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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY SINCE 1871 AND ITS PRESENT CONDITIONS.

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Wednesday, 29th November, 1905.

Major-General R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, C.B., in the Chair.

[This lecture was delivered extempore, and illustrated by large wall maps.]

IN March, 1904, at a meeting in this building, we had occasion to discuss as the subject for a lecture "The New Pacific," and it was my duty, at the request of the Council, to set forth the revived and greatly enhanced importance of that Ocean. At the close of the meeting, Lord Roberts, who presided, put the weight of his authority on our side and pointed out that, beyond any doubt, the centre of gravity of the world of commerce and of international strategy was about to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Although Japan had then just started on its career of glory, we little thought—no one in Europe thought—what a remarkable development was about to occur. There was no indication that the Japanese Islanders would, by their naval exploits, rival the exploits of the British Islanders a hundred years ago. It did not seem probable to any one that the greatest military power of Europe, a power that had extended itself, accompanied by tremendous forces, from the Caucasus at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, to Port Arthur in 1898, should be not only defeated at sea, but also thoroughly defeated on land, in spite of the desperate heroism of its troops, under the influence of the hereditary tenacity of its race, and should be driven not only clean out of the Korean Peninsula, which might have been expected if the enemy gained sea power, but also out of Manchuria, and that for the first time since the Turks passed into Europe in the middle of the 15th century, a definite and distinct repulse should have been endured by the biggest part of Europe at the hands of Asia. This surprising fact is a matter of strategic international significance which cannot be overlooked. The result has been to affect the careers of every person in this room. Whether we continue to have an alliance with Japan or whether we have not, one thing is perfectly clear, that the relations of Europe and Asia have changed, for our time at any rate, and that, from a commercial as well as a strategic and inter-

national point of view, portentous events are in store for us all. This consideration alone would justify a lecture on the subject before us.

But other startling events occurred exactly about the same time. I say that our prediction in March, 1904, would have been absolutely verified, and predictions worked out in detail in that splendid book of Bancroft's, "The New Pacific," if nothing had occurred except what has taken place between Japan and Russia. The centre of strategic gravity has been transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as it had been previously transferred from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. But another incident, I think almost more significant, has occurred; that is to say, the assertion of themselves as a world power by the United States of America, and this clearly and almost defiantly. Here we have a power which apparently acted only in the interests of peace, coming and laying down not only the Monroe doctrine, that none of the European Powers are to expand any further into the vast American continent, north or south, but that practically no European Power is to come within 2,000 miles of America, for fear, within even that long range, the equanimity of the people in the United States might be disturbed. Here we have the President of the United States definitely asserting that his nation is to control what Captain Mahan calls the centre of international gravity, the centre of commerce and trade, the West Indian Islands, the Caribbean Sea, by the Panama Canal. He holds that the Panama Canal must be made as quickly as possible, and that the United States are to control it, and that they will punish anyone who dares to interfere with their policy. They propose to create a powerful navy, a navy which they can make powerful beyond precedent, owing to their unparalleled wealth and population, and assert this navy is to be supported, if need be, by a very powerful army, to control the link between the Atlantic and the Pacific in the interests of the United States for evermore. That is a very important condition in the position of international strategy. (See quotations in the Appendix.)

Now there are new strategic considerations. There is the *entente cordiale* with France on the one side and the alliance with Japan on the other. I do not propose, in regard to these matters, to say a word of my own, because they are delicate matters, and I might easily be led into trouble by the tongue, which is an unruly member, and, as you know, I am a man of peace. But I should like to read to you what some other people say on these matters, and I will take the views of the German Emperor, and the views of Mr. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, and the views of the French Press, in regard to some of them. A very plain-spoken and able work has been recently published by a Captain Sorb, of the French Navy,¹ and he, in discussing the *entente cordiale*, gives us definitely to understand that, in the opinion of a great number of Frenchmen, it is a thing to be reprobated, and they lay it down that it is a mere piece of hysteria. They say that a nation's policy was never definitely controlled by any such method, and that if the French were wise they would devote themselves to getting out of the Mediterranean,

¹ "Quittons la Méditerranée et la Mer de Chine." R. Chapelot et Cie., 36, Rue Dauphine, Paris, 1905.

to securing control as far as they possibly can of the Atlantic, and to aim at Ocean Power, the want of which at the time of Fashoda was so disastrous, and, if necessary, they should make an alliance with Germany with the object of crushing England in the future. You can get this book in the Library of this Institution. I really must not quote some of its advanced theories here, but in French military and civil journals of high repute similar views are clearly set forth, that they consider the *entente cordiale* as a thing that must be broken; that it is not of the slightest use to France, and is generally in the interests of England; and that the future of France is safer with an alliance with Germany than with England. They contend that it would be absolutely foolish, in shaping their policy, to be guided by the Triplice, by fears of the German, Austrian, and Italian alliance, an anachronism, as is also the Revanche. They contend that the new posture of affairs, since the fall of Spain and of Russia, demands new international combinations to cope with new strategic conditions. They contend that their true policy now is to prepare to ignore the *entente cordiale*.

All the lessons we have had, and all the discussion we have had about the combinations on the Eastern and Western frontiers of Germany, as to Russia and France *versus* Germany and Austria-Hungary, which have been leading topics of discussion in every strategy classroom in Europe for twenty-five years, are to go for nothing, and discussions as to the relations of Italy with this Triple Alliance are vanity, according to the new school. Germany gains much freedom by the present collapse of Russia, and Italy is not required they say. It is a pity, having regard to Italian finance, that this doctrine could not have been preached for the past fifteen years. French writers say, let us drop the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean is only a snare, relating only to dealings with Turkey or Italy and Egypt; let us ignore the frontiers of the Triple Alliance, and let us devote ourselves to becoming strong at sea in order to cope with Japan if need be, with England if need be, with the United States if need be. They consider these three Powers to be the real danger in the future, to the stability and commerce of the European Powers. Indeed, many German authorities entertain the very gravest suspicions of the United States, which they fear more than France.

I have not the smallest prejudice one way or the other, nor have you in this hall. We are not here to discuss what is the proper strategy, but only to discuss the modifications that have occurred in the strategic position since 1871, and to consider certain present conditions of strategy. Therefore, we cannot commit ourselves to one particular view or take any sides, or be influenced by our own susceptibilities at present. I must not be a partisan of France, or Germany, or Japan, or any other State or combination of States. One result of recent development is, that all the problems which a few years ago were discussed at Woolwich and Camberley in lectures, and which were the foundations of the strategic geography of Europe, are now of secondary interest, Japan being victorious, and the United States laying down the doctrine about the Panama Canal and the West Indian Islands to which I refer, and Russia, which was one of the two Powers that threatened to hover over Germany from Warsaw, while France advanced across to the Rhine, having collapsed for the time being. Away from Central Europe and across the seas Strategy has taken its flight—and its developments

depend on strong and ambitious and able unconventional men in Washington and Tokio.

I have referred to the French views, I have them all here; but it would be tedious to translate them. We have Captain Charrier here; he is a great authority on the French views in these discussions, and I hope he will get up presently and tell us something about them. I do not want him to commit himself in the slightest degree, but he might tell us whether or not it is the case that I have fairly represented the views of a very considerable number of eminent and well-informed Frenchmen about the *entente cordiale*. That is all.

It is not ancient history or antedeluvian policy that I am about to put to you next. Here is a speech of the German Emperor on foreign affairs, published in to-day's *Times*, a very clever speech, nothing offensive in it, but when you read between the lines you should begin to reflect, "perpend I prithee." When Emperors or American Presidents begin talk about humanitarianism, and courtesy in international relations, you should hearken to the voice of the spirit of Cromwell: "Fear God, but keep your powder dry." The German Emperor says: "I accompany the entrance of Japan into the ranks of the great powers with sincere wishes on behalf of the pacific mission of this highly gifted people, in the interests of civilisation. My liveliest sympathies are bestowed upon the exertions which the friendly neighbouring Russian Empire is making with the object of effecting a new arrangement of its domestic affairs." Nothing could be fairer than these sentiments. He loves the two of them; but like Captain Macheath, in the "Beggar's Opera," I fancy he would say: "How happy could I be with either were t'other dear charmer away." The German Emperor goes on to say: "I must take a glance at Germany's own international position, which cannot fail to involve the recognition of the fact that we continue to have to reckon with a considerable amount of misconception of German ideals, and prejudices against the progress achieved by German industry. The difficulties which had arisen between us and France in the Morocco question had no other source than an inclination to settle, without our co-operation, affairs in which the German Empire has also interests to maintain." He then goes on to say that the signs of the times make it the duty of the German nation to strengthen its defences against unjust attacks. But no nation ever considered that any attack on itself was just, or any of its own operations unjust. "Orthodoxy is my doxy, heterodoxy is your doxy." So that the speech amounts to strengthening the defences of the nation against any attack, just or unjust. That is what it means, and it is another significant statement.

