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### Turkestan

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## TURKESTAN.

By Colonel L. T. KOSTENKO, Russian Staff.

Translated and abridged from the Russian by Major F. C. H. Clarke,  
C.M.G., R.A.

### *Preface by the Translator.*

THIS is certainly the most complete and comprehensive work on Russian Turkestan which has appeared in Russian or any other language.

In its compilation Colonel Kostenko has consulted the writings and memoirs of numerous geographers and explorers, and the material so culled, together with the results of his own travels, which may be said to cover the greater part of Russian Turkestan, even beyond to the Pamir, have been collated into a valuable treatise on the geography, topography, and products of the country; while a chapter is devoted to the Russian troops and their mode of conducting war, which cannot fail to have an interest for those desiring an insight into the nature of a force as a rule little known beyond the precincts within which it is employed.

Readers must expect to find that part which is descriptive of the virtues of the Russian Turkestan soldier somewhat roseate in its colouring, and be prepared for statements with regard to the soldier's invincibility which are hardly borne out by the events of the last three campaigns against the Turcomans; but, with due allowance for the bias of patriotism and for the muzzling of every Russian writer by the restrictions of the press censorship, we have on the whole a book which is a valuable contribution to the literature of Central Asia.

The chapter on the Russian troops in Turkestan alone forms the subject of this abridged translation. The modes of marching and bivouacking which the Russians adopt when within striking distance of the enemy are worthy of study and appear well suited to the comparatively small forces with which the Russians conduct their operations against an enemy far superior in point of numbers. It must be remembered, however, that the foes with which they have had to deal in the steppes of Central Asia consist chiefly of horsemen and matchlock men. We very much doubt if the "wagon-barricade" employed by the Russians would be of any use against an enemy provided with well-served artillery; but against a foe not so provided the arrangement is methodical and perfectly sound in principle, and may, therefore, find application in our own border wars.

The remarks at the end of the chapter on the political situation in Central Asia are also worthy of study, inasmuch as it must be remembered that it is the class of soldier-politicians to which Colonel Kostenko belongs which really carves out the destinies of the Russian Empire in the Far East. His observations emphasize the importance to Russia of her frontiers being advanced until they become coterminous with Persia and Afghanistan, and hence throw light on the true object of the present campaign against the Turcomans, namely, the annexation of their country, inclusive of Merv.

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### *Distribution and Strength of Troops. Forts, their Position and Garrisons. Nature of Forts. Barrack Accommodation.*

The distribution of the troops in the Turkestan military district is mainly dependent upon its extent and political circumstances. The area of the district is estimated at some 423,000 square miles (English),<sup>1</sup> or about one-twentieth of

<sup>1</sup> For convenience, the Russian measurements throughout have been converted to English.—TRANSLATOR.

the superficies of the whole Empire. On its southern and eastern frontiers the district is coterminous with three independent sovereignties: Khiva, Bokhara, and China.

Such a vast extent of territory, and the circumstance of its bordering upon these independent kingdoms, naturally entail a dissemination of the Russian troops over an area more than twice as large as France and thirty-five times greater than Belgium.

The district is defended by 25 battalions (18 frontier, 4 rifle, and 3 local), 8 cossack regiments (3 Orenburg, 3 Uralo-Orenburg, 2 Siberian, and 1 Semirechian), 88 field and mountain guns. The entire number of troops consists of 1,402 Officers and 46,465 men.

If we assume the population at 3,038,119 souls, there is one soldier to every 65 souls.

The troops, as already mentioned, are scattered throughout the country in forts and redoubts, distant hundreds of miles from each other, and in many cases separated by waste and uninhabited districts.

These forts are grouped in two lines—the *outer* or *advanced* and the *inner* or *reserve*. On the advanced line there are two or three fortified points on the frontier with each independent sovereignty. On the frontier with Khiva, Forts Petro-Alexandrovsk and Nukus; on the frontier with Bokhara, Samarcand and Katti-kurgan; in the district bordering on Kashgar, Forts Karakol and Naryn; and on the frontier with China, Forts Bakhty and Borohudsir.

Besides the foregoing, part of the troops are still stationed in Kuldja, which with its salient form projects like a ravelin.

Let us examine the positions of these frontier points more in detail.

(1.) *The Frontier with Khiva.*—The Khivan frontier, throughout its extent from the mouth of the Taldyk to Itchke-yar, is covered by the Oxus, the natural defensibility of which and the absence of a military force in Khiva enable the Russians to reduce their force on this side to two battalions, one mountain battery, and a cossack regiment of four sotnias. These troops are distributed in Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk, situated on the right bank of the Oxus, 6 miles from the passage at Khanki and 35 miles from Khiva, and in Fort Nukus, 110 miles lower down on the same bank, near the point where the Kuvan-jarma leaves the main river. Both these forts are quadrangular in form, with two flanking tower-bastions at opposite corners. The troops are quartered in barracks in the interior. The Fort of Petro-Alexandrovsk is the head-quarters of the administration of the Amu-Darya sub-district.

Communication between Petro-Alexandrovsk and Tashkent is maintained across the Kizil-Kum steppe through Kasala (Fort No. 1), a distance of about 400 miles.

(2.) *The Frontier with Bokhara.*—The frontier line with the Khanate of Bokhara is much more extensive than that with Khiva; but at the same time it is also protected for the greater part by the nearly waterless waste of the Kizil-Kum (in the west), or by the lofty and difficult Hissar mountains (in the east). Between these two obstacles there lies, as it were, an open gate presenting a very convenient communication between the Turkestan district and the capital of Bokhara. Here passes the postal road from Tashkent to Samarcand, and thence to Katti-kurgan, from which place to Bokhara, through a thickly populated locality, is considered only 110 miles—six or seven marches.

As the military forces of the Emir are more numerous than those of the Khan of Khiva and better trained, the Russians have to retain on this side a larger body of troops. Thus Katti-kurgan, 14 miles from the frontier, is garrisoned by a battalion of infantry, while 45 miles to the east, at Samarcand, there are three battalions, six sotnias, and a battery and a half.

There is no doubt that the four battalions, the battery and a half, and six sotnias, disposed in the towns of Samarcand and Katti-kurgan, would be more than sufficient to crush the head of Mohammedanism in Central Asia, the

Emir of Bokhara, should he essay to change his present good relations towards Russia—a proceeding which is hardly to be expected on his part.

(3.) In the centre of the district lies the province of Ferghana, which is defended from hostile attack, first, by the lofty and difficult Alai range, secondly, by the still more lofty and inaccessible Trans-Alai, and, lastly, by the barren and uncultivated Pamir. In this district are quartered seven frontier battalions, two cossack regiments (twelve sotnias), three batteries of artillery, and a rocket half-battery. The points occupied are Margilan, Khokand, Osh, Namangan, and Andijan, with small detachments at Vuadil, Gulcha, Uzgent, and Chust.

(4.) *On the Frontier with Chinese Turkestan (Kashgaria).*—In the year 1868, after the ratification of the Treaty of Chuguchak, a small fort was erected on the left bank of the River Naryn, for the purpose of guarding the bridge there and of counteracting the influence of Yakub Beg. A good carriage road was also made as far as the fort. The garrison now consists of a local detachment and a sotnia; in Fort Karakol there is a battalion, a sotnia and a half, and a mountain battery. Both forts are connected with Tashkent and Vernoe by post roads. There is an outlying detachment of half a sotnia at the Muzart post, in the Tekess valley.

(5.) *On the Frontier with Chinese Dzungaria.*—The troops placed for the defence of this frontier consist of the South Tarbagatai and Kaptagai detachments, and the force in Kuldja. The South Tarbagatai detachment—one company, one sotnia, and two guns—is located in Bakhty, near the old Chinese frontier picket of Kok-turu, on the Urdjar-Chuguchak road, 12 miles west of the latter town. The Kaptagai detachment, consisting of a sotnia and two guns, is posted a little to the south, not far from the old Chinese pickets of Aru-tsindalass and Kaptagai. In the Kuldja district the force detached from the province of Semirechia, seven companies (10th Frontier Battalion and two companies of the 1st), four sotnias, and six guns, is posted at the town of Kuldja and in Fort Suidun, 27 miles to the west. The town is connected with Semirechia by a post road.

Having thus examined the outer or advanced line of fortified posts, let us turn to the inner or reserve line. This latter consists of Fort No. 1 (Kazala), Fort No. 2, Perovsky (Ak-Mechet), Forts Djulek, Turkestan, Chimkent, Chinaz, Tashkent, Aulie-ata, Tokmak, Vernoe (Almaty), Kopal, and Sergiopol.

Small as the garrisons are of the forts in the outer line, those of the inner line are still weaker: with the exception of those in Tashkent and Vernoe, the garrisons usually consist of a company, a sotnia, or even half a sotnia of cossacks.

Tashkent is the central point wherein is concentrated the bulk of the troops forming a reserve to the whole of the advanced line. Here are stationed six battalions (four rifle, one line, and one local), five sotnias, three batteries, and a sapper half-battalion.

In the town of Vernoe are posted three battalions (two frontier and one local), two sotnias, and two batteries, which serve as reserve to the advanced detachments in Semirechia.

The forts in Turkestan, from an European point of view, would not stand criticism, and are hardly worthy of the designation of forts. They could offer no resistance to Europeans, but present a sufficient obstacle to a Central Asian foe.

