

function of the people to retain these elements of religion, which it is the high duty of the sage and the poet to purify away in the fire of refining thought. It is for this very reason that *ritual* has (though Mr. Max Müller curiously says that it seems not to possess) an immense scientific interest. Ritual holds on, with the tenacity of superstition, to all that has ever been practised. Yet, when Mr. Müller wants to know about *origins*, about actual ancient *practice*, he deliberately turns to that "great collection of ancient poetry" (the Rig-Veda) "which has no special reference to sacrificial acts".

To sum up briefly :—(1) Mr. Müller's arguments against the evidence for, and the primitiveness of, Fetishism seem to demonstrate the opposite of that which he intends them to prove. (2) His own evidence for *primitive* practice is chosen from the documents of a *cultivated* society. (3) His theory deprives that society of the very influences which have elsewhere helped the Tribe, the Family, Rank and Priesthoods to grow up, and to form the backbone of social existence.

A. LANG.

## II.—AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF FREE WILL.

IN one sense, the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air are like us : for most of their lives they do less than they can. A horse runs faster and farther when he follows the hounds in full cry than when he careers about his paddock in spring : when two bulls fight for an heifer one gives up when he is tired, but a bull in the bullring fights as long as he can : the hawk before he wears the jesses, while he flies unhooded where he will, chooses to stoop at smaller game than herons : and the fox journeys farther in a hour when the hounds have sighted him than in the state of nature he would journey in a day. All these have a store of force in their life to draw upon at their need, but of this force they have not the key which is kept by necessity and her vicar man.

Their ordinary activity does not seem to be free either. The need of food sets them in motion to seek it ; if food is plentiful the attraction of it will keep them eating without hunger : the desire of sun or shelter or of water, the fear of enemies, or any thing which seems terrible because it is strange, will keep them on the move, and all this diversity of action takes so much from the storehouse of their life either profitably or unprofitably. The power so expended is no more theirs while they sleep than the power they are able to expend at their need is theirs when they are at ease. The same may be said of their activity when most

spontaneous and disinterested. A lamb frisks, a nightingale sings, a lark soars; none debate whether to frisk, sing, soar, or be still, any more than a plant debates whether to flower, or a rose whether to blow, or a star whether to shine. Indeed it is less likely that such activity as this is conscious with some approach to human consciousness than that the activity which meets ordinary needs and desires or exceptional pressure is conscious. A hare that doubles, a fox that makes for a drain, must be taken to know what they are about: when Browning tells us of the wise thrush who sings each song twice over, one suspects poetical licence.

Now in man too we may trace the threefold activity of spontaneity, effort and response (so to name that sum of activity which includes all the actions prompted by an external stimulus or the need to make provision for an inward appetite). In man this threefold activity is far more abundant and complex, and in man the activity of spontaneity and effort may just as well be self-conscious as the activity of response.

It is the activity of response which in the main furnishes the observations upon which the thinkers rely who tell us that human actions are subject to law. It is the activity of effort and in a less degree the activity of spontaneity which support the traditional conception that in the conflict of desires and the storm of passions the rational will is sovereign and free, or, as an ancient thinker said more soberly, in the whirl of necessity man is but half a slave.

The tendency to avoid a mad bull or a cannon ball is one of the simplest cases of the activity of response and certainly there seems little freedom here. Again, a vigorous person instinctively returns a blow, a person less vigorous instinctively turns away: it is needless and preposterous to imagine that each calculates which is the most likely course to avoid being struck again or takes without calculation the course that experience suggests; all the experience either needs to act is just so much as gives them the orderly use of their limbs. It is obvious that we can observe the tendencies of individuals or masses of men in this sphere of action and reach generalisations which are pretty accurate, as that a bargee will respond to a blow with his fist or perhaps with his boot while an Italian will respond with his knife, and a Hindoo if struck by an European will probably cower before the aggressor and perhaps call him his father or his mother. Observation will carry us farther. If a gentleman is assaulted when alone he will defend himself and perhaps punish the aggressor; if a lady is with him he will see her safe and then settle with the aggressor with or without the help of the police. The late Mr. Keble when he came into a room was sure soon to

make his way to the bookcase "to see if there was anything about Bishop Wilson". Whatever may be said of the way in which Mr. Keble came to undertake his task, the effect of his preoccupation with it was something that could be observed and calculated upon.

