opportunities to appreciate the necessity for it in war. A sailor as soon as he goes to sea is on active service.

But still, *moral* may be cultivated in peace time.

It is required to produce the best in sport, *e.g.*, hunting, polo, football, boxing; in fact, in any sport where danger occurs, and where training is needed.

It is truly said: "No sport is worth anything where there is no danger."

Moral for military purposes is where there is combination and self-abnegation, or where, in fact, a man is ready to make the greatest sacrifice for his side. Discipline which finds its highest impression in accurate drill is not complete.

Now, has the Army in England considered the first step in strategy, viz., the creation of a high *moral*, not only in the Army itself, but in the nation? We want something more than bravery.

General Kléber, when his men, overcome with fatigue, refused to move a step farther, called them cowards. As they protested that they were at any rate brave in a fight, he replied: "Yes, you are brave men, but you are not soldiers. To be a soldier is not to eat when you are hungry, not to drink when you are thirsty, and to carry your comrade when you cannot drag yourself along."

True strategy is preparation and organisation in peace time of all the elements which lead to success in war, the manipulation of the human element being a very prominent one.

Though there was hardly any peace in his time, Napoleon did his best for his Cavalry prior to a campaign and in the intervals of fighting.

We read of his Cavalry School at Versailles, the careful preparation of his Cavalry for the invasion of England, the instruction of his officers in remounting duties, and so on. Nothing which could be foreseen, practised, or learnt was left to chance improvisation in war.

For the neglect of organisation and training in peace time in the United Kingdom, the nation is primarily to blame; but it has been exposed to that greatest of enemies to true national health—a long peace.

Dr. Miller Maguire made that very plain to you when he gave a lecture recently on the "Development of National Strategy," and I consider that the arguments and instances which he produced are unanswered and unanswerable.

But it is one thing for us soldiers who meet here to agree with him and quite another thing to get the nation, or that which is best and healthiest in the nation, to adopt his views.

But that does not absolve us from attention to this point.

For the purpose of considering the subject of this lecture, namely, "The Cavalry Spirit under Napoleon," I divide the history of his era into three periods:—

1. The Inception, from the Campaign in Italy in 1796 up to 1805.
2. The Zenith: 1805—1812.
3. The Decline: 1812—1815.

The Inception.

Beginning, then, in 1796, we find that the tendency in Europe, and especially in Germany, was for the generals (usually Infantry generals) to restrict the action of their Cavalry, and not trust their leaders. Napoleon, on the other hand, as soon as he gained a success, sent off all his Cavalry, even his personal escort, to confirm his success.

This was the time when Napoleon's future leaders were making their reputation, and we come across instances of this.

Ney (known as the bravest of the brave), when fighting against the Austrians, and commanding a Brigade of Hussars, was manœuvring to gain time for his infantry to come up, and when leading some of his troops to retake a captured gun, got a fall from his horse in some rough ground and was taken prisoner with some of his Hussars.

He was eventually rescued by the French.

At this period Cavalry leaders of high rank were still obliged to take part in hand-to-hand fighting.

It was done (says Picard) so as to affirm their vigour, bravery, and superiority before the men, a very desirable object for Cavalry leaders, but one which should be subordinated to some extent to their duties as commanders. Of these latter duties he says: "They still make too little."

Again, Lasalle at this time (1797 in Italy), a squadron leader, and about 22 years of age, charged a battalion with about 20 Chasseurs, and made them prisoners.

Napoleon, when Lasalle handed in the colours he had taken, only said to him, observing how pale and overcome with fatigue he was: "Go and have a sleep, you deserve it." But Lasalle was a general a few years later. Till his death at Wagram, he posed as a rowdy and a swash-buckler. He was that invaluable character in Cavalry, or R.H.A., who is always asking to be allowed to go on. A Cavalry general finds his greatest support in men of this character—who are always looking for trouble.

Lasalle was not only a leader but a trainer of light troops.

We read of a French and an Austrian squadron leader, engaging in a single combat in front of their squadrons for several mniutes.

Kellerman, Adjutant-General at this time and barely 27 years old, made a good charge and was promoted on the spot to a brigade.

Only two years before he was a private soldier.

We see again and again that Napoleon, the greatest military organiser of modern years, rewarded courage before all other military virtues, especially when anything out of the way was done.

Speaking of one of his generals he used to say: "When a man is as brave as he is, he is worth his weight in diamonds."

It is well known that it is a good policy to mention in Brigade or Regimental Orders, the same evening, any strikingly good work. *Bis dat qui cito dat.* Next day everyone, even not very brave men, are anxious to emulate yesterday's hero, and this becomes a habit and a step forward is organised.

Scobeleff presented medals on the battlefield. So also did Napoleon: taking the star off his own breast he gave it to a man.

Napoleon's Distribution of Rewards.

Of this question of reward, one learns something from the Memoirs of General Baron Thiebault, who says, speaking of the Emperor in 1812, that Napoleon, formerly so happy in his distribution of honours and decorations on the battlefield, had now grown capricious and bizarre.

But he kept to the point in one respect, that he honoured bravery on the battlefield before everything.

One day a Colonel asked for the Cross for his Quartermaster.

Napoleon refused it, saying: "I want blood, not ink."

Again a Sergeant asked for a decoration, his Colonel tried to keep him back, Napoleon asked what he claimed it for?

For pulling down the palisades at the attack on Stralsund. Is that so, Colonel? Yes. What else have you done? I took a colour at so and so. Is that true? Yes. Then why should I not give this man the Cross? Because he is a drunkard and a thief.

Bah! Blood washes all that out.

The 1798-1800 Campaign in Egypt followed the Italian Campaign. —It was the school of many of the Cavalry leaders of the Empire: Murat, Lasalle, Colbert, Davoust, and many others.

And there was plenty of hand-to-hand fighting, in which these leaders took part. The Mamelukes were considered by Napoleon to be, individually, the finest Cavalry in the world. Many junior officers first came to Napoleon's notice here.

And it was on the dash, quickness of comprehension in a fight, and belief in their superiority, that he built up his Cavalry in the next four or five years.

In 1804 there were certain changes in evolution, which show the general tendency to improvement in Cavalry.

At this time the movements were practically the same drill as we had in 1881, and also as the French had then had for 16 years since 1788.

Amongst other changes made we note that the place of the troop leader was with their horse's croup in the ranks in the charge.

That change looks to me as if they meant business.

As if they knew the value of the knee-to-knee charge.

We see a step forward made when close column charges against infantry were done away with, and it was impressed on all that the preparation for the charge on infantry should be made by light artillery, and be in succession of squadrons, for we see the unison of these two arms commencing.

Picard says we will not go into the reproaches heaped on the old evolutions, but we will only mention the most marked.

The worst assuredly was the complication of mathematical movements quite impracticable on the battlefield, and which must be eventually "boiled down" to the simple formula: "Direction, the enemy."

There is a word of command now in the French Cavalry training, *En bataille*; everyone forms as quickly as possible in the direction pointed out by the leader's sword, and charges.

He says the 1788 Regulations were evolved in peace, and they lost sight (as peace regulations have a way of doing) of the object in their anxiety for procedure.

Napoleon even required that his Cavalry should charge successfully at the trot, which he said was the quickest pace at which large masses could move and keep order.

Napoleon meant his cuirrasiers to charge infantry.

SECOND PERIOD.

The Zenith.

In 1805, the formation of what was known as Cavalry Reserve was the first great step towards giving strategical prominence to Cavalry.

Napoleon organised a great mass of Cavalry called the "Cavalry Reserve" (besides giving Cavalry to his Infantry Divisions).

Murat, as at Marengo, commanded this Cavalry Reserve, and it consisted of 22,000 men and 13,500 horses. Regiments were from 500 to 250 horses strong.[1]

We know that Napoleon's idea was to use his Cavalry Reserve as a scouting force, a covering force, and a support at one and the same time in this campaign.

It is said at this date, first, the unison of the three arms was remarkable (but that is always the result of continued fighting); and second, the cavalry believed in a *resolute offensive*.

This latter was to be the real secret of their success in the next few years.

[1] This inconsistency in the number of horses and men is explained, owing to the Dragoons being dismounted.

Now, in the advance on Ulm, as the Cavalry began to clear the forests and mountains, Napoleon was most anxious for news, and though later he entrusted reconnaissance duties to Cavalry officers alone, at this time he sent staff officers with them.

Staff officers cannot be sent everywhere to do this, and it is absolutely indispensable that Cavalry officers should be taught to carry out this work. But how is it possible for them to do this unless they have a certain strategic knowledge? This should form one of the incentives to young Cavalry officers to study.

At this time the Emperor used many orderly officers, and Captain Colbert, an orderly officer on the staff, was sent with despatches on a ride of 18 miles over the most frightful roads.

He had got some distance when the road was reported under water.