The forts are of two kind: (1), those erected by the Russians; and (2), those adapted from the Central Asian fortresses, chiefly from the native citadels. The former are mostly found in districts frequented by the nomad, and the latter among the sedentary nationalities. The tracing of the former class is, as a rule, a quadrangular fieldwork, with towers at the angles; inside the towers are the powder magazines, and on the ramparts of the towers are placed the guns. The forts of the second category are unlike anything

European. After the capture of a Central Asian town,<sup>1</sup> the Russian detachment, being numerically weak, occupied only part of the defensive wall, generally the citadel. The latter was then repaired, ramparts and barbets made for the guns, embrasures cut, esplanades cleared, and so forth. Inside the citadel were formed the hospitals, stores, artillery and engineer depôts, &c. Outside, under the protection of the guns of the citadel, were built the private houses of the Officers and the shops of the sutlers. In this way a town sprang up, consisting of three parts—the Russian fortress, the European quarter, and the native town.

In Tashkent, the fort is built on the site of the old Sart citadel. It is in shape a bastioned hexagon, of field profile, and about a mile in circumference. The citadel commands the town, and the guns from the ramparts overlook the native bazaar.

There is another description of fort, where the strength consists in the garrison itself. Of such are Forts Bakhty and Borohudsir, which have no ramparts, and consist merely of a defensible barrack.

In Turkestan, nearly all the troops are located in barracks. The accommodation, up to a very recent period, was very bad, consisting either of native huts or of huts of mud or sun-dried brick, erected by native workmen; but improvements in this respect have lately been introduced, and better barracks constructed by the soldiers themselves. Stabling for the artillery horses has been lately commenced. None existed heretofore, and cossack horses are still kept in the open air all the year round.

*Armament. Supply of Warlike Stores: Arsenal. Clothing. Intrenching Tools. Supply of Food and Forage.*

On the 1st January, 1879, the infantry in the Turkestan district were armed as follows:—The battalions of the Rifle Brigade and the 3rd and 9th Frontier Battalions were armed with the Berdan rifle (1868 pattern); all the local and the remainder of the frontier battalions were armed with the Bogdan No. 2 rifle, of Birmingham make. Now, however, all the frontier and local battalions are armed with the small calibre rifle, No. 2 pattern, of Russian manufacture.

The field artillery is armed with 9, 4, and 3-pr. breech-loading guns.

The cossacks are armed with the small calibre cossack rifle and the Smith and Wesson revolver.

In the armament of fortresses we find smooth-bore field guns and 4-pr. rifled muzzle-loading guns, 18-pr. howitzers, 18-pr. mortars, and four 6-inch rifled muzzle-loading mortars. Besides these, 40 mitrailleuses were sent out at the end of 1878. Of these, 30 are with the Tashkent fortress artillery, and 10 at Vernoe; they are formed into separate batteries.

The provision of the troops with warlike stores is maintained entirely from the laboratory at Tashkent.

Ammunition (powder, lead, &c.) is brought exclusively from European Russia. The small productiveness of the district does not permit of any of the artillery stores being prepared on the spot. An attempt was made in 1870 to obtain a supply of lead from the local mines in the Kara-tagh, but, owing to the want of technical knowledge of mining, the attempt resulted in failure.

The requirements of both siege and field artillery are supplied from the district arsenal at Tashkent. Here are made wheels, ammunition-boxes, and so forth. The difficulty is to obtain hard wood, which has to be brought from European Russia.

<sup>1</sup> A Central Asian town is generally also a fortress, *i.e.*, is surrounded by a wall.

There are no field or siege parks. When an expedition is about to take the field, field parks are formed of hired carts or camels. At the close of the campaign the field park is again disbanded.

Reserves of artillery stores are kept up from the home magazines, under the orders of the chief artillery administration.

The clothing of the soldiers varies with circumstances. Climatic conditions on the one hand, and economy on the other, have created a costume by which the Turkestan soldier is sharply distinguished from his compatriot in Europe. For the greater part of the year he wears his gymnasium linen blouse with cloth shoulder-straps, chamois leather trousers (*chambars*) dyed red, and a white képi with hind-flap.

The blouse is renewed annually, the *chambars* biennially. The latter garments were adopted from the natives; they are durable, protect the legs from thorns, and are comfortable for riding. Officers are allowed to wear them in the field.

Instead of a knapsack, the soldier in Turkestan carries a linen havresac.

Cossacks, instead of the linen blouse, wear grey shirts made of camel's hair, known under the name of *armiachina*.

Intrenching tools are carried in the following proportions:—

In the frontier battalions, each line company has 20 axes, 10 shovels, 5 spades, and 25 *ketmens* or native shovels; each rifle company, 12 axes, 6 shovels, 3 spades, and 15 *ketmens*.

In the Rifle Brigade, each battalion carries 40 axes, 40 shovels, 12 spades, 12 mattocks with handles, and 3 10-lb. crowbars.

Each battery of the two artillery brigades is equipped with 16 axes, 16 shovels, 4 spades, 4 mattocks, and 2 10-lb. crowbars.

Before the creation of the Turkestan military district, when the Russians only occupied the infertile Khirghiz steppe, the supply of the troops in Central Asia with provisions was maintained by imports from European Russia. But after the occupation of the fertile districts abutting on the Syr Darya (*Yaxartes*) and its tributaries, it became possible to feed the troops from the local resources.

With the exception of the northern part of Semirechia, where rye is cultivated, the troops in Turkestan are now supplied with wheaten flour; groats—millet, barley, or rice—are also provided.

The chief descriptions of forage are barley, jugara, and lucerne (*jenushka*). In some of the northern circles of Semirechia, and in the Kazala circle of the Syr Darya province, meadow hay and sometimes oats are obtainable; but in the rest of the district these products are unknown.

In some parts of the Syr Darya province, in the Zerafshan circle, and in the Amu-Darya sub-district, barley is replaced by jugara (*sorgo*).

*Intellectual and Moral Condition of the Troops. Libraries. Discipline.  
Punishments. Desertions.*

In the early days of our occupation of the country many causes served to exercise an unfavourable influence upon the intellectual and moral development of the soldier in Turkestan. The dissemination of the troops, their severance from European life, the entirely strange mode of living, the difficulty of the service, the want of female society, and other causes, operated prejudicially on both Officers and men.

When the district was formed, its commander, General von Kaufmann, occupied himself immediately on arrival in the country with the question of raising the intellectual and moral condition of the troops under his orders. A

special Commission was formed, which, after giving an attentive consideration to the matter, found it necessary to propose the following measures :—

1. To establish local libraries in all circle (*uyezd*) towns, for which purpose a grant of 500 roubles was made in 1868 to each library, or, in all, 6,000 roubles.

2. To build military clubs at all the chief stations. In that same year (1868) clubs were established at Tashkent and Vernoe, and two years later at Samarcand.

3. To encourage the families of Officers and men to come to Turkestan, so as to give the unmarried the opportunity of passing their time in the family circle of their married companions.

4. To encourage sporting as much as possible amongst Officers and men. Prizes were offered for killing wild beasts (tigers), as follows :—25 roubles for the first tiger, 30 roubles for the second.

5. To form a racing club at Tashkent. This club was founded in 1868, and existed for several years, developing boldness among the cossacks, and encouraging the Officers to acquire good horses.

In consequence of the introduction of these measures, the intellectual and moral condition of the troops has improved from year to year.

At the present time, the Officers of artillery, engineers, and Rifle Brigade leave nothing to be desired in respect to moral and intellectual tone. All Officers of artillery and engineers, and 61 per cent. of those in the Rifle Brigade, have been educated in special schools.

In the frontier battalions, in the three local battalions, and in the local detachments, the percentage of Officers who have completed a course at the universities, military schools, former cadet establishments, and at gymnasia, is much less, but the proportion in these cases exceeds one-third of the total *personnel*. The remaining two-thirds have received their education at third-class schools or privately at their homes. The Officers of the first category, namely, those who have received the best military and general education, are for the most part employed as Adjutants, Paymasters, Quartermasters, and Instructors.

The cossack Officers are intellectually inferior to the Officers of the frontier battalions, which is explained by the peculiar character of the life they lead. But great improvements have manifested themselves of late, particularly among the Orenburg cossacks.

A taste for reading has gradually developed among the Officers, as witnessed by the fact that the army libraries have been enriched each year by the addition of many new books and papers.

The moral condition of the Officers in Turkestan is fairly satisfactory. There is seldom any necessity for assembling Officers' Courts in the artillery, engineers, or Rifle Brigade. In the frontier battalions, however, these courts were assembled eight times in 1877, but only once in 1878.

The delinquencies which necessitated the assembly of a Council of Honour of their companions consisted of quarrels and affronts, improper conduct, and other prejudicial behaviour.

Let us now pass to the consideration of the intellectual and moral progress of the lower ranks.

As soon as our power became more consolidated in the new country, when the movements of detachments from place to place became less frequent, consequently when it became possible to devote more time to instruction in reading and writing, education became more and more established among the troops. The progress is, however, as might be expected, unequally distributed among the different arms.

The highest position in reading and writing is occupied by the Sapper half-battalion (93 per cent.); next come the field artillery (76 per cent.); and the Rifle Brigade (65·3 per cent.). In the frontier and local battalions, and in the



circle and local detachments, the proportion of men who can read and write averages 47 per cent.

