

The Northern Pacification of 1719-20

PART III.—THE COMPLETION.

THE treaties of July and August 1719 assigned the southern half of Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, and Bremen and Verden to Hanover; and as it was agreed that Sweden must retain some territory in Germany, it followed that Denmark must be persuaded to restore Stralsund and the isle of Rügen. But the Danes refused to be so persuaded; they were convinced that by prosecuting the war Sweden must be compelled to accept any terms prescribed; and they demanded not only their share of Pomerania and ducal Sleswick, but also provinces in Sweden which had been theirs in old times—namely, as in an ultimatum presented at Hanover by Count Holstein in July, Båhus, with Marstrand, and Halland, Jemtland, and Herjedalen.¹ Sending these demands to Lord Polwarth at Copenhagen, Stanhope remarked that Holstein himself 'could not but confess that they were altogether impracticable;' and he hinted to the count that the limit of time within which Denmark might obtain terms of peace might come sooner than was expected.²

The resentment felt at Hanover against the Danes was largely due to the belief that their invasion of Sweden had been concerted with Peter the Great. It was known that a Danish captain, Cruyse, had been sent to St. Petersburg, and reported that Musin-Pushkin had returned thither from Copenhagen well contented.³ As we have seen,⁴ it was feared that if Admiral Norris advanced from Copenhagen up the Baltic Danish ships might sail to rein-

¹ British Museum, Add. MS. 28155, f. 124; Record Office, Regencies 12.

² 21 August, o.s., Record Office, S. P., Dom., Entrybook 269.

³ See on this subject Holm, p. 659 foll.

⁴ See Robethon to Polwarth, 8 August, and to Schrader at Stockholm, 7 August, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 28155 (translation), in reference to reports from Weber at St. Petersburg. Cruyse, he says, was the son of a vice-admiral in the Russian service. Robethon reflects on the fatal consequences to the Danes of sacrificing his master's friendship for that of the tsar, who would make his peace apart from them, if it were to his advantage, and leave them 'to pay the fiddler.' Their own negotiations with Denmark, he says, were at a standstill, and Holstein showed himself but little.

⁵ *Ante*, xlii. 696, 706.

force the Russian fleet. It was in vain that the Danes explicitly denied the existence of a concert, and that they appointed four ships to cruise with Norris south of Bornholm, to secure *contre qui que ce soit* Denmark and the empire from attack. Polwarth, when informed of this, answered that it amounted to the same whether there were a concert with the tsar or not, seeing that all evil which could result therefrom was arising effectually without it; that he did not believe in the likelihood of a Russian attack on Denmark or Germany; and that whatever the feelings of the Danes towards the tsar, he was certainly contented with them, or he would not have written that his 'brother Frederick' might be sure that he would always act towards him as an honest man should.* On Frederick's return from Norway Polwarth informed him of the signature of the Swedish-Hanoverian convention of $\frac{1}{2}$ July, saying that the object was to prevent a peace between Sweden and Russia. Frederick replied that he could not accommodate himself to King George's views, for he did not know on what footing he stood with Great Britain, no treaty having been concluded. He went so far as to issue a declaration that he was not included in the Swedish treaty, and that his fleet would not join in action against the tsar.⁷ When Count Holstein was recalled from Hanover in September, and reports arrived of Danish intrigues in favour of Russia at Berlin,⁸ the belief that Frederick IV was really acting in concert with Peter the Great was confirmed.

All Polwarth's arguments* that it was better for Denmark to sell back to Sweden her share of Pomerania than to keep it, and that by alliance with the tsar she would only work mischief for herself, were useless. He could only give warning of the danger of delay, which he attributed to the desire to wait and see whether any naval success would be obtained against the tsar. The answers to his representations were that to the ultimatum delivered at Hanover was only to be added that the cession of Sleswick, Pomerania and Rügen, and Marstrand must be a preliminary condition to the discussion of the terms of peace, in the same manner as the promise to cede Bremen and Verden had been a

* Polwarth, 9 August; cf. Norris's Journal, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 28129, and the memorandum, *ibid.* 28146

⁷ To his resident, Hagedorn, at Hamburg, 22 August (Wich, 24 August, Record Office, Hamburg 36)

⁸ Stanhope wrote on 21 August, o.s., 'It was very surprising to us to hear from Mr. Whitworth that the Danish secretary at Berlin is actually labouring to bring the king of Prussia off from our engagements, and to persuade him again to come into the Czar's measures' (*ibid.* S. P., Dom., Entrybook 260; further on the subject, 5 September, *ibid.* Regencies 12, where it is said that Stralsund and Rügen were offered to the king of Prussia as a bribe).

⁹ A long string of these in Stanhope's of 16 August, o.s., *ibid.* Regencies 12; see also instructions to Polwarth, 19 September, o.s., Foreign Entrybook 220, Denmark 42.

preliminary to the peace with Hanover. As to mediation and an armistice, the king would declare himself in a manner suitable to his friendship with Great Britain as soon as the aforesaid preliminaries were agreed to, provided that there was no derogation from the treaty of 1715, whose guarantees must continue.¹⁰ Polwarth attributed this firmness to Frederick personally.¹¹

Directing Carteret to present a last memorial in favour of the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, Stanhope informed him privately that if he found the proposition entirely repugnant he might intimate in confidence that it was made rather to show the Danes that the king's efforts to obtain the cession were not relaxed than to force it upon Sweden. But the Swedes ought to pay a sum of money for the restitution, and to allow the abolition of their exemption from the Sound tolls in return for the restoration of Marstrand; and all hope of bringing Denmark to make peace must be abandoned if she were not assured of keeping Sleswick.¹² Admiral Norris also was ordered to do all he could on his return to Copenhagen to persuade the Danes to consent to an armistice for six months, and further, if he thought it of use, to insinuate that if they continued to molest the king's subjects trading to Sweden reprisals would be made.¹³ His late return however prevented him from making use of these instructions.

The terms which Sweden was now prepared to accept were communicated to Carteret, as follows: In return for the restoration of the Pomeranian territory and of Marstrand without reserve, and in the state they were in before the war, a sum of money would be paid and Wismar ceded, upon condition of its not being fortified nor ever being mortgaged or sold to another power. The peculiar tenures of and the treaties concerning Sleswick and Holstein, it was said, obliged the interests of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to be referred to the emperor, but it was hoped that, as he had been neutral in the war, his dominions would be restored to him, or at least compensation granted to his entire satisfaction. And all former treaties and alliances between Sweden and Denmark should be renewed and confirmed in all points not contrary to that now to be made. Commenting on these conditions, Carteret stated, as the two principal reasons requiring the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen, the necessity that Sweden should preserve a footing in Germany for the support of the protestant cause, and the expectation that

¹⁰ Polwarth, 16 and 30 September, Record Office, Denmark 42.

¹¹ 8 October. 'Tout ce qu'il répondit, ce fut fort froidement, "J'ay déjà ordonné à mes Ministres de Vous donner une réponse la-dessus."' Holm says that while Frederick had no great confidence in his own judgement, and often could be persuaded, once he had made up his mind nothing could turn him from his resolution.

¹² 19 September, o.s., *ibid.* Sweden 25

¹³ 25 September, o.s., *ibid.* Foreign Entrybook 220

Denmark would either sell them to Prussia or be obliged for their sake to remain in close alliance with her.¹⁴ As to Marstrand, 'they will have their Marstrand again . . . got from them by treachery, for which the Governour has lost his head, or it shall cost the Danes Norway.' But he still believed that the exemption from the Sound tolls might be given up; 'further than that it was impossible to carry them.' They might yet make peace with the tsar, even though that entailed war, perhaps in Germany; 'but they say that they shall then sink Denmark for an age, and make that King fear a Duke of Holstein as much as ever that Duke has fear'd him.' A minister of Denmark to treat would not be received, because of the mischief which Lövenörn was believed to have made when at Stockholm in the spring; everything must be done through those of the mediating powers. *Il faudra aussi en frayer le chemin.*¹⁵ Polwarth, on receiving this despatch from Carteret, said that so little did the Swedish terms meet the views of the Danes that merely to mention them might spoil everything. In his reflexions he gave the opinion that if a proper frontier could be arranged between Sweden and Norway, and if the exemption from the Sound tolls were given up, then there might be the hope that Denmark might be satisfied.¹⁶

From Paris Lord Stair wrote that the regent thought it of his honour and the honour of France that Sweden should not be despoiled of all that she held in Germany under French guarantee, and that, while there were strong reasons for the Danes concluding

¹⁴ A result, said Carteret, very prejudicial to Hanover, seeing that the Danes 'upon any reverse of fortune, or whenever they dare, will fall upon that House with as little humanity and justice as they have done upon Sweden in its present distress.' If Wismar were retortified 'Denmark will be insupportable to Mecklenburg and extremely dangerous to Saxen-Lauenburg.' (The long-standing dispute about Saxen-Lauenburg had been settled in favour of Brunswick-Lüneburg in 1716: Erdmannsdorffer, li. 51.)

¹⁵ Carteret, 27 September, o.s. Writing to Polwarth two days later, he said that when he had proposed the payment of a sum of money for Stralsund and Rügen, the answer had been that Denmark was indebted to Sweden, and that now no money would be paid, in view of the rejection of Adlerfeld's proposals and of the Danish ultimatum. He goes on with a graphic account of the discussions. He warned Polwarth of the danger to Denmark if the tsar took up the duke of Holstein's cause, a pregnant remark in view of later developments; and about the Russian naval power, 'Tis notorious that the Czar can sell half as cheaply again as any other nation,' for he paid small wages, common labourers having nothing but their victuals, provisions were very cheap, and he had 'all the materials of shipping at home for nothing.' Merchants, therefore, would employ his ships, and his subjects be educated to the sea. The result would be that the Danish navy would become inconsiderable by comparison. The Danes 'must come with the Great Alliance at last; why not, then, at first, with a good grace? . . . If Denmark should succeed in conjunction with the Czar, which is next to an impossibility, that success will be its ruin.' Of Stralsund and Rügen Carteret wrote to Stanhope, 17 October, o.s., 'Denmark, I am confident, will never enjoy those spoils.' They would certainly be sold to Prussia, and Stettin would become one of the great cities of the Baltic (Record Office, Sweden 25).