Therefore, we have had one definite statement from France, another from the President of the United States, and another from Germany. Now let us take what the interpreters of the German Emperor think he meant by his statements. We will take a civilian of eminence and a soldier of eminence, and we will refer to International Law. But do not be deceived by International Law. From a practical point of view no greater rubbish was ever studied by any human being than International Law. I am a victim of International Law myself in a small way, and I see another victim to it sitting in front of me, Judge Rentoul. The learned judge and myself spent

much money, much midnight oil, and much time studying International Law, and when we had bought scores of books, new and old, from Grotius to Wheaton and Historicus, and learned them off by heart, and got our prizes, we found that much of what we had learnt was simply delusion — mere phrases; syllogisms of impotence. International Law at sea is merely the will of the most powerful maritime State at a given moment. Our International Law against the Armed Neutrality meant that we knocked the Danes into pieces at Copenhagen, and we were about to knock the Russians into pieces at St. Petersburg, under the guidance of that admirable exponent of international sanctions, Nelson, only that the Russians assassinated their Czar to save Nelson the trouble of a bombardment, 1801. We have heard what the German Emperor thinks about International Law. He has the same esteem for it as Celts like Rob Roy Macgregor and myself. Now let us take Professor Wagner, a well-known lecturer on Political Economy at the Berlin University. He is as full of discords as was his namesake, the musician. He said: "British hatred of Germany is solely due to jealousy. Germany must have a strong fleet to guarantee its independence, and the German workmen must remember that if Germany be defeated, the German workmen suffer most." There are plenty of people, he said, who wish Germany to be defeated. He would prefer to be in time and defeat them. That is what Professor Wagner says. We can say that there are plenty of people who wish England to be defeated also. There are people in high places, journalists and others, who are doing the best they can to bring this state of things about. Does anybody believe Professor Wagner of Berlin speaking on 24th November, 1905?

As to the Emperor's speech hear some German comments:—

A number of journals call attention to the distinction which the Imperial speech makes between Powers with whom Germany is on terms of "correct" relations, and Powers with whom her relations are "good and friendly." One expositor of the speech observes that "those Powers or that Power with whom—singular or plural—we do not enjoy 'good and friendly relations' must now realise that we are not arming in order to make, but in order to meet, an attack."

The *National-Zeitung* finds that "the speech declares plainly and distinctly to the whole world that we are under no delusion as to the source of all these endeavours to leave us out of account and to set us back. Their source is envy, excited by the success of Germany in peaceful competition in the markets of the world."

Of course, by British, Professor Wagner meant to include Scotch and Irish as English. I need not read any more. These are important pronouncements, and I could go on with many similar pronouncements. It is perfectly clear there is an enormous amount of theory at any rate, calculated to shake our confidence in either alliances or the law of nations.

We, as 40,000,000 people having control of 360,000,000 of the human race, must see that the result of these speeches be not to our detriment if we can possibly prevent it. I think I may go as far as that without committing myself to any excessive statement. I hope I will not be called a Jingo in the coming discussion because I believe it to be the duty of British Statesmen to watch day and night over British interests.

There is another side of the picture, and that is the views of the Japanese. The Japanese have won, the Japanese feel sore—I do not see any Japanese gentlemen here—and one of the reasons they feel sore is, the use of the phrase “Yellow race,” and the depreciation of their race which it most unfairly implies. No man likes to be flattered to his face, and therefore, you would not care very much for people going about and calling you “white,” even if they are going to do something good for you, and to embrace you; *a fortiori*, Japanese cannot feel strongly elated by a large proportion of civilised people going about calling them yellow, and not only calling them yellow, but beating or maltreating, keeping them out of this locality and that locality, or making violent laws against men merely for being yellow. Every insult to the yellow Chinese is an insult to Japanese. Suyematsu, a most distinguished gentleman, a scholar of the highest type, a true patriot, a gentleman extremely like the knight portrayed by Chaucer:

“Sounding in moral manere was his speech,
And gladly wolde he learn and gladly teach,”

has written a splendid work, and I have his book here. He gives you distinct warning that you had better conduct yourselves a little more civilly for the future, you people who have not the privilege of belonging to the yellow race. He warns Europeans going to the East to be more courteous and considerate to Eastern races for the future, or the Japanese may feel bound to teach them manners, and I believe he is quite right. Insulting treatment of Asiatics has always seemed to me not only ill-breeding, but also dangerous policy.

But see the consequences of success in war in international relations which is my immediate topic. I ask you, would any member of a “yellow” race have written in English a book like the “Risen Sun,” and circulated it, and, indeed, been so kind as to send a copy to your lecturer of this afternoon just in time, in the year 1860, or in the year 1865 or 1880? Do you think any “yellow” man could have circulated that book immediately after that most infamous and dastardly proceeding, the last sack of Peking by the Western European Powers, that fell outrage to civilisation, and abominable outrage on mankind? Not at all. But why is it circulated now? Because the Japanese have won in the campaign against Russia and can now afford to assert their dignity before all mankind, none daring to either insult or frighten them. Verily a successful war doth elevate a race. I beg my audience to study the “Risen Sun.” He is not educated who has not read it. It will do the ladies no harm either, if they read it, especially if they read the poems by the Emperor of Japan, and the lessons with regard to the future of the race, which, I am sorry to say, many English ladies are not in the habit of observing; but in the hands of women is the future of every race. Their family relations and fitness for duty are “the chords of men.” Suyematsu tells you that people going out East will be wise to give up the “old habit” of “giving themselves too many airs.” He speaks about religion. In Europe, he says, we have only 370,000,000 of people, whereas the English in India govern 222,000,000, and the Chinese have 410,000,000, and amongst the 370,000,000 Europeans the religions are not “necessarily identical.” “Besides,” he says, “deeds are more important than words.” That

is exactly what old Spenser¹ said, "he never thought with words, but deeds, to prove the right." The ethical notions of the Japanese may be defective in many ways, "but in many ways the Japanese practice conforms to the rules which it behoves anyone belonging to any religion to obey." That is a challenge for the people of Western Europe coming from the people of the Far East. But he gives you other lessons—lessons of dread import. Handwriting on the wall of your abodes of luxury. Harken in time. It will soon be too late. You will not find sounder precepts of wisdom in Solon, in Socrates, in Thucydides, Tacitus, whom I quote in the appendix, or in Ruskin, who says he would much prefer to "sculpture a man with a sword by his side in Westminster Abbey than to sculpture a man with a ball at his toe, or a bat in his hand."

I say that the decay of our people is imminent unless you take warning.

The foundations of your strategy and of your national life depend upon the moral and physical state of your leaders or richer classes, who ought to lead, and who must lead. "Those who think must govern those who toil," and, moreover, if you don't look very sharp, the state of your masses will soon be your ruin. I see them night after night in my wanderings for the study of Sociology, wanderings that have taken me into slum after slum, and worse, into abysms of human misery and turpitude.

Their condition has become deplorable to the last degree. There are long square miles of miserable tenements for even the well employed, all gloom except the public house. The leading people, the richer people, are becoming mere worthless ball players, ignorant, selfish, idling degenerates, as Lord Kingsburgh said in this hall, wasting their time instead of preparing for the developments that are inevitable; as for the poorer (alas, I have no words to censure their neglect by the rich), the absolute and comparative decay into which they drift saddens our souls.

Now, listen to Baron Suyematsu: "In the West there are vast numbers of people who are very rich; there are also a vast number of big buildings; but they do not imply that European society is perfect. One can easily see that the majority of the western people have a very small share indeed in whatever enjoyment is derived from inhabiting these dwellings." He challenges you. He practically says "we are superior to you, all of you, rich and poor; we have souls, and we do not trifle with our children; we have beaten Russia, and we are beating you in more important matters, matters on which success by the sword depends. We do not ignore our poor. Our richer folk study in youth and middle age."

I have quoted to you a large number of different authorities with the object of proving to you that whether you study the philosophy of Germany or France, or the military literature of Germany or France, or whether you study the tone or temper of the great Republic in the Far West, or whether you study the tone or temper of the ancient Monarchy in the Far East, you must be prepared for serious developments, from taking a part in which you cannot escape, and

¹The resemblance between the lofty sentiments of Suyematsu and his imageries, and those of our grand poets, Chaucer, Spenser, and Milton, ignored by clerical schoolmasters, is very remarkable.

in which if you do not take a leading part, you will be ruined in material resources as well as in honour. The necessity for some careful study of the general principles of strategy will be soon apparent if your memory takes you back to what has occurred since 1871.