Among the chief causes which have exercised an unfavourable influence on the development of reading and writing is the difficulty of providing teachers and appliances for the various detachments spread over an extensive territory. Owing to the insufficiency of the number of Officers present with the battalion, the instruction in reading and writing is partly entrusted to Sub-Lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, who are not very capable of imparting their knowledge.

In a moral aspect, the condition of the lower ranks is very satisfactory. The least satisfactory are the local troops, particularly the local detachments and the irregular troops. The cause of this is to be found in the character of their service and in the selection of the men. As regards the cossacks, their less high standard of morality is the result of their condition of life and the short time passed by them in service with the colours.

With respect to the causes which act prejudicially on the moral state of all soldiers in Turkestan, the chief is no doubt the habit of drinking spirits, a habit to which, in the case of the men, they have been addicted before coming to the country. Drunkenness is the mother of crime, and the bulk of the crimes and offences are committed by the men when under the influence of drink.

In the Khivan expedition, when the issue of spirits to the troops was forbidden and tea was served out in lieu, the moral condition of the men left nothing to be desired; not only were there no crimes, but there was an absence of minor offences. After the example of this campaign and of that in Khokand in 1876, the authorities resolved to discontinue the issue of spirit and introduce in lieu a ration of tea. In order to prevent the spread of drunkenness among the men, the local authorities are establishing "tea-rooms" at every military station, where the men may pass their leisure time, as has been done with success in European Russia.

The discipline of the troops is improving with each year. There have been no serious breaches of late years. The less serious cases of indiscipline have occurred among the local and irregular troops, in consequence, particularly among the latter, of the incompletely established relations between the Officers and their subordinates.

The most prevalent crimes are drunkenness, petty theft, absence without leave, brawling, and, amongst the irregular troops, negligence in performing their escort and sentry duties.

The total number of men punished in 1878 was 388, or 0·7 per cent. of the average effective. The number of deserters in the same year was 29 (0·05 per cent.), of whom 18 were re-captured. The causes of the diminution in the number of deserters must be sought in the improvement of the moral condition of the men and in the difficulty which deserters have in finding an asylum in the neighbouring countries, the sovereigns of which deliver them over to the authorities. The majority of deserters are of Mohammedan origin, who cherish the hope of finding abroad, among their co-religionists, a more attractive kind of life.

The spirit which animates the Turkestan infantry is excellent. An unbroken series of honourable and brilliant victories has served to strengthen in himself the consciousness of his own invincibility and a thorough contempt for the foe. He regards the natives not as men, but as some kind of animal who instead of a soul possess a vapour. He calls them a "cursed horde," and by other contemptuous epithets. It must be remembered that this contempt for the natives may be justified, to a certain extent, by the circumstance that the latter, on their side, are prone to call the Russians by the despised names of Kafir and Giaour—unbeliever or infidel.

The superiority of the soldier over the native has this effect, that in time

of war the former never loses his head, no matter how difficult the circumstances in which he may be placed. Neither the number of his enemies nor their unexpected appearance troubles him. He is always confident in his invincibility, and cowardice is unknown. He lives only with the hope of crossing swords with the foe. During the Khivan expedition in 1873, after the difficult march of the Turkestan detachment from Khal-ata to the Oxus, there were some fifty sick, but no sooner did they hear, on reaching Uch-chuchak, that the enemy was awaiting them, with the object of giving battle, than all the sick left the field hospital and took their places in the ranks, burning with the desire to share in the engagement.

The infantry soldier is perfectly satisfied with his lot, and in the majority of cases preserves his good humour, wittiness, gaiety, love of mischief, and devil-may-care.

On the completion of his term of service he can gain an honest livelihood. The greater part of the house-owners in Turkestan towns are soldiers. For the artisan, and generally for an intelligent man, there is no place where one can become rich so easily and quickly as in Turkestan. This is the reason why many soldiers remain in the country on the completion of their period of service with the colours.

The following are the numbers of discharged men who have remained in the country :—

On 1st January.	Province of		Total.
	Syr Darya.	Semirechia.	
1869.....	413	109	522
1870.....	408	341	749
1871.....	400	463	863
1872.....	552	218	770
1873.....	791	639	1,430
1874.....	918	685	1,603
1875.....	1,020	836	1,856
1876.....	940	564	1,504
1877.....	751	603	1,354
1878.....	815	598	1,413

The men who have remained in the country are engaged in trade, as artisans, or in the service of Officers and officials as servants, cooks, coachmen, and so forth, receiving pay varying from 20 to 25 roubles<sup>1</sup> a month.

*Service and Occupation of the Troops. Sentry Duty. Escorts. Imperial and Government Works. Voluntary Works. Changes of Garrison. Military Training. Rifle Practice. Gymnastics. Fencing.*

In ordinary times of peace, when there are no military operations or movements, the duties of the troops in Turkestan are comprised under the following headings :—

(1.) *Sentry Duty.*—The daily sentry roster consists of 573 posts. Generally speaking, the roster increases from year to year; this increase is due chiefly to the unsatisfactory state of the guard-rooms, demanding new posts, in order to prevent the escape of prisoners.

<sup>1</sup> The silver rouble = 3s. 2d.; paper ditto = about 2s. 6d.—Ed.

(2.) *Prisoners' Escorts.*—This kind of duty usually devolves upon the cossacks. The absence of étappen buildings along the roads by which prisoners march, the unsatisfactory state of the guard-rooms, and, to some extent, the insufficient acquaintance of the cossacks with their duties as escorts, explain the cause of the frequent escape of prisoners. But every year has seen improvements in the mode of carrying out these duties, and, in 1878, the number of cases of escape of prisoners was only two.

(3.) *Imperial and Government Works.*—To this class of duty belongs the construction of good roads to the frontier; for instance, the roads over the Tian Shan to Kashgaria; the construction of high roads and bridges; the erection of new and the improvement of old fortifications; the construction and repair of barracks and military buildings. These latter works have been carried on upon an extensive scale at the chief military centres—Tashkent, Samarcand, Margilan, and Vernoe. In fact, these works have chiefly devolved upon the troops, owing to the insufficiency and costliness of native labour. In former years the engineering works, particularly in the Syr Darya province, occupied the troops all the summer, not infrequently until late in the autumn, that is to say, during the best part of the year, and thus their military training was interfered with. Of late years, too, the Turkestan troops have had to construct their own barracks.

(4.) *Voluntary Works.*—Soldiers are permitted, at the discretion of their commanding Officers, to hire themselves out as labourers in parties or singly, during the season when no military duties require their presence with their regiments. Artizans and soldiers not being troops of the line are, however, allowed to undertake work at any period of the year.

From the money thus earned, stoppages for the mess fund are made in the following cases:—(1) If the company mess fund has a less capital than 500 roubles; (2) if the reserve capital is under 500 roubles; and (3) if in consequence of the high market rates or other unfavourable circumstances the ordinary disbursements are inadequate.

In no case is the stoppage to exceed one-third of the money earned. The remaining two-thirds are divided among the men in proportion to their share of the work. This division is superintended by those in charge of the company mess fund, and is confirmed by the commanding Officer. Thus two-thirds of the money earned pass in full into the hands of the men who have shared in the work, with the exception of a trifle retained for the duty men who have been unable to participate in it.

The voluntary work of artizans who have no separate mess is subject to the same rules of stoppage as obtain for the men. But in the case of artizans who have separate messes, one-third of the earnings goes to the fund and for providing tools, and the remaining two-thirds are paid over in full to the artizan.

With regard to soldiers hiring themselves out on these voluntary works, it may be said generally that Turkestan, in consequence of its relative sparseness of population and the limited extent of agriculture, offers very little employment for simple labourers; and consequently whole regiments are without the voluntary works which they can always obtain in European Russia. It is only the artizan who finds plenty to do.

(5.) *Movements of Troops.*—Troops are moved with various objects.

(a.) *Reliefs.* These take place the most frequently among cossacks. According to the regulations half the cossacks are relieved every year; this relief takes place by half-sotnias. In exchange for the new arrivals, the same number of cossacks are sent on furlough. Besides the relieving half-sotnias, detachments of recruits arrive each year in the district in order to complete the establishments, while the reserve and time-expired men, with their families, are sent to their homes.

(b.) *Formation of new frontier detachments* or strengthening of others.

(c.) *Patrolling the border country* and chastising raiding parties.

(d.) *Change of quarters* of troops who have been a long time on detached duty. Companies of infantry and divisions of artillery are frequently away from head-quarters on detachment duty several hundred miles distant, and in order that they may not suffer in their military training require to be relieved.

(e.) *Camps.* The troops in Turkestan usually go under canvas on the 1st May (in Semirechia in the middle of June), and return to barracks in September. The greater number are collected in camp at Tashkent, Margilan, Samarcand, and Vernoe. While under canvas the troops are exercised in combined drills and manœuvres. These exercises are continued even after their return from camp until November, as these months throughout the greater part of Turkestan are very favourable, owing to the absence of high temperature.

All the foregoing movements are carried out in summer, spring, and autumn. In winter (from the middle of November to the beginning of March), in consequence of the cold and of the absence of any buildings at the halting-places, and owing to the waste nature of the country, no movements are possible, except in extreme cases.

