

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series, vol. vii. Containing the papers read before the Society during the Twenty-eighth Session, 1906-1907. London: Williams & Norgate, 1907. Pp. 244.

This annual volume again opens with a paper by the President. Dr. Rashdall's theme is "Nicholas de Ultricuria, a Medieval Precursor of Hume". After noting the advantages possessed by clerical and denied to secular thinkers during the Scholastic era for getting their teaching diffused and their writings preserved and handed down, and the consequent oblivion to which some of the most original thought of the mediæval period of philosophy has been relegated, he takes up the remarkable instance of one such neglected Schoolman. Quoting passages from the works of this thinker and commenting upon their significance, he shows that they go far to anticipate the main theses of Berkeley and of Hume. The Hon. B. Russell contributes a paper "On the Nature of Truth," in which he argues that since the monistic theory of truth—that only the whole truth is wholly true—presents certain difficulties, and especially since there are reasons for rejecting the axiom on which it is based—that relations are always grounded in the natures of their terms—we must adopt another theory; namely, either that those beliefs (or propositions) are true which are beliefs in facts, or that those beliefs are knowledge whose objects are true propositions (such propositions then being facts). In the former case, truth means some sort of correspondence between beliefs and facts; in the latter, no account can be given of what makes a proposition true. Between these alternatives Mr. Russell does not here decide. In a paper "On Causal Explanation" Mr. T. Percy Nunn describes and illustrates different forms of scientific explanation, and gives historical examples of the use and nature of hypotheses. The next contributor is Miss E. E. Constance Jones, whose subject is "Logic and Identity in Difference". Urging the importance for logic of precision in the use of this notion, and premising the distinction between individual or numerical identity and exact resemblance, she shows how various logical processes—assertion, classification, etc.—can be exhibited as forms of unity in difference. Discoursing upon "Humanism and Humanism," Mr. F. C. S. Schiller maintains that, while these two types of philosophy resemble each other in being very pronounced empiricisms, and therefore in their common opposition to intellectualism, there are deep-seated differences both of attitude and doctrine between them; and that, indeed, on some most important points, there is a profound antithesis between them and a marked congruity between Hume's scepticism and rationalism. Mr. S. H. Hodgson treats of "Fact, Idea, and Emotion," applying inspection of the actual nature of conscious experience in elucidation of such topics as the meaning of the concept of being, the distinction of knowledge and existence, the concept of matter, the meaning of truth, and the nature of the moral criterion. Dealing with "Intuition"—its place in philosophy and its relation to self-knowledge—Mr. A. T. Shearman urges that a satisfactory system of philosophy must be one based on intuitions which are common to many different thinkers; and contends (agreeing in part with Prof. Stout and in part with Prof. Dawes Hicks) that while sensory contents or intellectual elements are intuited or directly apprehended, feeling, desire and activity are not, and that the subjective self, although known to exist, is not matter of immediate apprehension. The volume closes with a paper on "Philosophy and Education" by Mr. B. Dumville. Pointing out the frequent separation yet necessary interdependence of theory and practice, he sketches the main lines of relation

between philosophy and education in the history of thought, and concludes by urging the pressing need for philosophical directors of education and the application of philosophy to the elucidation of educational problems.

*The Liberal State: A Speculation.* By THOMAS WHITTAKER. London: Watts & Co., 1907. Pp. 202.

In describing this thoughtful volume as a *Speculation* Mr. Whittaker takes the precaution to inform us that his forecast of the probable future of European political conditions is not a mere prophecy, or an attempt at prophecy. What he has tried to do is to give a sketch of a political ideal going in some respects beyond the existing order, but having its basis in the past, and growing out of the past. The chief title of the book, "*The Liberal State*," he also tells us does not refer to contemporary party distinctions. By a Liberal State he means a State which accepts the principle of democracy and the principle of intellectual freedom as the permanent elements of an ideal polity. These two principles he considers would now be accepted by both political parties in English life, although they might sometimes differ in their interpretation of them. In Mr. Whittaker's opinion the real opposition to a Liberal State is to be found in a hierarchical or bureaucratic State in which a caste or an order of experts or the representatives of a doctrine govern without systematic popular control.