In the year 1862, stupendous battles raged along the Chickahominy and the Rappahannock. In these battles the Federal forces were thoroughly defeated again and again. General Burnside hurled thousands of men to slaughter against Longstreet and Jackson, from the slopes of Fredericksburg and across the river Rappahannock. Next year, in the battle in which Jackson met his death, the Federals were again completely defeated. The Federals had been beaten at Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the York Town Peninsula. The correspondent of the *Times* wrote back: "I have witnessed the death of a nation." All the upper classes of England were practically cheering over the dissolution of the great American Republic. Not that they desired to see any harm happen to the American people, but they thought perhaps a defeat would be for their good; would make them more complacent, and give them humility. Certain politicians were openly countenancing the South. What was the result? The United States were not dead, were not anything like dead. War is not "a disease," although it may be called a disease at the Mansion House or elsewhere. A man who says war is a disease knows nothing whatever about the history of humanity. You may as well call jurisprudence a disease, or surgery a disease; or the institution of police forces in London and Dublin a disease. It is not a disease, but it is a preventive of decay. No nation ever yet perished by cultivating the arts of war. Here is Marsh's "Earth modified by Human Action," in which he goes into every cause of national and physical decay, and says that not one State can be found that ever owed its ruin to the art of war.¹ Many States can be found that owed their ruin to luxury and sensuality; Tacitus would tell you that, Euripides would tell you that.² The United States, far from being ruined, continued fighting for two years after Fredericksburg, renewed their youth like eagles by this war, and started on a career of unexampled greatness and prosperity. It is true they buried 300,000 of their soldiers in the national cemeteries in a few years; it is true they lost a thousand millions of our money; but they became a great nation. They would have sunk into luxury but for the war. The United States (dying, according to our critics in 1862), through practice in the arts of war, and through that only—because it was just as wealthy in regard to materials and energy, and the earning power of its inhabitants—alleged to be dying through the art of war, and through that only, were able to defy England a few years after and insist on the award at Geneva in regard to the cruiser "Alabama," which, with an English crew and English equipment, went about destroying American shipping. The same United States boldly challenged Europe in 1898, in the case of Spain. Spain was theoretically backed up by a large part of Europe, but an American, Admiral Dewey, was able to defy a German Admiral; the United States took Cuba, took the Philippines, and took Guam and Hawaii, and now, by San

¹ See Appendix.

² See Appendix.

Francisco, by Hawaii, they are stretching across the Pacific into the Far East.

Critics, writing essays based on what they wished instead of on what they knew, asserted that certain ruin would happen to the United States; these criticisms were published in the Press and were believed. People believe that prosperity discovers virtue. Prosperity discovers vice. Money is not and never was the sinews of war, which depends on the hearts and arms of men. It is adversity that discovers virtue. The adversity of war discovered the virtue of the United States. The United States have since played a prominent part in the counsels of the world, and what Power in Europe to-day would dare to contradict the United States, as to either the Monroe doctrine or the Panama Canal?¹

So much for the prophets, the wiseacres, in regard to the United States.

Now we come back to Europe. We have spoken about Japan, and I need not repeat myself; we have spoken about the United States. We come to Germany, and then we shall go to Russia.

How dangerous it is to prophesy may be shown again by an incident—perhaps now forgotten—which occurred shortly before the outbreak of the war between France and Germany in 1870. The Foreign Secretary of the day came down to the House of Lords, and less than a month before the outbreak of war between France and Germany in 1870, calmly assured our public and our financiers that there was not “one single cloud on the political horizon.” Within three weeks of this optimistic statement by, after the Premier, the most important member of the Government, that great war, which, among other dramatic results, altered the whole political face of Europe, broke out—a war in which brain power at its altitude was for the first time thoroughly displayed since the days of Napoleon, when he intended to invade England, but, owing to our naval power, went East over the Rhine, and along the Danube, and destroyed Austria. There was brain power at its altitude on the part of the German General Staff, and the organisation and the mobilisation arrangements, equal in many respects to that exhibited and utilised by Napoleon: in point of fact, something that reminds us of those stupendous movements of population that are described by Herodotus, or those still more stupendous operations, the great invasions of Zenghis Khan or Tamerlane, spreading over Asia through Mongolia to Peking. This speech of the Foreign Secretary to whom I have referred, was delivered a month before the following events began:—Eleven days after the declaration of war, 19th July, 1870, the Germans poured 500,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, and 1,400 guns across the French frontier, fought two battles on the 6th August, shut up Bazaine in Metz, after Gravelotte, 18th August, took 83,000 French prisoners on the 1st September at Sedan, and were around Paris on the 19th of September.

After Sedan, and the fall of the Empire, Paris was invested, the people starved, and France lost £260,000,000 of our money in indemnities alone, and the results of the war were at the bottom of all the leading conditions of European policy which have existed ever since. There was a change in the strategical aspect in the twinkling of an eye. The fall of the Third Empire at Sedan was followed by

¹ See Appendix.

an ultimatum from the Russians that they intended to tear up a Treaty—the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The Russians were quite right. Treaties are made to be broken and torn up, and the Russians, to give them credit, have always been admirable professors of the art of tearing up Treaties. They announced that they were tired of the Treaty of Paris; it suited them no more. Our Ambassador went to Prince Bismarck declaring that no nation, with any sense of honour, could ever stand such trickery. Bismarck replied: "What are you going to do? France is engaged and cannot help you." But a few days afterwards our Ambassador had to return and inform Bismarck: "We are going to do nothing; Russia has torn it up, and there is an end of it."

The steady advance of Russia in Central Asia since 1870 is also worthy of note. It was inevitable, the Russian hands in Central Asia were forced as ours have been in India time and again, and this ought to have been foreseen by our Statesmen. It was not, and the undignified bickering with Russia which ensued was not creditable to our diplomacy.

Russia went into Khiva in 1873, and ever since she has been pushing on from Khiva to the gates of India. An idea seems to be abroad now that one of the *contre coups* of the present extraordinary political situation in the East may be a Russian attack on India. I do not say so, but Mr. Balfour has made speeches in this sense.

Russia, of course, has now very serious troubles at home, as France had in 1793-5, and again 1871; and as England had in 1642-1689 and 1797. But nations don't perish after civil or any other wars. If they can only get rid of base rulers, shuffling politicians, luxury, vice, and waste in high places, they will soon recover.

Our politicians profess to be afraid of Russia's advance from the Caspian Sea, through Orenburg, Khiva, Merv, Samarkand, Tashkend, to Termes and Khusk Post, and then to Kabul and Kandahar. I point out all these strategic localities on the map of Asia. A map is an instrument of education; even ladies can obtain the utmost possible benefit by teaching their children something on a map. Here you have the great North-West Frontier of India; Tamerlane took 93,000 cavalry over these places. Rightly or wrongly, our leading strategic politicians seem to think that there is a danger in Russia getting too near India, and that it may cost you much money and severe strain, that you want some hundreds of thousands of men, and that it would be a very good thing for us at present if the Russians had not been so near as Termes and Khusk Post. Now, some thirty-five years ago a number of able travellers, Burnaby, O'Donovan, and others, travelled through Central Asia and studied the whole question thoroughly after the capture of Khiva. They saw the whole future; but the English Government would not see it. The Amceer of Afghanistan saw it clearly; he saw his territory was in some danger, and he honed the English would do something to ward off all this danger. All our politicians received warnings year after year, clearly and distinctly, of the advance of Russia. The matter was before our Cabinet, and the Duke of Argyll was a Minister of the Cabinet. The Duke of Argyll was supposed to be a pre-eminently subtle Scot, a very excellent man, and a writer on philosophy; however, though metaphysics and diplomacy may be

nearly identical, metaphysics and strategy are opposite kind of things altogether. One is mere subtlety without force; the other is subtlety with force, which is a very different matter. I was a very young boy, but I remember reading a colossal book by the Duke of Argyll, a book that proved beyond all possibility of doubt that the Russians could by no conceivable process move from Khiva to Merv, 300 miles, in less than seventy years. I was amazed, boy as I was, because I had read of Alexander the Great traversing right through Asia Minor on to Egypt, and right across the great Continent to the Jaxartes and Chitral, down the Indus, and back again, and he did the whole journey of conquest in thirteen years from his start from Thrace. Yet we were told by the Duke of Argyll that the Russians could by no possibility get into Merv for goodness knows how long. That was in 1878. The Russians were in Merv in 1884, and in the lifetime of the writer of the book in question.