A constant state of preparedness for war serves to develop and foster the military spirit and faculties of the troops. Besides frequent expeditions they are constantly carrying out the already mentioned movements for military purposes in time of peace, and a series of unbroken triumphs has served to strengthen the confidence of the troops in their own power. Hence, as fighting material no fault can be found. Campaigning—that is the best school for them.

In order to be on a level with contemporary tactical requirements, the troops in Turkestan, in time of peace, receive the same training as those in the interior of the Empire. Of course the Turkestan soldier, being frequently taken away for other occupations necessitated by the conditions of his service in a distant land (Government and cordon works, security of frontiers), cannot devote so much time to all the branches of military training as his companion in arms of European Russia. But in spite of these unfavourable circumstances, justice demands the acknowledgment that the Turkestan troops, at least the majority, zealously labour to perfect their military training, and their efforts to this end, particularly of late, have been rewarded with excellent results.

The inspections made by the Commander-in-Chief show that the bulk of the troops have a good appearance on parade, and perform their evolutions well. Of the infantry the best are the battalions of the Rifle Brigade; the worst are the local detachments.

The drills of the two artillery brigades are well done, particularly in the batteries of the 1st Brigade. The same cannot be said of the companies of fortress artillery scattered in small parties in forts, and often, owing to the paucity of Officers, under the command of non-commissioned officers. At the head-quarters also of the fortress companies there is, as a rule, but a very small number of men, and these are employed on duties in the artillery stores.

The cossacks are, as regards parade work, weaker than the rest, a circumstance which must be ascribed to the unfavourable conditions of cossack service, conditions seldom permitting the assembly of the sotnias in their full effective.

In target practice, the rifle battalions occupy the first place. Of the frontier battalions, the 12th gave the best results in 1878, its practice at all ranges being "excellent." That of the local detachments was not so good, but even these gained the predicate of "satisfactory."

With the cossacks, the firing with the new rifle gave satisfactory results.

As regards gymnastics, the troops are under very favourable conditions. The constant state of preparedness for war, and the necessity for overcoming

every kind of obstacle, aid in developing the physical strength of the men. They take very readily to gymnastics.

Among the cossacks, in consequence of their frequent change of quarters, it becomes difficult to establish gymnastic clubs; hence they are not so good at gymnastics as at their own peculiar "jigitofka" and "voltjirovanié."

Fencing is on a lower level than gymnastics. The impossibility of carrying on the fencing during the winter from want of manœges and of sufficient barrack room, also the deficiency of good instructors, and the limited quantity of fencing implements, explain the circumstance that this branch of military training is confined to the elementary rules.

*Campaigning. Peculiarities of Warfare in Central Asia. Order of March. Normal Sketch of Order of March. Length of Marches. Distribution at Halting-places. Wagon Barricades. Normal Sketch of Bivouacking Order. Defence of Herds.*

The mode of conducting war in Central Asia is very different from that which obtains in Europe. In the former case nearly all the supplies of food, forage, ammunition, and so forth, required for the campaign, have to be carried after the detachment, as, owing to the waste nature of the districts, it is impossible to calculate upon obtaining many of the necessaries by means of requisitions. The longer the campaign, the greater the quantity of stores to be carried; and this, in its turn, entails an increase in the means of transport, or, in other words, of the train.


The trains accompanying Central Asian detachments are so considerable that the latter form, as it were, the escort of the former; and the order of march of the detachment conforms to the order which obtains for the escort of a transport. One of the chief cares of the detachment consists in protecting this transport, the fall of which into the enemy's hands would place the troops in a very critical position. Hence it is that the march of troops within the sphere of military operations must be mainly subjected to the rules observed in the escort of transports. As an Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks from every side, surrounds the detachment in front, on the flanks and in rear, the distribution of the troops during the march must be such that they may be able to repulse the enemy, no matter where he may appear.

In military operations in Central Asia there is no necessity for an advanced guard sent forward half a day's march ahead, as is the case in European theatres of war. Here it is sufficient to have a rear-guard, consisting of a half-company, a half-sotnia, sometimes even a sotnia or more of cossacks, which marches in advance of the detachment at a distance of  $\frac{2}{3}$  to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles (in intersected country nearer), always adapting its pace so as to be in view of the main body of the detachment.

This latter with the train, when marching through hostile territory, is divided as follows:—In front marches a detachment of sappers and a company or two of infantry; behind these follows part of the artillery in column of route or column of subdivisions according to the breadth of the road; then, again, one or two companies. After these come the endless train, extending sometimes for several miles; in rear, behind the train, again a company of infantry, artillery, and then another company or two of infantry. If the train is very extensive it will be necessary, after a certain distance, to insert at intervals a company or a sotnia among the train, or, if the locality admits, to place three companies on the flanks, at a distance from them of 500 or 600 yards. The flanking companies follow in rear of each other; but if the train is so lengthened that the companies cannot protect its flanks, then they should be broken up into half-companies, and follow one another at such distances that they are within sight. At the tail of the detachment, at a distance of  $\frac{2}{3}$  to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, follows a quarter-sotnia, a half-sotnia, or a sotnia of cossacks.


NORMAL ORDER OF MARCH IN CENTRAL ASIA.

Fig. 1.



NORMAL BIVOUAC IN CENTRAL ASIA.

Fig. 2.



- a. Detachment Commander
- b. Hospital
- c. Artillery Park
- d. Engineer
- e. Camel packs
- f. Filled Arms
- g. Companies in open order
- h. Companies in open order
- i. Cossacks
- k. Grans
- l. Trainers
- m. Ammunition Wagons
- n. Camels
- o. Artillery Horse lines
- p. Cossack
- r. Pickets

The cossack sotnias are divided in such wise that they march at the head, in rear, and in the middle.

The infantry, provided the ground admits, always move in line at open intervals, so that the troops in rear may suffer as little as possible from dust. The cossacks should, as far as possible, also move in open order, and the artillery in column of divisions or half-batteries (four guns).

The idea of our Turkestan order of march is as follows:—The sapper detachment in front makes the road practicable; in populated localities it has to repair the bridges over the irrigating conduits (*aryk*), level their steep banks if necessary, and, if there are no bridges, fill up the canals, &c.; while in moving through the steppe the sappers may be of service in the passage of ravines, rivers, and the like. The infantry at the head of the column serve to drive the enemy from behind cover when moving through cultivated localities, among mud walls, gardens, and so forth. This body of troops at the head is properly called the advanced guard; it serves, as it were, to clear the road for the troops moving in rear of it. In marching through the steppe one or two sotnias of cossacks are sent on in advance, who can more effectually drive off any hostile gangs which may appear in sight.

The train moving in the centre of the order of march should be as concentrated as possible: the less space it occupies in depth, the more secure will it be from attack. Camel trains should, if possible, move in several strings, the condition being observed that the camels carrying bulky articles (biscuit-bags, sacks of flour, &c.) should be placed on the outer side of the column, in order to protect the men from small-arm bullets, and in order that the "wagon-barricade" may be formed with the least possible delay.

If, however, the train consists of carts alone, it should move by preference in two, three, or four lines, at such intervals from each other that at any moment, by a simple wheel-up from the flanks, square can be formed. But if the train is mixed, the camels march in the middle between the lines of carts; and if there are but few carts, they should be in one line, the camels being on that side which is least exposed to the enemy's attack.

The rear-guard brings up the rear of the detachment. Upon it depends not only the protection of the column, but its chief solicitude is to prevent anything being plundered from the train and carried off as a trophy by the enemy. The rear-guard picks up the fallen camels, transfers the packs from the sick to the healthy camels, repairs the carts, &c. Having these numerous duties to perform, the rear-guard, as a rule, does not reach the halting place until long after the vanguard, and, consequently, has less time for rest. All this makes the duty of the men with the rear-guard so fatiguing that the troops forming it are relieved every day, in such wise that the rear-guard of to-day is appointed to-morrow to the advanced guard or to the flanking parties.

Among the duties of the cossacks following at the tail of the column, is that of making the final collection of the fallen packs if they can be removed, or of burning them if there is no possibility of their removal. The flanking parties have to keep a sharp look-out, lest the enemy approach the train and throw it into disorder. The train is defended, in addition to the formed troops interspersed in the manner already described, by the soldiers detached from each company or sotnia. These men, with the camel and other drivers, superintend the order of march, and, should hostile bands penetrate to the train, drive them off with their fire or their bayonets.

With the preceding remarks as a basis, the normal order of march of a force consisting of ten companies, one battery, and four sotnias is shown in Fig. 1, Plate XXVII.

In this normal order modifications may be made as, for example, when the attack is only expected on the front and on one of the flanks; in that case there is no necessity for guarding the opposite flank with flanking parties and

so forth. Protecting itself in this manner, the column, on being attacked by the enemy, need not form "wagon-barricade," but continue its march, which is generally done.

In those cases, when, according to our information, the enemy is prepared to meet us in a fortified position, a field column of all arms is formed from the detachment, while the train, under a weaker escort, marches in rear until the action with the enemy has commenced. It then halts, forms "wagon-barricade" in as concentrated a space as possible, and is protected on the faces by its troops. In the majority of cases, while the field column is attacking the enemy, parties of the latter, previously detached, fall upon the train, which, under cover of the barricade, drives him off with their escort and departmental soldiers; the latter are all armed except the hospital department. The action on the Samarcaud heights in 1868, and at Zerabulak in the same year, were fought under these conditions.

