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Riemann and Goelzer's *Comparison of Greek and Latin Syntax Grammaire Comparée du Grec et du Latin—Syntaxe*, par O. Riemann et H. Goelzer. (Paris, Colin et Cie., 1897) 893 pp. Price 25 francs.

E. A. Sonnenschein

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terms. But, Patin argues, the view of Parmenides is not so developed as this. He offers no explanations; he merely states the fact that the world necessarily *is* one, and just as necessarily *appears* many. To make it credible that Parmenides intended this, we have only to antedate by a little the distinction of *φύσις* and *νόμος* or *θεσις*. If we do this, a new light is thrown on such lines as—

τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ', ἐπίσημον
ἐκάστω

and we can better understand how Empedokles came to say—

νόμῳ δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.

This view of Parmenides, then, stands in sharp contrast to all recent accounts of him. Zeller held that the views expounded in the *Δόξα* of Parmenides were those of ordinary people. This, however, proved difficult to maintain; for they form a regular cosmological system far removed from everyday opinion. Diels, accordingly, propounded the thesis that the *Δόξα* was a sort of 'catechism' of the philosophy to which Parmenides was opposed, intended mainly as a school-exercise. Later writers went further and boldly identified the *Δόξα* with the Pythagorean cosmology. It must be admitted, however, that Patin's arguments have shaken the foundations of this view, and that certain chapters in recent works will have to be re-written.

It is an essential part of the argument before us that Parmenides wrote with Herakleitos in view. Hegel, as is well known, makes Herakleitos come after Parmenides, and Zeller followed this arrangement, though he attached no importance to the question of priority. The chronological evidence is not conclusive; but Patin shows, as I had done, that it is on the whole in favour of the view that Parmenides is of a later date than that commonly given. As he does not appear to have seen what I wrote, the confirmation is all the more striking. He is less successful, I think, in detecting reminiscences of Herakleitos. Those he believes he has found are enumerated on p. 650, and most of them seem to be phrases that any writer might have used. On the other hand, he seems to miss what I still regard as the decisive instance. The *παλίντροπος κέλευθος* has surely nothing to do with the *παλίντροπος* (or rather *παλίντρονος*) *ἁρμονίη*, whatever meaning we may give to that. Rather it is poetic diction for the prose ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω of Herakleitos; and, if so, the allusion cannot be mistaken.

On the whole, despite much that is fanciful, this is a most valuable contribution to the subject, and, along with the *Parmenides* of Diels, makes much that had been written before seem antiquated.

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RIEMANN AND GOELZER'S COMPARISON OF GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX.

Grammaire Comparée du Grec et du Latin—Syntaxe, par O. RIEMANN et H. GOELZER. (Paris, Colin et Cie., 1897) 893 pp. Price 25 francs.

THIS volume bears welcome testimony to the progress which is being made year by year in the direction of the parallel treatment of Greek and Latin syntax, and, it may be added, of the syntax of other languages. As Michel Bréal said of the present volume 'Le seul reproche que nous leurs adressons concerne le titre qu'ils ont adopté. *Grammaire parallèle* du Grec et du Latin eût été une expression plus juste et qui eût mieux indiqué aux lecteurs ce qu'ils ont le droit d'attendre.' Holland has now its *Parallel Grammars of Greek and Latin* by Woltjer (1892 and 1894). The progress of the idea

in Germany is fully set forth in an admirable article by Hornemann in Rein's *Encyclopädisches Handbuch der Pädagogik* (vol. v. 1898, p. 232), where the movement is associated with the names of Vogt, Eichner, Waldeck, Mangold, Harre, Vollbrecht, Heil and Schmidt, Seeger, Hornemann himself, and above all perhaps Banner and Reinhardt, who are now engaged in working out parallel French, Latin and Greek Grammars for the 'Reformgymnasium' at Frankfurt am Main.¹ As Hornemann points out, the idea was 'at least recognised' by the authorities who

¹ The latest School Greek Grammar published in Germany, that by Weissenfels, has as its central idea a close parallelism of order, terminology, and wording of rules with the Latin Grammar of H. J. Müller.

drew up the Prussian *Lehrpläne* of 1892; at the same time he gives full credit for priority to the English *Parallel Grammar Series* of which the first volume appeared in 1887, as the outcome of the work of the Grammatical Society founded in 1885. Now France has joined in with the present stately volume, which, if not a school book, is yet based on the same idea as the volumes referred to above.

The general execution of the work calls for nothing but praise. The late M. Riemann was known throughout Europe as a distinguished syntactician; and M. Goelzer shows himself in the present volume as a worthy collaborateur. But it would be a poor recognition of the labour bestowed on the present work to dismiss it with a few words of compliment. I have read a considerable part of the work: and if I find myself here and there in disagreement with it, that is only what might have been expected. Scholars who think for themselves on points of grammar can hardly at the present day be in entire agreement on fundamental questions, still less as to details. What appears to me a defect, might be judged by another as a conspicuous merit. With this proviso I will venture to suggest that the parallel treatment might have been more complete if the authors had taken as their basis of classification *meanings* rather than *forms*. The division of Syntax into two parts (called by the Germans *Satzlehre* and *Bedeutungslehre* respectively¹) is now a commonplace of Grammarians: and my suggestion is that too much prominence is given in the present work to *Bedeutungslehre* as a basis of classification. You cannot, for instance, bring out in clear relief the correspondence of the different kinds of sentences and clauses in Greek and Latin if you group together all those which have the Indicative, and separate off from them those which have the Subjunctive and those which have the Optative; for where the one language uses the Indicative, the other will use the Subjunctive; and so forth. A special difficulty results in the case of the 'past potentials'²; being debarred by their scheme

from treating the Latin *credere*, etc., in connexion with *ἐγὼ τις ἂν* (§ 302), the authors are driven to treat it in connexion with the Greek Optative with *ἂν*, to which, as they themselves confess, it does not really correspond in form (see note on p. 334). In fact they have no proper place for it at all. No doubt the justification for this mode of treatment would be that to separate things which are connected in meaning is sometimes necessary, in order to maintain the historical point of view. But a strictly historical point of view is not consistent with parallelism; and parallelism is after all the main object of the authors. Had they been writing a grammar from the point of view of development pure and simple, they would not have resigned the attempt to connect the Latin Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctive in Conditional Sentences with some prototype.