He got a guide on horseback with a long stick to take soundings, and with him he got within a mile of his destination, then he had to take a boat. He got through, and was praised for doing so by Napoleon. I mention this because it enables me to draw attention to the fact that Napoleon always asked of a man:—

First: Is he lucky? Second: Is he enterprising?

The fighting which followed at Ulm proved the success of well-trained Cavalry.

After this success in 1805, we come to 1806—the Jena Campaign.

French and Prussian Generals Compared at Jena.

On the outbreak of this campaign, Napoleon had an almost perfect weapon forged to his own hand, and could afford to take risks; and he took them.

Leaders selected and tested in war and proved by war, leaders who would "go ahead" on their own responsibility; leaders who had confidence in their troops, and whose troops believed in them: "Let me be at them," lads.

What had Prussia?

Peace-worn generals, selected because they had never given any trouble or dreamt of doing anything out of the ordinary run.

Nice, good fellows, and so "smart" on parade.

The "let-me-lay-down-to-rest" and pension division.

Seldom or ever on a horse, and then it must be a very quiet one.

A very powerful parallel was recently drawn in the *Times* between our nation (not our Army) in 1906 and the Prussia nation in 1806.

Fat, lazy old men cannot lead cavalry.

They cannot do 18 hours in the saddle on a hot summer's day.

A long peace is bound to be fatal to cavalry efficiency.

The Prussian cavalry, 225 squadrons (rather more than the French), who were destined to be swept away like chaff before the French Cavalry, were the squadrons with the Seidlitz and Ziethen traditions, and perfect in evolution.

But what avails evolution without a leader or organiser?

These Prussian squadrons were mixed up with the Infantry by groups of ten squadrons, and generally kept in reserve, and under the disposition of the commanders of the Infantry divisions, *cf.*, our organisation.

It is a warning to us how necessary it is not to let a single squadron, much more a regiment, be wasted in this fashion.

The French reserve of Cavalry under Murat was the same which had effected so much in 1805.

What destroyed the Prussian Cavalry was their hopelessly bad organisation.

However good such a Cavalry might be in evolution, it was useless for war against a Murat at the head of squadrons, in the hands of squadron leaders, to whom a fortunate charge might mean promotion of a most rapid nature.

Leaders will gamble on a charge much more freely when they know they will get something if their efforts are crowned with success.

But surely the moral is, that Napoleon's plan was to find a Cavalry leader and let him organise his Cavalry to help his plan of campaign. He put the whole matter in his hands, and above all avoided wasting his Cavalry in a sort of insurance policy.

The essence of Cavalry is offence, not defence and shepherding Infantry divisions. The latter work, it seems, would be best carried out, as suggested by Brigadier-General A. Thornycroft in a recent Cavalry journal, by highly-trained M.I.

The Archduke Charles says of this campaign: "These magnificent Prussian squadrons had no chance against the French Cavalry, because though the latter were inferior, they were led by officers who knew the value of opportunity, and were ready to take every advantage of it, whilst in the Prussian Cavalry any good points of this sort were paralysed by defective command and dispositions."

Their generals—aged gentlemen, who had been subalterns under the Great King—had lost all idea of the main object: superiority in the combat, in their search for *minutiæ* of questions of evolution.

They were the college dons of cavalry — the pedants — "the *formulæ* hunters."

Their conceit was so great that the Prussian general, Ruchel, said that if Bonaparte took service in their Army they could make a good corporal of him, and that they had scores of officers better than him.

Marbot says that the young cavalry officers sharpened their swords on the steps of the French Embassy. Such pride usually goes before a fall.

At no time, it is said, was military literature so highly thought of.

Mathematical *formulæ* were produced for every possible circumstance.

What had France to place against these combinations? Instead of mechanical perfection it had patriotism; instead of drill it had *moral*.

I do not like to pass this period without mention of Napoleon's system of getting information.

He derived information from three sources—spies, reconnaissance, and intercepted letters (and one might add from prisoners, for whom he often asked his Cavalry leaders).

His squadrons must march massed, and the information must be got by small parties under a responsible officer (they sent, say, under a subaltern, 25; under a captain, 50; C.O. or squadron leader, 100 men).

We read: "Now no longer does he send a staff officer with them; he has confidence in his Cavalry leaders from their experience of war."

In all cases an objective was indicated, whether the course of a river, or a place where any roads meet, or an important town, *e.g.*, Gera in 1806.

When they have long distances to go they march at night and arrive about dawn, like partisans.

Later we shall see his enemies use somewhat similar means to beat Napoleon.

The battle of Jena was won largely by determined charges of the French Cavalry.

On the other hand, the battle at Auerstaedt was lost by the Prussian Cavalry because the French Infantry stood firm.

Blücher had a mass of Cavalry with him, but they did not break the French Infantry.

When we remember what I said above about the training of the Prussian Cavalry, it is strange to note that Blücher complained to the King, that when he tried to rally his Cavalry they knocked him over instead of rallying.

The King replied: "They did the same to me."

(The "rally" is one of the most important portions of the training of Cavalry; evidently it had not been much practised in a time of peace by the Prussians.)

In peace we are apt to forget that it must be second nature to Cavalry. Cromwell's battles should teach Cavalry that.

Napoleon now entered Berlin.

By pure effrontery Lasalle, with a few regiments of Hussars, got the fortress of Stettin to capitulate.

Then Napoleon writes to Murat: "If your Hussars take strongholds, I have nothing to do but break up my artillery and discharge my engineers."

After this campaign Napoleon said, in regard to the proportion of the various arms: "If it were not that I must have regard to recruiting for my Artillery and Infantry, I would increase my Cavalry, and would make Hussars and Chasseur regiments consist of 1,000 men (5 squadrons of 200), Dragoons consist of 1,000 men (4 squadrons of 250), and that would give me 84,000 Cavalry."

The severity of the discipline which led to efficiency at this date is apt to be overlooked.

In 1807, Lasalle's Brigade of Hussars were about to charge, and had not advanced 20 paces before a cry of "Halt, halt" was heard, and spread through the ranks without anyone knowing where it had started. They then turned tail and bolted, and it took seven or eight minutes to rally them. This accomplished, Lasalle led them to the front and kept them where they had bolted from till the middle of the night under a terrible artillery fire, which killed many of them.

Even the general at their head had two horses shot under him. It is said "not a soul moved or murmured."

A large part of Napoleon's Cavalry were Dragoons. Dragoons were really Mounted Infantry.

What was thought of them may be gathered from the following story:—

General Milhaud says in his report that a miserable affair between Cossacks and Hussars caused a disaster among my ranks.

I had led several lines of Dragoons to attack, but had the mortification, not of seeing them cut down, but of seeing them one after

another go about. I could have wished to have died there and then in the *melée*, but was rescued by our Grenadiers of the *Corps d'élite*. I never wish again to command such troops.

Picard comments as follows:—

"These Dragoons were doubtless as brave as the rest, but their arm was victim to the false idea that one can make men into good Infantry and good Cavalry at one and the same time."

The greater part of these Dragoons had only been mounted a few months or weeks before.

The moral as applied to Cavalry is obvious: if you make them think (what is not correct) that Infantry cannot be ridden down, because the rifle is such a terrible weapon, they will *never* charge.

Each arm must have its own ideas.

Infantry officers must not try to teach Cavalry that they cannot ride down Infantry.

Cavalry officers must not imagine that it is their *metier* to persuade the Infantry of our Army that they can be ridden over by Cavalry.

Colonel Baykoff says of the work of the Russian Cavalry in the Russo-Turkish campaign:—

"If the dash of the Cavalryman is to be maintained, he must not allow himself to get into the way of a faulty and too frequent dismounted action."

He further holds:—

"That dismounting easily degenerates into an impulse of self-preservation, and for this reason some men take to it more readily than to a cool daring on horseback.

"They are men who wear the Cavalry uniform, but who do not possess the daring Cavalry spirit."

Von Schmidt:—"It cannot too often be repeated that the main thing is to carry out the mission *at any price*; if possible, this should be done mounted and with the *arme blanche*, but if that should not be feasible, then we must dismount and force a road with the carbine."

This holds good to the present time.

THIRD PERIOD.

THE DECLINE—1812—1815.

To what can we assign the decline as far as the French Cavalry are concerned?

I would suggest that:—

1st.—It was owing to the force of Cavalry being top-heavy, an immense corps without training. It is said that there was a great rush of the Parisian "young bloods" to take part in the Russian "walk over."

2nd.—To Napoleon's and Murat's prodigality of Cavalry and disregard of horse management.

3rd.—To the partisan tactics of the enemy.

4th.—To the exhaustion of France in horses and men.

5th.—No time being given to Napoleon to organise his defence in 1814 and 1815.

6th.—To some of his own generals fighting against him, and again because some of those who held commands under him wanted to rest on their laurels.

What were Napoleon's future antagonists about now?