The length of the marches in the steppe depends mainly on the points at which potable water is found, and varies from 14 to 30 miles, or even more.

It is desirable to start as early in the morning as possible, so as to finish the march by daylight and give time for pasturing the animals. If the latter cannot be fed before night, the detachment should not start before 6 or 7 A.M., so that the animals may be driven out to pasture at dawn and get some food.

Halts and rest-days should be avoided; the former because they deprive man and beast of a considerable part of the time which should be passed in rest at the night halt, and the latter because they unnecessarily protract the campaign, increase the quantity of supplies to be carried, and, consequently, the size of the train. Hence both temporary halts and rest-days are only allowed when absolutely necessary. Thus, with long marches of 25 to 30 miles, or more, a long halt after completing half the march is necessary, as the packs have to be taken off the camels; for every halt without their removal is no rest to the animal. After a succession of long marches, a day's rest is of course necessary.

Bivouacs in the steppe are usually chosen at wells, springs, or water in some form. It is desirable that there should also be fuel and feed for horses and camels. For fuel there is *Saksaul*,<sup>1</sup> or the root of wormwood (*Polyn*), which are pretty generally found in the steppe; while the latter—*polyn* (juzan)—is also used as forage for cattle.

In the absence of local obstacles in the steppe, they must be created artificially. The detachment must take up such a position that it is ready to sustain an attack and repulse the enemy from all sides; this object can be effected by making use of the transport, forming it into a "wagon-barricade." In the case in question, we must regard the transport either as a material for constructing a fort, or as a fort in pieces, which is always present with the detachment. As the enemy may attack the position from all sides, the bivouac is arranged in a quadrilateral form. If the train consists of carts, they are so placed that the axles of the wheels lock together. With this arrangement it is no easy task to break through them. It is necessary to state that the carts should be placed with their shafts inwards. If it be desired to increase the length of the faces, the carts should be placed with their sides and not their backs towards the foe.

When the train consists of pack-animals, the packs are placed along the faces and form the defence.

Behind the lines of carts or camel-packs are placed the troops, and behind these again are the horse and camel lines. In the middle of the barricades are placed the artillery and engineer parks, hospital, staff, drivers, and so forth.

<sup>1</sup> Saksaul = *Holoxylon Ammodendron*; Polyn = *Artemisia Absinthium*.—TRANSLATOR.



In order to guard the camp both by day and night, it is necessary to throw out pickets. With a view to lightening the guard duties it is sufficient by day to occupy two or three eminences with cossack pickets. Each picket should consist of three cossacks; one of these remains mounted, while the other two rest with their horses picketed.

At night, however, the camp should be surrounded by a chain of posts thrown out to a distance of 300 paces; each company furnishes two pickets, and the general supervision on each face is entrusted to the commander of that face. Moreover, secret patrols, consisting of four to ten men, are posted on those routes by which the enemy's patrols may be expected; they are placed in concealed spots, and are of use chiefly for intercepting small plundering gangs.

In support of the cossack and infantry pickets, there should be a *reserve du jour* always ready for battle. The experience of the last Khivan expedition has shown that it is best to tell off a portion of this reserve for each face, and not, as in European warfare, place the grand guard in the centre of the bivouac to be moved on the alarm wherever the commander of the detachment appoints. In Central Asian warfare, when the interior of the bivouac is encumbered with tents, pack and draught animals, &c., it would be difficult for the *reserve du jour* to make its way among men and animals; whilst, for example, one-tenth of the effective on each face is quite sufficient to defend for a time the face from an unexpected attack. When the enemy is expected to attack in force at night, all the troops should be under arms.

In accordance with the above considerations, the normal order of bivouac in the steppe for a detachment of ten companies, one battery, and four sotnias is shown in Fig. 2, Plate XXVII.

It is, of course, understood that the normal order may be modified if necessary. For example, if the bivouac is ordered on the bank of a broad river or generally is appuied on an impassable obstacle, there is no necessity for forming a quadrilateral; in such case the bivouac should have the form of a redan, lunette, or semi-circle. In order to give more space within the bivouac, the companies and sotnias should be at open intervals. If necessity requires the interior space to be still further increased, the angles of the faces should be piled up with packs, and the intervals between occupied by troops. In the cultivated parts of Central Asia the garden walls or inclosures may be utilized. Here the bivouacs are favourable, inasmuch as the guard duties are lightened, the high walls, with which the natives ordinarily surround their gardens, affording a ready-made defence; it is only necessary to place pickets in front of these walls, and the position will be sufficiently protected. Modifications will be required also in posting the chain of pickets according to the locality, the direction of the roads, the nature of the enemy, and other considerations.

The protection of the herds, particularly the horses, forms one of the chief objects of solicitude on the part of the commander of a steppe detachment. On the least negligence the herd may be driven off by even a small plundering gang, not to say that it may be startled by some very insignificant cause, and take flight into the steppe. The loss of horses and camels would place the detachment in a very difficult and even inextricable position, as with the loss of its cattle the detachment is deprived of the means of moving from the spot. Central Asiatics understand this thoroughly, and endeavour in consequence to cut off the pack-animals (*e.g.*, at Adam-Krylgan).

In order to prevent loss of herds, the following measures of precaution should be taken:—(1) There should be mounted guards with the herds both by day and night; (2) the cossacks should surround the herds with pickets, and one of the cossacks in each picket should always remain mounted; (3) the horses should be shackled; (4) no horses or other animals should leave the barricade for pasture before the watch pickets have occupied

their appointed places, and the patrols have scoured the neighbouring locality ; (5) the pickets in their turn must not quit their posts until the herds have been driven back to camp.

*Battle. Characteristics of Warfare with a Central Asian Foe. Rôle of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery. Examples of the more Brilliant Successes of the Russians. Storm of Fortresses.*

The superiority of the discipline, organization, and armament of the Russians over that of the enemy is so great that, no matter how numerous the latter may be, the attainment of success in the field, provided the dispositions be skilful, is no difficult matter. The troops, burning with the desire to measure swords with the enemy, seek only to get at him ; it is not the encounter that they fear, but the possibility that the enemy may elude them. Ill-success, it is plain, can never be their fate (!) The fire of the skirmishers, the sight of the fixed bayonets, the roll of the drum, and the mighty cries of "Hurrah !" produce a disturbing effect on Central Asiatics, and constrain them to seek safety in flight. Owing to the absence of all steadiness in the enemy, the tactics of the Russians in Turkestan are peculiar. An attack is seldom prepared by skirmishers or artillery fire. Artillery sometimes remains either with no escort at all or a very weak one ; if attacked, it can defend itself. Cavalry has been known to storm fortified points ; infantry charges hostile cavalry. Neither numerical superiority, nor strong positions, nor high walls—nothing in fact saves the enemy from the handful of Russian troops who dash manfully at the foe (!)

The disregard of tactical rules and the exclusive employment of the charge have more than once called down the condemnation of the critics of Central Asian campaigns. The Russian troops have been reproached for dashing too boldly at the foe without previously preparing the attack by artillery fire, often leaving that arm in rear. The critics say that such neglect of fundamental tactical principles may have an unfavourable influence on the training of troops, and this influence in its turn may be perniciously reflected in European campaigns. This criticism is partly justified, but, on the other hand, in the majority of cases the Russian troops were right. What is the use of thinking about the preparation of the attack with artillery fire when the enemy is preparing to bolt, and will not give the infantry the chance of coming up with him ? Hence it is that the infantry hastens to attack the enemy ; it knows that with the least delay the enemy will be off ; and at the same time it is fully aware that the least wavering on its part, or the least hesitation in attack, encourages the enemy and makes him daring.

The enumeration of all the victories gained by Russian troops in Central Asia would lead us too far, but some of the more important may be mentioned. First we must allude to two affairs which testify to the superiority of even the Russian irregular over the Central Asian warrior, namely, the famous three days' engagement of the Ural sotnia of 98 men under the command of Yesawal (Captain) Seroff near Ikan in 1864, with a band of 10,000 Kokandees led by the skilful Alim Kul ; and, secondly, the heroic affair at Chagrai in 1870, when twenty cossacks kept several thousand Kirghiz at bay for a period of four hours and a half, until they were succoured by the arrival of a detachment of infantry which had marched upwards of 16 miles.

In 1860, at Uzun-agatch (two marches west of Vernoe), a detachment of 800 Russians completely routed a band of some 20,000 Kokandees.

In 1865, a detachment of the same strength captured by storm the town of Tashkent, with a population of 76,000 inhabitants.

In 1866, at Irdjar, a detachment of 14 companies, 5 sotnias, 20 guns, and 8 rocket-stands, in all some 3,000 men, defeated the army, 40,000 men, of the Emir of Bokhara.

In the same year small Russian detachments captured the fortified towns of Ura-tepe and Jizakh. In the latter case the garrison resolved to conquer or die. It closely shut the gates, and when the Russians entered the town through the breaches, the enemy was literally annihilated.