Hitherto we have been dealing with the effects of instinct trained and untrained without finding anything to suggest the idea of freedom. It is idle to say of instinctive acts that we are free to do them or not as we wish: we do them at the time without wishing; we need have no imagination of some agreeable sensation to accompany the process or to follow upon its result. Even Mr. Keble did not ransack his friend's bookcases because he wished for the pleasure of seeing something to Bishop Wilson's honour: he never forgot his task and was always instinctively trying to further it, though of course he knew it was very unlikely that he would come upon anything relevant and much more unlikely that he would come upon anything he did not know before.

Nor do we get out of the sphere of observation and calculation when we come to what men do because they wish. Their wishes themselves seem to be facts which belong to the general order of the world. That a man grows up with a taste for wine is a fact like the fact that another grows up with a tendency to consumption. One woman is dressy as another is hysterical, one man is avaricious as another is greedy. It is premature in every case to inquire why those things are so; we do not know the general facts which would prepare us to recognise the individual facts without surprise or even to anticipate them. But when the individual facts are recognised they give rise to rational expectations of what a given person will do under given circumstances: for instance, one may come to be pretty sure on a few months' acquaintance that So and So will postpone a concert to a drinking bout at thirty, and a drinking bout to an important business appointment. Longer acquaintance may give rise to a shrewd suspicion that at fifty or soon after he will be liable to risk an appointment for a drinking bout, for experience shows that prolonged indulgence in drinking bouts tends to lower activity.

This takes us a step farther. We may observe the comparative strength of wishes. A man may like fruit and he may like wine, he may like marmalade and he may like tea, he may think also that wine spoils the taste of fruit and that marmalade spoils the taste of tea, and as he cannot have both the things he likes at once it is possible to observe which he likes best. Again, we may distinguish between the desire for a distant and permanent satisfaction, and the desire for a satisfaction so near that the prospect of it is importunate. To take an instance which is

common and creditable, a man may find he likes the prospect of an assured income better than the excitement of cultivating his literary gift even though it may be as considerable as Barry Cornwall's when its owner settled down to conveyancing. And it is still a matter of observation whether a man is naturally given to looking far ahead just as it is a matter of observation whether he is naturally longwinded or longsighted.

All calculations founded upon this kind of data are at best approximate. We cannot measure the strength of instincts and likings exactly, we seldom know all the circumstances which co-operate with them or thwart them. And we generally underrate the extent of the uncertainty because when we consider large numbers the error is reduced to a minimum. It is possible to ascertain within narrow limits how a given rise in the rate of wages, a given fall in the price of bread, will affect the marriage rate in a given country, though it is seldom safe to predict what rise in salary will seem enough to a given clerk to make it worth his while to marry. This affects our imagination as if the special facts which cannot be foreseen could be deduced from the general facts which can be foreseen if only we had an adequate calculus; just as if we knew exactly the mass of the whole ocean, the conformation of its bed, the strength and volume of its currents, as we know the force of gravitation of the sun and moon, we should need nothing more but a perfect calculus to predict the hour and height of a spring tide in any given creek. Of course this is an illusion: the height of the tidal wave in mid-ocean is not an average of its height in all the creeks of the coasts of that ocean. When we find a theory that is adapted to averages which does not meet individual cases, the fault is not merely in our inadequate means of applying the theory but in the inadequacy of the theory itself.

After we have made all that is to be made of instinct and desire and training and habit and circumstance, and the effect of the remembered and unremembered consequences of action, we are only half way to understanding what people will do though we are often much more than half way to giving a plausible detailed account of why they did what they did. If we assume that more knowledge of detail would make both explanations decisive and complete, this is because we assume that "the law of causality" (or whatever we call it) extends to all actions and thoughts of men, and this we assume because such knowledge as we have explains so much, and because "the law of causality" plainly extends to everything else.<sup>1</sup> It will now be well to turn

<sup>1</sup> Supposing experience to show that people with any rallying power will recover if properly prayed for as they will recover if properly treated, or that litanies are as effectual in bringing rain as the discharge of heavy guns, neither fact would be any exception to "the law of causality".

to the other side and begin by the consideration of some of the simpler cases where the conception of "motive" seems more or less inapplicable or inadequate. A man may take his daily walk simply as a matter of habit, and then arises the question what motives if any he had for forming the habit. Again, he may walk because he wishes to get to another place for business or pleasure, or because he wants to work off a fit of moroseness or worry, or because he knows it is a necessary precaution against his dinner disagreeing with him, or again because he expects positive pleasure from the quickening of his circulation. Each of these is a definite intelligible motive; but what are we to say of a man who walks because he is a good walker, because the accumulated energy of a well-nourished trunk and limbs presses for discharge. If his occupation confine him much indoors he is likely to be aware of the pressure, but the pressure does not act through his knowledge of it, as other motives do. When he acts on them he is made aware of his relation to other beings and of the limitations of his own being; but when he acts upon his own inward impulse coming into consciousness with no trace of the conditions under which it matured, fulfilling itself unchecked, he feels himself free all the more if, as seems probable, the impulse just after coming into consciousness encounters and surmounts at once the check of a momentary hesitation.