The Prussian Cavalry was being reformed, but could only get 19 regiments, of 500 men apiece, together.

They also re-wrote their Cavalry training, and Laroche-Agnon says:—

"We feel the necessity of abolishing for ever these complicated exercises, which charlatans only could have introduced.

"The detailed instruction, if very simplified, demands less time, and cutting out everything which is not necessary affords more time for instruction on horseback and detached duties."

In 1811, probably as a result of the fatal defeat of Jena in 1806, the Prussians, for want of horses, had to come down to 3 squadron regiments, as we have now.

But though they made progress, their organisation was still faulty, as they had mixed brigades of Infantry and Cavalry.

Also their Cavalry were mixed with Landwehr Yeomanry, in a proportion of about 50 per cent.

The Russian Cavalry had at this time most useful allies in the Cossacks.

These made reconnaissance extremely difficult, and very soon Napoleon's Staff and Cavalry officers, instead of pushing their exploration well up to the enemy, had to be content with what they could learn from the inhabitants of villages and cottages; so Napoleon was now less well served in respect of information of the enemy.

The immense corps of Cavalry which Napoleon now formed had a tremendous disadvantage, by reason of its being too cumbersome. With 3,000 horses in one corps they did not get the value which would have been got from 300 (says General Foy). On the march the horses were saddled and bridled just three times as long.

One month after the passage of the Niemen, out of 50,000 Cavalry then present, scarcely 6,000 took part in the battle of Borodino.

The difficulties of feeding the horses were immense. Though requisitions were made to such an extent that Prussian and Poland suffered more than from a war, food was not served out regularly, and soon everyone requisitioned on his own responsibility and without method. Further, there being no stores of hay, oats, etc., the Cavalry used green forage and lost innumerable horses from this cause alone, whilst the rest lost strength.

Before crossing the Niemen, more than half the horses were saddle galled.

Still, at the opening of this campaign there was immense enthusiasm. To such an extent was this carried that a Colonel commanding a Polish Regiment of Light Horse, asked permission to be allowed to swim the river instead of fording it. He plunged in and told his men to follow him. Great confusion followed, and forty Lancers and many horses were drowned. Most of the remainder came back to the bank from which they had started. The Colonel, with a few only, got to the other side.

An order issued shortly after crossing the Niemen shows how much less confidence was now felt by the light Cavalry of the French:—

> "The enemy have so much Light Cavalry that reconnaissance parties should consist of at least 50 men, unless they are supported by other parties. Otherwise the patrol will be taken, to our loss of confidence and to the increase of that of the enemy. The aim of reconnaissance is solely to establish what is in front and on the flanks, but this must be done by strong parties."

After 25 days of the campaign, Murat's Cavalry was reduced from 22,000 to 14,000 horses, and the remander to an even greater degree.

The Cavalry of the Army Corps by half. Latour Mauburg's 10,000 to 6,000.

The Emperor's personal Cavalry, used by him for special reconnaissance, had great losses; and this without much heavy fighting.

Murat is now seen at his worst. He is sent to follow up the enemy, and he does so with a large force of Cavalry in an endless column on the main road, every day under the saddle for 16 hours. All the time Murat was with the advance guard, galloping here and there after wisps of Cossacks, who dispersed as soon as he got near them.

The column had no repose and no time to feed, and as Nausouty said to Murat: "The horses, unfortunately, not being able to sustain themselves on their patriotism, fall down by the roadside."

The galloping after wisps of Cossacks reminds one of some of the latter stages of the Boer War, and so does the remark about the horses. How could our horses live on patriotism in South Africa, especially as they were in many cases aliens?

It is remarked that the great number of young horses sent from depôts and badly fed, had something to do with the loss of horses.

But the fact was, Napoleon took less care of his Cavalry than did Frederick the Great; all he cared for was to get results (in the battle in hand).

Turning from the Russian fiasco we come to the campaign of 1813.

Napoleon now, in 1813, attempts to organise his Cavalry. A *levée* of 30,000 was made in France in this year. Nearly 3,000 officers and sons of officers were obtained from the Gendarmerie and from the Spanish Cavalry Division, to fill up the cadres of Cavalry returned from Moscow. Of these latter it is said:—"Little was left, almost all having perished."

Both Russia and Prussia now employed free corps or partisans against the French, and these corps had more effect than anything else in ruining the French. The instructions drawn up for the partisans of the Prussian Army are regarded as a model of their kind. De Brack's light Cavalry outposts are equally so.

After the battle of Katzbach we read that Blücher pressed his Cavalry to pursue, but these made a very weak attempt at pursuit, blaming the weather, etc., and then fatigue.

Blücher said, and his words show the true Cavalry spirit: "The State can afford to lose a few hundred horses in order to make a victory complete, or when it is a question of the annihilation of the enemy's army. The neglect to obtain the full results of a victorious

battle is inevitably to oblige yourself, sooner or later, to gamble again."

He made a successful rearguard fight on the river Neisse, near Gorlitz, as follows:—

Murat, coming up at the head of his Cavalry, saw a Cavalry regiment covering the last portion of the retreat over the bridge.

When Murat's Cavalry was just about to charge, these Cavalry opened their ranks and unmasked the heavy artillery, which opened an unexpected fire, causing a loss of 300 or 400 horses in a few instants.

1814. The Invasion of France.

At the commencement of the invasion of France by the allies, Napoleon was organising as quickly as possible the meagre resources left in France of horses and men.

He commandeered all horses suitable for Cavalry, and sent to regiments funds to buy any suitable horses.

He dismounted the same day all the foreign element, Germans, Croats, Hollanders, etc.; these were objects of suspicion now.

The French were not only short of horses, but of arms, including *l'arme blanche*; 3,000 of the Cavalry were conscripts. Still, extraordinary good work was done to begin with.

Milhaud's Cavalry inflicted severe loss (400 men and 150 prisoners) on Wrede's advance guard, and established Cavalry superiority early in the campaign.

Wrede finally had to use two army corps to push back General Milhaud's Cavalry line; but as soon as they pushed after it they lost touch.

Picard says the allies constantly spread out their Cavalry in every direction instead of concentrating it. Consequently they moved blindly, which naturally increased their slowness.

He points out, what does not appear in Hamley, that a great deal of Napoleon's strategy of 1814 was based on exceedingly good officers' reconnaissance work, *e.g.*, a well-mounted officer and four men go out with orders to push on till they find the enemy and ascertain definitely the direction of his march; but remember this was in their own country.

On the 12th February, at the Château Thierry, Cureley, in command of the 10th Hussars, got an opportunity and successfully threw his regiment at the flank of 30 squadrons of Landwehr. This gave an opportunity for Letort with the Dragoons of the Guard to charge the front. This resulted most successfully for the French.

Napoleon, in his bulletin, only put: "Colonel Cureley made himself conspicuous." But he at once promoted him to the rank of general for this feat of arms, and if a tithe of what de Brack says of Cureley is true, no man ever better deserved such promotion.

Now, take Napoleon's action, on the other hand, when his subordinates displeased him.

After the battle of Vauchamps, General Guyot's division of heavy Cavalry left its company of horse artillery some distance behind it owing to the wet weather. Some Russian Cavalry in retreat met the artillery in a wood, and in spite of the efforts of the commanding officer, who formed his detachment into a troop and fought bravely, two guns were taken.

Napoleon deprived General Guyot of his command for this and gave it to Excelmans.

As an instance of the difficulties with which Napoleon's Cavalry leaders were confronted at this date, we read that after the battle of Montereau, Pajol charged with Cavalry only trained for fifteen days.

It shows what leaders can do, for it is said: "The men were young and untried; some had never ridden until a fortnight before, and hardly knew how to hold the reins in one hand and the sword in the other They could scarcely do right or left turn without using both hands to the reins."

And yet these Cavalry supported the attack (even if they did not make it) on the bridges at Montereau.

Practically the horses took charge and carried them through. Pajol apparently counted on this and took the risk.

But it stated further that "With young soldiers who were not able to control their mounts" one knows what will happen — a torrent of runaway horses.

No one has done more service to Cavalry than Colonel Maude when he insists that the Cavalry horse must be unconditionally obedient to his rider.

General Delort did not hide his mind from the officer who brought him the order to charge, when he said: "I believe in truth he is mad when he asks me to charge with such Cavalry as this."

At Arcis the French Dragoons had been outnumbered and outflanked, and were flying. Napoleon heard the cannonade at Tourcy and galloped over with some officers and the troop of escort, and got mixed up in the fight, and had to draw his sword and fight to get clear of it.

After taking refuge in a Polish square, he at the first chance left his place of safety, and, racing through the flying Cavalrymen, got to the bridge, turned about, and faced the runaways, at the same time he thundered out: "Which of you will pass before me?"

The Emperor then rallied and reformed them, and led them against the enemy's squadrons.