In 1868, at Samarcand, the Russian troops, numbering 3,500 men, captured what in Europe would be called an inaccessible position defended by 60,000 Bokharians. In the same year, at Zerabulak, a numerous hostile band, including some 6,000 Serbaz or regular troops, which was occupying a range of heights very difficult of access, was completely routed by a Russian detachment of scarcely 3,000 men. The enemy estimated his own loss on this occasion at upwards of 4,000 men.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, no Russian detachment of any size has ever experienced defeat at the hands of Central Asiatics in the open field. The detachment of Bekovitch-Tcherkassky in 1717 perished, not because it was beaten in fair fight, but because the commander was duped after his victory at Kara-gatch. The Khan of Khiva, finding it impossible to compete with the Russians in the open field, had recourse to treachery. After giving pledges of peace on the Koran, the Khan persuaded Bekovitch to divide his detachment into five parts for convenience of quartering them, and when this had been done, the Khivans rushed upon them and annihilated the detachment to a man.

Equally unsuccessful was the expedition of Perovsky in 1838-39, not that the detachment suffered defeat, for the Khivan troops, 2,000 to 3,000 men were worsted, but the severe frosts, down to 30° below zero, and the storms, in which men and horses were frozen, created such havoc among the Russians that they were forced to return.

The chief arm in Central Asia, as in Europe, is the infantry. The cavalry (cossacks) render the greatest service in pursuits and as scouts, but in action, when it has before it a numerous and as yet untouched enemy, it transforms itself into infantry. The cossacks dismount, couple their horses, and meet the enemy with fire. When the enemy becomes disorganized, the cossacks leap on their horses and charge him. By means of this original mode of cavalry fighting, the cossacks, despite their inferiority of training compared with the infantry, have distinguished themselves by very brilliant feats of arms.

The artillery, in Central Asian campaigns, brings great advantage in the siege of fortresses. Nearly all the important towns of Central Asia are surrounded with high mud walls, which in many places are flanked by two-storied and even three or four-storied towers. The ditches which surround the walls are dug in several rows, and are filled with water, which, in some cases, reaches to a depth of 28 or more feet. On the top of the walls, on the outer side, are built thin crenelated walls, of the height of a man, and these are pierced with embrasures. The wooden gates are strengthened with iron, and form in the wall a corridor.

After the fifth decade of the present century, our troops were frequently employed in besieging and capturing towns in Central Asia; but at first, having no idea as to the means of defence of these fortresses, we acted with great circumspection, threw up approaches, opened trenches, and so forth, by which we lost uselessly both time and men. Thus we laid siege to Ak-Mechet (1853) and to the fortress of Pishpek (1860). Subsequently we changed our tactics, and abandoning the regular siege, began to have recourse to open escalade. The gain in point of time was great, but, on the other hand, the losses we sustained were comparatively heavy (Tashkent, Hodjent, Ura-tepe). Then we commenced to capture fortresses by storming the breaches. We threw up breaching batteries at close range (not more than 350 yards), breached some of the faces, and selecting the favourable moment, dashed forward to the storm. This is the best means, and that generally adopted for gaining possession of the larger forts of Central Asia.

A bombardment seldom attains its object; the warrior of Central Asia possesses, in a high degree, the virtue of passive bravery. A murderous fire he sustains with *sang-froid*, dies, but never surrenders; he cannot, however, withstand a bold attack; it is this peculiarity which has stamped the nature of the Russian operations against the Central Asian foe.

The capture of towns has always been a more serious affair than an engagement in the open field. A comparative table of losses sustained by our troops in sieges and in the open field will clearly show this.

*Table of Losses Sustained in the Siege of Fortresses.*

Year.	Name of Fortress.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
1853	Ak-Mechet.....	25	75	100
1854	Turkestan.....	5	33	38
„	Chimkent.....	6	41	47
1865	Tashkent.....	25	17	42
1866	Hodjent.....	11	122	133
„	Ura-tepe.....	17	210	227
„	Jizakh.....	6	92	98
1870	Kitab.....	34	116	150

*Table of Losses Sustained in Affairs in the Open Field.*

Year.	Name of Engagement.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
1860	Uzun-Agatch.....	2	32	34
1866	Irdjar.....	—	12	12
1868	Samarcand.....	2	38	40
„	Zerabulak.....	—	37	37
„	Karshi.....	2	10	12
1870	Kuli-kalan Heights.....	7	30	37
1871	Ketmen.....	2	32	34
„	Alimtu.....	—	5	5
„	Chin-cha-ho-dzi.....	1	18	19
1873	Uch-chuchak.....	—	—	—
„	Sheik-aryk.....	—	—	—
„	Chandir.....	4	37	41
1875	Mahram.....	5	9	14

If the storming of Central Asian fortresses has cost the Russians dearly, it has cost the natives still more. Their losses in the above instances were incalculable. They are fully aware of this, and of late years have ceased to meet us behind their inaccessible walls. In the open field they always have a shadow of hope of safety, but in a fortress they generally suffer annihilation (Jizakh).

On the other hand, the ease with which victories have been gained in the open field disposes us to contempt for the enemy and to disregard for tactical principles, which is paid for at times in useless losses. At the same time our first thought should be to spare the Turkestan soldier, because the detachments are very weak in comparison with the enemy, and there are no reserves or else they are far distant from the theatre of war; in other words we have not the wherewithal to replace casualties. The reinforcement of troops, in the event of great losses is very difficult, and demands much money and time.

*Conclusion. Review of the Position and Importance of Russian Turkestan from a Military and Political Point of View. Political Importance of the Neighbouring Sovereignities.*

The Turkestan military district was constituted in July, 1867, chiefly from the territory added to the Empire immediately after the junction of the West Siberian and Orenburg frontiers. At that time the area of the district was about 164,000 square miles, and the number of inhabitants a little over a million. At once the district began to increase rapidly in extent and population. Thus, in the following year, 1868, to the existing territory was added a considerable part of Bokhara, under the name of the Zerafshan circle. The addition gave 8,400 square miles and 200,000 inhabitants. In 1870 were annexed the small independent Bekates of Kohistan, lying to the east of Samarcand, in the upper waters of the Zerafshan, viz., Matcha, Falgar, Farab, Magian, and Kishtut, which contained an area of 1,555 square miles and 31,468 inhabitants. In 1871 was conquered the Upper Ili country, or the so-called Kuldja Sultanate, which included an area of 21,000 square miles and 100,000 inhabitants. In 1873 was annexed the Amu Darya sub-district, giving 35,700 square miles and 109,585 souls. In 1875 the Namangan district was added, with 14,200 square miles and 127,216 souls, and in the following year, 1876, circumstances forced us to include within the Empire the rest of the Khokand Khanate (forming, with Namangan, the Ferghana district), with 13,500 square miles and 602,245 souls. Besides these, the Karshi Bekate was conquered in 1868, and two years later the Shahr-i-sabz district, but both of them were subsequently handed over to the Emir of Bokhara.

Thus from the time of the constitution of the Turkestan military district to the present day, some 94,000 square miles and 1,171,514 souls have been added to the Empire, or more than double the population it had at first.

But what is to regulate the extent to which we are to penetrate into the continent of Asia, and where ultimately are to be the limits of our forward movement? An attentive consideration of our relations towards the neighbouring kingdoms will give the means of solving this question.

Our frontiers in Central Asia are well sheltered from external attack. The western part of the district is protected by extensive wastes, thinly populated by nomad tribes, while the eastern part, from Samarcand to the Kungess, is defended by the massive Tian Shan range, with its difficult passes. Both the steppe and the Tian Shan range present a secure line of defence, which would hamper the incursions of even an European foe. But we in Turkestan are guaranteed still more from attack by the weakness and political insignificance of our neighbours, who cannot threaten us even in those places where an incursion into our frontiers might be said to be practicable, as, for instance, from Bokhara or Khiva. The Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva abut immediately on our frontier, and are in complete subjection to us. The sovereigns of these Khanates clearly understand their dependence on Russia, and if they sit on their unstable thrones, it is only with the support of the Russian Government. The authority of the sovereigns over their kingdoms is too weak to keep in subjection the varied elements which compose the population.

In Khiva, from time immemorial, there has raged a bitter antagonism between the sedentary population of the Khanate—the Sarts—and the nomad Turcomans, who are the real rulers in the affairs of the Khanate. Owing to the self-will of the Turcomans, the authority of the Khan is often a pure fiction. The Turcomans not only refuse frequently to pay taxes into the treasury, but even extract them from the sedentary population, on their own account. The large indemnity (2,000,000 roubles) which the Khanate has to pay from the time of the expedition of 1873 often places the Khan in difficulties, owing to the self-will of the nomads, who ruin the people and

threaten the Khan with ejection from the throne. In order to support the Khan in his rights, the Russian troops have, from time to time, to cross the Oxus and, by force of arms, re-establish the lawful Government. The difficult position in which the Khan of Khiva is placed has impelled him, more than once, to beg the Russians to take the country under their administration.

The dislike to extend the frontiers and increase our territory in Asia has served as a reason for not complying with the Khan's request.