¹⁶ To Carteret, 14 October, *ibid.* Denmark 42.

promptly, in order that they might be quit of a war which they had not the means to continue, it was important that they should be brought to terms in some way, for then the tsar, seeing himself isolated, would become more tractable.¹⁷ Stanhope, narrating to Dubois what had occurred at Copenhagen,¹⁸ said that, as the cession of Stralsund and Rügen was absolutely refused, and as the king knew how greatly the regent was interested in their restoration, he was trying to obtain it for a sum of money.

After protracted discussions following upon his presentation of a memorial in terms prescribed to him, Polwarth was given on 10 October the following statement: The king of Denmark was as greatly desirous as the king of England for mutual amity. He had shown equal goodwill in giving up to him Bremen and Verden for a small sum. Denmark had of late borne almost alone the brunt of the war, and was earnestly desirous of peace. As the ultimatum delivered by Count Holstein had been found excessive, a very moderate one was now presented, too easy, in fact, considering Sweden's present circumstances. Only the cession of the Pomeranian territory, Marstrand, the fortress and province of Båhus, and Vigen, and the abolition of exemption from the Sound tolls were now insisted upon. For Sleswick a promise was sufficient on the part of Sweden never to interfere therewith. On this footing the king of Denmark would conclude preliminaries at once, and on receiving the formal guarantee of Great Britain for Sleswick would sign an armistice and accept British mediation. If in spite of everything Sweden would not cede Stralsund and Rügen, an equivalent must be given in land. Polwarth replied that he could look upon this statement only as a refusal of the king's offers, and prayed for a speedy explanation. The proposals, he said, were made to release the king of Denmark from the war. Did he accept them or not? Let a clear and distinct answer be given, without mingling of other matters and without loss of time. This he received. Mediation was accepted, freedom of commerce and an armistice were agreed to; only compensation for Stralsund and Rügen in land was still insisted upon. This, said Polwarth, was all that could be obtained, but *cela les engage à la fois dans un traité séparé du Czar, fixe une cessation d'armes sans qu'il y soit compris, et déroge au traité de garantie de 1715*. The rest must be *indagé* as best could be in the treaty to be made.¹⁹

In reply to this Stanhope furnished Polwarth with other arguments to use, besides the incompatibility of Denmark's safety with the rise of Russia. The Danes, he said, could not be ignorant that theirs was the court least considered and least in favour at Vienna. The emperor and empire were guarantors of the treaties of West-

¹⁷ 6 October, Record Office, France 165.

¹⁸ 8 October, *ibid.*

¹⁹ Polwarth, 6 to 11 October, *ibid.* Denmark 42.

phalia and of the duchy of Holstein to the duke; the emperor had specially guaranteed the duchy of Sleswick to him by various treaties. France and Prussia were his guarantors also. The imperial ministers insisted that Sweden must have Stralsund and Rügen back; France did the same; they themselves must support France in the demand, in view of her straightforward conduct. If in spite of these considerations it was necessary to fortify Polwarth's arguments *de quelque réalité* he might employ 4,000*l.* or 5,000*l.* among the Danish ministers; nor would the king regret the expense, if the prompt conclusion of a convention resulted. This despatch was private;²⁰ it was accompanied by a principal one²¹ entering at length into the whole question, and by a draft of a proposed convention consisting of a long preamble and seven clauses. As soon as this was signed, Polwarth was told, a minister ought to be sent to Stockholm to arrange a preliminary treaty to be confirmed at Brunswick. Carteret would have orders to act as mediator; the good offices of the French minister would also be sought; and efforts would be made at Paris to obtain the guarantee of France for Sleswick. The king of Denmark ought to accept French mediation if it were offered. The British guarantee of Sleswick could only be relative to that given by Hanover in 1715. And, as there was then expressly reserved to the duke a compensation for his portion of Sleswick, the same compensation would be considered to be reserved for him now; its nature to be settled at Brunswick. If it consisted of the Danish part of Holstein Denmark would gain at least one-third by the acquisition of the whole of Sleswick.

The French ambassador at Hanover, Count Senneterre, had already been persuaded to send instructions to Campredon at Stockholm to offer to the Danish minister who should come thither the mediation and guarantee of France. The guarantee, Stanhope wrote to Stair (20 October),²² would principally concern Sleswick; French mediation indeed would only be accepted on this condition, as the king's had been. The king of Denmark would never willingly resign the duchy, nor could Hanover or Prussia, who had guaranteed it to him in 1715, require him to give it up. The position of Stralsund and Rügen, cut off from his dominions, was different. He insisted, with reason, that the guarantees given to the house of Gottorp could not now stand, that house having been an aggressor in the war by lending its strong places and troops to the late king of Sweden. But the guarantee

²⁰ 7 October, o.s., Record Office. Polwarth replied about the proposed bribing (24 October), 'Votre Excellence n'a pas besoin de douter que je ne mane ce que Vous m'avez confié de la manière la plus avantageuse; et je ne m'en servirai point, à moins que la nécessité ne le demande absolument.'

²¹ *Ibid.* and Foreign Entrybook 220.

²² *Ibid.* and France 165.

to be given to Denmark had two essential limitations: it was conditional upon her making peace, and it would authorise endeavours to obtain for the duke the most ample satisfaction possible. It was hoped, therefore, that the regent would confirm the orders sent to Campredon. In the preliminary terms offered by Sweden Sleswick was included, also a sum of money for Stralsund and Bügen, and Wismar. It would have been preferred that the duke should have Wismar, and all Holstein, if the Swedes would yield something on the Norway side—'Dalie,' for instance, as Stair had suggested; and truly it seemed that they might make such a concession without serious inconvenience, and ought to do so, in order to increase the satisfaction to be given to the duke, and to satisfy the king of Denmark's punctilio. He resented receiving only money, however great might be his need of it. Such a cession appeared to be too inconsiderable to stand in the way of a peace so indispensable to them and of their re-establishment in the empire. Comparing the Swedish preliminaries with the terms sent by Polwarth the peace certainly appeared to be well advanced. Both Sweden and Denmark ought to be tractable, considering their present relations with Russia. Stair replied (28 October) that the regent entirely approved of the steps taken to bring about a peace between Sweden and Denmark, and was ready to give a guarantee to the king of Denmark in the manner desired and as given to the king of Prussia.²² He very much approved of some equivalent being found for the duke of Holstein, and would order Campredon to join Carteret in pressing the crown of Sweden to part with the little province of 'Dallia.'

What the duke himself principally wanted as compensation was his recognition as successor to the Swedish throne. He had conversed on this subject with Lövenörn when the latter was at Stockholm, and had then betaken himself to Copenhagen. He offered there, in the event of his becoming king, to give up Sleswick for Danish Pomerania. Frederick received his overtures well, deputed Lövenörn to treat with him at Hanover, whither he proposed to go,²³ and wrote to George in his favour. In the conferences there George himself and Bernstorff took part. The duke offered much, for the king of England's money and support were necessary. But

²² But he was mistaken; the regent proved most reluctant to give a French guarantee of Sleswick, and sent orders to Campredon not to offer it. When Stanhope was at Paris in January 1720 his personal efforts could only obtain the promise of a guarantee subsequently to peace being made—that is to say, after the restoration of Stralsund and Bügen and the compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had been agreed upon.

²³ The duke stayed at Hamburg, negotiating with Lövenörn and others, from 15 June to 5 July, departing then for Hanover. He seems to have gained over Wich, who extols his person and accomplishments: 'he is certainly a very fine prince' (Wich, 16 June foll., Record Office, Hamburg 86).

neither his offers nor his threat to throw himself into the arms of the tsar availed. All that he could obtain was an undertaking that at the general pacification at Brunswick the attempt should be made to procure for him the throne of Sweden in reversion.²⁵ Nor do the efforts of his envoy Dumont at Paris appear to have had better success.²⁶ In October, to protest against the guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark and to make representations in favour of the restitution of his estates, the duke sent to Stockholm Brigadier Hans Bertram von Rantzen, and on 2 November presented a memorial through his envoy extraordinary L. von Flohr. But Rantzen was ordered to quit Stockholm at twenty-four hours' notice for speaking his mind too freely.²⁷ The duke himself went a second time to Hanover early in November.²⁸ His proposals were now more favourably received, and Stanhope wrote to Carteret about settling the succession to the Swedish throne upon him. But Carteret declined to mention the subject till the Hanoverian treaty was completed, on account of the jealousy existing against the duke. His party, he said, was decreasing every day. The prince said that it was no new scheme, but 'the thought of the Hanover ministry;' that it would be unconstitutional to suggest to the estates the naming of a successor; and that such a course might have the effect of excluding the duke permanently. Carteret agreed.²⁹ Of a cession of Stralsund and Rügen Carteret could only write in the same terms as formerly. He enclosed an extract from a despatch of Dubois to Camille de Forbin of 22 September, insisting that Sweden must have that territory back in order to maintain a footing in the empire; otherwise France could have no further interest in her affairs.³⁰

At length, after prolonged discussions,³¹ a convention between Denmark and Great Britain³² was signed on 30 October, accepting the king of England's mediation, and agreeing to a complete

²⁵ The above from Holm, pp. 654-6.

²⁶ Stair, 10 July.

²⁷ Stanhope, 2 October, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 220; Wich, 30 September, 11 November, 1 December; Polwarth, 14 and 25 November.

²⁸ Wich, 7 and 17 November, 22 December.

²⁹ Carteret, 7 December, o.s.

³⁰ Carteret, 20 October, o.s. Dubois wrote, 'Il est également important à la Suède et à la France qu'elle conserve un pied en Allemagne par la restitution de Stralsund et de Rügen de gré ou de force, sans quoi la France ne pourroit plus prendre de la part à la Suède, parcequ'elle n'auroit plus d'intérêt, même apparent, de s'intéresser pour elle . . . En aucun cas vous ne pouvez consentir à aucun accommodement qui n'assure à la Suède la restitution de tout ce que le Roy de Danemarck possède en Allemagne qui a appartenu à la Suède. . . . La restitution de l'Estonie et de la Livonie à la Suède ne peut être d'aucune considération pour les intérêts particuliers de la France, que quand cette Couronne conservera un établissement en Allemagne.' Stanhope sent this on to Whitworth on 20 November, o.s. (Record Office, Sweden 25 and Foreign Entrybook 58.)