The third part of the subject is to try and outline the causes of the striking fact that in no particular is the international strategy of the present or future analogous with what it was in the years 1870 and 1871. I am afraid I am nearing my limit of time, but this is a matter that really ought to be taught to our people on every platform. We do not do as well as we might with our resources; we do not face facts; we do not recognise the truth; we are losing our backbone. It is all very well to attack the Russians. The Russians in my opinion have done splendidly. I wish I had time to quote from a book which is the corellative of Baron Suematsu's. These are two epoch-making books, "The Risen Sun" and "The War in the Far East," by the military correspondent of the *Times*, a most admirable book. On pages 610 and 611 you will find weighty statements about the Russians and their splendid though badly managed soldiering. I was talking to a German strategist, and I said: "Do you think the Russians did badly in this war as against Japan?" admitting, of course, as we all do, that Japan did marvelously well, beyond all expectations—probably beyond the Germans themselves in 1870. No one expected the Germans would do so well then, and we did not expect Japan to do so well last year. The German officer in question, who knows all about the facts, and knows all European Armies very well, replied to my question: "Would you Germans have done as well against the Japanese as the Russians have done?" He said: "We would not dare to attack the Japanese in battle except in the proportion of three to two at the very minimum." I further asked him: "Am I right in saying that the Russians, as against the Japanese, did better than the three following races: Did they or did they not do better than the Federals in 1862 and 1863?" "Of course they did," he said, "much better." Well, we know that; the battles were fiercer, and the disasters were not so complete. Then I asked him: "Did they do better than the Austrians against yourselves in 1866?" Well, I might have known in advance the answer to that query: "Of course they did, infinitely better." Then I ventured to ask another question: "Did they do better than France against you in 1870 and 1871?" And he said: "Certainly." He was not carping at France in the least; nor am I, yet Russia did very much better, and for a much longer period. Now another warning. Why on earth were some of our Press, and some of our people, constantly nagging at the Russians during this

war? I could never sympathise with that policy. It is not the proper thing for the representatives of a great people to rejoice in the misery of any other people. It is not a sign of greatness to hooray and rejoice at the fall of any nation. It looks rather like poltroonery. But the Russians in point of fact had no Sedan, and yet the French were a great nation. Nor had the Russians disasters such as the Federal States of America endured, nor did they collapse in seven weeks like the Austrians.

Now to come to ourselves. It is generally believed that all the troubles in the Far East have been in a great measure due to our own official weakness, vacillation, and incompetence, 1897 to 1902. At any rate, Beveridge, Krausse and Weale are of this opinion. Are we ready to look after the interests which our French critic, Sorb, points out as the objects to be attacked? He says that the English are only keeping their Empire up by making a Treaty with this State and with that State, and by hoping that Japan will save India, and hoping France will let us alone. Is that true? Are the gentlemen in this room desirous that Japan should save India?

"In native arms and native ranks
The only hope of courage dwells."

Alliances are useful, undoubtedly. He is a fool who would say to the contrary, but the only person that can save a man's honour is the man himself, and the only instrument that ever saved a nation was the strong right arm of its people. It is not the Japanese who will save India; it is not the Himalayas that will save India; it is not wealth that will save India; it is not official intrigues which will save India; it is not the natives of India that will save India, because they are not an organised mass, and have not been welded together in one community for many centuries. What will save India? The present race of British men and women, and their children, and no one else.

There are tens of millions of prosperous peasants whose hoardings make of India the grand absorbent of the precious metals; tens of millions of peasants, beside whose poverty Fellahs or Sicilians or Connaught men are rich; millions of artisans ranging from the men who build palaces to the men who, nearly naked and almost without tools, do the humblest work of the potter. Every occupation which exists in Europe also exists in India. The industry of the vast continent never ceases, for India, with all her teeming multitudes, with a population in places packed beyond European precedent, imports nothing either to eat or drink, and but for the Europeans, would import nothing whatever. She is sufficient to herself for everything save silver. Amidst these varied masses, these two hundred and fifty millions, whose mere descriptions would fill volumes, the tide of life flows as vigorously as in Europe. There is as much labour, as much contention, as much ambition, as much crime, as much variety of careers, hopes, fears, and hatreds. It is still possible to a moneyless Indian to become Vizier of a dynasty older than history, or Finance Minister of a new Prince, whose personal fortune in hard cash is double that of the late Emperor William, or abbot of a monastery richer than Glastonbury ever was, owner of an estate

that covers a county, head of a firm whose transactions may vie with those of the Barings or Bleichroders. One man, Jutee Pershad by name, fed and transported the army which conquered the Punjab.

Well, see in imagination a Europe even fuller of people, but only full of brown men; and then see also this. Above this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, protecting all, taxing all, rises what we call here "the Empire," a corporation of less than fifteen hundred men, partly chosen by examination, part by co-optation, who are set to govern, and who protect themselves in governing by finding pay for a minute white garrison of 65,000 men, one-fifth of the Roman legions—though the masses to be controlled are double the subjects of Rome—less than the Army of Sweden, or Belgium, or Holland. That corporation and that garrison constitute the "Indian Empire."

There is nothing else. Banish those fifteen hundred men in black, defeat that splendid garrison in red, and the Empire has ended, the structure disappears, and brown India emerges unchanged and unchangeable.¹

I quote from "Asia and Europe," by Mr. Townsend, who sets forth the philosophy of these questions with sage profundity. What is the safeguard of the British Empire in India? Is it the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush, or the Throne of Solomon, the Indus or the Ganges? Certainly not. No mountain ever yet saved a nation from invasion, or the Pyrenees would have done so, or the Alps would have done so. Did the Alps save Rome? They only enabled the Barbarians to surprise the Roman Empire all the more safely. What is the British Empire in India then? A certain limited number of civilians, and a certain limited number of British soldiers—that is the British Empire in India. What is the German Fatherland? Not the Rhine, or the Elbe, or the Oder, as the song says—not Bavaria or Prussia. The German Fatherland is the heart and brain and body of the German. Consequently, your only hope for any strategic movement is in yourselves.

I wish to set forth clearly and shortly—I have done so before, but this Institution wishes me to do so again—that no single part of the Empire, of which you are to-day members, from a strategic point of view, occupies the same position as did the Empire of which your fathers were members in the years 1870-71.

In the first place, you have practically got the carrying trade of the world, and consequently, as every gallant admiral here will tell you, must insure more heavily to protect it absolutely, though not in proportion to its value, like the owners of any other property. Then you were not only, as Captain Mahan says, a naval Power, but *the* naval Power. When the French Marines were taken prisoners at Sedan, when the French gunners of the Navy were dispersed in the fortresses round Paris, the Germans having no Navy, and the Russians having practically no Navy, you were not only a naval Power but *the* naval Power. I read to you at the beginning of this lecture, data which enabled you to see whether you are the greatest naval Power, as I honestly hope you are, and I am not going to discuss this point. I only say there are other Powers that propose to be naval Powers, and there are three who are not to be ignored even now. The French think they are a naval Power, so do the Americans, and the Germans

¹ See "Asia and Europe." By Meredith Townsend. Pp. 84, 85.

hope they will be the fourth, and recognise that their future is at sea—and hence their occupation of Kiao Chau, and their strenuous efforts to develop its potentialities. There are the United States, Japan, and France, which is better, according to French authorities, than we think, and probably Germany. So that whereas at the beginning of our period we were *the* only naval Power, now there are actually some others of great strength, and there are the probabilities of more coming on. Is not this a matter that ought to make you reflect and think it more desirable to train yourselves for arms instead of hiring condottieri to play games of ball for you? Your ancestors conquered France by practice of archery, not by playing ball, much less by looking at others playing ball for money.

There was another thing in 1870. I cannot remember the facts of that date, so I speak subject to correction, when I point out that in the year 1870-71 we were not conterminous with any other great Power except the United States. It is quite true our Empire had frequent military expeditions on the frontiers, frontier wars and small wars, and we had a serious struggle in Afghanistan, and a war in Abyssinia. By the way, Abyssinia is in a very different position now; even Abyssinia has changed enormously. As you will see in the papers of yesterday, with regard to railway questions and treaties with France and England, Menelik is a very different person from Theodore. But we were conterminous only with savage or semi-civilised States. Our frontiers were, therefore, not like the frontiers of Germany, France, and Russia, liable to be invaded suddenly by military Powers, led by the best military brains of the time. This has been said very frequently, but it bears repetition. You have the maps of the Navy League in your hands, and you will see we touch France on the Mekong; you will see that Germany practically makes a strategic movement against the flank of our Cape to Cairo Railway in Africa; you will see we touch the German Demara and Namaqualand, but that does not make much difference just now, as the Hereros and Hottentots are mobile operators on strategic fronts in these localities. Russia is very near at Termez and at Khush, and on the Pamirs. Then there is the United States, which, since 1870, has become a tremendous Power. Therefore, we are in a different position altogether from what we were in 1810, 1854, or 1871. These are ordinary everyday facts to most of the officers in this room, but then we are not governed by officers. We are not even governed by lawyers—not altogether—and that is a very good thing, but both these professions are composed of men of energy and ability, and accustomed to observe and command, and to weigh evidence. We are governed by the mass of the people and in every country, as Mr. Burke says, and as the author I have quoted says about Asia; even in Asia the despot is as much under the control of the mass of the people for his means of existence; and the continuation of his power, as is a President in a democracy. We are governed at present, and were, for the past generation, by blind leaders of the blind. We see in Russia to-day what state of things arises from such guidance, and we have been even worse led relatively since 1871 than the Russians. Talleyrand defined Russia's power as an absolutism, tempered by assassination. The mass of the people in every land are not the people who are rich, and have time to think, and read, and work if they will; the mass of the people are those who toil, and it is they who, in the last resource, have to be consulted in our nation. There-

fore, in a country with votes and politicians and vote catchers, you want to educate the people, and to begin with Members of Parliament; to do that you must certainly procure and circulate maps such as those which the Navy League has allowed me to give out to-day, and subscribe to Army Leagues and Navy Leagues, and National Defence Leagues. If bad party charlatans combine, so must good patriots combine, and clearly show the voters that they are perfectly inane if they think we shall get out of these tremendous complications which I have only had time feebly to indicate, rather than describe, without self-sacrifice. Hence you must teach them and set examples yourselves, of being true to themselves, their women, and their children, and of "screwing their courage to the sticking place," in the interests of that Empire on whose prosperity they all depend for their daily bread.