Bokhara was always considered one of the most powerful independent Khanates. But a series of disastrous defeats, in 1866 and 1868, inflicted during the expeditions which the conduct of Bokhara had itself evoked, humbled and abased her to the condition of a vassal State. The Emir not only cannot count upon undertaking any hostile operations, but, on the contrary, like the Khan of Khiva, rules the Khanate solely with the assistance and support of the Russians. He fulfils unconditionally all demands which the Russian Government may make upon him. In 1873 the Emir of Bokhara co-operated to the best of his ability by supplying camels and food during the march of our expeditionary detachment to Khiva. In 1879 similar co-operation was shown during the march through Bokharian territory of two of our frontier battalions, moving from Petro-Alexandrovsk to Katti-kurgan, in relief of each other. The deference of the Emir has also been shown in more serious matters. For example, in 1873, after the Khivan expedition, when slavery was abolished in Khiva by General Kaufmann, it was proposed also to the Emir of Bokhara to do away with the slave markets in his possessions, and not to allow traffic in slaves for the future. The Emir agreed to this proposal, and in the present day slavery is rapidly becoming extinct. In return for this deference the Russian Government not only makes no attempt on the Emir's possessions, but has even, on several occasions, co-operated in extending them. Thus in 1868, the Karshi circle, which had seceded from Bokhara and was conquered by us, was given up to the Emir; in 1870, the towns of Shaar and Kitab were captured by us, and all the Shahr-i-sabz Bekates, which had seceded from the Emir, was added to his possessions. In 1873 the Emir of Bokhara was given a slice of territory between Gugertli and Itchke-yar, which had belonged to the Khan of Khiva.

Notwithstanding our support, the position of the Emir of Bokhara is very difficult. This Khanate is constantly torn by internal dissensions. Provinces rise one after another, and strive for independence. Parties led by various pretenders help still more to excite anarchy.

After the destruction of Samarcand by the Russians in 1868, the south-east provinces, Hissar, Kuliab, and Shahr-i-sabz seceded from the Emir. Shahr-i-sabz, as already mentioned, was returned solely through the instrumentality of the Russians, while to bring the Hissar and Kuliab circles under subjection cost the Emir very great efforts. Supported by the Russians, the Emir, after acquiring Hissar and Kuliab in 1870, extended his influence still further east over two independent countries, Karategin and Darwaz.

Karategin lies to the south of the Ferghana district and the Zerafshan circle along the middle course of the River Surkhab (Kizil-su), from Little Karamuk to the mouth of the River Hulliass, a distance of 110 miles. The average breadth of this country varies from 26 and 34 miles; on the south it touches Darwaz, and on the west the Kuliab and Hissar Bekates. Karategin at one time constituted an independent sovereignty and was governed by rulers bearing the title of Shah. These rulers were at one time vassals of Khokand, at another they owned subjection to Bokhara. Khokand extended its influence over Karategin, in consequence of its greater propinquity, while Bokhara established its ascendancy as access from that side was more easy. At the beginning of 1870 Karategin was a vassal of Khokand, but in the autumn of the same year, the Emir, strong in the protection of Russia, asserted his claims to Karategin.

This country passed into the possession of the Emir, and although a fresh Governor was appointed by him, the Governor took as before the title of Shah, and the amount of subjection was expressed by sending to Bokhara once a year a trifling present, for which the Emir, in his turn, made gifts to the Shah of Karategin. But in 1877 the Shah, Mohammed Said, was placed in confinement, and Karategin became entirely subject to the Emir who nominated his own Bek to govern the country.

In this same year, 1877, the sovereignty lying to the south of Karategin—Darwaz—was united to Bokhara. The sovereigns of Darwaz, also bearing the title of Shah, were kinsmen of the Karategin rulers. Like Karategin, Darwaz was also in very weak dependence on Bokhara. When the Shah of Karategin, Mohammed Said, was placed in confinement, the Darwaz ruler, Seraj-ed-din Khan, proclaimed himself independent and refused to send the Emir *tartuk*, that is to say, tribute. The Bokharian Army, under Khudai-Nazar-Datkha, the new Bek of Karategin, then marched into Darwaz in December, 1877. The war, apparently, was not sanguinary, but lasted until the spring of 1878, owing to the deep snows and severe frosts which marked this winter throughout Central Asia. There was only one serious conflict, near Kala-i-Khum, when the Darwazees were routed. The Shah was taken prisoner and conveyed to Bokhara, where he is still kept in confinement.

The greater part of his family, including the heir apparent, Mohammed Afzul Khan, escaped to Shushan, from which place they entered Ferghana, where they still reside. Thus Darwaz became joined to the possessions of the Emir, Muzaffer. Khudai-Nazar-Datkha was appointed Bek of Darwaz. But, nevertheless, Bokhara did not succeed in pacifying the Darwazees; in 1878 there were some 5,000 Bokharian troops in that country, taken chiefly from Hissar and Karategin, so that the forts in these last-named localities were almost denuded of their garrisons.

Thus the outward activity of the Emir of Bokhara is manifested by moving his troops from one province to another, bringing them under subjection. Constant wars exhaust the Khanate; the taxation is very high and the people have difficulty in meeting it, whence arises a general dissatisfaction with the Emir.

Among the suite of the Emir are many persons who wish him no good. Particularly dangerous for him is the party of adherents of his eldest son Katti-torah. This faction, with Katti-torah at the head, nearly drove Muzaffer from the throne in 1868, and it was only through the instrumentality of the Russians that the Emir succeeded in retaining his power.

There is no doubt that in the event of the Emir Muzaffer's death, the state of affairs in the Khanate will become still more disquieting, and in all probability will require our complete intervention.

On the east the Turkestan frontier line touches the Chinese dominions; Eastern (Chinese) Turkestan, and Dzungaria.

Eastern or Chinese Turkestan (or Little Bokhara, Little Tartary or Kashgaria) lies on the system of the River Tarim. It includes the following towns, which serve as centres of the sporadically populated localities: Kashgar, Uch-turpan, Ak-su, Kucha, Kurlia, Turfan, and Komul (Hami).

These towns lie on the so-called southern Chinese road, *i.e.*, the road made by the Chinese along the southern slopes of the Tian-shan. In Komul the southern road joins the northern, which runs along the northern slope of the Tian-shan from Kuldja, through the Talki Pass to Manass, Urumtsi, and Barkiul.

In the south-east of Kashgar, within the limits of Eastern Turkestan, there are other towns with districts: Yarkand and Khotan, which lie on the old southern Chinese road.

The towns here mentioned consist of small forts with outskirts populated by the aboriginal inhabitants, Sarts, and the aftercomers, Dungans and

Chinese. All three nationalities entertain the greatest hatred for one another, and this antagonism has more than once led to serious disturbances. The Chinese garrisons of all the forts in question were small and, with the exception of Kashgar, did not exceed in each a few hundred men.

In 1856 in the south-west province of China—Yunnan—there broke out the most formidable of all preceding Mohammedan revolts, which rapidly spread to all the remaining provinces of Western China. This revolt, known under the name of the Dungan, produced terrible desolation in Dzungaria, in the province of Ili and in Chinese Turkestan. The Dungans were shortly joined by their co-religionists, called in the Ili province by the name of Taranchis.

The Khan of Khokand, wishing to take advantage of the disorders in Eastern Turkestan, sent to Kashgar a certain Buzurg, one of the descendants of the Khodjas, who ruled at one time (up to 1757) in this country. With the aid of the Khokand troops, commanded by the brave Yakub Beg, Buzurg Khodja gained possession of Kashgar in 1865. But in consequence of his incapacity, he speedily lost all influence, which passed entirely into the hands of the resolute Yakub. Having sent away Buzurg to Mecca on a pilgrimage (1867), Yakub Beg remained the sole and absolute master of Kashgar and, owing to his energy and spirit of enterprise, in a short time brought under his sway all the towns of Chinese Turkestan.

Intoxicated with his good fortune, Yakub Beg set no value on friendly relations with Russia. Our merchants who penetrated into Kashgar with their wares, were detained by him for a considerable time, even for entire years; the wares were purchased by the sovereign himself at an arbitrary and low figure, so that the merchants sustained heavy losses. In reply to letters from the Governor-General of Turkestan, suggesting free trade in Kashgar, Yakub Beg generally answered that his country was poor and could not afford to trade with any one; but should the Russians come to Kashgar, with the object of conquering it, he would place all in the hands of God, by whom it will be decided if Russia is to conquer Kashgar, or Kashgar to conquer Russia.

Yakub Beg, protected by the difficult Tian-Shan mountains, had some reason for counting upon the impunity of his acts, and in order to strengthen himself entered into relations with the English. In 1870, his nephew, Shadi Mirza, was sent to the Viceroy of India to negotiate for an alliance and a request for arms. The return Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. Forsyth, arrived at Yarkand at the time when Yakub Beg was engaged in war with the Dungans; for this reason he was not received in 1870, at Kashgar, and it was not until his second visit in the following year that the English agent met with a polite reception. Subsequently in 1874-75 a great embassy was sent to Yakub Beg under the same Mr. Forsyth; it did not, however, lead to any positive results. Much more substantial were our relations with the ruler of Kashgar. While carrying on negotiations with Yakub Beg with regard to the free passage of Russian merchants into Kashgaria, the Governor-General of Turkestan turned his attention to putting in order the road to Kashgar, so that in the event of refusal, troops might be moved into the country and Yakub Beg forced to sign a commercial treaty.

Thus intimidated, Yakub Beg, in May, 1872, actually signed a treaty, similar to those signed by the Khan of Khokand and Emir of Bokhara in 1868.

By virtue of this treaty, the Kashgar sovereign bound himself to open to our merchants free entry into his dominions, and to collect from them duties similar to those levied on Kashgar merchants in Russian territory, that is to say,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. *ad valorem*.