³¹ See fully Polwarth's despatch of 30 October.

³² Record Office, Treaties 44, copies, Treaty Papers 4, 71.

suspension of arms for six months, during which time there should be full freedom of commerce in all waters, ports, and countries of Sweden and Denmark. Every effort was to be made during the armistice to conclude a permanent peace, and, as an essential preliminary condition thereto, the king of England undertook for himself, his heirs and successors to maintain the king of Denmark in peaceable possession of the duchy of Sleswick against all who should attack or trouble him, as under the treaty of 1715, the guarantee to continue in force always, after peace was made, and specially to procure that in the treaty of peace Sweden should agree to this. If the Swedes could not be persuaded to cede Pomerania and Rügen, the king of Denmark, in his desire for peace, would resign them for an equivalent. On this head he referred to previous declarations given to Polwarth and the king of England, being persuaded that the latter would obtain for him at the peace conditions just and equitable. Eight days later a similar convention was signed at Stockholm, stipulating freedom of navigation and trade, of posts and couriers, and maintenance of the *status quo* during the armistice, and prohibiting Danish ships from carrying, as they were reputed to do, Muscovite colours and commissions.²¹ The armistice was shortly afterwards proclaimed. After the ratifications of the Danish convention had been exchanged, and as soon as Polwarth could get the money, he put into execution the instructions he had received about gratifications to the Danish ministers. He sent notes payable to bearer at sight (among others) to Count Holstein and Wibe for 5,000 dollars each, and to Sehested and L. G. Holstein for 3,000. To his astonishment they returned them, though the others, he said, made no difficulty. Count Holstein said that the offers were premature, the business not being yet ended and nothing having been done to earn the money.²²

Two results followed from the armistice, the freeing of trade to Sweden and the definite separation of Denmark from Russia. Efforts had been renewed at St. Petersburg on Peter's return to maintain the alliance. He emphasised his constancy, would let Denmark name her own terms, and hinted that George's tyranny might be overturned. But Frederick had declined his advances, saying that it was better that each should prosecute the war independently. There was violent recrimination between the Russian ambassador, Dolgoruki, and the Danish ministers,²³ and though

²¹ 27 October, o.s., Record Office, Treaties 530. Copies with Carteret's of 10 November, o.s. and Polwarth's of 3 December.

²² Polwarth, 12 December. 'This,' he remarked, 'is the part of negotiating I like worst.'

²³ Polwarth was informed of 'a very strong and threatening memorial' presented at Copenhagen on the tsar's behalf. 'As pointed and as strong an answer' had been given. He thought this a good opportunity for the king to conclude a defensive treaty

before long relations were improved, and friendly expressions used, matters had then gone too far.²⁴ But towards a permanent peace between Sweden and Denmark the armistice effected little. 'All is not yet ripe for that peace,' Carteret wrote on 21 November.

By this time Knyphausen had arrived at Stockholm to negotiate the peace with Prussia.²⁵ Stanhope had directed Carteret to see that the preliminaries agreed upon were strictly adhered to, but on all other points to act as an impartial mediator conjointly with Campredon and do his best to remove difficulties. Special care, he said, must be taken to provide expressly for the re-establishment of Baltic commerce on its old footing, in whomsoever's hands the ports might remain, as in the second article of the British treaty with Prussia. Knyphausen would agree to this so far as regarded Stettin, and would undertake that no new tolls should be imposed on the traffic of the Oder or Peene.²⁶ Carteret remarked that Knyphausen would see that neither his own great abilities nor his master's credit, although 'sustained by the power and violence' of the tsar, would avail by themselves, all that the king of Prussia had obtained having been due to the influence of the king of England; and he would meet with insuperable difficulties unless he could show that the former 'will enter into the great and necessary design of driving the Czar out of the Baltick, at least out of Revel and Livonia.' Prompt payment in full of the two million crowns for Stettin was wanted, the difficulty being to tide over the next two years, and the original demand for four million having been reduced to that sum only on that condition. The mere expectation of receiving so large a sum at once had raised Swedish credit 20 per cent.²⁷

Knyphausen's first step was to sound Carteret upon a cession of the whole of Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, an ambition for its acquisition being still nourished at Berlin in spite of formal disavowal in consequence of French opposition.²⁸ He believed, he told Carteret,

with Denmark, if he were so inclined, 'to keep them in heart and bring them into His Majesty's measures in order to bring the Czar to reason' (21 and 25 November).

²⁴ Holm pp. 673-6. Stanhope wrote to Polwarth, 19 February, o.s., 1720: 'The usage they [the Danes] met with from the Czar must have made them very cautious how they trust to any new offers from him, besides that his health is in so uncertain a state, and that government in case of his death seems to be upon so precarious a foot, that they can not in common prudence look upon his friendship as a foundation of any solidity for them to build on' (Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 5).

²⁵ Orders were sent on 2 October to Captain Smith of the 'Port Mahon' to convey him to Sweden, together with Rantzau, above mentioned (Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 220). But the grant of Knyphausen's passport had been steadily put off, until, as was alleged, King George's ratification of the British preliminary convention was received—really, Carteret wrote in cypher, that he might have nothing to do with the payment of the 110,000 crowns for bribing the senators.

²⁶ 24 September, *ibid.* Sweden 26.

²⁷ 27 September and 2 October, o.s.

²⁸ CL Stair, 18 October, and Stanhope to him, 9 November. Whitworth wrote in cypher (21 October), 'Monsieur d'Ilgan a pressé le Comte de Rottembourg d'écrire

that he could persuade the king his master, as a condition for the cession of the rest of Pomerania and Rügen with the dependencies, to join to the Swedish troops 20,000 of his own, and over and above give subsidies sufficient to pay the Hessian troops. So that the king of Prussia would help Sweden upon his own bottom and at his own expense with 80,000 men, make himself as it were a principal in the quarrel, and continue in it till all was fairly over, Sweden reinstated in Finland, Eastland, and Liefland, and the Czar drove beyond his ancient limits.

This could not be done for Stettin only, which was regarded as bought. And it was absurd to consider or to expect aid from Denmark. Suppose 25,000 Swedes landed in Livonia: if they were not supported, not a man would come back; the tsar would keep Finland in addition to the rest, would perhaps conquer Sweden itself, and England and France could not hinder him. If his wishes in regard to Stralsund and Rügen were not considered, the king of Prussia would remain indifferent, knowing that they must come to him sooner or later, from Denmark immediately or from Sweden some time. Carteret replied that he could not enter into any such scheme, nor act in any other manner than as mediator upon the terms already stipulated. But he was taken with the idea, and proceeded to discuss it, propounding the certainty of success of a general offensive league against Russia.⁴¹ Knyphausen however did not abandon the scheme, dropping, says Carteret, a hint to the prince that he could find him 600,000 or 700,000 crowns if he would do something real for the king of Prussia.⁴²

There was delay, principally on minor points, chief of them the river tolls known as *Licenten*.⁴³ By the end of the year everything but this was settled, and Knyphausen agreed to refer the matter to commissioners.⁴⁴ But suddenly he received fresh in-

fortement en France pour ce que sa Cour favorise le Roy de Prusse dans son dessein d'acheter Rügen et Stralsund de la Suède.' Stair later took advantage of Knyphausen's proposal to press for a resumption of the payment of subsidies to the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel (who had shared with Sweden the subsidies paid under the treaty of April 1715), in order that he might use them to place his son in a position to hinder the demand, as the latter wished to do. And not only did the regent agree to this, but also sent a sum of money for the prince's private use (Stair, 12, 27, and 30 December).

⁴¹ Carteret, 28 October, o.s. He gives his opinion that if 60,000 men could be brought together, of whom 25,000 Swedes, 'Revel and Riga will fall in one campaign, and the Muscovite power be crushed.'

⁴² But 'I know the Prince is above any such thing.' He had solemnly promised never to think of the cession (Carteret, 10 December, o.s.)

⁴³ These were tolls at one time levied at Wolgast, but long since transferred to Stettin and now claimed by Prussia. The other points were (1) certain reversionary rights to Stettin, to Prussia proper, and to the towns of Damm and Gollnow, beyond the Oder, which were claimed by Sweden under the treaties of Westphalia, and which Carteret and Camperdon desired should be left 'to be decided by posterity'; (2) intricate matters relating to the rights of private persons. See fully Carteret's despatch of 4 December, o.s.

