

GERMAN AND BRITISH COLONISATION IN AFRICA

[Translated from the "*Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*."]

THE article "Merchant Adventurers," in No. 28 of the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, contains a passage evidently meant to create the impression that Britain's expenditure on her colonies is much greater, in proportion, than that of the German Empire. If this were really the case, we should be forced to conclude that the German colonies are insufficiently supported. For we may assume that the great experience of the English in colonial administration, and their practical and business-like turn of mind, would not allow them to spend unnecessarily large sums on their colonies. We might, therefore, suppose that there was every reason to press for higher subsidies to our colonies. Before doing so, however, it would be well to test the truth of such an assumption.

The passage in question runs thus: "In the Budget of 1903-4, nearly 16 million marks were spent on Uganda and the Central and East African Protectorates, and on the small island of Cyprus no less than 1,700,000, while the rest of the colonies, taken together, required over 16 million marks. The expenditure on our Protectorates is so small as to be scarcely worth mentioning. Togo is entirely self-supporting; the estimated Imperial subsidy for East Africa is 6,100,000 marks (compare the figures for Uganda 1),—for Cameroons 1,400,000 and for New Guinea under one million." No mention is here made of the heavy expenditure on the South-West African and Kiao-Chao Protectorates.

But now we are to compare with the 6,100,000 marks of the estimate for German East Africa, the "total for Uganda"—i.e. nearly 16 millions. On closer inspection it appears indeed

that this sum is to be expended, not on Uganda only, but on all the British Protectorates in Central and Eastern Africa—presumably including Uganda, British East Africa, Somaliland, Zanzibar, British Central Africa, and Bechuanaland. It is obvious that our East African possessions cannot be compared with the totality of these territories. But Uganda, taken by itself, in any case costs the English much less than German East Africa costs us; and the same is true of British East Africa taken separately. The sum of the subsidies received by these two great Protectorates from the mother country is even in all probability less than the above-mentioned 6,100,000 marks.

The official figures for the revenue and expenditure of the British colonies are published in the "Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kingdom"; but as yet they go no farther than the financial year 1901-2. In that year, the deficit covered by Imperial subsidy was, for Uganda, £154,681, or about 3,093,620M.; for British East Africa (apart from the costs entailed by the suppression of a rebellion), £114,696, or about 2,293,920M.¹—in all, therefore, only 5,387,540M. We may assume that the amount contributed by the Imperial Government for the years 1902-3 and 1903-4 will rather fall below than exceed the above, as the hut-tax recently introduced into East Africa has produced an appreciable rise in the revenue; while Uganda for the last two years has presented the usual spectacle of a young and flourishing British colony, with a steadily increasing revenue and diminishing expenditure.

It is, therefore, evident that the English can administer their territories, both in Uganda and British East Africa, on smaller means than we in German East Africa; for the above figures embrace all the regular items of both civil and military expenditure.

¹ This sum includes the £17,000 rent paid annually to the Sultan of Zanzibar—the greater part of it out of German money—i.e., out of the 4 million marks given to the Sultan by the German E. Africa Company as compensation for the surrender of his sovereignty over the districts now belonging to the German Empire. The money was not handed over to the Sultan, but paid into the Bank of England, where it still remains, bearing interest for the benefit of the British colonial administration.

It does not seem quite probable that the Central and East African Protectorates of Britain, taken together, should in the last year still have required a subsidy of 16 million marks, in so far as only the regular expenditure is in question. In the year 1901-2, the deficit on British Central Africa had been reduced to £53,735, and that on British Bechuanaland to £52,430; and for these two territories, together with Uganda and British East Africa, it was under £380,000, while British Somaliland in the same year showed a surplus of £20,690, and the Zanzibar Protectorate one of £1,747. If, therefore, it is true that for 1903-4 an additional expenditure of £800,000 was required, this can only be explained by extraordinary expenses, such as those of an expedition against the Mullah in Somaliland. In Cyprus, too, the British administration has, for years past, obtained a considerable surplus (e.g. in 1901-2, one of £62,245), and if, in spite of this fact, the island cost England 1,700,000 marks in 1903-4, it can only be on account of the annual payments demanded by Turkey, in money (£92,800) and salt, for the cession of her rights. If we look through the budgets of the newer British Protectorates in the *Statistical Tables*, we get, in general, the impression that the English succeed sooner than ourselves in making their colonies financially independent. Among the causes of this phenomenon may be mentioned: Better knowledge on the part of the English of countries and conditions over-seas, greater mercantile enterprise, greater racial and personal consciousness, and (connected with this) the right treatment and better training of the natives, greater independence of the settlers, and absence of paternal government (*Bevormundung*) by the colonial administration. But the most important point is probably the *personnel* of the administration, efficient men being secured by thorough training and long service. German officials go out for 2½ years in the first instance, and afterwards for periods of two years, alternating with six months' furlough.

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NOTE.—The estimates for the German African colonies are made to balance with an income and expenditure of 91,564,558 marks

(£4,578,227), an increase of 45,686,988 marks (£2,284,349). The figures for German East Africa are 9,257,960 marks (£462,893), representing a decrease of 378,760 marks (£18,938). The income includes an Imperial subsidy of 4,863,556 marks (£243,177), or 1,317,681 marks (£65,884) less than in the current year. The estimates for the Cameroons balance with 4,484,717 marks (£224,235), representing an increase of 398,717 marks (£19,935). The Imperial subsidy to this colony amounts to 1,756,517 marks (£87,825), an increase of 351,717 marks (£17,585). The estimates for Togoland balance with 5,265,640 marks (£263,282), an increase of 660,140 marks (£33,007). In the case of this colony an Imperial subsidy is not required, and, in fact, Togoland contributes an estimated surplus of 151,000 marks (£7,550) to the extraordinary revenue of the Imperial Treasury. The estimates for German South-West Africa are made to balance with 55,123,200 marks (£2,756,160), an increase of 42,592,750 marks (£2,129,637). The Imperial subsidy for this colony amounts to 53,412,400 marks (£2,670,620). Of this subsidy 6,769,400 marks (£338,470) are towards the current expenses of the administration, and 46,643,000 marks (£2,332,150) represent expenditure in consequence of the native rising. A vote, the exact figures of which are 73,580,250 marks (£3,679,012), is demanded to supplement the estimates for the current year in respect of special expenditure for the suppression of the insurrection. This is the second vote supplementary to the current estimates, and altogether the expenditure already incurred and contemplated on account of the insurrection amounts to about 130,000,000 marks (£6,500,000).

The above information, reproduced from the *Times* of November 28th, may be of interest in conjunction with the foregoing article.—Ed.