If you do not be wise in time as to housing questions, race questions, national education and military training, you will assuredly lose your position in one generation. Party-bound voters think that war is far away. Not at all. It is always within touch of you. It may be touching you in a territory, the loss of which would paralyse every home in England. Is a man in the room going to get up and say that the loss of India would not paralyse the home life of our people, morally and financially? I hope someone will do so; if he does, we will have an exciting discussion, and a war of words is better than no fight at all. The gallant Admiral I see agrees with me, and he has been in the Far East and I have not. But I have been in Stamboul, and I have consulted, for the purposes of this lecture, very able Frenchmen, Germans, Huns, Poles, Russians, Spaniards, and Turks, and strange to say, each and all depreciated the English and say they are perfidious to the last degree. So that you will not live on the admiration of foreigners. Any neglect, or any trimming, or any party trickery as to India, on the part of our rulers, will be a deadly outrage to the British Race.

The future of India is of vital importance, not only to our fighting man, but to our taxpayers, and it touches our honour, without which a Race is nothing at all—mere *Canaille*. One of the best features in the books of the Japanese is the one that dwells on the fact that a man is not only of the earth, but that he has a soul—let him cultivate honour. Let us shake off the earthly form and weeds of Thyrsis:—

"The soul that rises in us; our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
It cometh from afar."

Successful strategy, in the future as in the past, will depend, like all human greatness, on the qualities of the Race, especially in the brain and on the soul. You must eliminate slum life and slum thought from the poor, and "week end" life and "week end" thought from the rich. Irradiate your souls, men and women together, with a new pleasure—the sacred passion and lasting pleasure of Patriotism, which will grow with your growth, and strengthen with your strength, and not decay with old age.

Again, there is another serious problem that was not of such imminent peril in the year 1870-71. As years pass we are more and

more dependent on territories outside our Isles for our food supply. The map will tell you where we get our materials for industries and our food, nor has this problem escaped the attention of Captain Sorb and other critics. He said that France is in no danger, because after all you cannot materially injure France by sea Power. He says that we might annoy France and bombard a place or two, but it would do us no good; "but," he says, "what about the English? You will have no food, if you lose naval power you lose the materials of your industries; your working classes will be idle and starving. You are in the most peculiar position in which any nation ever were placed." Even Rome, when it was enjoying its gladiatorial sports, much superior to football matches, was not in anything like such a position, nor was Constantinople before its sack by the Crusaders. We are the only nation with such responsibilities, who could not live for three or four months on the produce of our own islands. That is a strategic position which you may find before many years is awfully important; but it has been fully discussed by Captain Stewart Murray and eminent mercantile, as well as naval and military experts in this hall.

Well, I have discharged my task by indicating rather than teaching the lessons of the past. We have heard out of the mouths of the most eminent people living what they think of the position, and no recondite knowledge is required to acquire data for a sound judgment. You can procure all the information you require, strategic maps included, for a few half crowns. Our rivals are very considerate, and tell us the whole truth. You can read their speeches and views every morning in your own daily press, which is admirably served with regard to intelligence. You can take up any Encyclopædia and read the doings of our diplomatists for the past thirty years, and the essays of our dialectical political strategists are issued in cheap pamphlet form. You have read of the consequences to other communities of military apathy? What do you propose to do? To muddle away? To continue apathetic, or awake and arouse yourselves like strong men after sleep? You have command of the sea. Will you keep it? Look at Australia. Are you going to leave Australia at the mercy of the Japanese and Chinese? What about New Zealand? I wish to goodness they had kept their football players at home. Their games prove nothing, except the degeneracy of the spectators. What about India, that great strategic centre? Singapore? Are you going to abandon or keep it? We have a splendid position there. Hong Kong, South Africa, East Africa, West Africa, the present strategic value and tremendous potentialities of Canada. Surely, here on this map of our Empire are conditions of greatness if properly co-ordinated far beyond all Greek, far beyond all Roman fame. If we do our duty as well as our ancestors did in 1805, this Empire will be strengthened and confirmed in strength to the honour of our rich folk, and the mental and moral elevation of all classes of our community.

"One strong great Empire must that be;
Oh, God in Heaven! we look to Thee
To give us courage, strength, and skill,
To keep it safe from shame or ill."

APPENDIX I.

PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGNS SINCE 1870.

- 1870-1.—Franco-German.
 1876-8.—Balkan Peninsula and Armenia.
 1878-1880.—Afghan Wars—two of 60 small campaigns by British in this period, most of which, like Zulu, Chitral, Tirah, Boer War of 1881, etc., we omit.
 1882, and at intervals till 1898.—Egypt and Sudan.
 1894-5.—Japan and China.
 1896.—(Adowa), Italians defeated by Abyssinians.
 1897, April and May.—Turks smash Greeks.
 1898.—America smashes Spain.
 1899-1902.—South Africa.
 1900.—China War. Peking taken by Allies.
 1904-5.—Russo-Japanese War.

APPENDIX II.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

From the *Times*.

In foreign affairs no less than in questions of internal policy, President Roosevelt is not the man to shrink from taking part in the solution of any problems that may present themselves. He has been telling the people of Richmond that the Americans are a great people and must play a great part in the world. It is not open to them, he says, to choose whether they will play that part or not. It is only open to them to play it well or ill. Things move quickly at the present day, and it is easy to forget that only a few years ago such language was never heard from American lips.

The dominant view until quite recently was that America had to maintain the Monroe doctrine, and for the rest to let the world go its own way. That mode of thought has gone for ever, and world politics have to admit new factors from the West as well as from the East. In his speech at Jacksonville, the President took the same high ground in referring to the relations between the United States and the Republics of the South. He reaffirmed his view that the United States must police the Panama Canal district and possess for this purpose an efficient navy and the control of the strategic approaches. But he was careful to add that the United States did not desire another lot of territory, and that if ever it was necessary for them to interfere in the affairs of any of their neighbours, it would be with the sincere purpose of being beneficial to the peoples concerned. No one will imagine that the President is other than genuine in his desire to further the best interests of the ill-organised States which border on the Caribbean, but the rôle of international policeman has many difficulties and dangers attached to it, and we can only hope that untoward circumstances may not call upon him to play it.

APPENDIX III.

CAPTAIN SORB QUOTED.

Translated from Captain Sorb's book, published, 1905, by Chapelot, p. 8:—

"France has hitherto had only one policy—it contemplated war against the Triple Alliance. But the expansion of its colonial domain compels it to consider henceforth the probability of a struggle with England, and we must study the best means of attacking the commerce of that Power."

Page 13:—"We were obliged to retire shamefully from Fashoda, because the French fleet was absolutely unfit to combat, that of England."

Page 324:—"For quite a long time the European nations were absorbed in military preparations, while Great Britain lived in perfect quiet, and was proud of her splendid isolation, but since France, Germany, and Russia began to organise their fleets, it was necessary for her to shake off her torpor."

ENTENTES CORDIALES.

Page 331:—"Let us not then cease, in spite of passing *ententes cordiales*, to contemplate, in a future more or less distant, the perspective of a war against England, and proceed more actively than ever to take the necessary measures for its preparation. Let us show our neighbours that while keeping on excellent terms with them, meanwhile we won't fear, ourselves alone, to enter into a contest with them in which we may well be victorious, especially when the British naval organism will necessarily be enfeebled in consequence of a struggle with Germany."

Page 331:—"England is to-day in a state of unstable equilibrium. Great Britain only maintains its position by shifty devices and transitory arrangements, which enable it to keep alive as it were from day to day. Her future is always uncertain, and the least accident, brought about by a continental alliance, would cause the complete foundering of her 'Colossus with feet of clay.'

"On the other hand, France can consolidate her position by the adoption of a far-seeing policy, supported by certain and durable alliances."

APPENDIX IV.

SIR E. BARROW ON THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY.

National Review, October, 1905.