⁴⁴ Carteret, 23 December, o.s.

structions, from which he was forbidden to depart *un seul iota*, the consequence, says Carteret, who found himself 'in as intricate a case as ever,' of his sending to Berlin, contrary to his promise, a copy of the first Swedish counter-project, subsequently altered to accord more with his views. If Knyphausen's hands, Carteret went on, were really bound, the treaty was lost. The Swedes would not hear the new project read, but had ordered their own to be engrossed, and it had been offered to Knyphausen to sign. In case of refusal, he himself and Campredon must accept the treaty as mediators, and he would complete the British treaty, in order that new difficulties might not be raised about it in the Riksdag. 'What can I do? 'tis vain to ask. 'The States assemble in fifteen days, before which time I can have no answer from anybody. . . . I would pay a good sum of money to be out of it.' Anyhow he would keep his word with the queen and prince, who would otherwise suffer extremely, especially the prince, 'to whom Our Master has great obligations.'⁴⁴ Whitworth attributed the difficulty to the inadequacy of the information sent by Knyphausen, and says that the king had sent a further sum of 100,000 crowns to be bestowed by him, 'as he should think most proper for procuring the same conditions as had been granted to His Majesty and obliging the Swedes to desist from their pretensions to the Licent.'⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Carteret to Stanhope, private, 2 January, o.s. 1720, and to Whitworth, 20 December, o.s. 1719, Record Office, Sweden 26. 'Unexpected and undesired difficulties,' he said, 'have arisen in the negotiation with the king of Prussia, who by a little start of passion, and tying up the hands of his minister too strait, has gone a great way towards obstructing his own business.' If Knyphausen would not sign 'what by his own approval Mons^r Campredon and I have been able after great difficulties to obtain for him, I must indispensably venture to accept the Swedes' signature of the treaty as we have by our Mediation fixed it,' in the hope that the king would be able to persuade the king of Prussia to accept it. Campredon approved, but would only act in this manner in the last extremity. The British treaty must be finished before the meeting of the estates, 'or the best of our friends will have just reason to accuse us, and our own interests will suffer for want of our work being approved in that Assembly, which we can't expect it should be, but the contrary, if the English alliance is not ready to be produced.' If the British treaty were signed before the Prussian, the latter would infallibly be sent to Brunswick, which would be worse for the king of Prussia. 'I hope Mr. Knyphausen will venture, otherwise I must.' The chief difference was that 'the king of Prussia won't pay no duties at all at Wolgast, not even the ancient duties properly belonging to the place, and settled long time before the war.' Copies or translations of 'the first Swedish Project, the sending of which to Berlin has occasioned all this difficulty,' of the king of Prussia's 'ultimatum,' 22 December, 'apostillé de la main du Roy,' of the instructions to Knyphausen, 21 December, and of 'M^r Knyphausen's first and second remarks to get time,' with Carteret's comments (26 January, o.s.) at length, Record Office, Sweden 26. Whitworth wrote (to Stanhope, 19 December) that the king of Prussia's statement, that the 'ultimatum' was his last resolution, was 'only the effect of a little vivacity,' and would not be carried out literally.

⁴⁵ Whitworth, 17 February. Carteret wrote on 12 February, o.s., that Knyphausen had received this money, and offered to put it into his hands, 'to get the Zol and

In the emergency Carteret signed the British treaty¹⁷ on 21 January, old style, the night before the estates assembled, and at the same time he and Campredon accepted as mediators the Prussian treaty signed by the Swedes only, giving a promissory paper acknowledging the receipt and acceptance, recording Knyphausen's refusal to sign in spite of all persuasion, and declaring that if the king of Prussia would not accept and ratify within six weeks the treaty should be returned to the Swedish plenipotentiaries *as nul et non avens*.¹⁸

The instrument began in peculiar phraseology by acknowledging the good offices of the king of Great Britain, which under the divine benefaction had procured in the treaty of 1st August 1719 an agreement upon preliminary articles to serve as a basis for peace between Sweden and Prussia by the praiseworthy offices of the king of France, uninterruptedly exercised to pacify all the belligerents under his mediation. The territories ceded included Damm and Gollnow beyond the Oder. The majority of the clauses dealt with their internal affairs, liberties and rights, freedom of religion according to the Augsburg Confession, redress of grievances, and so on, and with the navigation of the rivers Oder and Peene, in which Swedish commerce was to be favoured, the *Licent* being left to be settled by commissioners. There were the usual first clauses respecting friendship and amnesty, liberty of navigation and commerce, release of prisoners, and mutual help. The king of Prussia undertook to observe the Anglo-Swedish treaty of 1st August in all its points; not to assist the tsar during the present war with Sweden directly or indirectly; to renew all former bonds of friendship and alliance, with guarantees regarding the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, on the footing of the treaties concluded with the allies of the north, or to be concluded in concert with himself; to pay to Sweden two million rix-dollars in instalments during the year; and to do all he could to persuade the enemies of Sweden to consent to equitable conditions of peace. It was stated that the treaties of Westphalia, so far as not derogated by recent or impending treaties, were to continue in force; in particular the king of Prussia was to work with the king of England to obtain for Sweden restitution of Stralsund and Rügen, and to use the most

Licent of Wolgast. I desired him to send the bills back, it being impossible to obtain.' Carteret wished that he had power to dispense 30,000 crowns banco himself, in case of absolute necessity. Compare his despatch of 24 February, o.s., on Knyphausen obstructing the Danish peace in order to be able to buy the *Licent*.

¹⁷ *Acts*, xxii. 722.

¹⁸ Carteret, 26 and 27 January, o.s. 'I believe it is the first time,' he wrote, 'that in the course of a mediation, when a Treaty was in a manner brought by it to a conclusion, that an Ultimatum was ever sent by the Prince, who sought the mediation, and this ultimatum founded upon matters wrong understood.' However a treaty had been obtained for the king of Prussia 'in the most advantageous manner that it can ever be framed.'

pressing instances with the emperor for that object. He was to withdraw his garrison from Wismar as soon as peace was signed between Sweden and Denmark. Lastly, there was to be liberty to seek and admit imperial and other guarantees of the present treaty. The first separate article stated that, it being notorious that the Protestant religion was being persecuted within and without the empire, and particularly in Poland and Lithuania, the most efficacious means were to be employed jointly in the strongest manner to defend both the Lutheran and Reformed religions as under the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva. Two others had reference to ecclesiastical and other questions within the ceded province, and a fourth to matters affecting the part of Pomerania occupied by the Danes, should it be restored to Sweden.¹⁰

Carteret wrote to Whitworth at length about the treaty, recounting what had occurred, and explaining and criticising it clause by clause. It could be allowed to go to Brunswick or not, he said, by refusal or acceptance, as the king of Prussia pleased, but it could never be drawn again so advantageously for him if the present opportunity were lost.¹¹ To Stanhope he wrote that Knyphausen really approved of what had been done, adding: 'I can say one thing which I think will please you; that there is not a scrap of publick paper in the world that can show that this treaty has been dependent upon that of Bremen and Verhden.'¹²

When Whitworth and Rottembourg learnt what had been done, they determined to attack the king personally, and were fortunate in finding him in an excellent temper. He approved the whole treaty without change. On February 24 his ratification was despatched to Stockholm with however what Whitworth called 'a very long and frivolous representation' about the tolls. This caused little difficulty; the ratifications were exchanged on March 5, o.s. Prussian chicanery, Carteret wrote, had nearly ruined everything, and the treaty would certainly have been remitted to Brunswick had it not been 'for our king's honour' to have it settled at Stockholm.¹³ On 2 April, o.s., full powers were issued to Whitworth to confer with the ministers of Sweden and Prussia about settling the *Licent* and other questions which might arise in connexion.¹⁴ Ranke observes that by the cessations of Stettin and of Bremen and Verden the proposals of the Prusso-Hanoverian

¹⁰ Copy, Record Office, Sweden 26.

¹¹ 23 January, o.s. 1720, copy enclosed with Carteret's despatch to Stanhope of the 26th, *ibid.*

¹² 29 January, o.s., private.

¹³ 5 March, o.s., Record Office, Sweden 27. Whitworth wrote (24 February): 'It is no easy matter to keep people from spoiling their own business, but by going on roundly and steadily reasonable things will always be brought to bear.'

¹⁴ Record Office, King's Letters 65. Carteret wrote on 9 March, o.s.; that he supposed that the king would give orders for the *Licent* to be adjudged to Prussia.

treaty of 1684 were now carried out, France assenting instead of as formerly opposing.⁴⁴

Another convention signed by the Swedes on 18 January was with the king of Poland. It is not necessary to say more of the negotiations than that they had been begun in the summer by a mission of General Trautvetter to Dresden,⁴⁵ and continued by him and by General Poniatowski, now reconciled to Augustus, travelling backwards and forwards and calling on their way at Hanover to receive King George's advice and instructions. One Boscawen, too, was sent by the latter to Dresden in September.⁴⁶ George, anxious to bring the kings of Poland and Prussia into line against the tsar, was mainly concerned to introduce provisions of importance to the latter king, namely that the crown of Poland, especially on account of the electoral prince of Saxony's change of religion, should remain elective, and that there should be strong provision for the security of the Polish protestants.⁴⁷ The preliminaries finally signed contained the following provisions: an armistice, mutual renunciation of all pretensions and work for the common advantage, recognition of Augustus as sole and lawful king, and after him whomsoever the republic should elect, reservation of interest for a suitable provision for Stanislaus at the future peace, amnesty and restitution of estates to all Poles who had taken his side and that of Sweden, all possible joint endeavours to preserve the liberties of the republic of Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania, validity of the conditions independently of treaties to be made with Sweden by other of the northern allies, all possible exertion to put an end to the troubles, and the conclusion of a solemn treaty under the mediation of the emperor, Great Britain, and France, in which the treaty of Oliva should be confirmed in all its points and articles.⁴⁸ These preliminaries remained for many years an empty form.⁴⁹ Augustus continued to disregard the rights of the protestants⁵⁰ and the efforts of George and Frederick William in their behalf. On the other hand he was induced to explain his Fraustadt letter of

⁴⁴ *Preussische Geschichte*, v. 80.

⁴⁵ John Benoit de Trautvetter, general prefect of the Queen's Guards, a Livonian, says Carteret (27 September, o.s.) and of Decker's party. He had credentials to King George of date 26 September, o.s., and a laudatory letter of introduction from Carteret of 8 October, o.s.

⁴⁶ A letter to Stanhope from Dresden (6 September, Record Office, S.P. Dom. Geo. I, vol. xvii.) is signed G. C. Boscawen, but the credentials (31 August, *ibid.* S.P. Dom. Entrybook 269) are made out in the name of Hugh Boscawen.

⁴⁷ Stanhope to Whitworth, 27 October, cf. Whitworth, 28 October, Record Office, Prussia 10.

⁴⁸ Carteret, 24 January, o.s. 1720

⁴⁹ Till 1782, say Koch and Schoell, xiii. 313-4.

⁵⁰ Of whom James Scott wrote that they were in a worse case than when he was in Poland before, the bishop of Cracow being their chief enemy (Record Office, Poland 26, 13 March 1720). See also on this subject Whitworth, 30 May and 10 June 1719, *ibid.* Prussia 8, and 23 August 1720, *ibid.* Holland 274; and Droysen, iv. ii. 255.

