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**Bonner's Evidence in Athenian Courts *Evidence in Athenian Courts*. By Robert J. Bonner, Ph.D., Assistant in Greek and Latin, University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. 98. 75 cents net.**

W. Wyse

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same papyrus the symbol appears to be that for 3,000 drachmas; and that which stands at the ends of ll. 14 and 20 represents four obols, not three.

The demotic texts, which belong to the same group as the Ptolemaic Greek texts, have been edited by Prof. Spiegelberg, whose commentary (as is very natural in the present state of demotic studies) is mainly linguistic.

This I am not qualified to criticise; but with regard to the rest of the volume one may be allowed to congratulate M. Reinach on a very workmanlike contribution to the study of 'papyrology,' and to thank him for the additions which he has made to our knowledge of the subject.

F. G. KENYON.

### BONNER'S EVIDENCE IN ATHENIAN COURTS.

*Evidence in Athenian Courts.* By ROBERT J. BONNER, Ph.D., Assistant in Greek and Latin, University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. 98. 75 cents net.

DR. BONNER's aim in this little treatise is 'to deal with the whole subject of evidence from the standpoint of English law, which, though it differs so widely at every point from the Athenian system, is yet admirably suited for the purpose, as it is the most perfectly rational system of rules ever devised for ascertaining the truth about matters in dispute' (p. 1). The results of the comparison remind me of Dobree's *not* on Mitford's *History of Greece: the author has discovered that the Greeks were totally unacquainted with the British Constitution*. The conclusion of the whole matter is that at Athens 'the rules of evidence were comparatively few in number and simple in form' (p. 12). Further, it is clearly shown in the course of the enquiry that no effective machinery existed for enforcing the few and simple rules which the law prescribed. Thus, though a person was not allowed to produce his slaves as witnesses, he could tell the judges what he had learned from them. The speaker of Lys. i. who is charged with murder, rests part of his defence on the alleged confessions of his maidservant, whom however he does not offer to the other side to be examined under torture. A woman could not appear in court as a witness, but nothing was easier than to incorporate in a speech statements attributed to a woman and protest to the judges that she was in a position to know the truth. Men having been produced to testify to a fact, the knowledge of which was in possession of their wives, Isaeus makes a litigant say that, if the evidence had been false, the wives would never have allowed their husbands to come

forward (xi, 5). The defendant in Dem. 55 seeks to fortify such hearsay evidence by an imprecation on his own head: λέγω μὲν ἅπερ ἤκουσα τῆς μητρός, οὕτω μοι πολλὰ κάγαθὰ γένοιντο, εἰ δὲ ψεύδομαι, τάναντίρ' αὐτῶν (§ 24). Hearsay evidence was expressly forbidden by law, unless the original witness was dead ([Dem.] 46, 8 *Law ἀκοὴν εἶναι μαρτυρεῖν τεθνεώτος*), but to exclude it was impossible. 'When improper evidence was once produced in court, the only means of attacking it was to make a vigorous objection in the hope of prejudicing the jury against the whole case' (p. 20). A litigant had no power to stop his opponent's speech, and the mischief was done before the objection could be raised. In view of these facts, emphasised by Dr. Bonner himself, I confess that, though not prejudiced in favour of the 'furred cats,' I am surprised at the statement with which his book begins: 'The experience of Athens has shown that law may be administered satisfactorily without a professional class either of judges or of lawyers' (p. 11).

The Athenian speechwriters would be both gratified and amused, could they know how successful they have been with modern scholars. It is the common and perhaps inevitable fate of expositors of Attic law to fall into traps set by artful speakers for ignorant and inattentive judges. Dr. Bonner is not to be ranked with the innocent professors who extend to λογογράφοι the consideration claimed by respectable Christian gentlemen organised in a very powerful and dignified profession. He is not only a Ph.D. but was 'formerly of the Ontario Bar,' and probably knows from experience what a 'smart' advocate will dare to say in the presence of a trained judge, when 'up against a tough proposition that takes the tuck out of a man.' But sometimes Dr. Bonner is bitten. Commenting on the absence of any cross-examination of Athenian