A most interesting article is contributed by Lieut.-General Sir Edmund Barrow, K.C.B. It is entitled, "The New Balance of Power in the Far East," and as a prelude the writer gives the reader some extracts from two articles contributed by him to *The United Service Magazine* in the years 1893 and 1895. In the article of the former year he gave a description of the Japanese Army of that period, which recent events have proved was an accurate one. Sir Edmund described

it as admirably organised, splendidly equipped, thoroughly drilled, and cheaply and honestly administered. In the article written in the year 1895—a sequel to the previous one—the conclusions and predictions which he arrived at so far back have been most strikingly verified by recent events. Sir Edmund summarises in the present article the immediate results of the Japanese War, with its corollary the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty, as follows:—

1. The supremacy of Japan in Korea.
2. The preponderance of Japanese influence not only in Manchuria, but also in the councils of Peking.
3. The domination of the Asiatic shores of the Pacific by the fleets of Great Britain and Japan.
4. The position of sullen impotence to which Russia is reduced in Asia.
5. The discomfiture of German political aspirations in China.

Sir Edmund then considers the influence these results may reasonably be expected to have on the course of events, and the political strategy which the new situation demands. The deductions which he draws are:—

1. That the interest of foreign countries outside the Alliance may be seriously compromised by the new situation, and that, thanks chiefly to China, the sources of international friction have been augmented rather than diminished.
2. That the regeneration of China from within is an impractical aspiration, and that foreign pressure may easily produce an acute crisis.
3. That though the commercial exploitation of China is a problem for immediate solution by our mercantile classes, we shall in the future be confronted by the real "yellow peril," in the shape of the formidable commercial and industrial competition of a fully developed China.
4. That Japan may, by the force of circumstances, become a dangerous rival or even an adversary instead of an ally.
5. That federation with our Australian Colonies may be quickened by this very danger.
6. That no reliance should be placed on the direct support of Japan for the protection of India.

From the above deductions the general conclusion that may be drawn is, that though the new balance of power in the Far East is unquestionably to our present advantage, it contains within itself many elements of disturbance and danger. Sir Edmund, who is an ardent student of the Far Eastern question, writes with a knowledge and acumen that places him in the front rank of authorities on this intricate subject.

APPENDIX V.

EURIPIDES ON GAMES AND MILITARY EXERCISES.

I've often blamed the customs of us Hellenes,
Who, for the sake of athletes, meet together
To honour idle sport and feed our fill:—
But who, I pray you, by his skill in wrestling,

Swiftmess of foot, good boxing, strength at quoits,
 Has served his city by the crown he gains?
 Will they meet men in fight with quoits in hand?
 Or in the press of shields drive forth the foeman
 By force of fisticuffs from hearth and home?
 Such follies are forgotten face to face
 With steel. We therefore ought to crown with wreaths
 Men wise and good, and him who guides the State,
 A man well tempered, just, and sound in counsel.

Euripides, if alive again, would be a strenuous lecturer for the Navy and Army and National Defence Leagues.

APPENDIX VI.

IGNORANCE AND GAMES.

Tactitus Dialogus.

Iam vero propria et peculiaria hujus urbis vitia paene in utero matris concipi mihi videntur, histrionalis favor et gladiatorum equorumque studia, quibus occupatus et obsessus animus quantulum loci bonis artibus relinquit? quotum quemque invenies qui domi quidquam aliud loquatur? quos alios adulescentulorum sermones excipimus, si quando auditoria intravimus?

APPENDIX VII.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

24th November.

The speeches delivered last night at a meeting organised in support of the new Navy Bill by veterans of the German Students' League were characterised by a decided Anglophobe tone.

Professor Wagner, the well-known lecturer on political economy at Berlin University, said that British hatred of Germany was solely due to jealousy. Germany must have a strong fleet to guarantee her independence, and the German workman must remember that if Germany were defeated the workmen would have to suffer most. There were many, he continued, who desired to see Germany defeated, and there were people in high places who were doing their best to bring it about. Did anyone believe that England would respect neutral harbours? England for centuries hindered the humane development of maritime law, so that even now piracy was rife. No people in the world were more hypocritical and brutally egoistic than the British. After alleging that it was to England's advantage to keep France and Germany apart, Professor Wagner pointed out that German finances, which, as an expert, he was able to declare were the soundest in the world, permitted the Navy to be increased.

General Liebert said that he was no Anglophobe, but he would endorse the saying that whilst respecting England and being always ready to learn from England, it was necessary to maintain the strongest defence against England.

APPENDIX VIII.

GERMANY AND ABYSSINIA.

The Emperor has publicly declared that if the Powers do not, within a reasonable time, present a scheme for his approval, he will undertake the construction of the line from Diré Daoua to Adis Abeba without their assistance. Dr. Rosen's mission has been followed up by the appointment of a German Minister at Adis Abeba, and it was recently reported that the Emperor Menelik is making preparations on an unusually magnificent scale for the reception of the new Minister. At present German commercial interests in Abyssinia are small almost to insignificance. But a contract secured by a German firm to build and finance the railway to Adis Abeba would completely change the situation. It can scarcely be to the interest of either France or Great Britain that, *mutatis mutandis*, the Morocco imbroglio should be reproduced on the other side of Africa. An alternative proposition has been mooted, by which the newly-established Bank of Abyssinia would provide the Emperor with the funds for the construction of the railway in his name. From one point of view such a proposal would perhaps be less open to objection than if the Emperor were to accept German assistance, but it would scarcely tend to strengthen the *Entente Cordiale* if a bank with its headquarters at Cairo were to secure a contract to which a French company believes that it has a prior right. Yet France can scarcely with reason invite the British Government to use its influence with the Bank of Abyssinia to prevent that institution from securing business which might otherwise go into German hands.

APPENDIX IX.

GERMANY IN AFRICA.

In Africa the principal German possession is her large and practically barren colony in the South-West—"light soil," as the late Lord Salisbury would have called it—which, in all human probability, will never be worth the blood and treasure which Germany is spending upon it at the present moment. In East Africa, too, she has a troublesome war on hand; but German East Africa is by far the more valuable asset of the two. It has a fair chance of becoming remunerative, and its strategic value is unquestionable, for it stands between our own possessions in East and Central Africa, and commands the route from the Cape to Cairo. Whether it will pay or not is another matter.

APPENDIX X.

Marsh, the American author of "The Earth as Modified by Human Action," says, page 395:—

"War develops great civil virtues, and brings into action a degree and kind of physical energy which seldom fails to awaken a new intellectual life in a people that achieves great moral and political results through great heroism and endurance and perseverance. Domestic corruption has destroyed more nations than foreign invasion, and a people is rarely conquered till it has deserved subjugation."

APPENDIX XI.

PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF ON THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.

In reply to remarks by England in 1864, Prince Gortschakoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested that the Russian Government had no desire to extend in Central Asia. His explanation is very interesting. I quote Niox "*L'Expansion Européenne*," page 108:—

"Lorsqu'un état civilisé se trouve en contact avec des peuples dont l'organisation sociale est rudimentaire, il arrive toujours que l'intérêt de la sécurité des frontières et celui des relations du commerce exigent que l'état le plus civilisé exerce un certain ascendant sur des voisins que leurs mœurs nomades et turbulentes rendent fort incommodes.

"On a d'abord des incursions, des pillages à réprimer; pour y mettre un terme, on est forcé de réduire à une soumission plus ou moins directé les peuplades limitrophes.

"Une fois ce résultat atteint, celles—ci prennent des habitudes plus tranquilles; mais elles se trouvent, à leur tour, exposées aux agressions des tribus plus éloignées. L'état est obligé de les défendre contre ces déprédations et de châtier les pillards et qu'on se retire, la leçon est bientôt perdue; la retraite, surtout dans l'esprit des peuples de l'Asie, est mise sur le compte de la faiblesse; il faut donc poser les bases d'un système sur des conditions géographiques et politiques, fixes et permanentes."

Captain P. A. CHARRIER, Royal Munster Fusiliers:—I should not have reason to address the meeting were it not for the fact that Dr. Miller Maguire asked me whether the *Entente Cordiale* was of very great value to England. I have read a great deal about it, and made considerable enquiries with regard to it, and so far as I know the people in France do not seem to lay much stress on it. They certainly would not go to war just to please us. In fact, as far as I can make out, they are extremely peaceful in France. They would not take up any question in which we were concerned unless of course there seemed to be a very great advantage to be gained by it.

Captain CECIL BATTINE, late 15th (the King's) Hussars: It is a very bold thing to disagree with the lecturer on strategy, but there is one point at any rate on which I should like to join issue with him. In tracing the changes in the International strategic position since 1870, he has dwelt, as I think unduly, on the importance to us of the situation in Central Asia, and on the Indian Frontier. I have never believed that the annexation of India was really threatened by Russia. I think Dr. Maguire himself in some way points to that by his admiration of the Russian people, and his admiration of the way they have extended trade and commerce, railways, and civilisation towards the Far East in a perfectly legitimate manner. It must be remembered that the British policy has been systematically to thwart the expansion of Russian power, and it seems a perfectly legitimate and natural retaliation on their part to threaten the nearest British territory; but that does not mean they necessarily covet that territory. I cannot help thinking that the last thing they wish is to be established rulers of India; but they certainly mean, and have meant, that if we go on interfering with their legitimate expansion, they are prepared to resort to reprisals as best they can.