March 1719, and to declare that there was no question of the *supremum dominium* of the king of Prussia in Prussia.⁴¹

The alliance between George and his son-in-law was indeed now close and real. In November Frederick William had paid a private and informal visit to Hanover, which passed off most successfully.⁴² Immediately afterwards he offered to the tsar the mediation of the kings of England and France and himself, a proposal which replaced one of Stanhope for mediation by the first two and the emperor, communicated to Stair shortly before.⁴³ From Whitworth's reports there was some reason to believe that the tsar would accept the mediation proffered.⁴⁴ They were mainly founded on those from Schlippenbach at St. Petersburg,⁴⁵ Whitworth's own experience with Tolstoy at Berlin not having been satisfactory. Though King George's ministers, Jefferyes and Weber, had been withdrawn from Russia,⁴⁶ Whitworth says that they were

⁴¹ Scott, 18 March 1720, enclosing a copy of the explanation. Stanhope pressed this matter on his attention, upon the appeal of the Prussian minister Wallenrodt (19 February, o.s. *ibid.* Foreign Entrybook 123).

⁴² The queen of Prussia had a long private interview with Whitworth about the visit. She prescribed absence of ceremony, music at table, comedies, and so on; any business to be mentioned only to Geradort. She intimated that the king had changed his views with reference to the proposed match between Prince Frederick and the Princess Wilhelmina, and that the subject might be brought up if the king of England was still of his former opinion (Whitworth, 31 October foll. He calls Geradort in one place count, in another general. The better-known members of this family were in the service of Saxony). On the visit, see Droyson, p. 280. It was delayed, partly because Frederick William would not meet Count Flammang at Hanover, partly by his illness, brought on, says Whitworth, by the efforts of the prince of Anhalt and Grumbkow to prevent his going, and by the eagerness of the Russian ambassador Golovkin to be of the party. One result of it was the recall of Bonet, who had made himself so objectionable in England. He was replaced by Baron Hans Christopher Wallenrodt, whom Whitworth describes as 'très superficiel et léger,' doing well or ill by accident rather than by design (3 December).

⁴³ 9 November. 'Il s'agit,' Stanhope wrote, 'de l'intimider et de luy faire envisager des Médiateurs capables de le réduire à une Paix raisonnable, s'il rejetoit leur entremise et les conditions qu'ils luy proposeroient. Outre que par là nous engagerions en quelque manière l'Empereur contre luy.' Stair replied (14 and 25 November) that he had made this proposal to Dubois, and later to the regent, that they both approved it, and that he and the Austrian ambassador, Pendentrieder, would write to Vienna on the subject (Record Office, France 185).

⁴⁴ Stair would see, Stanhope said, communicating to him (9 November), what Whitworth wrote, 'que le Czar se ravise quant à nous, et qu'il y a lieu de croire qu'il accepteroit la médiation du Roy, si sa Majesté le luy offroit en luy écrivant Elle-même.'

⁴⁵ Before leaving St. Petersburg Schlippenbach was told that if the king of England, in making peace with Sweden, had not entered into any direct engagements against the tsar, or if he would give a declaration that he would not act against him, then there would be no further difficulty about accepting the mediation, but that the Swedish counter-ultimatum still held good. Ilgen instructed him to say in return that, if the tsar would agree to a suspension of arms for some months, there would be no need for such a declaration (Whitworth, 9 December).

⁴⁶ Orders dated 24 August, o.s., were sent to Jefferyes to repair to Dantzic, some person being required there to reside for a short time (Record Office, S.P. Dom. Entrybook 289). He and Weber left St. Petersburg on 4 October, o.s. But his credentials

dismissed with *assez d'honnêteté*.⁶⁷ Jefferyes himself wrote later⁶⁸ of advices from various parts that the tsar had written a very obliging letter to King George—namely, that he wholly submitted his interests to the latter's disposition, preferring his friendship to all the conquests he had made, and readily accepting his mediation. He himself however doubted the truth of this.⁶⁹

On 24 November Frederick William explained to the tsar his visit to Hanover, and said that both the king of England and himself were anxious to see the war concluded upon equitable terms, and the tsar freed from the embarrassment of carrying it on alone. He asked, therefore, would Peter, now that the Åland conferences were broken off and there was no hope of direct negotiation, accept the mediation abovesaid? In his covering letter to Mardefeld he desired him to say that the tsar, like Louis XIV, must make peace some time, and that if he desired the mediation of the emperor that would be quite acceptable. A revival of troubles in Livonia would be dangerous to Prussia. And on 28 November he instructed Mardefeld to say that peace was making with Denmark and with the king of Poland, so that the tsar would be left alone. Finland, Livonia, Esthonia, and Reval must be restored, the rest could be accommodated. If the tsar would not consent, a dangerous league might be formed against him. Swedish ministers were busy at Vienna, Paris, London, Dresden, and Berlin. Some courts were disposed that way, and so on, he wrote threateningly, with a series of arguments to be brought forward.⁷⁰

This action of Frederick William gave great satisfaction in London, whither George had now returned. Stanhope congratulated Whitworth heartily upon the success of the visit to Hanover, the happiest measure, he said, that could be taken for mutual interests and for the benefit of the protestant cause, and upon 'the strong and persuasive manner' in which the king of

were not withdrawn till much later. His first despatch from Danzig is of 4 November, o.s. (Record Office, Russia 9).

⁶⁷ 3 November.

⁶⁸ 28 November, o.s.

⁶⁹ He wrote on 7 November, o.s.: 'I left his Czarish Majesty and the Court as much pleas'd with their expedition against Sweden, as they were dissatisfied with the measures that kingdom had taken with their Maj^{ty} of Great Britain and Prussia; nothing could surprise them more than the sudden change of the latter, for they thought themselves so secure on that side that I verily believe this to be the reason of their having so much neglected the friendship and amity of other Princes. . . . Tho' his Czarish Maj^{ty} can dissemble his resentment as much as any man living, yet he could not forbear giving to me and the rest of the British nation sensible marks of his displeasure' (i.e. by the arrest of British merchants). Schlippenbach, Jefferyes said, was much concerned, for the tsar would still do all he could to keep Prussia on his side, or at least neutral. On 14 November, o.s., Jefferyes sent an account of his and Weber's leaving conference with Shafirov, when they assured him of the king's goodwill if the tsar 'would return to his former maxims.'

⁷⁰ Copies of the letter and instructions with Carteret's and Whitworth's despatches, also in Prussia 105 (Record Office).

Prussia had written to the tsar. The instructions to Mardefeld, he said, were 'perfectly right, and in the very terms we ourselves could wish and desire.'⁷¹ The Prussian proposals were duly backed up by money. Ilgen avowed, on Whitworth's suggestions to this effect, *qu'ils n'ont jamais rien obtenu de cette Cour que par ce moyen*. He said that Mardefeld was ordered to offer up to 100,000 crowns to the most accredited persons at the Russian court, the tsaritsa included, if they could find means to dispose the tsar to give up Reval to restore peace.⁷² Carteret wrote that the tsar's acceptance of mediation (as reported) gave great comfort in Sweden, it being thought better to sacrifice something to him than to see Livonia made a desert, as a result of war there. All possible efforts, however, were being made against next year's campaign, in the conviction that a British squadron would come to secure the country from attack.⁷³

Peter's answer to England was conveyed in the well-known memorial presented by his resident, Veselovsky, in London, dated 29 December. It recapitulated from the Russian point of view the behaviour of King George from the year 1715, protested strongly against the threatening letters sent by Carteret and Norris, and concluded with a formal assurance that the tsar continued in the disposition he had always had to cultivate the king's friendship. Replies of a duly recriminatory character were delivered separately as from England and from Hanover.⁷⁴ Answering the king of Prussia, Peter only thanked him for his assurances of friendship and his overtures, and desired him to complete the treaty proposed by Tolstoy as a preliminary.⁷⁵ Mardefeld wrote that the mediation of England and France was objected to, that of the latter because of the subsidies paid to Sweden contrary to treaty engagements. He was trying bribery. Many Russians, he said, disapproved of the tsar's naval enthusiasm, which was eating up resources. But Whitworth interpreted him to say that the mediation was not rejected, but the outcome at Vienna awaited, and that though many of the ministers

⁷¹ Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 212, 4 December, o.s.

⁷² Whitworth, 2 December, private.

⁷³ 8 December, o.s. The Russian ravages this summer, he said, would cost the crown a revenue of 400,000 crowns for some years. The losses of private persons were reckoned at two million. Twenty thousand families had been burnt out of house and home. Carpenters from the British fleet, when it was at Elsnabben, had helped some to set up huts. In consequence of reports of Russian preparations in Finland and elsewhere it was hoped that the fleet would come early. Campradon calculated the damage done at 2,851,000 rix-dollars (Paris, Ministère des Aff. Etr., Suède 146, end), and so Carteret, in German crowns, 25 January, o.s. 1720.

⁷⁴ Copies, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 254 and elsewhere; also printed. The replies were dated respectively 22 February and 21 January, o.s. 1720.

⁷⁵ 26 December 1719, reported by Whitworth 23 January 1720. For the treaty see *note*, xxii. 506.

were in great agitation and for giving up Livonia in order to obtain peace, yet Esthonia and Reval would only be restored in the last extremity, and nothing would be allowed to the prejudice of the fleet.⁷⁶ Later Mardefeld wrote that all the money which England could employ to equip her fleet and pay the subsidies to Sweden would be necessary to induce the tsar to give up Livonia, Reval, and Esthonia, for he would not give up Reval except to a superior force, and would rather die than submit to an unjust peace.⁷⁷

While George offered his mediation to the tsar he did not at all desist from his efforts to raise up war against him. When Count Flemming was at Hanover at the beginning of November he was sounded on the subject of action on the part of Poland. He asked as the price of war the reversion of Courland for a Saxon prince and Kiev and Smolensk for the republic. This was approved, but in addition, he said, it would be necessary to follow the tsar's example in expending money among the Poles. The sum of 60,000 crowns, which George was prepared to find for the purpose, being in Flemming's view entirely insufficient, it was sought to obtain a further sum from France. Stanhope wrote to Stair that the Saxon minister, Le Coq, would be sent to Paris to negotiate this, and must be supported.⁷⁸ It was intended now to despatch to the tsar, to demand satisfaction for divers injuries, the solemn embassy resolved upon at the diet of Grodno but delayed by his intrigues and by the lukewarmness of the king of Poland. Flemming had given assurance that measures had been taken with the principal senators which would prevent the tsar from hindering further this decisive step on the part of the republic. The money would be used in the first place to defray the expenses of the embassy, and when it was received the king of Poland would convoke a diet to take the necessary resolutions. Stair must observe strict secrecy. Care must be taken, Stanhope concluded, never to name war to the Poles, if it were desired to engage them in it. It must be proposed to them under the name of means for procuring peace.⁷⁹

Stair used every possible argument, whether of his own or of a series supplied by Stanhope,⁸⁰ to induce the regent to provide the

⁷⁶ Whitworth, 6 January 1720, enclosing copies and translations of Mardefeld's despatches of 11 and 18 December. The latter wrote: 'Solte Gott über S. Ozarische Majestät gebieten, so wird diese See-Macht gewesen seyn wie eine Blume aus dem Felde.'