But there were only some 2,600 against the enemy's 6,000, and these were supported by a formidable force of artillery, and behind that an army.

Ney's Infantry could not get to support the French Cavalry. The Old Guard was still a long way off.

At last they came up, and Napoleon began to put them in order of battle. At that moment a shell fell in front of the Old Guard, some of whom ran back.

Napoleon at once pushed his horse close up to the smoking shell, and kept it there to give them a lesson in steadiness.

The shell burst, disembowelled the Emperor's horse, who fell with its rider. The Emperor was hidden in the dust and smoke for a moment. Then he rose without a scratch, got on a fresh horse, and began again to mark out the position of his troops.

It is characteristic of the true leader to show himself cool and brave when the rest are shaken.

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815.

The coalition had done away with conscription in France and substituted voluntary service.

It is interesting to note, in view of our present leaning towards territorial organisation, that each department had a territorial force formed of the three arms as follows:—2 battalions Infantry of the Line; 1 battalion Light Infantry; 1 company Mounted Eclaireurs; and 1 company of Artillery.

Picard says: "Of course, the allies knew well in making such an organisation that they rendered instruction quite impossible. An organisation of Cavalry or Artillery must always be by regiments, in order to maintain efficiency."

When Napoleon escaped from Elba the strength of the Cavalry was 25,000 men and 11,000 horses fit for a campaign.

Napoleon's first step was with regard to the *moral* of the Army. He knew well how to play on their feelings.

He reconstituted the old numbers of the regiments and gave a 4th and 5th squadron to Cavalry regiments. Then he set to work to get horses. On the 1st June the contractors had already handed over 20,000 Cavalry horses.

10,000 trained horses were obtained by dismounting the *gendarmes* and paying them the price of the horses; the gendarmes had remounted themselves in 8 days on horses selected by themselves. (Half of these were again to have been taken by the end of July.)

One way and another there were 46,000 horses in the depôts by the middle of June. Men were collected at the average rate of 7,000 per diem.

Napoleon was secretly organising an army without letting the allies know anything of his intentions.

On the 12th June he arrived at Leon, and having sent for Grouchy, he learned that he had had no orders for eight days.

Napoleon at once gave orders to him to send all the Cavalry officers whom he had with him to report themselves to him personally. They were then instructed to carry to all the Cavalry regiments orders for their immediate march. Many of these regiments had to make journeys of 15 to 20 leagues to get in time to the frontier. The French Cavalry were thus overworked from the start of the campaign.

CONCLUSION.

Now, what is the application? Napoleon recommends us to read to obtain a knowledge of the *secrets of the art of war.*

Is there any secret to be learnt in reference to some of our Cavalry problems?

Personally, I like to think what Napoleon (and his Cavalry leaders) would have said on these questions if their ghosts, friendly disposed to us owing to an *entente cordiale*, could come and sit here and discuss them.

What is Our Cavalry for?

After saying: "You know if I had had Cavalry in 1813, I could have conquered Europe," Napoleon would ask: "What is your Cavalry required for?"

1. You say at any rate your Cavalry is required for keeping up the Indian and Colonial garrisons.
2. For interposition with a striking force in Europe.

Possibly for other reasons. But taking these two.

Then, for the latter (No. 2) they must be trained up to the best possible standard. And you can at once decide that Yeomanry, who train for two weeks in the year only, are not up to, say, the French or German standard of men trained continuously and systematically for three years? Yes. Even if the Yeomanry were under severe discipline? Yes.

Again, you need not regard Mounted Infantry, trained with horses for two or three months, perhaps some two or three years back, as of the same calibre as Continental Cavalry.

Then for your Cavalry striking force you have only whatever proportion of your mounted men is real Cavalry, less recruits of under one year's service, and plus your Reservists.

But you are aware that the Continental Cavalry will not rely upon Reservists, as they consider they are not suitable, except for the second line troops.

You have further the disadvantage that on the Continent they take the pick of the nation at 21 years of age, and you take those, who, as a rule, cannot get other work, and at a much younger age. It reminds me of the conscription of 1813.

Hence, your English Cavalry begin at a very considerable disadvantage as regards *personnel*, however good your cadres may be.

After my experience of the difficulty of improvising Cavalry in 1813 and 1814, I deeply sympathise with your leaders.

But you say really one of our greatest difficulties is the question of our drafts for India.

The Director of Recruiting has done all that a man can do.

Well, as far as your Cavalry goes, could you not train far more men with your present *personnel* and *matériel*?

Certainly.

And the Cavalryman is already trained as a rifle shot equally well as the Infantryman.

Then why not train more Cavalry?

Then in war you could select the men required for Cavalry, and for whom you have horses; any surplus can be only too easily disposed of.

In a war with European nations your Mounted Infantry will be ridden down by well-trained cavalry. It is of little use to flatter yourselves that they have their place on lines of communication, and will not come in touch with the enemy's Cavalry. That is pure theory, and not practical.

The objections urged to their use in my day have not disappeared.

I would merely add that your proportion of Cavalry to Infantry seems to be most appropriate to a campaign in the Pyrenees or Alps. *cf.*, Napoleon's War Maxims, XCI.

Reserve of Young Officers.

It is obvious you want a large reserve of *young* and thoroughly trained Cavalry officers, since your loss is bound to be great in war; and the question is, therefore, how can you provide them?

The troop officer, as long as he can lead men, has thoroughly learnt horse management and his duties in the field, is what you require in large numbers.

Well, to learn to lead men, he must be practised when young, as in the Navy. The other duties also he learns just as well at 17 years of age as later.

And he could learn to be a troop leader in two or three years, and for the next eight or ten years on the Reserve he would be valuable, in case of war, as a troop leader. Yes.

Then why not take him on a very simple examination in literary ability at 17 years of age? Make his parent pay £100 a year for his expenses on the same principle as at Osborne and Sandhurst, draft him to Aldershot or the Curragh, teach him his duties, and let his education run concurrently, as is done in the Navy.

Why should he not live frugally and cheaply for two years?

One hears of many parents wishing to send their sons to Osborne for the sake of the education.

Why should not, and why cannot the Cavalry give an equally good education?

And will not a large number of parents be glad to send their sons where they will learn discipline and command of men, and finish their education before they take up their permanent walk in life?

Surely you know many parents who would wish to do so, and who know very well that at the age of 17 years they cannot determine their son's fitness for the Army *as a profession*, or, in fact, his suitability or otherwise for any particular line of life.

It is after the cadet becomes an officer that he must get his higher military education in tactics, strategy, organisation, law, and so on.

You do not want in the Cavalry a large number of generals; you want in war a good supply of first-rate troop and patrol leaders.

Again, the officers, selected from these cadets to go on in the Army, will be worth paying as professional men. You recollect my well-known saying: "That you are a nation of shopkeepers." Surely, then, you know that you must pay highly for a good article.

At present your reserve for Cavalry is formed of much older men, many of whom left the Army because the work was too hard for them, or for similar reasons.

Note also that they leave with a rank which does not suit them for re-entrance to the Army.

They would come in, in some cases, over the heads of very much more able juniors.

They are well suited for some jobs such as remount work, etc., but not in the combatant ranks of Cavalry.

Your Yeomanry officers are not sufficiently instructed to come as troop leaders in an emergency. They cannot be without two years' training in a Cavalry regiment.

Much wiser to promote your non-commissioned officers to command troops in war. It would arouse their emulation.

You remember I always said plainly, I must have the best officers for my Cavalry. Neglect of this principle may cost you dear in war.

Napoleon on Polo.

You say polo is obviously a good game, bar the question of expense. But do no poor men in the Cavalry play polo?

Oh yes, a number. Well, send for one and let us ask him how he does it. You know I started a pack of hounds at the Cavalry

School—and we all know how well those British officers rode across country in the Peninsula.

Well, in the first place, how do you buy ponies?

I buy some ponies which run away with my rich friends, because their grooms have overfed them, and they have underworked them.

I buy some ponies which have kicked a lady's pony cart to pieces for similar reasons.

You, no doubt, get them cheap?

Yes, practically given away, £20 to £40 not more, or I buy them when their owners must sell.

And how do you feed and groom them?

Well, as overfeeding has caused them to come into my hands, they do not get much. I give them grass and hay till they are reformed characters, and as I seldom get off their backs, grooming is superfluous.

In the autumn I turn them out to grass for five or six months, or I sell them to a dealer if I get a good offer.

I think this young officer is lucky and enterprising; the sort of man who seizes an opportunity and can make a good deal out of very little opportunity. I should put him down for promotion in my light Cavalry. He would be just the man for advanced posts in war, where, as de Brack says: 'There are no such things as magazines.'

If this officer can play polo and so exercise his brains, muscles, and knowledge of horses to his own advantage in peace, he will be able probably to exercise the same to the advantage of the Army in time of war, and will be much more valuable than those officers who have not his abilities. If he can do this, presumably others can do so.