Furthermore, I think that if strategy had been better understood, and history and geography more extensively studied in English schools, especially in the public schools and Universities, where our Statesmen and Members of Parliament are educated, the immense difficulties in the way of invading India would have been better appreciated—difficulties which have to some extent, it is true, been reduced by the extension of railways, but which are still gigantic. Since Lord Kitchener has been Commander-in-Chief in India it may be said that measures have been taken which render all chance of a successful invasion of India impossible at present, and for some time to come. Furthermore, although the Hindoo is not able to defend his own territory, still there are undoubtedly in India populations from which forces far larger than those at present under the British colours can be obtained. What we want in India is what we want in England, namely, a sound system of military organisation, which would make the best of the magnificent material we possess. To quote Sir Charles Dilke, the centre has changed now from the Indian Frontier to the Straits of Dover, that there is much more risk of hostile invasion of our territories nearer home than there is in India. It is true our fleet at present is so formidable that no European fleet, and no combination probably of European fleets, would have a chance against it; but it does not follow this state of things will last for ever, nor does it follow that the new fleets being built will be on our side. Weakness is the surest temptation to another country, and to a coalition, to attack us. Dealing with the case of France and the views expressed that there is an influential party in France not very keen about the English alliance, that is very easily understood. It would be a very small consolation to the people of Paris, if they were being bombarded and besieged, to know that the British fleet swept the Channel and the North Sea. So long as we can put an army into Belgium, or on the flank of the French army, which is strong enough to turn the scale in a war, or even to render doubtful the issue of a war with Germany, I feel sure that we can count on allies on the Continent, just as certainly as we could in the days of Marlborough and Wellington, when we were able to put such an army in the field as eventually to turn the scale in both the great Continental wars. For it was Marlborough who checked the victorious career of Louis XIV., and it was Wellington at the crisis of the war against the French Empire at Salamanca, Vittoria, and Waterloo, who eventually turned the scale, and it was a British army that ultimately occupied Paris. If we are to be able to check the dominant Power of the Continent, it must be under the same conditions; we must have an army, if not strong enough to compete with the armed forces of Germany in a single duel, at any rate strong enough to enable the French successfully to defend their independence, because their very independence and existence will be threatened in the next war between France and Germany. I have said that the problem is the same in India as at home, and that what we have to do both at home and in India is to organise the magnificent material we possess. I think we may perhaps go too far in the direction of running down our own people. No one more than myself feels that there is room for criticism against the lackadaisical carelessness of our rulers in the highest situations during the last ten years; but I think we can go too far in that direction. I am certain there is no other country in the world that could be depended on for two years running to supply, as we regularly do, 100,000 voluntary recruits to the various Services. With great regularity 100,000 men enrol themselves in the military service of their country of their own free will every year, and a

great many more offer themselves. Very much more use might be made of the services of these men. I think a great deal might be done to enable them to serve in such a manner that their economical interests would not be injured, and that so far from their losing money, and losing a chance of starting life by serving their country, their services in the Army might be arranged so as actually to help them. It must be remembered that countries like France and Germany maintain their Armies for a double purpose; they not only exist as schools for recruits and officers, but also for organised forces which must be prepared at a very few hours' notice to resist invasion day and night. No such necessity exists, or can exist, in England so long as we have a fleet on the sea. We are in the position to use the whole of our military organisation purely as schools for the training of the troops, and that we do not do so is not the fault of the people. The majority of the voters, although they have the cheerless homes Dr. Maguire has so eloquently described, are marvellously patriotic, and take a wonderful interest in the prosperity of their Empire. It would be surly to begrudge them the pleasure they get in watching that magnificent New Zealand fifteen who win match after match against our English football teams. There is one other thing I should like to allude to, and that is the very unfortunate comparison made by the Prime Minister of a warlike country in saying that war was a disease. It should be remembered, however, that he had a very mixed audience to appeal to. There are many people who have been brought up, without knowing what they are talking about, to talk of war as very wicked. It is an absurd thing for a country that rules a huge Empire by the power of the sword, which it has conquered by force, to talk about war as a disease. Accepting the metaphor, there is, however, such a thing as antiseptic surgery. There are surgeons who can be depended upon to do their best honestly and fearlessly, and there are also Chinese surgeons who resort to old-fashioned methods, harmful drugs and incantations. We should apply the principles of modern surgery to our International position, to the strategic education of our people, and to the tactical education of our troops.

His Honour Judge RENTOUL, K.C., LL.D., City of London Court :— I have very great and excellent qualifications for speaking on the subject of the lecture, namely, that I know absolutely nothing about military strategy from any possible point of view; but after twelve years' experience in the House of Commons I learned that knowledge of a subject is not an essential qualification for making a speech, and that, in fact, knowledge of the subject is rather a detriment to one's eloquence than otherwise. I am sure that I shall rise in the estimation of Dr. Maguire at once when I tell him that I never played football, golf, or cricket, either on a Saturday, Sunday, or any other day, in the whole course of my life. I always had one very strong idea throughout my Parliamentary career, and that was, that no amount of money that we were spending on our defensive forces in this country was more than enough. I always thought that spending money on a force to defend this great Empire was spending money as a great national insurance, and was money extremely well and extremely wisely spent. Men often deplore the money they spend in insurances. Why are they sorry about spending it? Simply because the house was not burnt at any time, and therefore the money was lost. But if a time should come when the house was burnt down, then they would find that insurance was a very wise thing indeed. There is a fear amongst the people of this country that if we went in too

much for improving our defensive forces we should suffer from what is called militarism, and that the great force and power of this country, namely, our commerce, might suffer neglect and decline. But if one takes Germany as an illustration, and remembers what attention Germany gives to the Army, and then observes that in commercial enterprise Germany is leaving us behind at the present time, one sees that attending to our forces, even to a very great degree, and compelling the people to be trained in order to defend themselves, does not interfere in the slightest degree with the commercial enterprise of the country. I remember when I was a student in the University of Berlin, our Ambassador at that time was Lord A. Loftus, and the old Emperor was in the habit of being very jocular at times with the Ambassadors. One day he said to Lord A. Loftus: "My lord, you must admit, I am sure, that the Germans are superior to the English." "Well," said the Ambassador, "might I ask your Majesty in what direction?" "In every way," said the Emperor. "Well, to particularise, in what one department are the Germans so superior to the English?" The Emperor replied: "In education, for instance." He thought he was on firm ground there; but the Ambassador said: "What department of education, your Majesty, for education is a big word?" "Well," said the Emperor, "for instance, in speaking foreign languages; 70 per cent. of the educated people of Germany speak a second language, whether with a Parisian accent or not, whereas not 10 per cent. of the educated English are in that position." "That is so," said the Ambassador. "But your Majesty must remember that we have not had the same educational advantages as your subjects have had; we have not had the same opportunities of learning foreign languages practically." "How so?" asked the Emperor. "Because," said the Ambassador, "we have never had a foreign foe holding possession of our capital city, and living amongst us, so that our educational opportunities have been somewhat limited on that account." That story delighted all the English who were in Berlin at the time, and it is a proud boast that our capital is the only capital of any great Power in Europe that can tell that tale. May the day be far distant when we shall no longer be able to tell it. We trust that we shall never see the foreign foe holding possession of our capital city. At the same time, talk such as one often hears at a city dinner, for example, late in the evening, about the impossibility of anybody touching England from any possible point, or about nobody being equal to us in anything at all—well, that is all very well for an after-dinner speech; but we shall have to walk along the lines on which other nations are walking if we intend to keep the position which we have at the present time, with an Empire scattered over the whole world. I quite agree with Dr. Maguire that International Law is pure rubbish. I also agree with him with regard to metaphysical strategy. I do not know anything about military strategy, but I know a great deal about the very wide-spread strategy one sees very often in the Old Bailey—the strategy of house-breaking and picking pockets. But International Law is, after all, merely a code of etiquette at the best, which one breaks exactly when it suits one so to do. Therefore, for us to rely on International Law, and in any way to neglect attending to our defences a great deal better than we do at the present time, is certainly not a wise thing. I am sure we have all benefitted very much by the light that has been thrown on this subject to-night. Metaphysical strategy is not good strategy, I should say, and Dr. Maguire was certainly not metaphysical in his remarks to-day; he was extremely pointed. Metaphysics has been defined as one man explaining a subject of which he

knows nothing to another man who does not understand him; but I am sure that Dr. Maguire was explaining a subject he knew, and, as far as our limited capacities go, I hope and believe we understood him.

