

Iriba-tukte, which looks like an attempt to assimilate a barbarian name to something that would have significance to a Babylonian. The Babylonian monarch considers that this overthrow of Nineveh took place in revenge for the indignities Sennacherib had inflicted on Marduk, the supreme divinity of Babylon. He does not claim that the Babylonians had any hand in it, but terms the Medes his allies. Further, it is clear that this overthrow took place in B.C. 607. For Nabonidus says the Umman-manda destroyed all the temples of Assyria, and among them the temple of Sin at Harran. Nabonidus in the first year of his reign (B.C. 556) received commands in a dream to restore this temple. Three years later, after Cyrus had defeated these barbarians, Nabonidus was able to carry out the command, and states that was fifty-four years after the destruction of the temple. Further, we learn that Labaši-Marduk, king of Babylon, was only a child, and did not know how to rule; and that he came to the throne contrary to the will of the gods. Lastly, we learn that Nabonidus was not of the royal family, for he only calls himself the delegate of Nebuchadnezzar and Nergal Šar-ušur. The grounds for all the above conclusions are ably stated by M. Scheil. The remainder of the inscription, like nearly all the monuments of these later Babylonian kings, is concerned entirely with accounts of temple restorations, religious ceremonies, etc. Rarely do they give such valuable historical information.

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## The New Hebrew Concordance.<sup>1</sup>

THE want of a satisfactory Hebrew Concordance has long been seriously felt by all those whose duty or inclination it is to study the original languages of the Old Testament. Fürst's was by far the best, but he often chose the context of the words in, it would seem, a merely haphazard way, and he did not profess to include either the particles or the proper names. For the former one had to turn to Noldius, and for the latter to one or other of the small concordances expressly devoted to them. Neither was there any Concordance that took note

<sup>1</sup> *Veteris Testamenti Concordantiæ Hebraicæ atque Chaldaicæ.* Solomon Mandelkern. Leipzig: Veit & Co. 1896.

of proposed emendations of the Massoretic text, numerous and often important though these now are. There was room for a Concordance which should combine everything.

Dr. Mandelkern felt himself moved to fill up the void, and has to some extent succeeded. He has indeed done but little for the last item. No doubt it was difficult, but he mentions very few emendations and these only in his little Rabbinic notes, and has not affixed any indication to the passages themselves that such emendations have been suggested. Dr. Mandelkern should have studied under Mr. Redpath, and have learned how to make a Concordance as useful as possible, without passing a single hair's-breadth over the due limits of his subject.

But as regards the contexts that he quotes for each word, Dr. Mandelkern has conferred an immense benefit upon us. They are, with hardly an exception, much more carefully chosen than those in Fürst. It is also a convenience that he has adopted the Hebrew order of the books instead of the Vulgate. We have further tested several words taken entirely at random, and, so far as we can judge by doing so, find that the accuracy lies on the side of Dr. Mandelkern. He has a serious misprint on page 248, but this evidently is a misprint and nothing more. Whether he has made an improvement in putting only one reference where the same word comes twice in one verse is an open question. Fürst gives two, Dr. Mandelkern one, quoting the whole verse at length. He further helps us by often putting the Massoretic points in doubtful cases. We wonder that where the same form comes under more than one root he does not put cross references. It would have been an advantage.

Although we cannot candidly say that Dr. Mandelkern's quite comes up to the ideal of a Concordance, it is doubtless the best that exists for the Hebrew and Aramaic of the Bible. It is well printed, and the completeness of its contents makes it much more serviceable than any other.

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## Lipsius of Jena.

R. A. LIPSIVS (whose course is sketched for us by Professor Reischle of Göttingen in the *Christliche Welt*, 1896, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 12) has left a deep mark

on the theological thought of our day. Like Dorner, Biedermann, Schweizer, Ritschl, Frank,—all taken away between 1884 and 1894,—he represents a particular type, the evangelical-speculative one. He was born February 14, 1830, and died August 19, 1892, of a surgical operation. Destined almost from birth, by natural bent and parental wishes, to theological study, at twenty-five he was privat-docent at Leipzig, at twenty-eight a Doctor of Theology, and after some years as Professor at Vienna and Kiel from 1871 to his death was a leading ornament of the University of Jena. His personal character, like his work, was distinguished for solidity, honesty, and thoroughness, not unaccompanied by some hardness and disregard of the feelings of others. His amiability and kindness of spirit came out only in the intercourse of private life. Lipsius was not a recluse Professor. He wielded great influence in church assemblies of all kinds, and took interest in the entire work of German Protestantism.

He is best known by his *Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*, which first appeared in 1876, and in a third edition in 1893. An interleaved copy of the work, pencil-marked, was found on a table beside his deathbed; his last days were spent on the work which gives us the result of his life's thought in its maturest form. There are considerable differences between the first and the third edition. The chief labour of his life, however, was given to exploration in an obscure and uninteresting field of study,—early heretical and apocryphal literature. A series of volumes bears witness to years of patient investigation in this field. The history of Gnosticism, the sources of the earliest history of heresy and of the Roman legend of Peter, the Acts of Pilate, the apocryphal Acts, engaged his attention.