He is suitable for Cavalry and the sort of man who is required.

"Poverty, hardship, and misery are the school of the good soldier."

Let our young Cavalry officers and their parents ponder over what de Brack says in his introduction to "Light Cavalry Outposts" (the best book, I think, ever written on the subject):—

"A man must be born a light Cavalry soldier. No situation requires so many natural dispositions, an innate genius for war, as that of an officer of light troops. The qualities, which render a man superior — intelligence, will, power — ought to be found united in him. . . .

"His profession is a rough one, but every day affords him opportunities for distinguishing himself. . . .

"He must inspire his men with entire confidence, devotion, dash. . . ."

Napoleon on Moral.

What would Napoleon say in regard to *moral*? One may suppose that, whilst he would allow that it is most difficult to preserve and cultivate in peace time, and extremely apt to degenerate into mere ceremony. He would insist:—

1. On more importance being attached to the soldier's attestation oath.

   It should be a solemn ceremony before the whole regiment, not hurried over in a Magistrate's Office.

2. That attention must be paid to the nation's discipline. Discipline and the ordinary rules of sanitation must be taught in the schools.
3. That the nation must be cunningly stirred by every available means to an enthusiasm for the Army.
4. That the vogue of abusing the Army must be "bad form" in the so-called educated classes.
5. That it is a pity when the Army becomes an arena in which our embryo strategists display their muscle and air their political propaganda.
6. That the idea that anything but strict discipline and continual hard work in peace can make a soldier of any value in war must be strangled.
7. That the cost of the amateur soldier must be approximated to his real value.
8. That no material advantage should accrue to those who do their duty as Volunteer soldiers to the State over those who do not, is a cowardly subterfuge on the part of the nation.

Colonel R. N. R. READE (late Commandant Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada):—There are two very interesting points in General Rimington's lecture on which I would ask him to give us some further illustrations of Napoleon's views. He has touched upon both. The first is about the training necessary for a reserve officer. I gather from him that once an officer has had a good preliminary training, he need have no more for the next eight years, and would still be valuable to come out as a troop leader. It is a point about this preliminary training which I wish to put to him. I want to ask him if it would not be, in Napoleon's view, a good thing to establish a training college, where these officers could be taught by the cavalry leaders, the school being run in every way as a cavalry school, but where they would also learn something to help them in civil life, so that on leaving the school they could go out as graduates and take their place in the civil life of the country as successful men and not as wasters? I am very much interested in this point, because I have had the honour lately to command the Royal Military College of Canada, and there I have been in touch with two unique and very interesting military schools on the other side of the Atlantic—one, the United States Army School at West Point, and the other the Royal Military College of Canada. West Point College was established in 1802, when the Americans saw the necessity of having trained officers, even if they had a small army; and they see the necessity still more now when there are so many things in a rich nation to attract men to go to rather than to the Army. They have very little to offer them as a career in the Army, though they may pay them better than we do here. The way they do it is this: Each senator can nominate so many cadets for the West Point College, and they pass a very easy examination, and then go there for four years. They pay nothing while they are there, except an entrance fee of £20. They are fed, clothed, and taught for the four years there, and on graduation they pass out for another four years into the United States Army. The United States consider that they are well paid for the expense of the College. They get a good class of officer in their Army for four years; and the proud boast of a graduate of the United States Army is, that he is fit to take his post as an officer in any branch of the service, and that with very little extra training he is fit to be a staff officer. Perhaps it might

rather interest you to know that one point General Rimington has touched on here is touched on at West Point, and that is polo. Not only are ponies provided by the United States for the cadets to learn polo, but they are ordered and made to learn it as part of their training. The other college, with which I was connected, the Royal Military College at Kingston, is different. There, it is a poor country, and they have not a standing army, and there is no great opportunity for going into military life. But 30 years ago it was found that it would be a good thing for the Canadian nation to have men trained in a military way, who would be able either to take their place in the ranks of the army or to go into civil life. Out of 30 cadets who pass each year out of the College, half-a-dozen come into the English Army, and I need not point out how well those who have joined us have done. I think there is one very successful cavalry leader, Colonel Leader of the Carabiniers, who is one of them, and many others have done well. Some of them go into the Canadian Army, but the vast majority of them go into civil life. They are trained at the College, both to be soldiers and to be civilians. They are trained in civil engineering, surveying, and so forth. We find them on the great railways of Canada and the States, and we also find them in civil life as bankers, brewers, and merchants. All through we find them, and every one of them will tell you that the reason of his getting on in life has been because he has been at the Royal Military College of Kingston. When it comes to a pinch we find that the backbone of the Canadian contingent in a war is formed of the boys from the Canadian College, not only those boys who have gone into the Canadian Militia, but those who have passed into civil life, and who come back when the nation comes to a pinch. There is another point I want to ask General Rimington's opinion upon. Does he think Napoleon would approve of establishing some such college to be run on those lines, in order to form a reserve for the cavalry of England? I forgot to say that the expense at Kingston is greater than West Point. Each parent pays £60 for the first, and £50 for the second, and £50 for the third year his son is there, and the rest of the money is paid by the State. I think it costs about £80 or £90 a year per cadet to run it, the balance being paid by the State. The final point I wish to bring forward is, about the supply of officers to the cavalry. I want to know what General Rimington would think Napoleon would say about that. Would Napoleon hamper himself by only going to a certain class of people and getting his officers from them? Or would he not say that with the cavalry it is most important to have the cleverest men and the best trained, to go and lead our mounted troops? Would not Napoleon have said:—"I will not be hampered by anything; I will pay for it, and I will get the best I can." Napoleon, besides being a general, was an economist and a political economist. He would get men, and he would see that if he paid for them that he got full value out of them. What would Napoleon say? Perhaps he would say:—"Look back forty years!" I should like to see a system under which I could get men like the cavalry leader, General J. B. Stewart, who was a landowner and a rich man in Virginia; and also a system which did not exclude a poor Irish lad, like that brilliant cavalry soldier, General Sheridan.

Lieut.-Colonel F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (Commanding 1st Hants R.E. [Vols.], late R.E.):—I will not waste your time by apologising for rising to speak before a gallery of cavalry officers, because I am afraid time is getting on, but I should like to call attention for a moment or two to

one or two points in General Rimington's admirable lecture. First of all, on the question of the *moral*. We have always one great difficulty to contend with, and that is the popular feeling in this country. If you kill two or three men on a field day, or break a few horses down, there is such a howl raised by the daily Press that practically the training is stopped for the year for good and all. That has happened over and over again. On the other hand, you can go out and break as many men and horses' backs as you like in steeplechasing, and the Press takes no notice of it at all. The fact of the matter is, that you may kill men for sport in England, but you cannot kill them in preparation for war. A few years ago we had a rather trying experience in South Africa, and our chief difficulty was, that our horses could not travel fast enough to catch the Boers. They might have got along all right if we had ever been taught how to manage horses for long distance rides. But there were very few long distance riders then; in fact, they were not popular in England, all such contests were held abroad. People went to these long distance rides, sent by the Press; I saw many of those gentlemen, and they really did not know one end of the horse from the other. They wrote about the atrocious cruelties perpetrated on these poor unfortunate horses. But I can say that those things never happened, for I was myself an eye-witness of the longest of these rides, *i.e.*, Berlin to Vienna. However, those gentlemen effectually knocked all training for long distance riding pretty well out of the country. It was the same with us again, after the Boer War, when we might have been expected to have learnt that it was better to sacrifice a few horses in peace than to lose many in time of war. That is one little trouble we have always got to deal with. Further, I would like most strongly to support what General Rimington said on the subject of the attestation of recruits. I think the hole-and-corner way in which a very solemn thing like that is done with us is most improper. Half the men do not know what the oath means. They swear it just as they do in the Police Court, but the majority have no more intention of keeping it longer than suits their convenience than the average "rice Christian" in the East, and they are perfectly astounded when they are told that they are liable to punishment if they break it. They do not know the sanctity of an oath. This is possibly due to some of the Board School training; and under the provisions of Mr. Birrell's Bill, matters are likely to get worse rather than better. On the general question of the lecture, the question of the spirit of the Napoleonic cavalry, I should only like to point out that this spirit was uniform all through the whole of his campaigns. From the very first, Napoleon himself and his generals meant to get on. He always meant, as General Rimington said, "to get at them." In the early part of his career he succeeded, not because he had better men and better horses; on the contrary, most of the advantages of training both of horses and of men were distinctly on the side of his opponents. But he succeeded, because his enemies did not possess the true (cavalry) spirit, and, not having that true spirit, they were most immobile and always too slow. But as soon as the conditions of war changed, and Napoleon got into country where the enemy was more mobile than his own men, then the spirit could no longer help him, as the Russians and the Cossacks could ride all round the French cavalry. There was no question of firearms in those days. We have been led to believe that the Boer war was completely conditioned by the use of firearms; but here we saw all along the Russian frontier a great army, covered by an enormous force of