Take another instance. If a man likes cherries and walks where the ripe cherries hang in easy reach, the motion of hand and lip seems nearly as mechanical as the movement of the idle arm that keeps time with the lazy swing of his legs, though of course this last is unattended by desire and unguided by sensation. But now consider a man with the same liking for cherries getting up and going out to gather and eat. Shall we still say, as we might very well have said before, that his liking for cherries is an adequate motive for his action if a motive is wanted? Hardly: his action is no longer mechanical, he has taken a resolution though a small one. His liking for cherries has been reinforced from the same central store of energy as set our disinterested pedestrian in motion. It is the coming in of this fresh factor that reproach or self-reproach naturally fastens upon. If the censor says "Cherries are so bad for you" or "You are always eating cherries," it is a defence especially to the second indictment to say "It is my nature to be fond of them"; but still the censor has the last word "You need not have gone out on purpose".

In fact, he would not have gone out if his central store of energy had been fully taxed just then by a severe fit of toothache or a stiff game of chess. While it was taxed (if the pain was sharp enough or the game stiff enough) he had no consciousness

of freedom: when he forecast the consequences of two alternative moves with strained attention as far ahead as he could see and then chose the one that was most hopeful or least objectionable, his choice, if we like to say so, was determined by the prospect as the poise of a balance is determined by the weights. But perhaps the game after one or two exciting crises got dull as the board grew clear and both players got tired of it and left off. At once they were free as they were before they sat down, for by the hypothesis what the game exhausted was not the general store of energy of their lives that day but their specialised energy as trained chess players: while this lasts it is very likely strong enough to take up all the general energy they consciously possess at the time when it is exhausted. It very likely leaves the general energy not perceptibly impaired and ready for fly-fishing or swimming or smoking and talking politics or anything else the owners resolve to do.

*Paulo majora canamus.* Toothache and chess are much more absorbing than much more important occupations. Whatever we are doing, whatever reason we have to do it, we are seldom wholly and spontaneously taken up in it (hence the difficulty of application); so too when we are contemplating something to be done we are quite aware of reasons for doing it, perhaps not aware of any reason against it, and yet it is not true as a rule that the reasons of themselves determine us: we have to make up our minds with more or less delay to act upon them. Most people at some time of their lives find it a daily test of resolution to get up in the morning; most people if they sit up long after their time find they have to make an effort to go to bed. It would be absurd to imagine those in such case swayed by the rival attractions of bed and breakfast, or the fireside and bed; commonly enough the only attraction felt is a languid one to doing the proper and sensible thing, but this attraction has to be reinforced by an inward effort. So too when we yield to temptation, up to a certain point we co-operate with the feeble attraction of the right course and then we co-operate with the stronger attraction of the wrong. Seldom, if ever, do we resist in vain until the temptation with which we have parleyed has gathered strength and volume enough to sweep us away. As the tide rises we plunge.

It is the same with innocent alternatives: we may weigh consequences and balance difficulties till we feel no inclination left to any course, and this though, before we stopped to deliberate, the attraction of one may have been strong enough to make impetuous instinctive action possible, since in a world like this reflection upon remote results commonly mortifies desire. For instance, if a man asks a maid to run away with

