

In conclusion answers are given to two fundamental objections to this theory of consciousness. First, how can a process-consciousness and an ego-consciousness be analyzed into the same elements without the reduction of the latter to the former? Second, granting the general correctness of this description of consciousness, is such a description not unnecessary? To the former the author replies: "If by conscious self (ego-consciousness) were meant a special kind of idea, this comment would obviously be correct. But by conscious self is meant the concrete reality of which the idea is a mere abstraction. It follows that all the positive content of the idea must be attributed to the self." Finally, description in terms of self-psychology is essential, for when it is omitted the description is inadequate. "The merely structural psychologist's treatment of emotion, thought, recognition, and the rest is indeed true so far as it goes, yet it goes but part way, toward portraying the tumultuous chaos of the conscious life. And psychology is both defective and artificial so long as it undertakes observation, experiment, and scientific description in disregard of the basal fact of the science."

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The Stream of Consciousness. E. B. MCGILVARY. Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sci. Methods, 1907, IV., 225-235.

The Continuity of Consciousness. W. T. BUSH. Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sci. Methods, 1907, IV., 428-432.

In the first article James' doctrine of the 'numerous successive egos, no one conscious of itself but only of its glorious line of ancestors,' is examined and found to be inconsistent with the introspective evidence for the continuous stream of consciousness which James himself upholds. It is concluded that James "was after the 'transcendentalist' as well as after the facts, and in his endeavor to prove that introspection does not reveal an unalterable time-neutralizing ego, he went to the extreme of asserting the existence of little egos, constantly neutralized by time and transmuted each into its successor." The denial of a direct 'awareness of awareness' is thus a corollary of an erroneous proposition. Either the "thought knows itself unbroken, and in so knowing, knows itself; or it does not know itself, and, therefore, can not know itself unbroken." A continuous stream of thought demands an awareness of awareness. This, to be sure, is not generally attended to, for it 'never exists except in one indissoluble awareness of something else.' "We may not say that our awareness is an object of itself. . . . Consciousness is conscious of itself *as consciousness*; it is

conscious of its 'object' not as *consciencing*, if I may use this word, but as *conscienced*." Neither may it be urged 'that if there is an awareness of awareness, there must by the same token be an awareness of awareness of awareness, and so on *ad infinitum*,' for 'this way madness lies.'

In the second article the query is made as to what sort of continuity belongs to consciousness, a distinction being noted between that which *is* continuous empirically and that which *must be* continuous metaphysically. "If consciousness is . . . empirically continuous it must be either that all the objects which crop up in the course of experience are evidently cases of consciousness, or that they come to us having a gapless fringe or penumbra of consciousness, or that the continuity is maintained by means of a combination of objects characterized as consciousness and of consciousness-penumbra." It is presumably the first alternative which is meant by the advocates of continuity. "But we can not continually 'hold up' life in the interest of philosophy, and the section of experience through which consciousness may, possibly, have been continuous, must be followed by sections full of practical interests and physical energy, in which consciousness very probably does not exist, consciousness, that is, as one type of 'that' along with other 'thats,' and therefore as something identifiable and distinguishable. Accordingly, if there is any truth in this way of describing the facts, consciousness is not empirically continuous, but occasional and intermittent." Under which head, then, the empirical or the metaphysical, the *is* or the *must be*, does this continuity occur, and has the consciousness which is continuous 'any subjective character' or is it simply a "psychological word for 'empirical situation'?"

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The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought. A. M. BODKIN. *Mind*, April, 1907; July, 1907.

Using feeling as an expression for emotional and sense experience the author asks the fundamental question: Is there a difference between sense and cognition — between feeling and knowing? There is a fundamental difference, though in our focal consciousness the two are always conjoined. Sense experience (feeling) must be conceived of as containing the material for the knowledge of relations.

The analysis of the concept of judgment brings out the author's idea of the distinction between sensations and ideas. The predicates of our judgments constitute a world of ideas — a world of Platonic