Wavering between the English and Russian alliance, Yakub Beg ultimately recognized that he had been less offended by Russia, and, in cou-



sequence, submitted to Russian influence. Yakub Beg was alone able, by the force of his intellect and iron will, to keep in order the varied elements composing the population of Eastern Turkestan. In 1877 he died, and his monarchy, artificially welded by fire and sword, resolved itself into its component elements, all at variance with each other. Disorders and animosities commenced. The Chinese took advantage of the state of anarchy, and once more occupied the country. Nevertheless, the authority of the Chinese is also unstable. One province after another revolts and endeavours to throw off the yoke. The Chinese troops with difficulty keep them in subjection. In consequence of the anarchy prevailing in Eastern Turkestan, trade is strangled, and our caravans have ceased to go thither. The state of affairs here is very serious, and our relations with Eastern Turkestan cannot be called favourable.

Our eastern frontier in Semirechia is well defined by high ranges, which surround the valley of the Upper Ili, and include the territory of Kuldja.

In this latter country, after the expulsion of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, there speedily arose an independent Sultanate, the head of which was Abil-ogla. This Sultanate was founded by the Taranchis, who succeeded in defeating the Dungans, and subjecting the latter to their power. The arrogant and presumptuous tone adopted by Abil-ogla in his relations towards the Russian administration in Turkestan, his obstinacy and his refusal to enter into any compromise with us, the harbouring of deserters from our borders, were the reasons that led to our conquering the Khanate in 1871; not with the object of annexing it to our own dominions, but of restoring it to the lawful Chinese Government, with which it was possible to carry on regular commercial and political relations. With this desire, immediately after the occupation of Kuldja, a communication was made to the Peking Government with a view to its dispatching a Plenipotentiary, with troops, to take over the Upper Ili country. The Dzia-dziun Jun, appointed by the Bogdokhan to govern the province which the Russians had conquered, speedily arrived in Russian territory and was established in Sergiopol, with a view to negotiations respecting the transfer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fervently wishing for the transfer to take place, also sent to Turkestan its agent, Major-General Boguslavski, who was entrusted with negotiating on the spot a suitable arrangement. On arriving at Kuldja, Boguslavski was met by the population (Taranchis and Dungans), who begged his mediation, with a view to their becoming Russian subjects, and declared their aversion to the odious yoke of China. The population positively declared that, in the event of their being handed over to the Chinese, they would at once either exterminate their oppressors or die in the attempt. The Chinese were now told that Kuldja would not be restored to them until they have put an end to the Dungan revolt in the entire district between Ili and the Great Wall, and, with full pardon to those who declare their submission, have all the Mohammedan population under control. In the course of the last few years the Chinese have actually succeeded in re-establishing their authority in the revolted province. Having regained possession of Kashgaria in 1877, the Chinese have closed in upon the Ili province on the south side, and have commenced to solicit the restoration of this latter.

The possession of the Ili province is very important for the Chinese. This fertile oasis produces an abundance of corn, which was exported by the population to the neighbouring countries. It plays the rôle of a base from which the Chinese can keep in subjection all the districts lying to the east as far as the Great Wall. The districts in question are remarkable for their poverty and their scanty productiveness, and are not capable of furnishing supplies for the Chinese troops and the Chinese administration, whilst the Ili province has always been a granary from which they could draw supplies.

The transfer of Kuldja to China would augment to a considerable extent

her political and military importance, while, to a certain degree, it would weaken our Eastern Turkestan frontier. The latter, on the transfer of Kuldja, will become open, and easily accessible to the incursions of the Chinese.

From what has been said, it is plain that our frontier in Turkestan, throughout its extent, cannot be considered stable, despite the desire on the part of the Central Government and the local administration not to quit its borders. On the east, the Turkestan frontier touches the Chinese provinces which were only recently subjected anew to the authority of the Bogdokhan, after the fearful desolation known as the Dungan rebellion. It may be positively asserted that, if the Chinese have extinguished the rebellion, and have reached Chunguchak and Kashgar, it is only by reason of our support, as it was in the interests of Russia that her frontier should touch that of a Power sufficiently civilized to pay regard to international treaties—a Power with which it is possible to enter into definite transactions both political and commercial. Doubtless it will have difficulty in governing the recently subjected peoples, and Russia of course will have to give it support. But it is evident that, in spite of all our efforts to preserve good relations with the Chinese, our support must have limits.

On the west side of Turkestan our frontier is still more unstable. Notwithstanding what has been stated in the foregoing, the Turcoman question inevitably gravitates into our Central Asian *politique*. On reaching the Oxus we come into juxtaposition with tribes in the highest degree unbridled and self-willed, who do not acknowledge any international treaties or rights.

Our position towards the Turcomans is entirely analogous to the position in which we stood towards the Kirghiz in the last century and first half of the present century. Like the Turcomans, the Kirghiz made constant raids on our Orenburg-Siberian frontier, seized and carried off into slavery our subjects, plundered the trading caravans which were proceeding from Orenburg, Orsk, Troitsk, and Petropavlovsk, to the Central Asian Khanates, attacked our detachments escorting these caravans, and rendered all communication with the sedentary nationalities of Central Asia impossible. The different measures which our Government adopted in order to pacify the Kirghiz steppe (seizure of ammanats, annual despatch of military detachments, &c.), led to no result. Matters changed considerably for the better when, in the fourth decade of the century, at the instance of General Obrucheff, our hold became more real by the construction of forts in the midst of the territory occupied by the nomads, where the Russian troops appeared as a constant force keeping in subjection the nationalities which until then acknowledged no authority or order.

The object was ultimately attained when, by the construction of similar forts, we became masters of the winter quarters of the nomads; that is to say, when the nomads in their migrations never passed beyond the limits of Russian surveillance.

In the present day, the Turcomans, like the Kirghiz of old, make attacks on our subjects, carrying them off into captivity, plunder the transports, rob the trading caravans, and prevent the opening of direct communication between the basin of the Lower Oxus and the Caspian, such communication being necessary for us, in order that the possession of Central Asia may bring us substantial advantage.

The solution of the Turcoman question is easy in principle, because we have before us the experience in the solution of an entirely analogous question—the Kirghiz. The closing of the West Siberian and Orenburg frontiers, completed in 1864-65, may be fitly supplemented by closing the Turkestan and Caucasus districts. It is only by such junction of our frontier line between those districts that tranquillity can be attained in the Turcoman steppe, tribal animosities quenched, regular trade communication between the basin of the Oxus and the eastern shore of the Caspian established, and direct communica-

tion between the heart of European Russia and Central Asia opened; that is to say, the realization of the idea bequeathed to us by the genius of Peter.

The connection of our Turkestan and Caucasian frontiers will bring us another substantial advantage. Our possessions will be coterminous with those of Persia, and will approach those of England—that is to say, the possessions of Powers which respect international treaties, and with whom it is possible to have direct relations. Particularly advantageous to us will be the neighbourhood of a strong and mighty Empire like England. The apprehension felt by the English at our gradual approach towards the frontier of India will disappear, when they become convinced that no ambitious designs and no other considerations of self-interest guide Russia in her gradual advance in Central Asia, but the sole desire to pacify the country, to give impulse to its productive force, and to open the shortest route for sending the products of Turkestan to European Russia.

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#### SOME NOTES ON THE AUTUMN MANŒUVRES OF THE 2ND DIVISION OF THE FRENCH ARMY, 1880.

By Captain JOHN L. NEEDHAM, R.M.A.

THE autumn manœuvres of the 2nd Division of the French Army were carried out this year in the neighbourhood of St. Omer, the combatant portion of the force assembled for the exercises comprising the 3rd and 4th Brigades of Infantry, the 5th Regiment of Dragoons, and four field batteries of the 15th Regiment of Artillery. A brigade of infantry in the French Army consists of two regiments, each of which has four battalions. Three of these battalions again are known as the field battalions, and one as the *dépôt* battalion of the regiment; each battalion serving in turn for two years in the latter capacity, so that no one battalion can fall permanently behind the others in its knowledge of field duties or in general efficiency as a fighting body. Consequently the 3rd and 4th Brigades of Infantry each placed in the field for the late autumn manœuvres two regiments, or six battalions; the regiments of the 3rd Brigade being the 33rd Regiment and the 73rd Regiment; those of the 4th Brigade, the 8th Regiment and the 110th Regiment. The actual establishment, again, of each regiment at the outset of the exercises included 58 Officers and 2,125 non-commissioned officers and men; the strength of each of the field battalions being raised to 18 Officers and 700 non-commissioned officers and men, by drafting into its ranks those among the reservists of the two classes of 1871 and 1873 (which had been recalled to the colours for twenty-eight days' training on the 1st of September) who were sufficiently exercised to take part in field manœuvres; any gaps which still existed being filled up by temporarily transferring the necessary number of Officers and men from the *dépôt* battalion into the field battalions. Each battalion as it marched out from its garrison accordingly consisted of 18 Officers (namely, the *chef de bataillon*, or, as he is commonly called, the Commandant, the Captain and Adjutant-Major, 4 Captains commanding companies, 4 Lieutenants, 4 Sub-Lieutenants, and 4 Officers of the reserve) and of 700 non-commissioned officers and men, among whom were the Adjutant of the battalion, 4 Company Adjutants, 4 sergeant-majors, 32 sergeants and quartermaster-sergeants, 64 corporals, 1 drum-corporal, 8 buglers and drummers, and 586 privates; while the regimental staff consisted of the Colonel, a Paymaster, an *Officier d'approvisionnement*, and 2 Surgeons, with 25 non-commissioned officers and