cavalry consisting of 84,000 horses or more, opposed and destroyed by a very mobile screen of Cossacks, who fought them by merely appearing and disappearing. They did not do very much material harm, but they wore that cavalry out so that it was as impossible for Napoleon's French troopers, with all their spirit, to catch those men as it was for us in South Africa to catch the Boers. I think we might take some little consolation to ourselves on that point if we did not succeed out there as brilliantly as we should have liked to. If we did not end the Boer war in the few months' time that we all hoped for, it was no fault of the men who were there; it was the fault of conditions for which they were not responsible. It was not the fault of our British generals, but was simply due to the fact that all our forces had to go 6,000 miles across the sea and then to be landed in a country where the circumstances were entirely changed, the horses being landed with long coats when they ought to have had short ones, and so on. It was not their fault that they broke down, but it was due to circumstances which had never received sufficient consideration. But I do think that following on from such experiences, we might look into the causes of such deficiencies as there *may* yet be in our cavalry—I do not say there are—and ask ourselves whether we cannot in peace do something to remove the evils which still remain. I am alluding to the question of the weights carried throughout the whole of our cavalry, indeed, throughout the whole Army. Excess of weights were the chief cause of our troubles in the Boer War. We never caught the Boers, because the Boers carried nothing but what was absolutely necessary, and our men, weighted as they were, never had a chance of chasing them. Then the Boer shooting was very good. As near as we can make out, they fired about a thousand bullets for one man badly hit. Unquestionably, our men started on the average—and I lay stress on the words "on the average"—better trained than the Boers, but we took 10,000 rounds to kill one Boer, that is to say, we used up about 5 cwts. of ammunition to create one casualty. Having that experience, after the war, we actually propose to make the already great weight greater, and we proceed to put a heavier rifle into the hands of the cavalry than they had before. Then we have added another hundred cartridges to his equipment. We have also put more weight behind the teams of the artillery. In whatever we have done, we have made the whole Army slower still. I submit that the whole essence of the question is, that our generals shall be given a mobile cavalry, and one so mobile that they can choose their target, and not the other way round. When we can do that choosing, there will be no complaints about our shooting. The real secret of the better shooting made by the Boers was this:—Their superior mobility gave them the power of choosing their own target. But we might train the whole British nation to shoot at targets in peace time at ranges, from now to the end of the world if you like, and they will not make any more hits than we made out in South Africa, until they learn to move faster, and thus give our generals a chance to put the troops confided to them in such places from which the rifle can be used to the best effect. That used to be the whole essence of the regulations, but curiously, in 1898, that one paragraph on which army efficiency entirely depends, was struck out and ceased to exist. Coming now to the special side of the cavalry question, it seems to me a question whether we should not do better if we dispensed with some ammunition and went back to carbines, so that we could put a lighter weight altogether on to the horse. Then as to the saddle. That has not been changed for some years, and I should

like to ask whether we could not take that structure of iron, steel, wood and leather, and of its 28 lbs., take off some 20 lbs. The idea is, that a cavalry saddle must last for ever; it never seems to have occurred to people that though the saddle lasts it breaks down the horse, and that it is very much cheaper to buy a new saddle than to replace a horse. In South Africa the saving in this department alone would have run into about £7,000,000 sterling—I worked it out the other day; and that is obviously a consideration. We can make a much lighter saddle, and we should be able to do it, if we could only once get the Woolwich people who make the saddle to understand how essential it is that we should have something better than what we now have. Last of all, I would simplify the question of food and forage. Forage is very nearly the essence of mobility. Water, of course, is the first thing, and you cannot fight in any country where there is no water; but if you can sweep over a great wide area with your cavalry, then your chances of finding water increase as the square of the distance covered. Every well you find, and every additional puddle you find, becomes a sort of focus from which the energy of the cavalry is revived. Now, if you carry absolutely dry rations of food and forage, when you come to a well you can swell the food or ration out, and thus obtain the bulk both horses and men require. Thus, instead of carrying 7 lb. tins of bully beef, etc., you would carry about 1 lb., and thus get another half a stone off your horses, which means additional mobility and greater chances of finding the enemy, instead of being found by him. Adding all these possible savings together, I think that we might well attain that excess of mobility over our possible enemies, which alone renders the realisation of the cavalry ideal possible.

Major R. A. Johnson (1st Vol. Batt. The Hampshire Regiment):—I should like to express, on behalf of the civilian element of the population, our great indebtedness to General Rimington for the admirable lecture which he has given us; and, on behalf of the civilian element of the population, I should like to say a word in confirmation of what he has said about, what strikes me as the great problem—the problem of the reserve of officers for the regular cavalry. I may say that I am hardly entitled to speak on this matter, because I am not even a Yeomanry officer, and even if I were a Yeomanry officer, I should not, as General Rimington has told us, be fit even to lead a troop of cavalry in war. I *was* a Yeomanry officer for a very short time, and then, finding myself "too fat, and too old, and too lazy," I had to betake myself to a bicycle. At the same time, I think one's experience of active service with Yeomanry leads one to imagine that the sort of man who is now in a Yeomanry regiment might, if he were seriously taken in hand, be made quite fit to lead a troop even in the cavalry. After all, if we can't look to Yeomanry officers for our cavalry reserve, where else can we possibly get him? General Rimington has told us that he would perfer a non-commissioned officer of the Regular cavalry to act as troop leader, rather than a young Yeomanry officer. General Rimington, of course, has the very best reasons for knowing; but experiences differ, and some of us found that the Regular non-commissioned officer, who served with Yeomanry in South Africa, was generally too wooden for that display of dash and enterprise, which is the essential of a troop leader. At the same time we must all remember that since the South African War, the change in the Regular cavalry and in the Regular Army in general has been very great, and that the highly-trained troops which General Riming-

ton has under his command in Ireland, and which General French has at Aldershot, are about five times or six times as well trained as they were in the days before the war. Consequently, the superiority, which always existed and which the professional soldier, naturally, always enjoyed over the amateur, has now become a superiority out of all proportion to what it was in former times. Nevertheless, I do not see how we are going to find the reserve for the Regular cavalry, which General Rimington quite rightly desires to have, unless we are prepared to go to the civilian element of the population, and make the best of what it can give us. Nor do I quite think that the British parent would regard a military school as a suitable preparation for civil life. How then, are we to get a reserve of trained officers? The true solution of our difficulty surely lies in getting hold of the Universities. Various people have already been approaching the Universities with this object in view, and one finds that the University authorities would be very willing indeed to add to the ordinary degree course at the Universities, a course in military subjects, accompanied by a practical course of field training, given by attachments for a short time to a Regular unit. The undergraduate, who passed these courses, would get a diploma attached to his University Degree, and, of course, he would have to be rewarded financially for his trouble. Some small payment would be very grateful to an undergraduate, especially when he is going down, and his debts accumulate, and consequently, there would be many applicants for this course. But in return for the money payments, candidates would be asked to enter into an obligation, after passing the course, either to be attached *à la suite* of a regular regiment for four years, or else to go to the Auxiliary Forces. I take it that what General Rimington means, when he tells us that he cannot trust the Yeoman, is, that the present Yeomanry officer has not got sufficient grounding. But he surely does not deny that it ought not to pass the wit of man to give him this grounding. Nor I imagine would he have the slightest objection, were the Yeomanry officer properly grounded, to his continuing to do the valuable work that he already does in helping the mass of the population to do something in the way of soldiering. I suggest for the General's consideration whether Napoleon, who, after all, was not only a great soldier, but a great Statesman as well, and who, amongst other things, practically recreated the great University system of France, would not think that, having regard to present conditions in this country, it would not be possible, instead of asking people to go to a military college on their way to civil life, to take a suitable training in military subjects in the stride of their ordinary degree course at the University, and of their ordinary civil work. I think, perhaps, General Rimington was just a little inconsistent, if I may say so, in two ways. In the first place, he said that misery was a good school for a cavalry officer, and then he complained that the cavalry officer was underpaid. He also said that the nation must be cunningly stirred up by every available means to enthusiasm for the Army. I submit that the best way of all to stir everybody up to an enthusiasm for the Army is to encourage our young men to do everything that they will, and not to tell them, after all their efforts, they will not be fit to lead even a troop of cavalry. The Yeomanry ought to be, even if it is not at present, the real second line to the Regular cavalry. Hence, we must encourage them all to take advantage of every possible chance that the Regular Army will throw open to them for training themselves, not merely as Yeomanry officers but as reserve officers for the Regular cavalry in time of war.