witnesses he remarks that 'a passage in Isaeus (vi, 53) shows how effectively this method would have exposed the pretensions of the witness, if he had been obliged to answer the question which Isaeus suggests' (p. 87). This is the passage: *νὺν δὲ πῶς ἂν περιφανέστερον ἐξελεγχθείη τὰ ψευδῇ μεμαρτυρηκώς ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο* 'Ἀνδρόκλεις, πῶς οἶσθα Φιλοκτῆμονα ὅτι οὔτε διέθετο οὔτε ἰδὼν Χαϊρέστρατον ἐποίησατο;' But Androcles was a defendant, charged with bearing false witness, and under Athenian law ([Dem.] 46, 10) the speaker had a right to call up his opponent and insist on an answer to questions. Why then did Isaeus forgo this legal privilege? One reason was that he was afraid. He knew that Androcles might have replied 'I believe Philoctemon's will, which the prosecutor's friends now produce, to be a forgery, because they did not produce it ten years ago, when Philoctemon died.' The question is bluster, and what the passage proves is that the methods of Mr Serjeant Buzfuz are classical. 'Why is Mrs Bardell so earnestly entreated not to agitate herself about this warming pan?' Again on p. 74 Dr. Bonner writes 'A rather curious effect of slave evidence, according to Isaeus and Demosthenes, was that it would protect a witness who gave similar testimony from a prosecution for perjury.' Any one who will diligently examine the references appended (Dem. 29, 21, [Dem.] 47, 5, Lyc. 28, Isae. viii, 10) and the speeches which contain them, will make two discoveries, (i) that the assertion of the speakers is only that the testimony of freemen and citizens will carry more weight if confirmed by confessions wrung from tortured slaves, (ii) that this sufficiently 'curious' proposition proceeds in each case from a man contending against opponents who flatly deny it and decline to stake their interests on statements made by slaves on the rack. In Massachusetts Colony a white man's oath was deemed sufficient answer to the accusation of an Indian (p. 74). 'That juries did believe the unsupported statements contained in a speech is clear (says Dr. Bonner) from a case in Demosthenes' (p. 30). Let me copy out the passage: *ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἀδεῶς ἔλεγεν ὁ Θεόπομπος, μάρτυρα μὲν οὐδένα παρασχόμενος, ὅστις ἔμελλεν ὑπεύθυνος ἡμῖν εἶσθαι, συνομολογούντας δ' ἐαντῷ ἔχων τοὺς κοινωνοὺς, οἳ ἦσαν ἀλλήλοις συναγωνισταὶ καὶ ἅπαντα ἔπραττον κοινῇ, ὅπως ἀφέλωνται τὴν γυναῖκα . . . τὸν κλῆρον* ([Dem.] 43, 30). The saving clause, *ὅστις ἔμελλεν κ.τ.λ.*, is a danger signal. Its meaning is revealed by the complaint of Theopompus in Isae. xi, 45

*κάμοι μὲν ὁ κλῆρος . . . οὕτω βέβαιός ἐστι· δίκαι γὰρ ἐνεστήκασιν ψευδομαρτυρίων, κελεύει δ' ὁ νόμος, ἐὰν ἀλφ' τις τῶν ψευδομαρτυρίων, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι περὶ αὐτῶν τὰς λήξεις.* The quotation from Pseudo-Demosthenes shows that the attacks on Theopompus' witnesses failed.

Dr. Bonner's survey of the subject is the best in existence, and should be read by all who are interested in Greek law. If I proceed to criticise certain of his conclusions, it is not from any desire to depreciate his work, which I have found very useful, but because I am convinced that the difficulties besetting inferences from the Attic Orators are not generally realised. 'Indeed, sir, there are cozeners abroad; therefore it behoves men to be wary.' Not even the most smoke-dried of *Stubengelehrte* really supposes that Athenian litigants addressing their judges always spoke the whole truth and nothing but the truth. At the same time in practice the systematisers and compilers in their eagerness to present a *corpus* of Attic law are prone to forget that a catena of extracts from forensic orations may be rotten rhetoric from a *Speaker's Handbook*, and that it is prudent to scrutinise closely each speech as a whole and endeavour to discover the exigencies of the orator's situation. In Greece mendacity was not confined to Crete, and it should be borne in mind that in the employment of the venerable artifices of *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi* Athenian speechwriters display at least as much adroitness and literary skill as the anonymous bravos of modern journalism. The Englishman is a clumsy liar, and the enterprise of his halfpenny newspapers is not directed to the pursuit of subtlety.

