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Sociality and Sympathy.

An Introduction to the Ethics of Sympathy.

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DEFINITION OF SYMPATHY.

Sympathy is the feeling accompanying a representation or memory state when referred by the subject to an object. In this definition it is to be noted: (1) Sympathy, as such, is feeling. Accompanying as it does a representation, the feeling of sympathy is emotional. (2) It is the reference to an object which constitutes such feeling or emotion, sympathy. Although there can be no sympathy without emotion, yet it is in the being referred to an object that the emotion becomes a sympathy. (3) The reference is made by a sentient subject. Self-consciousness is here presupposed. Such a memory state as becomes sympathetic involves self-consciousness and stands so far for a personal experience. If we say that it is this represented experience—myself pictured—which is referred to the object, then it is the emotion, which is therein inherent, that constitutes the sympathy in the referred experience. (4) The object as cognized is distinguished by the sentient subject from itself in point of time and space. The object as an object of a sympathy must first have associated itself somehow with the representation out of which the sympathy springs. Whatever else the object of a sympathy may be, remains to be discussed.

This definition, since it limits sympathy to a high order of intelligence, will not by any means fall in with all other accounts of sympathy. Before we enter upon the investigation of the conditions of sympathy in the race it will be very well to compare briefly the present definition with several standard definitions of the phenomenon in question. The first factor of this definition, theories of sympathy generally are agreed upon. Sympathy is feeling—feeling with another. For instance, Professor Höffding¹ speaks of sympathy as ‘an instinct to feel or to suffer with his kind.’ Mr. A. Sutherland² calls sympathy ‘that general tendency which makes men grieve at the pains

¹ ‘*Outlines of Psychology*,’ p. 244.

² ‘*The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*,’ 1898, Vol. II., p. 302.

and rejoice in the pleasures of their fellows.' In the same way, Dr. James Sully¹ writes: "By sympathy is meant feeling excited by the manifestation of a like state in another, or as we may call it, concomitant feeling. * * * In sympathizing with a person, we are occupied with his feelings as such, and are ourselves in a state of resonant feeling."

The second factor of the definition is not generally accepted as an exclusive characteristic of sympathy. Most theories find an organic as well as a representative form of sympathy. Thus M. Th. Ribot² writes: "In its primitive form, sympathy is reflex, automatic, unconscious or very slightly conscious. * * * Sympathy is originally a property of living matter. As there is an organic memory and an organic sensitiveness, there is an organic sympathy." Sympathy considered as organic has been coördinated with imitation, when also considered as organic. The imitative factor in the sympathetic psychosis was observed as early as Spinoza: "He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected pleasurable or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurable or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved. * * * This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion."³

M. Ribot also observes:⁴ "Between sympathy and imitation, at any rate in this primitive period, I see only one difference of aspect: sympathy everywhere marks the passive receptive side of the phenomenon—imitation its active and motor side." Dr. Sully may be quoted here also:⁵ "The simplest manifestation of sympathy is to be found in the phenomenon known as the contagion of feeling. * * * It might be described as reinstatement of feeling through imitative motor discharges." Mr. Sutherland very aptly terms sympathy in this sense 'induced primary emotion.' Finally, Mr. Herbert Spencer,⁶ followed also

¹ 'Human Mind,' 1892, Vol. II., pp. 106-7, 111.

² 'The Psychology of the Emotions,' 1897, pp. 231-2.

³ 'Ethics,' Pt. III., Prop. XXI.; Prop. XXVII.; N. I., R. H. M. Elwes tr., 1891.

⁴ *Lib. cit.*, p. 231.

⁵ *Lib. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 108.

⁶ 'Principles of Psychology,' 1887, Vol. II., p. 563.

by both M. Ribot¹ and Dr. Sully,² grounds the spontaneous coöperations of lower animals in the imitative reaction upon excitation of such so-called sympathetic feeling. "The alarmed members of a flock, seen and heard by the rest, excite in the rest the emotion they are displaying; and the rest prompted by the emotions thus sympathetically excited begin to make like movements and sounds."