him at a moment's notice and she consents, her act is most plainly one determined by a motive—complicated enough though probably her imagination of the man's need of her is the decisive part in it. If on the contrary two people are reasonably persuaded that a runaway match is their only chance of marrying, if they are both possessed with expensive tastes and habits, it is obvious that their decision if they take time to reflect will be very nearly unmotivated. The more they contemplate the wretchedness of the state when poverty comes in at the door and love flies out at the window, or the gradual drying up of all interest and emotion out of their lives if they prefer their habits to their love, the less they will see to desire in either path; and if they consider farther how they came to a meeting of two such ways they will find how much there is to fear and little to hope, and will conclude that in an unfortunate planet the least unfortunate are the small minority who find action enough without any prospect of enjoyment. But if the lovers have lost any rational prospect of enjoyment the loss does not abolish their own activity, they are young and vigorous. The light of truth has put out their desires as sunshine puts out a fire of coals. Desire does not blind them and yet they are able to blind themselves, that desire may burn up a little in the dark to warm them at the beginning of a journey that will chill them to the marrow before it is done. The received explanation is that the same set of motives, the same conflict of desire and circumstance, acts differently upon different characters. And it is quite true that there are crises which are simply a revelation: they bring to light what has been growing more or less consciously while there has been no need to talk about it or act upon it. But often there is a real struggle, a real suspense, followed by a decision. If an emergency is not too much for us we rise to it—if, in other words, it brings out fresh powers which have still to receive their direction. To take an instance that is not tragical. It is quite possible that a boy of fifteen may have to decide whether he shall be an engineer or stay at school and go to an university: it will probably be a little shock to him to realise that thenceforward his employments must have a definite purpose, but this will give place to a sense of responsibility at once steady and bracing. Suppose he has fair sense of his own and considerate friends, who wish not to dictate to him but to help him to make up his own mind, and a pretty fair chance of a moderate success either way. Let him think which of his impulses present and prospective either life would gratify; let him think of acquaintances whose positions seem to be within his reach, and ask himself which of them he would wish to be like at forty. It does not exhaust our perception of



the case to say the boy is free; something woke up that is free within the boy, something that is as independent of the rival inducements each of which has its hold upon him as a judge is independent of the counsel between whose pleading he decides after learning all he knows of the cause from them.

So far then we have an explanation of the immediate consciousness of free will as the consciousness of that part of the sum total of our energy which we feel just coming into play, not yet taken up as much if not most is by habit, desire or circumstance. Some farther observations will strengthen this explanation. People who seem in some way weak and irresolute, like Johnson who was incurably indolent, or Coleridge who in the literal etymological sense was incurably 'dissolute,' or Maine de Biran who was at the mercy of distractions, are remarkable for their confidence in their consciousness of freewill, while great men of action like Cæsar and Napoleon are often fatalists, even though they may be dilatory like Wallenstein or irresolute like Cromwell. It is plain that in great men of action the two factors of human activity derived from nutrition and from experience are fused into perfect unity, while in the men of speculation the fusion is imperfect to the last as it is in the great majority of mankind. Hence while men of action conceive their own activity by the analogy of the more impressive of the overmastering forces of the outer world, men of speculation formulate and defend the natural "personification of the abstraction Will as something apart from the total of volitional impulses, and therefore removed from their conditions". And there is much in the experience of the most exemplary men of action who are content to work within consecrated limits to reinforce the theory which commends itself to men of inaction. The perfect unity which is so wonderful in the central portion of the career of a Cæsar or a Napoleon is only possible when the monstrous overweening activity, beneficent or maleficent, is absolved from all laws and conventions and tries to be a law to itself alone. A thoroughly dutiful person is always persevering with tasks that have grown distasteful, doing unprofitable things, leaving profitable things undone, out of deference to personal or impersonal superiors, crushing strong impulses in order to husband strength to act upon weak, never able for long together to act without thinking, never able to suspend action to indulge in unbroken thought. In this way also it is possible to come to unity at last, perhaps a more admirable and stable unity than is possible to unrestrained self-assertion. Cæsar crawling up the steps of the Capitol on the day of his triumph, Napoleon improvising a Christology at St. Helena suggest a break-up. But the unity of self-assertion is



spontaneous; the unity of self-control has to be laboriously maintained, in many acts it has to be laboriously attained. To compare great things with small, no one is conscious of effort or freedom when they run from hurry or fright: very few keep up a steady pace for three days together in a walking tour without some sense of both. Or we may recur to the case of Coleridge: he recognised a law which he fulfilled very imperfectly; his ineffectual effort at conformity was accompanied by a sense of freedom, responsibility, guilt. Shelley's theory was the unrestrained assertion of human spontaneity or communion with nature, and as might be expected Shelley was a necessarian. To resume what has been said: so far as human conduct depends upon experience or desire we have as much evidence as we could expect that it is subject to the "law of causality";<sup>1</sup> it is the unexperienced energy which manifests itself in disinterested activity, in resolutions great and small, in the deliberate decision of great alternatives, in baffled aspiration and in dutiful endeavour, that gives rise to the subjective consciousness of freedom.