⁷⁷ Cipbered postscript of 15 January to the king of Prussia, enclosed by Whitworth, 8 February. Whitworth said of Mardefeld: 'This gentleman is wholly devoted to the Czar, and consequently all his reasonings turn that way' (20 January).

⁷⁸ 'Mr. Le Coq est homme fort sensé, et nous avons beaucoup à nous louer de lui à tous égards, et il se laissera diriger entièrement par V. Ex^{te}.'

⁷⁹ Stanhope to Stair, 9 November, Record Office, France 165, and S. P. Dom., Entrybook 414. The Polish ambassador designated was Stanislaus Chromostowski, palatine of Mazovia (Credentials, *ibid.* Russia 9).

⁸⁰ In a long despatch of 16 December from London, Record Office, S. P. Dom., Entrybook 414.

money. He brought up again the danger of the Swedes ceding Stralsund and Rügen to Prussia in return for an army to help them to recover Livonia and Esthonia, if they could not get the aid of Poland.⁴¹ He asserted that it was more important to France than to Great Britain that the tsar should not possess the Baltic countries, because she was entirely dependent upon them for naval stores, whereas England now had her American colonies to draw upon. The regent agreed that the tsar must not be allowed to be master of the Baltic, and said that he had no consideration for him, partly because he knew for certain that he was making every possible effort to induce the king of Spain to continue the war. Could there then, Stair answered, be any hesitation about placing the king of Poland, by a payment of 60,000 crowns, in a position to take steps more efficacious than any other to determine the tsar to make peace with Sweden by restoring Livonia and Esthonia? If the diet now about to assemble dissolved without resolving upon the measures proposed the tsar would be very easy. But the regent stood firm, advancing various objections, but at the bottom declining to trust the Poles. Le Coq was sent back at the end of December with his propositions not accepted.⁴²

However when Stanhope was in Paris in January he returned to the subject.

Talking with the regent about Poland and pressing him to contribute towards animating the Dyet against the Muscovites as the King hath done, which he at last consented to purely in consideration of his Majesty, and then speaking of the Swedes, that unless they were well assisted they might be in danger of parting with Rügen and Stralsund to procure powerfull succours against the Osar, his Royal Highness replied very seriously, 'J'aimerais mieux alors les Moscovites que les Suédois,' an expression which ought to weigh greatly with the Swedes, not by such a measure to forfeit the friendship of France.⁴³

The money was granted; Stanhope was able to send orders to Wich at Hamburg to forward it at once in the safest and speediest manner he could.⁴⁴ He wrote also to Count Flemming about the matter.⁴⁵ But James Scott, sent to Poland in February 1720, had to report that, while plain language had been spoken in regard to the restoration of Livonia and the evacuation of Courland, the Poles were extremely averse from war, first on account of the embarrassment of their affairs, secondly from fear of the consequent entry

⁴¹ Stair said that he could not believe that there was a single person in Sweden who would not rather lose Pomerania than Livonia, if it came to a choice.

⁴² Stair's despatches, 18-20 December.

⁴³ To Carteret, 19 January, o.s., 1720, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 221.

⁴⁴ 26 January, o.s., *ibid.*: the 60,000 crowns 'which the Regent of France at the King's instance sends to the king of Poland, the better to enable him to make such dispositions as may contribute to procure a peace in the north.'

⁴⁵ 26 January, o.s., *ibid.* 123.

of Saxon and other foreign troops into their country, to the prejudice of their liberties.⁶⁶ And Whitworth had written that Scott would arrive in Poland too late; the diet would not accede to the treaty of Vienna. When, he said, the Swedes had finished their treaties with Prussia and Denmark, and were repossessed of a footing within the empire and in a condition to assemble a good body of troops of their own and their allies in Courland or in the neighbourhood of Dantzic, then would be the proper time to push negotiations in Poland, and money well employed would gain at least a strong confederation.⁶⁷

On the question of Courland the establishment of a prince of Saxe-Weissenfels there had been preferred at Hanover to an incorporation of the duchy with Poland, with the view of attaching 'the whole house of Saxony and thereby the republic' to measures against the tsar, and of extinguishing his pretensions in favour of his niece, the duchess Anne. But the proposal, Whitworth was told, was only to be broached at Berlin, if it could be done without disobliging the king of Prussia, and he wrote that to mention it only would spoil everything.⁶⁸ Carteret too thought it indispensable, in view of Prussian ambitions in that quarter, to conceal from Knyphausen 'our acquiescence' that a Saxon prince should have the duchy.⁶⁹ Later James Scott was ordered to support the claims of the princess of Courland, married to Prince Ernest Ferdinand of Brunswick-Bevern.⁷⁰

After the British and Prussian treaties were signed there remained only the peace with Denmark, and here an accord seemed impossible. Carteret stigmatised the Danish demands⁷¹ as 'exorbitant and absurd,' and declined even to mention them; to do so, he said, might spoil the Prussian treaty. If Denmark were to have much more than Sleswick the Swedes would not make peace, 'nor indeed be able to subsist well' after it. Their revenues would be reduced from eight million crowns to less than three, while those of the Danes, possessed of Sleswick, would be five million; of the tsar, in time of peace, eight. 'The Swedes,' he went on, 'look upon the Czar, considering his ill state of health and the probability of the Muscovites returning to their old manners upon his decease, as a temporary foe, but they regard the power of Denmark as an eternal enemy.' The rivalry of Sweden and Denmark had caused all former wars in the north.

⁶⁶ 6 and 14 February, Record Office, Poland 26.

⁶⁷ To Tilson, 6 February.

⁶⁸ Stanhope to Whitworth, 27 October; the latter to Schaub, 3 November.

⁶⁹ 8 December, o.s.

⁷⁰ Craggs to Scott, 29 December, o.s., Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 123.

⁷¹ Proposals delivered to Polwarth on 20 November still demanded Jämtland, Halland, and Billhus, with Vigan and Marstrand and part of Scania, including Helsingborg. Carteret said that England anyhow could not allow the Danes to hold both sides of the Sound.

The latter had always been the stronger at sea, the former in revenue and on land, besides having the support of Holstein. Now the balance would be heavily altered. 'The reserving a satisfaction for the duke of Holstein will please the Swedes, which for the honour of all parties it is essential to do. The Swedes had rather Wismar should be in any hands than the king of Denmark's. So it is very possible to make that a free imperial town.' Knyphausen thought that Denmark ought to be satisfied with Sleswick and its revenues. He wanted exemption from the Sound tolls for his master's new Pomeranian subjects, and would support Sweden in this matter. He objected to Denmark having Heligoland, an appanage of Sleswick, and in this he was right; it was an impregnable island governing the entrance to the Elbe, and ought to remain in the hands of the duke of Holstein, who could do no harm with it. The Dutch ambassador objected also; indeed, 'it will be a common cause to all traders, who will not be easy, if Denmark is to keep it by a solemn treaty.' Knyphausen believed that the Danes could be forced to peace. Although his master had guaranteed to them Sleswick and Rügen and Stralsund, yet, he said, 'there were always equivalents reserved, which, being in general, they have ground to extend them as they please, and can come off honourably, considering the conduct of the Danes in this great matter, and their having broke off their treaties by taking several Prussian ships.' Knyphausen would support these views at Berlin, if brought forward by the English minister, but thought that the business had better be done at Stockholm. 'The Danes will never make peace unless they are forced. It has been their constant lot. The treaties of Fontainebleau, Lund, and Traventhahl are examples.' Prussian troops would soon bring the Danes to reason, and the king of Prussia would risk little in employing force, not having reason to fear Denmark as he had the tsar. He had only joined her for his own advantage, and was securing that by a wise peace, whereas the Danes were 'unwise enough to run the risk of being alone in war.' They believed that Bernstorff and the German ministers were supporting them. The Swedes insisted upon keeping Stralsund and Rügen, not on account of their revenues, which amounted at the most to 60,000 crowns, but from weighty political considerations. 'I shall send a courier to England in a few days to acquaint the Court that the Danish peace is impracticable and that some measures ought to be concerted to oblige Denmark to be reasonable.' After completing the Prussian and British treaties he would return home, 'having leave to do so, if I don't see any probability of concluding soon with the Danes.' Further, Carteret quoted with approval the views of Count Horn,²² a man,

²² 'I was perfectly pleased with this discourse from a person who was always thought to be against us, and who is the third person in this country and likely to be

he says, filled with resentment against the Danes, and professing to look upon the king of England rather as the protector of Sweden than her ally, who, though he might not be able to coerce the tsar, could certainly coerce Denmark.³³

Carteret's expression of his views, says Polwarth, 'put me under such difficulty that I did not well know what hand to turn to. The Danes, in standing firm, were in the right. However, in spite of their refusal to do anything till an answer was received to their demands, he had obtained a resolution to send some one to Sweden. If Marstrand, he wrote to Carteret, and the abolition of the exemption from the Sound tolls could be obtained peace might be made. He was greatly surprised that the Swedes looked upon the armistice and freedom of commerce as things indifferent; the king, in procuring them, had thought otherwise.'³⁴ Frederick himself wrote to George on 19 December, asking him to order Carteret to lay weight upon his demands, and it was held at Copenhagen that the king of England both ought to and could force them upon Sweden.³⁵ A chief difficulty was the refusal of the Swedes to receive a Danish envoy, at least during the session of the estates. When their reluctance had been overcome Carteret further postponed his arrival until he should himself have arranged the substance of the preliminaries. The envoy chosen was again Lövenörn, now a major-general, although strong objection was made to him personally.³⁶ He arrived at Stockholm on 31 March.

