

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie. MARY WHITON CALKINS. Leipzig, Veit & Co., 1905; American agent, C. A. Kühler, Boston. Pp. 80.

The old associationist treatment of consciousness, more logical than psychological, considered consciousness as consisting of a series of ideas, such series, moreover, being considered *in abstracto*. In what lay the fault of such a view? Miss Calkins has given us a carefully prepared monograph to show wherein such a treatment is lacking, and has also supplied what in her opinion is necessary. According to Miss Calkins, we must supplement the structural standpoint by what she calls the point of view of the 'self-psychology' (*Ichpsychologie*), *i. e.*, a view of consciousness as the consciousness 'of a personal self in all its relations and phases' (p. 9), a psychology of selves, as it were.

At this point a question seems to me to remain unanswered. Granted a consciousness which is always in relation to another self or subject, a social consciousness as it were (pp. 35, 36), how does that help us any as regards the serial explanation? I do not here wish to uphold any special theory, but simply to seek light on the modification of the English view by the psychology which is treated as a science of selves. It seems to me that the latter method is trying to explain the problem by scattering it among a number of selves, by losing it in a multitude. Now, granted a series of ideas, how can we help explain consciousness by making such ideas social, or related to other selves? By relating them to other selves, we still leave them in all their barrenness, they still are discrete, they still remain atomistic and self-sufficient. If each is related to a number of other selves, we have the same old series with further complications which remain unexplained. Miss Calkins becomes somewhat more explicit in the treatment of perception and ideation, and perhaps it is here that the two standpoints are shown as mutually supporting each other.

In the former case, according to the one point of view, we have simply a succession of percepts which may undergo the usual analysis. According to the other standpoint, that of psychology treated as a sci-

ence of selves, every perception of an object has with it the added experience of a feeling due to the presence of concomitant observers who also perceive this object. 'In perception,' says Miss Calkins, 'I am always conscious that I am sharing the experience of others' (p. 42). This seems evident to Miss Calkins for the following reasons: (1) We verify a doubtful perception by appealing to the experience of others; and (2) we are able according to this theory to understand why we class some impressions as 'higher' than others. Visual impressions are considered the 'highest,' so Miss Calkins says, because they are such as can be shared by the greatest number of individuals (p. 43). And to the possible objection that we may perceive objects when no one is around, Miss Calkins even then by a continual appeal to introspection feels the object as one which *may* be experienced by others. 'Solitary and alone,' says she, 'when, in my study, I am aware of my desk for example, I have at the same time an indistinct consciousness that other persons, were they present, would see the same thing' (p. 43).

These seem to be very good reasons, but have they really anything to do with the case? Is it moreover a fact that this vague, dreamy, haunting feeling of another's possible presence is always involved in any perception? Is there not a most vicious example of the psychologist's fallacy here present? This objection can be safely left to the reader's judgment, without further remark by me. Concerning the verifying of perception by means of the experience of others, is this also a fact as stated? The point at issue in the latter case, it seems to me, is the *kind* of experience needed for verification, whether my own or that of others. Do we always need to verify our experience by such social appeal; or do we not rather of our own account attempt in verification to explicate our attitude by a series of reactions or motor adjustments? This point, too, I think can be safely left to the reader. Finally, as regards perception, supposing all the above mentioned statements of Miss Calkins to be correct, I do not see how such social awareness has anything to do with improving the structural view of consciousness as a series of abstract moments. We have simply the same old series, plus an awareness that others have or can have a similar series.

Further, as regards imagination and thought: "Psychologically, to distinguish imagination or fancy from perception, we must have recourse to 'self-psychology.' * * * The world of perception is in fact the world in common, which lies open to all. On the other hand, dreams and images belong only to individual beings" (p. 45). A

rather subtle fallacy is here involved, which is also present in the social theory of perception. It is, briefly stated, the following: Since there is a common world to perception, therefore, the common world of perception gives us a world of common or shared perception; and experience as self-experience must on that account necessarily be different from that of every other. As a matter of fact, every experience, whether of perception or of thought, is uniquely self-experience; and perception of the same object can be shared only insofar as the meaning of such object is the same for all concerned. Moreover, as regards ideal revival, there is nothing to prevent a number of individuals from having the same idea, *as idea*. As regards sameness, is there not just as much possible in the case of the image as in the case of perception? Sameness of object is not necessarily community of experience, nor is sameness of experience necessarily shut out in all ideation. Is it not just on this latter that most social appeal rests?