T. Miller Maguire, LL.D., M.A., Barrister-at-Law (Inner Temple): —The most excellent lecture which we have heard is one of a series of these very improving discussions which have been inaugurated in this Royal United Service Institution, and cannot fail, in my humble opinion, to do much good, not only to each branch of the Army, but to the nation at large. I rise especially because General Rimington referred to me by name in connection with a singular incident in the life of the Prussian commander, Blücher—I mean the incident in connection with his brandy bath. General Rimington discussed Blücher's age on that occasion, and I turned to the distinguished German cavalry officer on my left, and I find that he supports my contention that Blücher was no less than 76 years of age at the time; and two days after Blücher himself was, with his own hands, helping to pull the guns to the aid of the English at Waterloo. Therefore, you and the gallant officer on your right, and myself, and others, may look forward, in spite of what Oxford professors may say, to a career of great liveliness and activity this time 20 years. Another remark: Blücher, although such a lively sportsman, that he could appreciate brandy after being ridden over in several cavalry charges, had, as the chief of his staff, General Gneisenau. At one party Blücher said, when he had about two more bottles of champagne than usual after dinner, "I am the only party that can kiss my own brains"; he made a bet on this, and went and kissed the head of General Gneisenau. But the Prussians did not come to that standard of excellence, which enabled them, with cavalry leaders like Dornberg and others, to follow the retreating French from the Oder to the Marne, and into Paris, by improvisation. They did that by self-denial, after their defeats in 1806—constant, perpetual self-denial on the part of every man in the nation; not that kind of miserable sense of luxury that we have now—in 1906. From 1806 to 1813 there was constant self-denial and devotion of men to soldiering, not to cricketing. They went in for universal soldiering, and the cult of knowledge, universal education, all pervading patriotism. They cultivated the "souls" of men from prince to peasant; they had a *Tugenbrind*. Hence, they were able to follow, with admirable cavalry arrangements, the mightiest genius of modern times, whose actions have been described by the gallant general, from the Oder to Paris. I assure you I agree most heartily with Colonel Maude that it was a terrible thing to see those poor boys of the Second Yeomanry, being trained for South Africa. We found that "sportsmen" are not horsemen. It was humiliating to the very last degree that a nation like ours should have to go and improvise the preparation of thousands of mounted men, and send them to death in consequence of our lazy, worthless games in times of peace. Can our people ride? Can they shoot? If not, why not? They can find time to look at football matches, money to spend £12,000,000 a year on golf, and £16,000 in one afternoon for gate money for "Cup finals." In spite of your being Chairman, Sir, I may as well tell you about your book on "Scouting." I bought every copy of it I could find, except a few that I left for the German Emperor, and distributed them among horsemen going to the front, who had never heard about scouting till then! We had 1,600 men in our Riding School, and hardly a single man of them could mount, or knew which side of the horse to go, or hold their rifles when mounted. They were miserably inefficient in regard to riding. Of the 1,600 there were only four who could ride properly, and they were deserters from the Royal Artillery. They asked me to say a few words of farewell, and I said:—"They call you 'the poor miserable Yeomanry on five bob a day'; all I can say

is, you are the bravest men in the world, without any exception. You do not know how to ride a bit, and you do not know how to sight your rifles, and yet you are gaily going to fight the Boers for 5s. a day; I would not do it for 50s. a day." There is no value in improvisation of ability or capacity for anyone. We are now putting the charge of the national education and the national Army in the care of two Chancery lawyers with parchment souls. Did they improvise in regard to their law? How many briefs would they get if they were improvised lawyers? And, who would go to an improvised surgeon to have his leg cut off? Would you? No, you say, certainly not. Nor would I. Is there use and improvisation in any industry? Do you remember that author in Cromwell's life who wrote about the accidents of war, and said the most admirable thing in the world:—"When you get a wild man, and a wild beast like a horse, and put the two of them together, it is no easy job to make the two go harmoniously together, and face death or mutilation"? I say your cavalry ought to be cherished by every member of the community. I am now speaking as a civilian, and I say it would be a very good job indeed if your mounted men, horse and man, were an object of affection and interest to every person in the British State. Then you would have the very first cavalry in the world. You should be proud of it. Now I will speak a word about the gallant officer who has lectured to us. The gallant lecturer practises what he preaches, which is a great deal more than many a political or other preacher does. I was with the gallant officer last summer, and, to tell you the truth, I had a pretty hard time of it. Students of history know that it is very common to censure and ridicule our own cavalry officers. If you gave me an hour, I would undertake to prove that there is not one mistake made (and I am sure Colonel Maude is with me now; I see him smiling, perhaps he knows what I am going to say) by any of our cavalry officers in any campaign since the immortal charge of Marlborough and his dauntless cavalry at Blenheim, in scouting, reconnoitring, charging, pursuing, retreating, rallying, whatever tactics you like to suggest, that I could not parallel in the annals of the French Army and the Russian Army, or if my noble and distinguished German friend will allow me to say so, in the annals even of the German Army. The country should know these truths—they are better than party and factious sophistry. Another thing I wish to say; if you take up history you will see that this is a most certain and most absolute truth—that no nation in the crisis of its life was ever able to evolve honour out of danger except with the aid of cavalry. There is not a single case in all history in which a long, protracted campaign has come to a successful issue without the aid of large bodies of cavalry; and those States which have been foolish enough to neglect cavalry in times of peace have not been able to do without it in war. There is not one case to the contrary. Alexander the Great relied on his cavalry. He could not have won his campaigns, except he had imitated Epaminondas by securing a good cavalry force before he went into Asia. When Hannibal came over the Alps he brought with him a good cavalry, and he played the very mischief with the Romans, in consequence, so that they were obliged at all costs to get up a sound cavalry force; and they carried that branch so far that by the time of the end of the Roman Republic, the cavalry officer and the cavalry soldier were great powers in the equites, knights were horsemen, and so, in the middle ages, chivalry (Cheval) and horsemanship were synonymous. But every ignorant and self-conceited fool who writes on Tactics prophesies the end

of cavalry after each new invention of the engineer. Yet, in point of fact, the cavalry have become more important after each new invention of ballistics. That was found after the invention of gunpowder, and it has been found at every step since. I will give you an example from America. From 1861 to 1864 the Federals had not a good cavalry, and they were knocked to pieces by the ability of the officers to whom my most excellent and gallant friend behind me, Colonel Reade, has referred, such as General Stewart, Nusby, Ashby, Morgan. You know perfectly well that for several years the Federals had no such General as Stewart. However, Lincoln and Grant and Sherman resolved to get a good cavalry, in 1864, and eventually they put 20,000 cavalry into the field under Sherman; and therefore, they won the war, but not till then. We were abolishing cavalry a few years ago. Yet, how many hundred thousand horses did you see in South Africa, and how many died, and how many might have lived? I will not enter into that; but at any rate, could you have finished that war efficiently without numerous mounted troops? And so, too, in the late war, the great value of cavalry was shown in the operations conducted by both the Japanese and the Russian Armies. I have spoken very long I know, and very incoherently I know, but I myself am, in a small way, a cavalry soldier. I have been seeing any amount of cavalry training, and I highly appreciate the troopers of the British Army, and I tell you plainly that the officers of the cavalry deserve more thanks than they receive. I believe that the sergeants in the British cavalry are amongst the finest set of men of their rank in the whole world. They are fine men, bold, brave, good-looking men, worthy of the highest admiration of our people. The civilian who despises our soldiery is a worthless man himself. If I had to begin life again, I would spend a considerable portion of my time, with the help of my pocket book or by the help of the State, in cherishing, studying cavalry tactics profoundly, and the company of the cavalry officers and the men of the British Army. I would consider that not only my manhood but also my intellectual tone, and my moral power and capacity for good would be immensely improved, the more thoroughly I became impregnated with cavalry skill, cavalry courage, cavalry discipline, respect, and live for my comrades' horses as well as men, and with cavalry ideals. I thank General Rimington for his lecture; it has done us all good, and I am ashamed that the despicable craze for cricket has prevented this room from being filled with an audience; but though we are few in numbers, I am sure we are all the more appreciative.

Brigadier-General M. F. RIMINGTON, in reply, said:—I have first to answer a question by Colonel Reade about education. My idea is, that we should have a school for young officers at a place like the Curragh or at Aldershot, or where we have two or three cavalry regiments, and that their education in physical science, law, surveying, and various things, which would be useful to them in their civil life, should run concurrently with their education as cavalry soldiers, and that they should have the command of men as their pastime. We can easily do this, because they will work at that age. They like work then, and that is the time to catch them.[1] I think that that would be Napoleon's view. The West Point education, from what I have heard of it, is an admirable one; and I should like to tell you, that Americans have the highest opinion of their cavalry, and speak of them as splendid fellows.

[1] It is more important for cavalry officers to learn their work whilst still young, than it is for other branches of the service.