While recognizing or at least conceding an 'organic' sympathy, psychologists naturally lean toward sympathy as representative or reflective. For instance, Adam Smith³ plainly recognizes the 'organic imitative' sympathy when he says: "When we see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or own arm, and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer." On the other hand he seems to make the entire psychosis representative, when he adds, p. 7: "Sympathy therefore does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it." Dr. Sully also speaks of lower and higher sympathy, and gives the 'higher and more complete form,' which he characterizes as 'sympathy with others,' far more attention. Professor F. Jodl⁴ seems to rule out altogether the organic feeling upon imitative reaction, as a form of sympathy, when he says: "Wir fühlen nicht deshalb Mitleid mit einem Unglücklichen, Elenden, weil uns seine Leiden physischen Schmerz bereiten, sondern weil wir uns den Schmerz vorstellen, welchen er fühlt oder den wir an seiner Stelle fühlen müssten." Professor Alex. Bain also seems to commit himself completely to the representative sympathy⁵ when he says: "Sympathy supposes the ability of representing the pleasures and pains belonging to other minds. * * * It is not enough to have emotional experience, there must also be the power of remembering that experience, or of effectively representing it to the mind. * * * We have seen that the fac-

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 232.

² *Lib. cit.*, p. 108.

³ 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' p. 4.

⁴ 'Lehrbuch d. Psychologie,' 1896, S. 661.

⁵ 'The Emotions and the Will,' 1875, pp. 66, 112, 120-1.

ulty is in a very great degree intellectual, that it rests upon intellectual operations."

As will be seen later on, the present definition of sympathy does not deny the fact of 'concomitant feeling' upon organic imitative reaction. It simply does not consider that such mere reduplication of feeling can be called sympathy. We do not make a distinction, such as Dr. Sully appears to make, between sympathy and sympathy with others, for we consider that the object—the 'with others' condition—is essential to any sympathy at all. In other words, it is this very reference of the experience-state to an object, which makes the feeling of the recalled experience a sympathy.

It is primarily because the reference-factor, being the central and essential mark of sympathy, involves of itself representative consciousness and self-consciousness, that we are obliged to ground sympathy in a representative state. The psychologists, who do not limit sympathy to the representation of an experience, naturally cannot consider the reference-factor essential to sympathy. Professor J. Mark Baldwin¹ expressly denies to sympathetic emotion this reference to an object. "There seems to be no difference in the conscious feeling of remembered pain and present sympathy, except a vague outward reference, which means only that it is not real pain now in me. * * * We may sympathize without sympathizing with anything. * * * The emotion of sympathy does not require an object at all. It acquires an object and then maintains itself by the emphasis of this object."

In the explanation of the definition which we may now undertake in some detail, we shall proceed by first giving an example of what purports to be a sympathy, according to the definition. Therein we shall show the operation of these several factors, and especially of the reference-factor, which is, we consider, the characteristic moment of a sympathetic reaction.

Suppose some person, *A*, to have had an encounter with a thornbush, such that the memory of the experience, the scratched hands, torn clothes and strained temper, is impressive and may upon occasion be readily reinstated. We find that the

¹ 'Hand Book of Psychology: Feeling and Will,' p. 189.

memory may be reinstated by two kinds of impressions: (1) by an impression in which the stimulus of the original experience (the thornbush and its attributes) predominates; (2) by an impression in which the thing *stimulated* (*A* and his attributes—scratched hands, etc.) predominates. Assuming, at the outset, that ‘the stimulus’ cannot become an object of sympathy, then it is plain that where *A*’s memory is aroused by ‘the stimulus,’ the object to which the ensuing sympathy attaches cannot be contained in this ‘stimulus,’ considered as an object of cognition. In such an event, there are in view of the problem three alternatives for sympathy. (1) *A*’s emotion remains without sympathetic reference. That is, having no object to which the emotion may attach and become sympathetic, it remains merely the emotion of a represented experience. (2) *A* *acquires* an object for his sympathy; which acquired object may be of two kinds: (*a*) *A* may acquire an object by fixing attention upon himself; that is to say, by imagination the memory-image of himself is projected and thus it becomes an object for sympathy. (*b*) *A* may acquire an object for his sympathy solely by discursive thinking. This alternative, which supposes a representation of something in space and time, brings the inquiry about to the most natural and usual kind of object, which we shall now proceed to speak of.