Professor Reischle, as a member of the Ritschlian school, is chiefly occupied in drawing a comparison between Lipsius and Ritschl. He evidently thinks that the changes made in the third edition of the *Lehrbuch* evince approximation on the part of Lipsius to Ritschl's distinctive views. First, as to some points of general resemblance and difference. Lipsius gives us a complete theological system, Ritschl does not. The chief concern of the latter is in the subject-matter of theology; he has little or no sense of style and systematic form. Lipsius has the latter quality also. 'In uniformity of formal construction, in many-sidedness of prac-

tical points of view, in skilful logical development, in cautious definition, Lipsius excels his predecessor.' Ritschl has the advantage of strength of thought compelling assent or dissent, deep insight into connexions of doctrine, the opening of new and surprising lines of thought and comprehensive views, pregnant, often almost violent language. 'Lipsius' dogmatic is like an artistic structure which, despite unevenness both of material and inner arrangement, commands admiration by a tasteful, harmonious exterior and care in details; Ritschl's monograph resembles a massive building, exhibiting many rough or boldly arranged parts, but sketched with genuine freshness, and, despite unevenness, worked out with impressive consistency from homogeneous material.'

The first point in which approximation is seen is in the use by Lipsius of the Ritschlian term 'value-judgment' to describe Christian doctrines. Reischle, like some other recent writers, including Otto Ritschl in his life of his father, gives a new turn to this much-disputed term. It has certainly been understood to imply an antithesis to judgments of reality or fact (*Seinsurteile*), a sense obviously suggested by the term itself. When Professor Bruce says, that to the Christian consciousness Jesus has the value of God, we can scarcely help understanding that the question of Christ's nature is left in abeyance. Now we are told that the term merely intimates that the Christian doctrines are no mere intellectual theorems but practical truths. Professor Reischle expressly denies that any contrast between value-judgments and real judgments is meant. 'Just as little as it ever entered Ritschl's mind to regard religious judgments as mere value-judgments in distinction from real judgments did Lipsius also energetically insist that religious value-judgments imply the certainty of supersensible realities.' The matter well deserves closer examination, inasmuch as it will greatly affect our estimate of the new school. The expression is said to mean that 'we have no religious knowledge of God so long as we think of Him only as an explanatory cause of the world, but only when in our judgments we describe what God is for us, in what way He is the object of our trust, or what value His existence and working have for us.' The same holds good of our ideas of Christ and of sin. On the other hand, Lipsius, in distinction from Ritschlians, earnestly maintains the possibility and value of a philosophical con-

struction of Christianity. He protests against building up any 'Chinese wall' between the knowledge of religious experience and that of philosophy. He always has present to his thought the conception of a Christian philosophy, or a system of Christian doctrine developed into a Christian view of the world. The aim, Reischle allows, is a justifiable one. The only question is how far we are to carry it. However far we push the conquests of knowledge, we must come at last to impenetrable mystery. Lipsius himself concedes: 'In the Christian faith in Providence we meet with insoluble problems; we know not how such personal leadings of divine love are reconcilable with the inviolableness of God's rule in nature and history, and with the undeniable dependence of human life on natural causes. . . . But although it is not permitted us to solve those dark riddles of Providence and human destiny, as Christians we know one thing, that it is the same world which, on the one hand, shows an inviolable system of natural events, and, on the other, is absolutely subject to the divine purpose, and must always help the execution of this purpose, even if our dim eyes fail to discern the higher harmony in which all the contradictions of life are explained.'

Another point on which a change took place in Lipsius was the relation between the principle of Christianity and the person of Jesus Christ. Formerly he had followed the old rationalist distinction between the two, making Christ's person subordinate to the abstract truth of Christianity. In the older rationalism certain abstract doctrines figured as the kernel of Christianity, and Christ was their perfect teacher or revealer. After Schleiermacher's days the idea of man as God's child, or of fellowship with God, was regarded as the Christian principle, and the importance of Christ consisted in the fact that in Him that principle found visible embodiment. In his later days Lipsius reversed the order, putting the person of Christ first, and so approximating to the best part of Ritschlian teaching. 'Formerly Lipsius had first discussed the religious principle of Christianity, and then shown the historical significance of the person of Jesus as the Christ in the realising of that principle. Now he starts at once with the concrete person of Jesus Christ. Like Ritschl, he makes that person the subject of *ethical* study, showing how in the unity of His religious attitude and His

moral conduct He exhibits His divine Sonship; then on the ground of this he develops the *religious* significance of Jesus Christ, who is not merely a religious and moral ideal, but the object of religious trust, on the one hand as the revealer of God to us, on the other as our representative to God, in all as the perfecter of God's kingdom. Then follows, what formerly came first, a section on the religious import of the salvation coming through Christ.' Altogether apart from Professor Reischle's special point of view, we must recognise that the change in Lipsius' teaching on this subject is a great improvement. In this, as in other respects, he made considerable advances towards a more positive theology.