Perhaps their education has something to do with it. I think that the younger nations of the British Empire are very much inclined to walk past us, as they are teaching the whole of their boys quite early, for instance, when they are 12 or 14 they begin in cadet corps; thus they instil the right spirit in them. The late Mr. Seddon was one of the great organisers of military sentiment in the Colonies. With regard to our system of obtaining officers for cavalry, Colonel Reade asked what class I would take. All I can say is, that in war I have been shoulder to shoulder with all sorts of people, and I found that as long as they had the right spirit in them, or had it put into them, one did not mind. You would much rather have a brave man shoulder to shoulder with you than you would have the finest fellow in the world, or the best dressed man in the world. Personally, I do not mind whom I go with; as long as he is a good man and means business. But I do not think that we will get the class indicated by Colonel Reade, because I do not think that they will come, unless they are well paid. Major Johnson said I was inconsistent, because I said poverty and misery were the school of the good soldier, whilst I suggested that officers might be better paid. But how are we going to get these good men unless we give them more pay? I think it is common sense that you must pay men according to their ability. We do not want to devote them like monks to a life of poverty and chastity. Major Johnson said:—"Would we be satisfied to take our reserve officers for the cavalry from those who had been educated at a University, or would we prefer non-commissioned officers?" and went on to say that he had found non-commissioned officers rather wooden. All I can say is, that that is not my experience of them. With regard to what Colonel Maude said. I think you can do anything you like with your horses or with your men, as long as you are acting fairly. In training cavalry, accidents are unavoidable. Colonel Maude spoke about the weight cavalry horses carried. In peace time we always increase the weight on a cavalry horse, because some of us are inventors and we invent something which we want put on the horse, and move heaven and earth to get it there. Then, of course, the moment we get on service the first thing we do is to chuck it all away, and the man goes out with nothing but his cloak, his rifle, and his sword, and half a ration for his horse. Major Johnson said:—Would I not like University men as cavalry officers? I am a B.A. myself of Oxford, and personally I do not know that I would.

Major JOHNSON:—I meant for your reserve of officers.

General RIMINGTON:—Quite so. I do not think it is a good thing to put a man in command of men before he has been disciplined himself. I think a man must have learnt to obey before he can command. Napoleon said: "*Pas de discipline, pas de victoire,*" and that is my difficulty about a University education in military science, because you want something more than that. We want practice and practical work in order to make a good officer. I was very pleased to draw such a great speech from Dr. Miller Maguire. It was an inspiring speech, and it did me good to listen to it. Dr. Miller Maguire said that every fool who writes on tactics has told us something to the effect that cavalry cannot possibly go on. The person I go to for cavalry tactics is Xenophon. You get better tips about cavalry in Xenophon than almost anywhere else; for instance, about the rally and about riding over rough country. Xenophon said:—"You must bustle your cavalry over the worst of the country, and then you will be able to beat the enemy easily in the plains."

He was a great advocate for that. I hope I have answered all the questions that were put to me.

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, C.B.) :—The lecturer has gone over a very wide field in the course of his paper, so that it is difficult to sum it up properly in the short time at my disposal. General Rimington makes it evident that the value of cavalry in war depends on the spirit which possesses it. The spirit in Napoleon's time was very great, and the value of cavalry was also very great. The remark which the lecturer says might have been made by Napoleon actually *was* made by him when he said : "Had I had cavalry in 1813, I could have beaten Europe." (See "Avenir de la Cavalerie," by Baron d'Azémar.) This was when Napoleon's cavalry had been destroyed, after its spirit had failed, as Colonel Maude has just pointed out, in the Moscow campaign. But it must not be supposed that this spirit only existed in Napoleon's time; it has been conspicuous at all times. Colonel Elliot would tell you that cavalry of old was termed "procella equestris," or "the mounted tornado"; and the term "to put a colon or stop on anything," was derived from the phrase, "Colophonem Imponere," which meant "lay on Colophon," Colophon being an Ionian town, which produced first-rate cavalry, who were used, when necessary, to turn the tide of the fight. It is immaterial with what weapon cavalry may be armed provided they have the spirit, and cavalry is to-day as invaluable as ever, provided that it is trained in the spirit which General Sir Baker Russell used to infuse into us, viz. : "The Hussar is made to be smart in peace, and to be killed in war." The cavalry armed as it is with the modern rifle and quick-firing guns, is stronger than of old, and its chances are at least equally good against infantry, whose endurance has to be four times as great as formerly, owing to the wider distances to be covered on the battle-field, and the days, instead of hours, which are occupied in deciding a battle; but infantry physique has not improved to that extent; short service means less discipline to counteract panic; small-bore bullets are not "stoppers"; ammunition is more liable to exhaustion; field guns are so heavy that they cannot readily get away; lines of communication are long and vulnerable; all these offer enhanced opportunities to cavalry; and it must be remembered that in any case infantry cannot, without cavalry, fully defeat their enemy, nor can they profit by their success. The value of cavalry in modern warfare is, therefore, as great as ever, and this fact has been strongly exemplified at the battle of Mukden. General Négrier says : "The Russian defeat at Mukden was complete. We may confidently assert that one of the principal causes of the disaster lay in the faulty employment of the cavalry." In this battle, Russia had 17,000 cavalry split up about the field, the Japanese had about 6,500 concentrated. As Colonel Elliott writes : "The Cavalry Division is not a net to catch sprats, but a battle-ship to strike and destroy." Defeat here, as in most cases, was due to false leading. At all times cavalry have remained much the same in the matter of men, horses, and horsemen; but in some campaigns they have failed, and in others they have brought success, and in almost every case the results have been directly attributable to the personality of the leaders—compare Cromwell, Seydlitz, Stuart, and others. Von Hoenig writes:—"It is more the want of capable leaders than defective tactics that has caused cavalry failure on the battle-field." The attributes of an ideal leader of cavalry are essentially those which a Briton possesses. Confidence in self; horseman and horsemaster; adventurous and cool-headed; quick to grasp a situation; quick to adapt himself to it; playing the game for his side, not for himself. All of these qualities are fostered

by our national sports, such as hunting, polo, big-game stalking, etc. Thus we Britons possess the best material; but we have our weak points, and an inclination to selfishness and exclusiveness is one among them. *Esprit de corps* is all very well, and, within bounds, commendable, but *esprit d'arme* is a vile, snobbish, and dangerous thing, where one branch of the service sets itself against another. It is essential that all branches pull together in war, and for that reason they must be close friends and intimate in peace; but it is not always so with us, and this is due to a want of a broader and deeper spirit which is needed among us, and which ought to be put into our rising generation as part of their education. The spirit I refer to is that of "chivalry," which was known of old as "chevalerie," *i.e.*, the attributes or spirit of cavalry. In the library of the Cavalry Club you will find a book called the "Broadstone of Honour," by Digby. It gives the whole history of chivalry, and shows, through the French writers of the Middle Ages, how England was the home of chivalry, which spread from there over Europe. Chivalry consists in absolute straight dealing; devotion to duty; patience; courage, reverence for women, and all that is best in one's country; and above all, in a continual state of readiness through due forethought and preparation to sacrifice self for the good of the whole. Is there any profession or line of life in which such training is not equally applicable and desirable? If "Broadstone of Honour" were a text book and a classic in our schools, in place of certain Greek plays, is it not possible—is it not certain—that we should have a more self-sacrificing generation arising to maintain our nation on its ancient pedestal? As President Roosevelt says:—"It is character that counts in a nation as in a man . . . . especially duty to God and to one's neighbour." If true chivalry (which practically includes patriotism) were more general among us, there would be little need to talk of conscription; every man would, by nature, try to do something for his country in the way of personal service or otherwise. Fortunately, some of the spirit of chivalry still remains in the Army, and is, I am glad to think, gradually increasing among all ranks there. Further development of it would make the Army a valuable school. General Rimington's proposition is, that boys should come for two years as cadet officers in the cavalry before taking up any profession, and they would thus form a reserve for future contingencies. But I would not limit this or any other idea merely to cavalry. I would commend a wider extension of General Rimington's idea for the mutual benefit of the nation, and of the Army at large. How would it be if all parents sent their sons from school to one branch of the Army or another as cornets or ensigns for two years of practical training in chivalry and formation of character before going to the University, or to other lines of life? *a*. There would then be no difficulty in officering all our forces, Regular and Auxiliary (which is a point of vital importance to the nation). *b*. And we should have the makings of the regeneration of our nation, which is now becoming badly needed. To sum myself up—for I have been inordinately long—cavalry is as valuable for war as it ever was, provided that its leaders have the proper spirit. This spirit is practically that of self-devotion, and therefore, applicable to all arms, and to all professions. Therefore, the Army might, with advantage, be used as a school for the rising generation. In thanking you for your attendance to-day, I would commend this proposition to your further consideration. Meantime, I think I shall be expressing your feelings if I say that our sincere thanks are due to General Rimington for having put forward the subject in so clear and interesting a form.