Dr. Bonner expresses doubt as to the possibility of compelling relatives of either of the parties in a suit to testify (p. 45). Two cases are cited to uphold the view that they were not compellable witnesses. 'The relatives of Timotheus successfully refused, on the ground of relationship, to testify against him' ([Dem.] 49, 38). Apollodorus, who, be it remembered, was a shameless rascal, is arguing that certain timber brought from Macedonia was the property of Timotheus, not of Philondas the shipper. His only evidence is an admission made by Timotheus before the arbitrator that the wood was taken up from the harbour to his house in the Peiraeus. Consequently he is obliged to fall back on *τεκμήρια*—always a sign of weakness. One of his arguments is this: *πολλοὶ καὶ χρηστοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν οἰκέοι ὄντες τούτῳ (Τιμοθέῳ) ἐπεμέλοντο τῶν τούτου,*

ἀποδημούντος παρὰ βασιλεῖ Τιμοθέου· ὧν οὐδεὶς τετόλμηκε μαρτυρεῖν τούτῳ . . . ἡγούνται γὰρ περὶ πλείονος αὐτοῖς εἶναι καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ δοκεῖν εἶναι, μᾶλλον ἢ Τιμοθέῳ χαρίσασθαι τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυροῦντες. οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ τούτου γ' ἔφασαν καταμαρτυρῆσαι ἂν τᾷληθῇ· οἰκείον γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἶναι. Now, in the first place, the word *οἰκεία* here may include friends as well as relations; see § 40. In the second place, it was Apollodorus' business to show that the wood belonged to Timotheus. He is trying to shift the *onus probandi* by asserting that Timotheus' friends were too honourable to testify that the wood was not his, and on the other hand out of friendship refused to testify that the wood was his. In the third place, Apollodorus' reputation is not so immaculate that we are constrained to believe his uncorroborated assertion that Timotheus' friends said that they would not give evidence in the case because Timotheus was their friend. Finally, observe that Apollodorus does not state in plain terms that the law provided him no means of overcoming their reluctance. Dr. Bonner's second case comes from a speech of Isaeus (ii, 33), 'in which the speaker promised to produce the arbitrators themselves to prove their own award, if they were willing to give evidence. The proviso was added because they were related to the defendants' (Dr. Bonner should have written 'prosecutors'). Isaeus' words are τοὺς γνόντας αὐτοὺς ὑμῖν παρέξομαι μάρτυρας, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσιν ἀναβαίνειν—εἰσὶ γὰρ τούτων οἰκεῖοι—εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς παραγενομένους. Who were these arbitrators? In § 29 the speaker says ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ τε κηδεστῇ τῷ τούτου καὶ τοῖς φίλοις. 'Friends' should in all probability be interpreted to mean 'common friends,' for to entrust an important dispute to the decision of relatives of the adversary was an act of magnanimity not common at Athens. But, after all, is it not conceivable that the orator's motive for not calling the arbitrators was an apprehension that they might not confirm his story in all its details? Thirdly, we have another argument of the slippery Apollodorus (Dem. 45, 53-56), which Dr. Bonner grants to be inconclusive. On the other side is an incident in Aphobus v. Phanus (Dem. 29). 'Aphobus, it is alleged by the speaker, had been forced in a previous case to give evidence against a relative.' I will quote the passage: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐξήτει με τὸν ἄνθρωπον ταῦθ' ὁμολογηκὼς ἃ μεμαρτύρηται, βουλόμενος καὶ τότ' αὐτὸν ἐξελέγξαι τεχνάζοντα τί ποιῶ; προκαλοῦμαι κατὰ Δήμωνα εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ὄντος αὐτῷ θεῖου καὶ κοινωνοῦ τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ συγγράφας ταῦτ' ἐκέλευον μαρτυρεῖν ἃ νῦν διώκει