But now pressure was being put upon the Danes from elsewhere. It was appearing, indeed, that if Frederick insisted upon his claims he might even lose Sleswick. From Hanover the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had gone on to Berlin, where, says Whitworth,³⁷ he did not advance his cause much, and thence to Vienna, where he had better success. An imperial mandate issued to Hanover and Prussia to make an execution in Holstein, if the Danes would not evacuate that duchy. George was accused of instigating this, but strongly repudiated the accusation, declining indeed to act upon the imperial letters. The Danish occupation, Carteret wrote, had lasted seven years, during which time double the ordinary revenue of 200,000 crowns had been drawn by extraordinary taxes

Marshall of the Estates, the most important office in the country, while it lasts.' 'On the character and work of this great man see Bain, *Charles XII*.

³³ Carteret to Stanhope, 10 November and 4 and 6 December, o.s., and to Whitworth and Polwarth, 25 and 28 November, o.s.

³⁴ Polwarth to Stanhope and Carteret, 16 December.

³⁵ Cf. Holm, pp. 677-80. The king of Denmark's letter, in German, with translation, Record Office, *Royal Letters* 5.

³⁶ 'He is the most disagreeable minister to this Court that could have been chose' (Carteret, 23 December, o.s.)

³⁷ 21 November, 2 December.

and the quartering of troops. 'If they wait for an execution, by the laws of the empire they are lyable to refund.' And there would be other consequences; the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin also would ask for damages, and orders would be sent to Count Bielke to solicit a like imperial mandate for the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen. Later Carteret communicated a despatch from Bielke to the effect that the emperor would employ every effort to preserve Sleswick for the duke of Holstein.⁹⁹ Stanhope instructed Polwarth to 'inculcate the ticklishness' of the present situation; the reinstatory letters from Vienna, he said, the disposition of the French court, and the Prussian opposition to the abolition of the exemption from the Sound tolls should give the Danes 'plainly to understand how few friends they have to support them in their pretensions upon Sweden, and how many enemies,' and so on.¹⁰⁰

But yet worse was in prospect when the duke, encouraged by the Russian ministers at Vienna, appealed to the tsar, sending his minister Stambke to St. Petersburg.¹⁰⁰ It was rumoured, with foundation, as the sequel showed, that he was to marry Peter's daughter, without foundation that he was to have Livonia. He wrote to his aunt, the queen of Sweden, that the tsar of his own accord declared his willingness not only to confirm former guarantees of his possessions in general but to give him a new and particular guarantee of ducal Sleswick, which he hoped would be combined with those of Sweden and Holland. In sending to the tsar he intended nothing inimical to Sweden; he only desired to save himself and his hereditary dominions, whose inalienability and indivisibility had long ago been constituted, and confirmed by the Danish king and senators. The right of primogeniture had been recognised by the emperor at Altranstädt. Hence a cession of Sleswick was impossible. He himself had attempted to bring about an armistice between Russia and Sweden, in order that the latter might be encouraged not to surrender anything to Denmark. If his minister could render the queen any service at St. Petersburg he would be very happy.¹⁰¹ Later he repaired to St. Petersburg himself.

On Lövenörn's arrival the terms agreed upon were at once presented to him. After the usual first clauses it was demanded

⁹⁹ 10 February and 20 April, o.s. Stanhope had written to him that the Danes 'seem to be alarmed and to grow more pilyant upon the coming of the Imperial letters for reinstating the Duke of Holstein in his territories' (19 January, o.s., Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 221).

¹⁰⁰ To Polwarth, 10 January, o.s., *ibid.* Foreign Entrybook 5.

¹⁰¹ James Scott, 8 April, *ibid.* Poland 26.

¹⁰² Vienna, 16 March 1720. Translation with Carteret's of 2 April, o.s., in which he gives his discussions on the subject with the Swedes. 'It must certainly now be intimation,' Stanhope commented, if the Danes 'do not close immediately with the offers of the Swedes' (to Polwarth, 19 April, o.s.)

that the portion of Pomerania occupied by the Danes should be restored without reserve within six weeks from ratification; the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls thereupon to be given up. The expectation was expressed that the emperor would dispose of Holstein, an immediate fief of the empire, in favour of the duke; as to Sleswick, in spite of solemn treaties and guarantees, the queen of Sweden stated her willingness to join with the emperor, Great Britain, and France as mediating powers in regulating that affair at Brunswick. To provide the money to be paid to Denmark, the amount also to be settled at Brunswick, she transferred to the mediating powers her rights over the town and territory of Wismar,¹⁰² excepting certain rights of private persons, upon condition that the disposition made thereof brought no prejudice or offence to the empire or to any neighbouring prince. Marstrand was to be held by Denmark until the final treaty was made, and then restored in the same state as when taken. It was an absolute condition that the king of Denmark should give no help to the war against Sweden, directly or indirectly. If these preliminaries were not accepted before the armistice expired, then it was declared that Sweden would not further be bound by them.¹⁰³

Of course Lövenörn resisted the proposals, in spite of Carteret's threats that, if they were not accepted within the time allowed, the promise of a British guarantee of Sleswick should be withdrawn. He still held out for Marstrand and the province of Båhus. The loss of Stralsund and Rügen, he argued, was definite, the questions of Sleswick and of money compensation of uncertain issue. Carteret offered him 50,000 crowns to use as he thought fit, if he could find a man to work for them, swearing that further cessions could not be obtained, and that if the terms were not accepted within the period of the truce Great Britain would hold herself released from her promise of a guarantee of Sleswick.¹⁰⁴ For form's sake, he wrote, he must listen to the Danish pretensions, but the whole negotiation turned upon the sum of money to be paid by Sweden as part of the equivalent for Stralsund and Rügen, and on Wismar. If Lövenörn did not shortly receive orders to conclude he would go with him to Copenhagen.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Whose revenues, according to a detailed statement sent by Carteret on 10 February, o.s., amounted to 25,200 crowns. But there were mortgages for more than 50,000.

¹⁰³ Record Office, Treaties 45 and 533, and Sweden 27, under date 4 March, o.s., 1720; Carteret's comments in his despatch of 9 March, o.s.

¹⁰⁴ Holm, pp. 687-8.

¹⁰⁵ 25 March, o.s. Carteret's first discussions with Lövenörn in his despatches of 23 and 28 March, o.s. to Polwarth, to whom he wrote that the Swedes claimed to be able to use the king of Denmark now as he had used them. 'He has played the Caesar upon them, made use of that Prince, and encouraged his power to punish Sweden. They can now do the same, make use of the Caesar's power, which the Danes have contributed to raise, to punish Denmark.'

Under the pressure from all sides Frederick gave way. He let Peter the Great know that he felt himself exonerated from blame in taking measures to avert the ill that threatened. A draft of a treaty sent to Lövenörn at the end of April demanded in exchange for Pomerania the isle of Hven and the sum of 1,200,000 crowns banco, besides the Sound tolls. Sweden was solemnly to renounce all treaties, alliances, and guarantees with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and energetically to support the claim of Denmark to Sleswick with its dependencies and islands; if she could not persuade the duke to this Marstrand must remain in Danish keeping for ever, unless exchanged for some other compensation.¹⁰⁶ But the highest offer that Carteret could obtain from the Swedes was 500,000 German crowns, in return for a simultaneous evacuation of Pomerania, Rügen, and Marstrand. Lövenörn offered to accept a million crowns banco, excluding Marstrand, and later 800,000, or a million current money.¹⁰⁷ Following upon an exchange of letters between the king of Denmark and King George the latter, in his anxiety to bring about peace, offered to find in the last resort 400,000 crowns himself, the half as king and half as elector, but upon condition that Denmark should positively accept the preliminaries and the Swedish court engage formally to dispose of Wismar as he should desire and not otherwise. The armistice (which expired on 30 April) should be renewed and the British guarantee hold during the prolongation.¹⁰⁸ At last the Swedes were brought to offer 600,000 crowns, and this was final. Carteret took upon himself to accept preliminaries signed by the Swedes alone on 3 June, old style, and at the same time Campredon signed conditionally the French guarantee of Sleswick. 'At least,' Carteret wrote, 'I secure to the king of Denmark for some time an opportunity of obtaining these very advantageous terms, which the King our Master has, with great difficulty, drawn from Sweden.' In spite of the renewed ravages by the Russians, he said, the court had held firm, but if the Danes would not finish soon other counsels would prevail. The Holstein party had done all it could to obstruct.¹⁰⁹ Ten days later he left for Denmark in company with Lövenörn, going straight to the king at Frederiksborg, where the joint arguments of himself, Polwarth, and General Bothmer obtained the signature of the treaty on 3 July.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Copy with Carteret's of 23 April, o.s.

¹⁰⁷ Carteret, 26 April foll., o.s.

¹⁰⁸ Stanhope to Carteret and Polwarth, the former being thought to have gone to Copenhagen, 1 May, o.s., Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 231.

¹⁰⁹ 8 June, o.s. *ibid.* Sweden 27.