And here we come to the question, Is the subjective consciousness objectively valid? If, as has been suggested, the subjective consciousness is really dependent upon the fact that sensation and work seldom if ever entirely expend the store of strength accumulated or replaced by growth and food, it seems as if we might confidently answer the question in the negative. It is obvious that the growth of a stable formation like a crystal, an unstable formation like a plant or an animal, is always in a definite direction except so far as it is marred by external hindrance or internal defect. Naturally we are inclined to explain the most complex organisms by the analogy of the simpler and have a plausible presumption to read into the scanty observations which it is possible to make. We may see that one is naturally resolute, another naturally irresolute; one naturally industrious, another naturally indolent; one naturally roused by emergencies, another naturally cowed by them; one puts forth more strength as difficulties multiply, another comes to a standstill. The difference seems like the different ways in which horses answer the spur. We may see too that the sense of freedom to do either of two things when we are doing neither has a curious resemblance to the arrogance of youth which has done nothing yet and in the pride of opening power pronounces everything that has been done unsatisfactory. Another fact which seems to tell the same way is that it happens to many to be tempted or provoked into the indulgence of unlawful wishes

<sup>1</sup> This corresponds to Kant's distinction between empirical determinism and transcendental freedom though the point of view is different.

with which they reproach themselves little because they never come to a commencement of execution. Their unwholesome day-dreams of pleasure or power or revenge incapacitate them more or less for waking life, but still it seems their activity is quite incapable of following the vagaries of their imagination. It is all one whether it comes into any empty head that it would be useful to rid the world of a tyrant or that it would be pious to copy the austerities of a devotee; whichever it is, plenty will be fools enough to nurse the thought, very few will be fools enough to begin to act upon it, most of them will draw back in time. If our activity were unconditionally free it would be free to attempt whatever we desire even though it were something which, whether right or wrong in itself, is absurd for us to attempt. As it is, it rebukes our dream with the dumb persistence of Balaam's ass. It is plainly free from the law of our desires and as plainly subject wholly or in part to other law.

On the other hand, it is by no means clear that the subjection is total: no amount of day-dreaming about Charlotte Corday or Saint Teresa will turn a commonplace person into a tyrannicide or an ascetic, but one of the things most completely in our power is whether we will check barren day-dreams or no. They present themselves more to some than to others, but of those to whom they come thickest some put them away. There are people naturally dreamy who have trained themselves to be practical, people naturally inattentive who have conquered application, as there are people naturally irritable who have conquered gentleness. Neither they nor others notice that they set out with an even stronger desire for the acquired habit or for some of its results than is to be found in those who acquire it to the same extent with no difficulties to overcome, nor is it found that they have always had some poignant experience which has forced them upon self-conquest. The more closely we analyse the process of the improvement or deterioration of character through a steady direction of the attention and intention, the harder it is to think away the central self which as far as we can trace the process back seems always active. If we consider the training of a man as a whole, it is possible to give an account of it without referring to anything but the conditions inward and outward which belong to the general order. He must have some desire and some aptitude for the end in view; action in the right direction will be sure to strengthen his desire to extend his aptitude; familiarity with certain ideas, association with certain persons, contemplation of certain results will as surely facilitate action. But it is he who has to act, he who has to dwell on the ideas, he who has to seek the associates, he who has to bear the results in

mind. Some do this, others not, the same man sometimes does sometimes not. Always we are thrown back upon the fact of choice at last when we try to go to the root of any special piece of conduct. It is possible to carry out the inquiry into effects within the sphere of psychology, but if we wish to carry out the inquiry into causes it would be necessary to descend into the sphere of biology where the late Mr. Lewes suggested that an explanation might be found. It is certain, for instance, that what affects the digestion is apt to affect the temper; it is also certain that what affects the temper very strongly is apt to affect the digestion. It may be held that the first of these two certainties is the more important because it is matter of ordinary observation that most fits of temper wear off under the influence of a good dinner.<sup>1</sup> It may also be held that discoveries yet to be made in the tissues of nerves or brain or in the variable rate or proportion of the different secretions may contain an answer to the question why among other things self-accusation is a bracing discipline to one and an enervating indulgence to another; only it is to be remembered if we hold this last we hold it as a matter of faith. We return to ground which is solid by comparison when we observe that all which is distinctively human implies the central store of surplus energy of which we spoke before. A thorough-going evolutionist is bound to face the question whether language is developed out of the cries which perhaps once accompanied keen external sensations as they still tend to accompany keen internal sensations, or out of the cries which accompanied concerted action; but whichever explanation may be favoured by the tabulated results of an analysis of the most ancient roots, it is clear that to erect the cry into a symbol of the accompanying perception already implies a vast superiority, and a rudimentary power of abstraction quite as special as the second step by which the symbol becomes the instrument of forming general concepts. So too with desire: in other animals desire is limited to the objects which suggest or satisfy it; it is peculiar to man to desire first something more than he finds or has found, then something better, then something other, till he ends by wanting better bread than is made of wheat. The power of idealisation is intimately associated with the power of generalisation; both imply a self apart from things.