The simplest situation for the rise of sympathy is given when the memory image is either aroused in the first place or rearoused (while *A* is ruminating upon it) by a presentation in which ‘the thing-stimulated’ predominates. Such a presentation, we will suppose, is something-*B*, that has just encountered a thornbush and shows the signs of the encounter to such an extent that *A* straightway recalls his own experience, or if he has already recalled it, has it reinforced upon his consciousness. Upon this supposition, we observe that *B* is an object of cognition, distinguished by *A* from himself in space and time. *B* is also a possible object of sympathy, for *B* has presented sufficiently ‘the *A*’ and his attributes’ to have aroused *A*’s memory of the experience, especially as contained in the thought of ‘*A*’ and his attributes.’

Assuming now that *A* has in one and the same impression

a reminder of his own experience, and an object which is undergoing this class (to *A*'s notion) of experience, we ask what is necessary, in order that this *B* may become an actual object of sympathy; that is to say, what is the relation of this presentation of *B*'s experience to *A*'s representation of his own experience, such that *A* will refer his own experience to *B*, and therein feel sympathetically toward *B*. We submit that it is the recognition of himself in object-*B* that will lead *A* to sympathize with *B*; or, to put it in the terms we are using, it is such a recognition of the '*A*' and his attributes' in the object-*B*, that *A*'s representation will be forced from its original setting and will be referred to and centered in the object-*B*. We are now in a position to analyze in detail this entire sympathetic psychosis.

We shall consider in turn the nature of the feeling, the nature of the representation, and finally the nature of the recognition of self in the object-*B*. In the first place, when *A*'s representation of an experience is aroused directly through the presented object-*B*, the feeling is *A*'s own. This is inevitable, since it is indeed *A*'s own experience, which *A* must first of all take cognizance of. In this feeling-complex, as in every feeling-complex accompanying a represented state, there are two distinct orders of feeling, which we should take account of in advance. On the physiological side, reactions peculiar to the encounter with the thornbush set in afresh; especially the characteristic motor attitude is reinstated, and therewith *A* has again the corresponding physiological feelings, which he experienced in the previous instance. These feelings are not, strictly speaking, remembered, but are actually felt anew. It is this reinstatement of the appropriate motor attitude upon the very awareness of another's motor attitude,¹ which underlies every sympathy; for it is the reinstatement of the physiological feeling which gives representation in the first place, as we see, its *presentative* affective tone. At the same time and along with this physiological process, we observe also the ideal or emotional feeling, accompanying the representation as such,

¹ This is the imitative aspect of the sympathetic psychosis, as propounded by Ribot and others (J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and Race,' 1895, ch. 6, § 4).

and it is *this* feeling-process which gives the representative state its representative or emotional affective tone. These two affective processes are contained in every representation, and thus they go to make up the content of a sympathy.

We consider next the nature of the representation, or rather the change which takes place in representation, when aroused by an object, which becomes also an object of sympathy. While *A*'s memory-image is, in the first instance, simply a representation of his former experience, it quickly undergoes a change. The perception of *B*, linked up through old associations to the memory image, is assimilated to *A*'s generic image of the thornbush experience, and transforms the old mental content—the simple memory of a thornbush-experience. We may call this the first stage of the recognition process. But *A* does not stop here, for (according to the hypothesis that *A* shall proceed to recognition) *B* is not something belonging to the general class of thornbush experiences, with only enough of '*A*' and his attributes' to arouse memory. *B* mirrors, so to speak, *A*'s thought of '*A*' and his attributes'; and thus, possessing essential marks of *A*'s represented experience (to *A*'s notion), is now completely or 'absolutely'¹ assimilated to that class of experience. What is now implied in this act of recognition? "We have," writes Professor Baldwin,² "in the recognition of an object not only the identification of it as objectively the same, but also a feeling of 'warmth,' ownership, self-reference. We do not recognize a thing simply *for itself*; we recognize it *for ourselves*. It has become, in a sense, ours by having been present to us before." We observe that there would be such a self-reference if *A* had had no thornbush experience and were recognizing *B* principally for *B* himself. But *A* is recognizing *B* principally for *A* himself. That is to say that it is *A*'s very self that is the object of recognition. Therefore, how 'warm' must be the sense of ownership, such that *A*, having assimilated *B*'s experience to his own experience, also recognizes himself in *B*. We observe that the criterion of self-reference is strikingly present, and so far as the criterion goes in determining recog-

¹ On the meaning of the term 'absolute' recognition, J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and Race,' ch. 10, sec. 3; ch. 11, sec. 2.