¹¹⁰ See Carteret's and other despatches, Record Office, S. P. Dom., Entrybook 270, and Denmark 43. Stanhope wrote on 8 July that Carteret had done wonders in obtaining the French guarantee, such as it was. The compensation question must not be raised at this time. 'The true point of view of Denmark is to fence and secure

The preamble cited the reiterated instances of the king of England, who had procured an armistice and offered his mediation, which had been accepted, as also that of the king of France. The usual first clauses established eternal peace and friendship, amnesty, and liberty of trade. All treaties, conventions, and alliances, so far as they were contrary to the tenour of the present treaty, were renounced, and no future ones to the prejudice of either party were to be made. The king of Denmark undertook specially not to aid the tsar in any way against Sweden while the present war continued, and not to open his ports to Russian privateers or their prizes. Sweden undertook not to oppose directly or indirectly anything that should be stipulated in favour of Denmark by the two mediatory powers in regard to Sleswick, and not to give any assistance to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in respect thereof. Denmark was to restore Stralsund and Rügen and Marstrand with all their appurtenances, and renounced all pretensions over Wismar, acknowledging the incontestable rights of Sweden there. In return the exemption from the Sound tolls was given up, and a payment of 600,000 rix dollars promised. Particular stipulations were made about the transference of Stralsund and the internal affairs of that part of Pomerania. Disputed boundaries towards Lapland were to be settled in accordance with the ancient treaties. A Swedish commissioner of posts was to be allowed to reside at Elsinore.¹¹¹

Polwarth signed the British guarantee on the 23rd. It referred to the temporary guarantee of ducal Sleswick to Denmark under the convention of 30 October, to the promise that it should be made perpetual if peace were concluded within the term of the armistice, and to the renewal of that six months later with the same condition; and it confirmed these undertakings formally.¹¹² But there was long delay in bringing the treaty to completion, in spite of every effort. The regent had all along been most reluctant to give a French guarantee of Sleswick,¹¹³ and now could not be brought

the possession of Sleswick against the duke of Holstein, who will not easily be persuaded to make a cession of that Dutchy.' Against him the Danes could have no better security than the guarantees of Great Britain and France. He went on, 'The Crown of Great Britain is at present under no kind of tie whatsoever to Denmark save the Convention signed by you and Lord Polwarth, the conditions of which will expire with the armistice, and will, I promise you, not easily be renewed. But if once the crown of Denmark shall have rendered our Guaranty perpetual by signing the peace with Sweden, it will then become our interest to concert with Denmark and elsewhere all proper expedients to extinguish the pretensions of the Duke of Holstein.'

¹¹¹ Copies, Record Office, Sweden 27, Treaty Papers 71. Exceptions and explanations were embodied by the king of Denmark in a separate document, see *ibid.* Royal Letters 5, with correspondence on the subject.

¹¹² Record Office, Treaty Papers 4.

¹¹³ Cf. *an/a*, p. 41, note 23. The Danes, on the other hand, had refused to accept a conditional guarantee. Carteret wrote on 25 March, o.s., that Löwenörn would not

to ratify it. The king of Denmark was urged not to wait for this, but could not be persuaded. The guarantee, though dated 18 August, was not delivered till 22 October, and only then were the ratifications of the treaty exchanged.¹¹⁴

The prince of Hesse was now king of Sweden under the title of Frederick I. His election had been long in negotiation,¹¹⁵ and the matter was mixed up with a loan of money to him and the question of the succession of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.¹¹⁶ The queen had first proposed to the Riksdag his joint sovereignty with herself, and then, when this was rejected, that he should be king when in the kingdom, herself regent in his absence and queen in case of his death; all acts to pass in both names, but one signature to be sufficient. But in the end all form of a joint sovereignty had to be abandoned. The queen consented to resign to her husband all royal power during his life, and he accept French mediation unless Camprédon signed a guarantee of *Sleswick at once* 'in the very same words as ours.' He expected to overcome the difficulty, but went on, 'The Danes don't seem to understand the value of the French guaranty. . . . They really seem to have a different way of thinking from all the people, that I have ever seen.'

¹¹⁴ See Stanhope's despatches from Hanover, Record Office, S. P. Dom., Entrybook 270; Carteret and Polwarth, 18 August foll., *ibid.* Denmark 44; and Holm, p. 700. To quote Stanhope, 'Nor should we, I believe, have obtained it [the promise of the guarantee], unless the present situation of affairs in France had made the Regent sensible that he stands more in need than ever of our Master's friendship' (to Carteret and Polwarth, 27 August; the beginning of the financial crash is alluded to). And again, 12 January, o.s., 1721 (Record Office, Entrybook 5), 'The procuring that [the guarantee] from France has cost His Majesty a great deal of pains, and he is very glad to have done in it what cannot but be extremely usefull and agreeable to Denmark.'

¹¹⁵ Thus Carteret, 5 September, o.s., 1719, in cipher: 'I think the prince stands fair for the crown. The queen is extremely for it. In what manner will the king assist him? If the king would give him the garter he would receive it with pleasure, and I believe such a mark of friendship in this juncture will be of use to him. I never met with anybody that loves our country better. It would do well to put an English mark upon his person.'

¹¹⁶ Carteret wrote, 26 October, o.s., that the prince wanted a loan of 200,000 crowns, without security, 'to make his views of the Crown sure and infallible.' Dubois, he said, had promised to furnish money to this end independently of the subsidies, but desired the matter to be kept extremely secret. Stanhope, in answer to Carteret's objections to proposing the succession of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, said that the king continued of the same opinion in that matter, 'and annexed the loan of the money for the prince of Hesse's use to that condition; we intended the promoting of that prince's interest at the same time' (19 January, o.s., 1720, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 221). The prince, Carteret wrote on 28 January, o.s., had asked him whether he had orders to work underhand and by money to procure the duke's succession, in reply to which he protested that his only orders were to work in concert with his highness, and the king's only object to render him a personal service and facilitate the peace with Denmark. Taube then came to see him, and, insisting on the impossibility of the scheme, and 'how it would certainly spoil the prince's business,' asked whether the money could not be advanced on the prince's engagement to repay it soon, to which Carteret replied in the negative, but promised on no account to speak of the matter, and to assist the prince as much as possible by good offices and representations. He goes on to discuss the subject, and says that Camprédon had bills of exchange for 200,000 crowns of French money to support the prince's views, and that more would be forthcoming if necessary.

was elected king on 24 March, o.s.¹¹⁷ The coronation took place on 14 May. After taking their oath of allegiance the estates took another to defend their liberties against despotic power.¹¹⁸ It was also proposed by a strong party to name the duke of Holstein-Gottorp successor, in order to prevent him from throwing himself into the arms of the tsar, but this also was rejected. A protest at Vienna by the duke against his uncle's election increased his unpopularity, being 'universally disliked,' says Jackson, and even by the Holstein party.¹¹⁹

George's work of pacification in the north, on the lines dictated by the requirements of his French alliance, was now completed. By the regent's help Stanhope's diplomacy had triumphed. Hanover and Prussia came off well; the king of Poland as well as could be expected; Sweden recovered something and had the expectation of more; Denmark also got something, if but a fraction of what was looked for. But besides George's plan of peace there was his plan of war, and this failed utterly. No power could be persuaded to join in an attack upon the tsar. Sweden was as incapable of raising war in Livonia by herself as were the squadrons, which Sir John Norris conducted to the Baltic in 1720-1, of attacking Peter's fleet and ports. They could not even prevent fresh incursions into Sweden; the Russian galleys were securely protected by the rocks and shallows northwards of Stockholm. When four Swedish frigates attempted an attack upon them they ran aground and were destroyed.¹²⁰ Already in October 1720 George advised King Frederick to make with the tsar what terms he could. Stanhope authorised William Finch, who had succeeded Carteret at Stockholm, to furnish him with 20,000*l.* for use among the senators, and with 100,000*l.* besides, if the expense of sending another squadron to the Baltic could be saved. A further bribe was the expectation of having the succession settled upon his house.¹²¹ But nothing could be effected in this way. The Swedes

¹¹⁷ 'To the great satisfaction of the Queen and all the good people of Sweden,' says Carteret.

¹¹⁸ Carteret, 27 February, 4 and 25 March, 7 May, o.s. When celebrating the occasion an English merchant ship of sixteen guns was blown up and thirty-five persons were killed, including Carteret's chaplain.

¹¹⁹ Jackson, 20 and 23 April, 11 June, o.s., Record Office, Sweden 23. He had lately resumed his post of minister resident in Sweden.

¹²⁰ Norris's Journal, 8 August, o.s., Brit. Mus. Add. MS 28129.

¹²¹ George to the king of Sweden, 11 October and 5 November, Record Office, S P. Dom., Entrybooks 270-1; Stanhope to Finch, 2 and 12 October and 4 November, *ibid.*, and 1 October, o.s., and 5 November, Foreign Entrybook 291. What caused most disquiet was the uncertainty as to the course the emperor would take; Stanhope wrote, for instance: 'La Cour Imp^{le} se découvre d'avantage, et la Cour de Pologne, loin d'animer la République contre les Russes, se conduit de manière à paraître d'accord avec l'Empereur et le Czar.' Cadogan, he said, was being recalled from Vienna 'pour donner un coup d'épée à la Cour Imp^{le}' (to Finch, 4 November). The situation is

insisted on the performance of treaty engagements which proved to be of no value, and the consequence was the peace of Nystad, which gave to Peter the Great all the coast from Finland to Courland. The result for Great Britain was hostility with Russia lasting nearly twenty years; but it did not entail the injuries to her commerce which had been apprehended. And, indeed, this commerce was of less importance now that naval stores were coming year by year in increasing quantities from the American plantations.¹²²

One important result of the northern pacification and of the alliance with Prussia was seriously to impair the relations of Great Britain with Austria. In the first place George and Frederick William declined to send plenipotentiaries to the congress of Brunswick to settle northern affairs, as they were formally invited to do by an imperial circular of 17 November 1719. The emperor naturally resented the disposition of German provinces without reference to himself, and steadily refused to confer on Prussia the investiture of Stettin, though ready to grant that of Bremen and Verden to King George. But he would not accept it apart from the Prussian investiture, or rather was prevented from doing so by his English ministers, who feared the offence which would thereby be given to Prussia and France. Secondly, George and Frederick William were united against Austria in defence of the German protestants, upon whose rights an organised attack was being carried on in the Palatinate, Saxony, and elsewhere. And, thirdly, there was the adoption of the cause of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp by the emperor, and his consequent approximation to the tsar, the enemy of George and of Great Britain. These were some of the causes which in 1725 enabled the treaty of Vienna to be immediately countered by the treaty of Hanover.

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set out in a private ciphered despatch from Carlsrød at Copenhagen of 10 October too long to quote (Record Office, Denmark 44).

¹²² Cf. Ranke, *Preussische Geschichte*, book v. p. 81.