And this self is always at first a disturbing element in the organism though afterwards it may and does become an element of guidance. To take the very simplest instance: almost any animal can stand or walk as soon as its legs are strong enough to

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand there is good medical authority for the belief that more men upset their stomachs by mismanaging their nerves, than upset their nerves by mismanaging their stomachs.

carry it; long after a child has reached this stage it is continually losing its balance and falling down: it has to learn to walk with its whole being, whereas for an animal the reflex automatic sensations of the legs are enough. So too when a child is old enough for oral training; if it is taught to do a thing the first thing it learns is to form some representation of what has to be done as a whole: in training an animal every stage of the process has to be separately inculcated and every inclination of the animal to do anything else has to be checked till the lesson is finished. After several repetitions the animal has some dim notion of the process as a whole, enough perhaps to set it off through the whole performance at a signal invisible to a looker-on. But a child learning to dance has just as much advantage over an animal as an animal has over a child learning to walk.

Conscious action and voluntary action are correlative conceptions (action under such excessive strain as to preclude consciousness is properly reckoned involuntary); self-conscious rational action and deliberate choice between distinctly imagined alternatives are correlative conceptions (in a continued methodical course of action pursued without hesitation self-consciousness and even distinct reflection upon the original purpose tend to disappear, reappearing as occasions of hesitation or declension arise). Is self-determination more unique or more anomalous than self-consciousness?

If we suppose, for the sake of argument, that mankind originated from a breed of highly improved apes by their exchanging a diet of fruit and nuts for a more digestible diet of unimproved cereals and at the same time exchanging arboreal for terrestrial habits, we are entitled to insist that the double change must have liberated a great deal of energy which may of course have gone to the head, though this does not seem to have been the case with the dodo. But even conjectures like this do not really make the hypothetical chain of causality complete. The most plausible conjecture as to how a reservoir has been filled does not tell us whither it will overflow.

It is obvious that the doctrine suggested above does not imply any belief in the creation of fresh energy (in the brain or elsewhere); it is quite in accordance with the orthodox assumptions that the whole sum of energy in the universe is absolutely fixed, that the share of the solar system is fixed since the first movements of the primæval nebula towards condensation, and that the share each individual is to appropriate is fixed by conditions of ancestry and nurture. When a man chooses, whether we believe in free will or determinism, energy is no more generated than when water boils. Very likely the water was doing no work till it passed from the tank to the boiler; when

there it might turn the engine or burst the boiler. Whether it stayed in the tank or turned the engine or burst the boiler did not depend upon the water. Whether a man shall live at full pressure or no, whether his activity shall be destructive or constructive, seems to depend so far as yet known on free will.

This must not be exaggerated: the power of free will is limited and transient. There is always a proportion between what we can attempt and what we can perform, even between what we can imagine and what we can attempt. The reason is not far to seek. As Professor Bain has pointed out, conscious action presupposes unconscious activity just as certainly as conscious thought presupposes confused sensibility. Free thought, free will develop and detach themselves from a back ground of automatism; trained thought, trained will become automatic again. A baby crows before it can talk, a man learns to converse and "falls into anecdotalage". Very young children have no free will; sometimes one sees in them a certain obstinacy of desire that looks like a rudiment of it. Very old people have no free will either; sometimes one sees in them an insistance upon habitual claims, often as impotent as it is imperious, that looks like a residuum of it. Even persons still in their prime, in full and successful employment, are much more keenly aware of things that have to be done than of their freedom to do something else.

After all free will is not the highest freedom: it decides perplexities, it determines hesitations, it surmounts hindrances; things and people, the world and the flesh are against us and yet to some extent we get our way in spite of them; we struggle to keep our place in the ranks, to keep our ground against the torrent; we are above and apart from nature, even our own nature, which we strive to subdue as its pressure almost overpowers us. But the action of the perfect so far as they are perfect is as natural as the play of a kitten, as the blossoming of a rose. Only it proceeds from a higher nature in which experience has passed through reason into insight, in which impulse and desire have passed through free will into love.

G. A. SIMCOX.

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