Admiral the Hon. Sir EDMUND FREMANTLE, G.C.B., C.M.G. (Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom):—I have very few words to say, but I wish to bear witness to the great importance of the subject and the manner in which Dr. Maguire has put the whole question of strategy before us. Of course, we all thought he was going to talk nothing but strategy, and we all knew he would be extremely amusing and interesting, and we were not disappointed. What struck me more particularly was the stress which he laid upon the human element. It is a question of the greatest importance, and all strategy would be of no value whatever without the human element being taken into consideration; in fact, unless we are the strong man armed we shall not keep our house. The difficulty arises chiefly at the very beginning of the subject, and we must look to the root of the matter. It is a question of the schools. What do they teach in the schools at the present moment? They teach, as far as I can make out, selfishness, and the way to get on. What they ought to teach is patriotism, self-denial, and self-sacrifice. Now, why is it that in this country we cannot show the national flag in the schools? Why is it that in America they almost worship the national flag? Somehow or other there is the greatest difficulty in introducing anything in the shape of a national spirit into the schools, although I am happy to say there is a change in that direction, and that we are improving. The next generation, if the Empire lives as long, I believe will be more patriotic than the present generation; I see signs in that direction. But we must make sacrifices; we must have less luxuries, and must be more determined to carry out to the best of our ability whatever work we have in hand and give a little less time to play and to amusement. There is no doubt about the extreme difference between the strategical position of this country, as compared with other countries, from what it was in 1870 or 1871, and I am very glad Dr. Maguire has called attention to that. But, after all, I rose merely to say that I entirely agree with him as to the necessity for something like self-sacrifice. What is it that the great Free Trader, Adam Smith, says? We know very well that he was a great advocate of commercial freedom, and for removing the restrictions of commerce, but he spoke very strongly and wrote very strongly in favour of the navigation laws, his argument being: "Security is of much more importance than opulence." Have we not in recent years, in the development of our ocean trade, as well as in other directions, given way to opulence, and made everything subservient to the idea of wealth and the idea of increase of trade? Have we not in many respects disregarded the question of security? That is the point which we have to bring home to our countrymen. I am very glad that we have such inspired lecturers as Dr. Maguire, and I am sure if his voice could be heard throughout the country, and people would give due weight to the words which fell from him—words explaining so eloquently the position we are in—we should not rest a moment longer before we put our house in order.

Dr. T. MILLER MAGUIRE, M.A., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law :—My function in regard to replying to the discussion will be simplicity itself, as I have to say that I agree with nearly every word that has been said. In regard to the last speaker, I can return his compliments a hundredfold. Since I have had the pleasure of knowing Admiral Fremantle he has

been foremost in every good work. Whenever I go to a meeting or a deputation for any patriotic cause I am not long there before I hear his cheery voice and listen to his sage remarks. I quite agree with him, and his experience is not merely derived from second-hand writers. I believe he was in the Far East and saw the Japanese almost in their embryonic stage, and he has watched their progress ever since. Preceding the Admiral was Judge Rentoul, who has an extraordinary faculty of letting cats out of bags, and some of his remarks I wish especially to refer to. The Judge hit the nail on the head over and over again. He specially pointed out the absurdity of talking about militarism. Of course it is an absurdity. Hired condottieri ruffians, who went about plundering in the Thirty Years' War, or even feudal tyranny or Bashi Bazouk raids and robberies, are of course most outrageous and deplorable; but a nation that is not ready to fight, or a man who is not ready to fight, even in a Law Court if not in tented fields, is no use whatever. The very Turks and Saracens fought for religion. No modern State has the slightest desire for pure militarism. Certainly a soldier who is fond of campaigning for the love of campaigning must be a peculiarly constituted man. The only nation that adopted this nonsensical view about militarism, as is pointed out by my friend Baron Suyematsu, were the Chinese. He says that the Chinese are absolutely the only large community of people who ever showed by their literature and practice that they really, like some of our public speakers, despised the Art of War. They were so numerous, however, that they absolutely absorbed their Tartar and Manchurian conquerors, who became more Chinese than the Chinese themselves. All the people who came down from beyond the great central ridge of Asia or from Mongolia to conquer China were absorbed like an injection into the blood, and the Chinese are numerous and rich still, and able to retaliate on Americans and Europeans. But the result of their non-militarism is that they have been insulted and beaten again and again, and, having no sea-going fleet, they adopted a plan of exclusion—an absolute alien exclusion system of the most comprehensive type for ages. But even these exclusive barriers have been forced open. They have a word which I cannot pronounce, and to which Baron Suyematsu refers, which means "utterly disgusting thing called militarism." But the ideas underlying that word brought the allies to Peking, and that word is what enabled the Manchus to rule the Chinese. However, there are signs that the Chinese propose to shake off their apathy and to drill and to arm and to hold their own again. I was very glad indeed to hear Captain Battine. Although he did not say much about himself, I am going to say something about him. Captain Battine has produced one of the best books on the American Civil War that has been written. It is a very valuable book indeed, with many valuable lessons on strategy set forth technically. But to-day he was dealing with the broader foundations of the subject and how it affects our business and comes home to our bosoms. Captain Battine's remarks were extremely wise and strategic, but it would take a long time to follow them. I cannot help agreeing with him in every particular; but if the gallant officer thinks I want to depreciate the British race in any particular he is wrong. What I want to do, if possible, is to see that we are able to talk to our enemies at the gate by being prepared in time—that is all. I was not born in either Paris or Peking, as could be easily seen when I spoke French and Chinese. I only want to enforce the one great lesson of all History, that the cheapest policy is to be prepared for war at any time. If the Americans had had ready two army corps in the campaign of 1861

of which Captain Battine is such a master, the Civil War, which was over in their favour in 1865, would have been over immediately in 1861, as Sherman proved in advance. What is the use of continuing a war for four years that might be over in four months? What is the use of spending a thousand millions of money when, by taking General Sherman's advice, the whole operation could have been completed for thirty millions of our money? What a ridiculous person I should be to stand up here and pretend to depreciate the British, because I belong to this nation as much as any of them. But the British Empire was not made by football players or cricket or golf players; it was made by workers who never played. Take our last war. What on earth was the use of our people spending 250 millions and losing 20,000 men in two and a half years in South Africa through mere folly and political drivel by so-called sportsmen, when, if they had listened to officers who spoke in this room and their own advisers—men like General Baden-Powell and General Butler and Lord Wolseley—there might have been no war. If they had listened to the General on my left or read this little book on scouting, to my certain knowledge they would have saved themselves many men and much money. If they had taken the advice of any class of wise folk outside their own narrow and ignorant fashionable sets of ball players and idlers, we should have finished that war at an expenditure of forty millions at the most; and we are suffering to-day, every one of us is suffering from indirect losses due to mere incapacity. I am simply telling you the mere facts of history. As to Captain Charrier, I think he is a bit of a diplomatist, because I know that he is one of the most deeply read men on strategy in this room, and one most conversant with these matters. However, as he agreed with me, I feel complimented. Criticising the *Entente Cordiale* is not the best way to get very popular in certain political societies at the present moment, and I was rather fidgety about being obliged to depreciate its value, and therefore I am glad to find that my views, which I expressed modestly, are supported by such a competent authority as Captain Charrier. I only want to warn you against trusting to anything but that which Lord Bacon said is the true source of greatness in the work-a-day world. We must not trust money, nor machinery, nor alliances; we can rely on nothing—nothing except the heart and brain and sinews, trained and well organised, of our great people. I wish everyone was full of burning enthusiasm for our national greatness and the elevation of the masses of our people. With all its faults, our little insular State has a splendid record, and is worthy of all our best energies.

“She's not a dull and cold land,
No! she's a warm and bold land;
Oh, she's a dear and old land,
This native land of ours.”

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, C.B.):—We have had a long meeting, and I will not detain you much longer; but, I should like to say that I think this lecture and the speeches we have heard in the discussion have been such that we ought to carry away with us many thoughts, and we ought to read the whole thing a second time when it is published. The subject is a most important one, not only for us who are soldiers and sailors, but more especially for those outside the Services, our legislators, statesmen, and merchants, and all those who have the interests and welfare of the country at heart. This lecture is most valuable in teaching us those great reasons why an adequate armed

insurance is necessary for our country. That insurance must be adequate. It is for our countrymen to see that it is so if they want to keep our present widely-extended rich Empire. We must be prepared to face any enemy, who would otherwise say:—

“Without the iron to guard it and hold,
Where is the good of your store of gold?”

It is our countrymen who must look to it that we have adequate forces to do that. They must understand that hysterics are not patriotism; and they could not do better, after studying this lecture, than read that work by Major Stewart Murray: “The Peace of the Anglo-Saxon,” and also that little brochure: “The Rise and Fall of the British Empire,” because those books have their lessons in connection with this survey of International strategy that Dr. Miller Maguire has given us this evening. Another point they would do well to remember is the axiom of Von Moltke: “That a nation gets the Army that it deserves,” and that it is their own fault if they do not get a good Army and an adequate one. That is the thing our countrymen must insist upon getting, namely, a well-found Army to second the Navy in its work of defending our dominions. I need hardly say that our most sincere thanks are due to the lecturer for the able manner in which he has put forward the subject this evening, and I therefore beg you to accord him a hearty vote of thanks.