Mr. Whittaker selects as the starting-point of his speculation the final crystallisation of human society set forth in Comte's positive Polity. Of the three greatest synthetic intellects of the nineteenth century—Hegel, Comte and Spencer—he looks upon Comte as the most antipathetic in appearance to political Liberalism. But in spite of this antipathy to Liberalism Mr. Whittaker considers that Comte has not been of the slightest service to the defenders of the old authoritative order of society. If he will consult one of the late Ferdinand Brunetière's latest books he will find that this statement is a little too unqualified. In a volume published in 1905, entitled *Sur les Chemins de la Croissance*, Brunetière attempts to show how the principles of Positivism can be used for the rehabilitation of mediæval Catholicism. Comte says Brunetière shows that morality cannot constitute itself or justify itself or maintain itself independently of religion; that religion must be based on the affirmation of the supernatural, and finally that Catholicism is the response to these demands. Brunetière it seems to me does not quite prove his case, but he produces a great deal of striking evidence from Comte's writings in favour of it; and in any event Brunetière's work shows that Comte as well as Hegel or Spencer can be used in the interests of the old authoritative order of things. But this is a side issue. It in no way affects the value of Mr. Whittaker's volume which is full of admirable reflexions and sagacious points of view. We agree with him that "Justice and Freedom" are better watchwords than "Order and Progress". It is probable as he points out that the social order of the future will demand a more systematic regulation of industry on the part of the State, and that the State in the future will curtail the possibilities of acquiring social pre-eminence by the accumulation of wealth. Science, philosophy and poetic thought are an admirable source of inspiration for many types of mind, but it is doubtful if they will ultimately supersede religion among the masses of mankind. It is no doubt true that the mediæval formulas in which popular religion now finds expression have largely lost their power. But the religious sentiment must not be confounded with the forms in which it temporarily finds expression. It possesses the power of casting

off antiquated formularies and of re-expressing itself in accordance with the highest and most inspiring ideals of individual and collective life.

W. D. M.

*Lay Sermons and Addresses, Delivered in the Hall of Balliol College, Oxford.*  
By EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., D.C.L., late Master. Glasgow : James MacLehose & Sons, 1907. Pp. 312.

During his tenure of the Mastership of Balliol College, Dr. Caird was in the habit of delivering a lay sermon, or address, at the beginning of each academical year; and twelve of these are now published in this volume. Several of them are suggested by current events, such as the death of Queen Victoria; some others are concerned with ethical problems, more or less directly connected with the life of students; but most of them are of a more general character; and it may safely be said that all of them have a certain interest for the student of philosophy, especially for the student of ethics and the philosophy of religion. Perhaps the most important, from this point of view, are the two that come at the end of the volume—on 'Immortality' and on 'The Faith of Job'. The former contains, so far as I am aware, the most definite pronouncement that the author has ever made on that great problem on which so many of our leading philosophical thinkers have lately been expressing opinions. This pronouncement, if less confident than that of some others, is at least pretty decidedly on the affirmative side. The discourse on 'The Faith of Job' puts the author's general religious position in a singularly direct and impressive form. The idea of the organic unity of social, and especially of national, life is strikingly emphasised in several of the other lectures; and they may serve to bring home the idealistic conception of the moral and religious life to many to whom a more esoteric treatment is inaccessible. It is hardly necessary to add that the book is characterised throughout by the ripe wisdom, the lucidity, and the felicity of phrase which have long been familiar to all the pupils and readers of Dr. Caird.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

*Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I., 6.—Systematische Philosophie.* Berlin : Teubner, 1907, pp. viii, 432.

This is a volume in a series of encyclopædic range. The volume consists of essays in each of which a writer of established reputation undertakes an appreciation of the achievement and tendency of some phase of the philosophical disciplines in relation to the culture of the time. The word *systematic* is to be taken in the loose sense which it nowadays bears in Germany. Philosophy has abandoned its claim to uniqueness of method and its opposition of validity to fact, in being made to cover psychology.

The essayists are independent one of another. Thus Wundt can characterise with complete detachment the metaphysical significance of Ostwald. The latter and Riehl are at issue as to the value of the law of the economy of thought put forward by Avenarius. Paulsen's *Monopsychismus* is alike alien from the views of Riehl and from the profession of faith with which Dilthey prefers to stop. Yet the spirit of the time has produced some unity of tendency. Negatively, there is among the writers no exponent of the dialectical method, no prophet of the absolute. Positively there is a common conviction that philosophy is essentially metempirical, though whether or how far the stress is on