τῶν ψευδομαρτυρίων. οὗτος δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπηναισχύνει, τοῦ δὲ διαιτητοῦ κελεύοντος μαρτυρεῖν ἢ ἐξομνύειν ἐμαρτύρησε πάννυ μόνυ (§§ 19, 20). Here Dr. Bonner becomes critical and sceptical. 'This is an *ex parte* statement, and in the absence of an explanation of the circumstance from the standpoint of Aphobus, it is not wise to base any conclusion on this case, particularly when there are several instances in which a litigant claimed that he could not secure the testimony of certain witnesses because of their relationship to his opponent.' Are not all the statements of litigants *ex parte*? The 'several instances' seem to be those examined above. Dr. Bonner does not quote the case of Hierocles in Isae. ix, 18 sqq. Hierocles was related by marriage both to the speaker and his opponent. Notwithstanding he is compelled to take the oath of disclaimer (*ἐξωμοσία*). This however proves nothing, because Hierocles is mixed up in the family quarrel and is also a witness for the speaker's opponent. A better instance occurs in Dem. 29, 15 ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτην τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἐμαρτύρησεν ἀδελφὸς ὁ τούτου Αἴσιος, ὃς νῦν μὲν ξαρνὸς ἐστὶ τούτῳ συναγωνιζόμενος, τότε δ' ἐμαρτύρησε ταῦτα μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, οὗτ' ἐπιорκεῖν οὗτ' εὐθὺς παραχρήμα δίκην ὀφλισκάνειν βουλόμενος. The last words of this extract certainly suggest that Aphobus' brother was a compellable witness, and would have been liable to penalties, if he had refused either to give evidence or take the oath of disclaimer (*ἐξομνύειν*). In fighting his guardians Demosthenes was not over-scrupulous, but it is hard to see what he hoped to gain in this case by misrepresenting the law. On the evidence shown my verdict is against Dr. Bonner and in favour of the opinion (which seems also in accordance with common sense), that relations of the parties in a suit could be constrained by legal process either to give evidence or to swear that they had no knowledge (*ἐξομνύειν μὴ εἰδέναι*).

Among inferences which seem to me insecure I have noted the following. 'Witnesses (present at the making of a will) might find it impossible even to identify the will' (p. 40). 'The evidence of the deposittee alone was deemed sufficient to prove the authenticity of the will produced' (p. 61). 'We may assume that the guardian could not be compelled (by a ward) to produce a will' (p. 64). 'It would seem too that a witness was not required to give evidence that would necessitate the breaking of an oath' (p. 44). 'Even in civil cases third persons might freely denounce and prosecute witnesses'

(p. 89). These propositions are not all on the same footing, but they have one thing in common: they surprise a plain man. Of course the apparent unreasonableness of a rule does not prove that it was not good law. There would be nothing more to say if an Athenian Blackstone had formulated these principles and shown that they were integral parts of the ancient fabric of the constitution. But this is not so. The questions are, What is the evidence? And is it satisfactory? For my part I do not find it convincing. *Iudicent peritiores.*