Underlying the whole treatment of '*der doppelte Standpunkt*' are the following misconceptions: (1) The isolation of the self as opposed to community of knowledge (one question, mainly epistemological) is confused with the twofold aspect, structural versus functional psychology (another problem). Miss Calkins takes the structural point of view, and opposes it to the problem of the community of knowledge, which, wrongly it seems to me, she calls functional (p. 33). (2) The consideration of psychology as a science of selves is simply one aspect of the treatment of psychology which views consciousness as always concerned with an object. From a psychological standpoint '*social*' means nothing. I am just as sociable, psychologically, when I press closely a much prized object, as when I press softly the hand of a friend, or share my experience with him or with her. Psychologically I take an attitude towards each. Psychologically I can abstract from the present moment and by analysis seek certain elements. But as far as sociability is concerned, there is just as much in the one case as in the other. The fact that the self is connected with other selves is simply a form of the more general experience that consciousness always has an object, that every moment of consciousness is filled with a content, and a variation of the philosophical view so well expounded by Royce, that the universe forms one interrelated whole.

Now Miss Calkins is perfectly justified in presenting her discovery as '*EIN*' *doppelte Standpunkt*, but hardly as '*DER*' *doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie*. As a personal contribution it is

acceptable on its own merits. But it seems hardly fair to foist it upon psychology in general. What the twofold aspect of psychology is, and wherein modern psychology is an advance on the structural view, is overlooked by Miss Calkins. This twofold aspect, as it actually exists, is seen in various fields. In literature we are beginning to emphasize the content, and the meaning, at the expense of the purely verbal and grammatical analysis; in pedagogy we have passed out of the Lockian view of the 'empty cabinet,' are forcing out the Pestalozzian practice of object teaching as such, and are appealing rather to self motivation and self activity under guidance; in biology, the study of function holds equal rank with that of structure; in philosophy we are ploughing out of the static into the dynamic view of the universe; and over all is arising the great cry, *What does it all mean?* WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR? Where no meaning is evident we tend to cast it aside, or leave it for academic disputation. Use as here mentioned may refer to an attitude merely, as well as the more violent form of reaction, and the æsthetic or 'useless' *is* of use in this sense. It is here where Bradley makes his mistake in his various criticisms of the modern movement. So too in psychology this twofold aspect, structural versus functional, is becoming more evident.

The inadequacy of the structural point of view in psychology to explain the various facts of consciousness has given rise to the functional and motor theories so ably put forth by Baldwin, Dewey, James (more in his various articles), and Münsterberg, the last named being classed, in spite of his 'motor' theories, as a structural psychologist, which it seems to me he is not in the least. Perception is studied, not simply as an agglutination of sense elements nor as an association-complex, but as an essentially motor process, giving meaning to the object concerned, and determining serial reaction towards such object. Images are not simply fleeting bits of sensationalist revival, but also logical aids to action; and, as such, require further analysis to determine the motor tendencies and the attitudes bound with them. Even by reducing all states to sensationalistic elements, we do not necessarily restrict ourselves to the structural view, for such very structural elements, if conceived as having meaning, may be motor, may help in constituting the attitude taken.

As I have said above, if we take the contribution of Miss Calkins as one originating with herself, and limited to her own views, we must take it for what it is worth. But it is hardly a correct discussion of the twofold aspect of psychology as it exists to-day, nor is it a proper presentation of the attempt to harmonize such opposing views, in the sensori-motor theories now of so much account.

The psychological analysis of sensational elements, of volition and belief, and of will and faith given by Miss Calkins in this monograph is essentially the same as that set forth in her excellent *Introduction to Psychology* and need not be further mentioned. Much work requires to be done towards a complete sensori-motor psychology, and Miss Calkins' attempt is valuable for at least stirring the waters of this stream.

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METAPHYSICS.

A System of Metaphysics. GEORGE STUART FULLERTON, Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University, New York. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1904. Pp. x + 627.

This book is divided into four parts dealing with (1) 'The Content of Consciousness'; (2) 'The External World'; (3) 'Mind and Matter'; and (4) 'Other Minds and the Realm of Minds.' Each subject is treated at length, and any adequate review of the work would require a very long article, rather than the few pages that can be given to its consideration in the BULLETIN. All that will therefore be attempted here is to call attention to a few of the points that seem worthy of study.

Part I. exposes the inadequacy of the 'psychological standpoint' in metaphysical work. From this standpoint the mind is regarded as 'quite shut up, so far as its immediate knowledge goes, to its own ideas; and though it may *think of* an external world, it is wholly impossible that it should look out of the windows and into the world beyond, at any moment of its existence' (p. 21). "In contemplating its condition of complete insulation, we are struck by the oddity of the fact that this whole doctrine rests upon reasonings in which it is assumed that the mind is *not* shut up to its own experiences, but directly knows an external world of things. The contradiction is palpable and unmistakable; between premises and conclusion there is an abyss which may be concealed by obscurity and confusion of thought, but which cannot be bridged by any legitimate procedure" (p. 24). Hence the metaphysician, if he is wise, must recognize that there are 'two kinds of thinking,' a psychological and a metaphysical kind, which 'are by no means the same, and one who does very good work upon the plane of natural science,' that is, the plane occupied by the psychologist, 'may still be incapable of doing good work of the latter kind, unless he has some degree of aptitude and has enjoyed some special training — a fact not infrequently overlooked, and sometimes