The most unmistakable difference is in regard to the mystical element in Christianity, which Ritschl disclaims and Lipsius defends. Professor Reischle makes some interesting distinctions and concessions on this point. The question in dispute is to a certain extent one of definition. As a Ritschlian our critic allows the possibility of conscious fellowship with God, mediated by the preaching and reception of the truth. 'When the preaching of Christ reaches our conscience and leads us to a faith in Christ, which finds expression in childlike prayer and earnest repentance for sin, I cannot doubt that, apart from these psychological means and acts, God's Spirit touches me, and I have entered into personal relation to Him; in all this I perceive God's voice in my heart, and enjoy intercourse with Him as a child with its father.' Still all this is not what is meant by mysticism, which, it is suggested, denotes fellowship with God apart from all outward media whatever, even of the Church or Scripture. Ritschl makes the Church the medium of all effectual knowledge of Christ and God. Lipsius maintains the old ground as against the new school. He says: 'The relation to Christ and in Christ to the Father is one of immediate personal love, in which there is no need of other mediation than that of the one mediator Jesus Christ. . . . The primary question is not that of a relation of the Church to Christ and of the individual to the Church, in which also a relation to Christ is involved; but that of a personal, individual relation, in which the soul is alone with its Lord, and in its still inner chamber is certain of His gracious presence. Belonging to the Church is only a secondary matter. To be in Christ is more important than

to be counted in the Church.' On this Professor Reischle remarks, first, that the Church means in Ritschl the community of those who are united together by personal faith in the gospel of Christ, and then become the messengers of the gospel to others; and secondly, that belonging to the Church depends on faith in the gospel, which faith is an individual, hearty persuasion of Christ's reconciling power. He concedes, further, that Ritschl did too little justice to the elements of inward peace and joy in God, giving full assurance of salvation, in comparison with the witness of the outward life,—a defect due to his severe, matter-of-fact temperament. 'So far as Lipsius contends against the danger of externalising the Christian life, although

his estimate of Ritschl is exaggerated and unjust, we may agree with his aim.'

It is interesting to note how a leader of the 'liberal' or negative school of theology, as the result of increasing knowledge and experience, drew much nearer to the orthodox position. 'We are reminded of Schleiermacher's definition of "positive." Christianity in his view is a positive religion, because it finds the ground and standard of piety in the primary fact of the revelation of God in Christ. Every theologian who accepts this historical basis of Christian faith and life is positive. In this sense, Lipsius became more and more a positive theologian.'

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## The Great Text Commentary.

### THE GREAT TEXTS OF ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

JOHN iii. 3.

'Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God' (R.V.).

#### EXPOSITION.

'*Jesus answered.*'—He answers his thoughts before they are expressed. We have other instances of this supernatural knowledge in the cases of Peter (i. 42), Nathanael (i. 47, 48), the woman at the well (iv. 29), the disciples (vi. 61, 64), Lazarus (xi. 4, 15), Judas (xiii. 11), Peter (xxi. 17).—PLUMMER.

The Lord's answers to questions will be found generally to reveal the true thought of the questioner, and to be fitted to guide him to the truth which he is seeking. Nicodemus implied that he and those like him were prepared to understand and welcome the Lord's teaching. This appeared to him to be of the same order as that with which he was already familiar. He does not address the Lord as if he were ready to welcome Him as 'the Christ' or 'the Prophet.' On the other hand, the Lord's reply sets forth distinctly that His work was not simply to carry on what was already begun, but to re-create. The new kingdom of which He was the founder could not be comprehended till after a new birth.—WESTCOTT.

'*Verily, verily.*'—That is *Amen, Amen.*—The phrase is found in the New Testament only in the Gospel of St. John (who never gives the simple *Amen*), and (like the simple *Amen* in the Synoptists) it is only used by Christ. The word *Amen* is represented by *in truth*, or *truly*, in Luke iv. 25, ix. 27. The word is properly a verbal adjective, 'firm,' 'sure.'—WESTCOTT.

'*Except a man.*'—Except a *man* (*τις*)—'a person,' or 'one' be born again, the most universal form of expression. The Jews were accustomed to say of a heathen proselyte, on his public admission into the Jewish faith by baptism, that he was a new-born child. But the Lord here extends the necessity of the new birth to Jew and Gentile alike—to every one.—BROWN.

'*Be born anew.*'—The word *ἄνωθεν* admits of being rendered 'from above.' Since both are undoubted truths, the question is, Which is the sense here intended? Origen and others of the fathers take the latter view, though Chrysostom leaves it undecided. But as it is evident that Nicodemus understood our Lord in the sense of a *second* birth, so the scope of our Lord's way of dealing with him was to drive home the conviction of the *nature* rather than the *source* of the change. And accordingly, as the word employed is stronger than 'again' (*πάλιν*), it should be rendered by some such word as 'anew,' 'of new,' 'afresh.'—BROWN.