It is only fair to Dr. Bonner to notice a controversy in which he shows commendable discretion. Meier and Schoemann (*Der Attische Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 875) lay down that a slave could never appear as a witness except against a man accused of murder, the statements of slaves in all other cases being taken under torture, and cite as proof Ant. 5, 48 *εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ μαρτυρεῖν ἔξεστι δούλῳ κατὰ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου τὸν φόνον*. In a slave-holding community this is a startling exception. Dr. Bonner reminds us that in the southern states of the American Union no negro or mulatto, bond or free, could appear for or against a white man in any case whatsoever. If a slave was to be a witness at all, why should he not give evidence in behalf of a man charged with murder as well against him? Now Plato did permit slaves to appear as witnesses in murder cases, but with a qualification: *δούλῳ δὲ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ παιδὶ φόνον μόνον ἐξέστω μαρτυρεῖν καὶ συνηγορεῖν, ἐὰν ἐγγυητὴν ἀξιώχρεων ἢ μὴν μενεῖν καταστήσῃ μέχρι δίκης, ἐὰν ἐπισκηφθῇ τὰ ψευδῇ μαρτυρῆσαι* (*Laws* 937 B). Was this regulation derived from Attic law? Probably not, for at Athens 'a master could not be compelled to give up his slave to be examined under torture in cases where his interests could in no way be prejudiced either by the injuries suffered by the slave or by the disclosures he might make' (p. 37), whereas Plato has a special provision for removing obstacles in the way of a slave's attendance in court: *ἐάν τις τινα δίκη παραγενέσθαι κωλύσῃ βία, εἴτε αὐτὸν εἴτε μάρτυρας, ἐὰν μὲν δούλον εἴτε αὐτοῦ εἴτε ἀλλότριον, ἀτελῇ καὶ ἄκκυρον γίνεσθαι τὴν δίκην* κ.τ.λ. (*Laws* 954 E). In any case Plato does not agree with Meier and Schoemann in limiting the testimony of a slave to evidence directed against a freeman accused of murder. It remains then to examine the context of the isolated dictum which is the sole foundation of their doctrine. The speaker, who is charged with murdering Herodes, is criticising the conduct of the prosecution. The prosecutors rely,

among other things, on the confession of a slave, who said under torture that he had helped the defendant to kill Herodes. The defendant replies, first, that the slave said this to escape the agony of the rack, his tale before and after torture being quite different. Secondly, he complains that the prosecutors purchased the slave—it is not said who was his owner—and privately on their own authority (*ιδίᾳ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν* § 47) put him to death: *τὸν μνηστὴν ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ διετείναντο αὐτὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς ὑμᾶς, μηδ' ἐμοὶ ἐγγενέσθαι πυρόντι ἄξει* (*sic MSS.*) *τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ βασανίσαι αὐτόν* (§ 46). Their action, he contends, was utterly illegal. They ought either to have kept the slave in bonds, or bailed him out to the defendant's friends (*τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐξεγγυῆσαι*), or handed him over to the magistrates for trial (*τοῖς ἀρχουσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις παραδοῖναι καὶ ψήφον περὶ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι* § 47). Even slaves who kill their masters, when caught red-handed, are not put to death by the relatives on their own authority (*ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν προσηκόντων* § 48), but are handed over to the magistrates 'in accordance with ancient laws of Athens' (*κατὰ νόμους ὑμετέρους πατρίους*; cp. Plato, *Laws* 872 B *ὁ τῆς πόλεως κοινὸς δῆμιος ἄγων* (*malim ἀγαγὼν*) *πρὸς τὸ μνῆμα τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὅθεν ἂν ὁρᾷ τὸν τύμβον, μαστιγώσας ὅποσας ἂν ὁ ἔλων προστάτῃ, ἐάνπερ βιῶ παύομενος ὁ φονεὺς, θανατωσάτω*). Now comes the sentence on which Meier and Schoemann build: *εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ μαρτυρεῖν ἔξεστι δούλῳ κατὰ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου τὸν φόνον, καὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, ἂν δοκῇ, ἐπεξελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δούλου* (*sc. τὸν φόνον*), *καὶ ἡ ψήφος ἴσον δύναται τῷ δούλῳ ἀποκτείναντι καὶ τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ, εἰκὸς τοι καὶ ψήφον γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἦν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτον ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν ὑφ' ὑμῶν. ὥστε πολλῶν ἂν ὑμεῖς δικαιότερον κρίνοισθε ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν φεύγω ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀδίκως* (§ 48). The first point to be noticed is literary: Antiphon, like other orators, sometimes uses the words *μαρτυρία* and *μαρτυρεῖν* in a sense which is not technical and does not imply a formal deposition in a court of law. In the second place, the argument of the speaker is in no wise weakened, if we understand him to say 'a slave may charge a freeman with murder.' At this point however I part company with Dr. Bonner. He thinks that Antiphon had in view informations laid by slaves (*μηνύσεις*), 'which of necessity could never be in favour of a man except indirectly' (p. 36), and that he selected murder as the subject in respect to which a slave could lay an information, 'because it enabled him to put his objection to the murder of the slave with more telling effect' (*ib.*). I believe