While speaking of 'past potentials,' it may be worth while to refer to a passage in the *Introduction* (p. 10) in which the well known difficulty in Georgic I. 320 f. is cited in order to castigate certain grammarians for their want of taste. I am not one of the persons referred to; but I venture to think that the authors are ill-advised in their adoption of the emendation of Heyne and Madvig (*ut* for *ita*). 'As if Virgil could have compared the effects of the tempest in spring to what happens in another season!' they exclaim. 'As if Virgil could have used the word *hiems* to denote a summer storm!' I reply. [I say 'summer' not 'spring,' because l. 316 *cum flavis messorum induceret arvis agricola* shows that Virgil is speaking of the time of harvest.] I venture to dwell on this point because, so far as I am aware, it is a new one. And I will go further: is it possible that Virgil can have described by the words *culmumque levem stipulasque volantes* the same thing as he has just before described as *gravidam segetem*? *Gravida seges* is precisely the opposite of *culmus levis* and *stipulae volantes*. My conclusion then is that the MS. reading is quite right; but I do not assent to the impossible explanation of *ita* as *ita ut*, with an *ut* got by some unexplained process of legerdemain out of the preceding *quae* (l. 319). No; the true explanation is a simpler matter. Virgil is describing a summer storm, and he tells us that it was

¹ 'Sentence construction' teaches how meanings are expressed in sentences and parts of sentences: 'the doctrine of meanings' relates to the *meanings of forms*, i.e. the various uses of the inflected forms of words.

² In employing this term I do not mean to imply that I accept the idea of 'possibility' as one of the fundamental meanings of the Latin Subjunctive or the Greek Optative with *ἂν*: on the contrary I regard

the 'may' used in translating these moods as representing something different from 'may possibly.' So far I agree with Elmer. I hope to return to the subject hereafter.

so violent that it carried off the *gravidæ seges* as easily as a winter storm would have carried off *culmus levis stipulaeque volantes*: 'just so might a winter storm have carried off light (i.e. earless) stalks and flying straw.' None of the commentators that I have ever seen appear to have grasped this interpretation of *ferret* as a past potential. The meaning which results is not 'flat,' it seems to me, but quite natural and effective.¹

I am not in accord with the authors in thinking it possible to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the fundamental meanings of the Subjunctive and the Optative: the former they say, denotes *l'éventualité probable*, the latter *l'éventualité possible*: some such distinction is, no doubt, forced upon the authors by their basis of classification; but all distinctions of the kind lead to *ἀπορία*—e.g. to what I cannot but regard as the fanciful distinction drawn by Elmer between two senses of *quid faciam* and two senses of *sic agamus*—the sense of 'ought' being connected with the Optative. In regard to a different point I notice a failure of our authors to reap the fruits of Elmer's study; they attempt no rationale as to the use of *μή* in Greek and *non* in Latin 'Deliberative' Questions. Had they entered fully into this line of thought, they would have been led, like Elmer, to constitute a class of 'statements as to what ought to be done' and so to solve the difficulty inherent in the Deliberative Question when regarded as a Command-Question. Is such a thing as an interrogative command conceivable? Regard it in the light of a question as to what *ought to be done* (i.e. as corresponding to the kind of *statements* referred to above), and the difficulty vanishes. Instead of such a treatment we find in § 325 the meaningless description that the Subjunctive here expresses 'the emotion which one feels in

putting the question.' The note on p. 329 shows that the subject is not one which the authors have gone into fully. Again the rule given in § 318, 2° ought to have been corrected in the light of Elmer's statistics; it is clear that we can no longer regard *ne feceris* as the normal form of prohibition in Latin. *Hic quaerat quispiam* (with the Subjunctive) is still quoted as coming from the *De Natura Deorum*, but without reference to the chapter and section—a curious concession to recent investigations.

In two or three passages I have noticed a tendency to give a rule without limitations in the large print, followed by a modification of it in small print. I doubt whether this is didactically right. Thus in § 521 we read that *πρίν* may always take an Infinitive and must do so when the principal clause is affirmative; but Remark 1 tells us that *πρίν* in the sense 'until' may take the Indicative even after an affirmative clause. The form of statement might, I think, be modified with advantage. So again in § 304 we read that in Greek a Command is expressed by the Imperative, a Prohibition in the 2nd person by *μή* with the Present Imperative: a Remark below gives the necessary limitation as to the use of the Aorist Subjunctive. But the propositions above ought to have been converted.

The description given in § 407, Remark 1, of the old Latin use of the Indicative in Dependent Questions as a usage of the *langue vulgaire* and an *incorection* is not satisfactory. In the whole of this part of the subject (Dependent Questions) we find nothing in the nature of an attempt to trace the origin and gradual development of this use of the Subjunctive—a fact which is in itself sufficient to show that the work is not to be regarded as an historical grammar properly so called.

But I will not enlarge upon points where this valuable book appears to me open to criticism. It will prove a very useful companion to the scholar and may in the main be fairly described as up to date.

E. A. SONNENSCHIN.

¹ I speak with a sense of liberation on this line, because I once wanted to write *verrit* for *ferret*—an emendation in which I am happy to say my friend Mr. H. Richards anticipated me in the *Classical Review*.