that what was in the mind of the speaker was his own hard case, *i. e.* the 'evidence' of the tortured slave which the prosecutors brought up against him. But I am in entire agreement with Dr. Bonner's closing

remark, that 'only confusion can result from calling a slave a witness when the chief essentials of regular testimony are lacking' (p. 38).

W. WYSE.

### WAY'S ODYSSEY.

*The Odyssey of Homer in English Verse.*

By ARTHUR S. WAY, M.A. Third Edition.  
London: Macmillan and Co.; New York:  
The Macmillan Company. 1904. Pp.  
viii + 323. 6s. net.

THE problem of discovering a metre in the English language into which to translate Homer is one which comes near suspicion of insolubility. Ever since Arnold demonstrated by precept the incapacity of blank verse, Popish couplets, and what not, to perform this office, and with still greater success demonstrated by example the similar incapacity of English hexameters, a feeling of despair has reigned in the British bosom. But meanwhile a new metre has risen into considerable prominence, the six-footed mixture of accentual iambs and anapaests (with 'accidental' trochees now and then thrown in) which was used by Tennyson for comedy in the *Northern Farmer* and for more serious purpose in *Maud*, polished by Swinburne in *Poems and Ballads*, and adopted by Morris in his *Sigurd the Volsung*. It is traced back by a learned and perhaps unkind critic to *Mrs. Harris' Petition*, in which certainly the germ at least of the measure may be found. It may be guessed that Morris was the spiritual father of Mr. Way; be this so or not, it was at least amusing to observe that, after Mr. Way had published his first edition of the *Odyssey* in this metre, the master himself came along and did the same thing over again. Not that Mr. Way has much to fear in the comparison. Let us take a specimen of both, the famous lines which so deeply and so justly moved the late Frederick Myers (xi. 196); this is Mr. Way:

For not in my halls did far-seeing Artemis  
come with her bow,  
And softly chill me to death with arrows  
like falling snow:  
No sickness was it that came upon me to  
steal away  
The life from the tortured limbs by the  
wasting of long decay.

Ah no, my beloved, my son! 'twas the  
aching of yearning for thee,  
For thy counsels and sweet lovingkindness,  
that broke the heart of me!

And this is Morris:

For neither on me in the homestead fell the  
Shaft-glad Eager-of-aim,  
Nor with her kindly arrows my body did she  
slay;  
Nor came the sickness upon me to drive  
the soul away  
From the limbs that erst it quickened, with  
woeful waste and pine;  
But the longing for thee, Odysseus, and  
those glorious reds of thine,  
And the longing for thy kindness reft the  
sweet life from me.

'And what a language!' cries Myers, 'which has written as it were of itself those last two words for the poet' (*ἐύσκοπος ιοχέαιρα*). What a Morris, one may well echo, who turns those two words into 'Shaft-glad Eager-of-aim'! Why didn't he stick to wall-papers? 'At least they sell.' But this comes of keeping company with *Beowulf* and Thule; for my own part I prefer Mrs. Harris.

There is one point, however, in which Morris has the advantage. He sticks to his couplets at any rate, and consequently when you read him you know at least what to expect. But Mr. Way treats his verse in a freer manner and often with a disconcerting effect, as at x. 307:

Thus having spoken to me, to Olympus was  
Hermes gone  
O'er the forest-clad isle of the sea; and I to  
the palace went on,  
While the dark thoughts surged in my  
breast like the sea in its wild unrest.  
And I stood at the gate of the hall of the  
Goddess of beautiful hair,  
And I lifted my voice to call, and the God-  
dess heard me there.

Still a great deal of the translation runs very well; a great deal, but by no means all