² 'Mental Development in the Child and Race,' p. 317.

dition, it may be said that the recognition of self in an object is the crowning instance of the phenomenon of recognition.

We are now in a position to show how the reference of the represented experience with its feeling-accompaniments to the object *B*, is involved in the very act of recognition. On the one hand, *A*'s representation of his experience, considered as mere memory, grows dim; for *A*'s interest and attention is focused upon a presentation-*B*. On the other hand, *A*'s representation of his experience, considered as a thought of '*A*' and his attributes,' grows clearer and more vivid, for the object-*B* mirrors essentially this very thought of *A*. Thus the representation is transmuted from its original setting as mere memory, to this presented setting, and becomes '*A*' and his attributes' in object *B*.¹ At the same time the feeling-accompaniment, aggravated by the heightened motor discharge upon the presentation of *B*, also shifts its center. *A* now feels pain not in terms of a mere remembered self, but in terms of the self, at the moment *presented* to him in *B*. Through the recognized '*A*' and his attributes' in *B*, the experience has indeed become actually *A*'s again, but *A*'s pain by what might be called the illusion of the sympathetic state is the pain of this alter ego-*B*. We say that *A* now has pain not as of a memory, but as of an actual experience; and yet it is not like any other actual experience, for the sensation-coefficient (the cutaneous and sense feelings) is lacking. It is *sui generis* among experiences, for the pain is felt centered in another being; and this is what we mean by sympathy.

With this result we have made out a case which illustrates the definition that sympathy is the pleasure or pain of a representation, when referred by the sentient subject to an object.

In the foregoing account of the sympathetic reference we have spoken as if there were but one self in question, self-*A*, which is referred from *A*'s own person to object-*B*. This oneness of self is indeed the essential mark of sympathy. Thus Prof. Bain² speaks of 'the characteristic moment of the sympathetic impulse—the being laid hold of and engrossed by

¹ This may perhaps be considered an instance of the Law of Obliviscence as stated by Höffding, *lib. cit.*, p. 244.

² *Lib. cit.*, p. 121.

these suggested feelings as connected with another person; the taking that person altogether into our own mental grasp to the setting aside or exclusion of our own personality.' Green also, in the 'Introduction to Hume,' II., Sec. 40, says: "Sympathy involves such a conceived identity or unity in difference between the spectator's own person and the person of the other that the same impression in being determined by his consciousness of himself, is determined also by his consciousness of the other as an 'alter ego.' Thus sympathy * * * is found to involve the determination of pleasure and pain, not merely by self-consciousness, but by a self-consciousness which is also self-identification with another." At the same time it appears that the subject is conscious from first to last of a difference between himself and the object. Bain and Green alike imply this in their use of the notion of identity. Already in the very cognition, the subject distinguishes the object from his own body. Then when he comes to recognize himself in the object, there is again implied this difference. First, there is lacking certain essentials of the reality-coefficient, viz., the sense-stimulation in his own body, with the accompanying sense and cutaneous feelings. This emphasizes the initial difference between his own body and the object. Then there is seldom if ever an absolute blending of the subject's self with the object. We have been speaking as if the object were another person, and in such a case the subject at the very first and before the identification by recognition has set in naturally distinguishes in the object a self different from himself; but even where the object is not a person, but only, we will say, a body, and becomes only so much of a self (to the subject's notion) as the subject reads into it — even then, there will still remain this difference of selves, for the body as object cannot in nature be precisely the same as the self of the subject; and the subject, in seeing himself in this body, commits himself to seeing something both more and less than himself. Thus he is obliged, at the same time that he attributes a self-hood to the object, to postulate a different self from his own. We may say that along with the recognition which yields sympathy, there is always a distinction in the mind of the subject between himself

and the object-self; and while sympathy consists in the identification of subject and object, yet there is never an absolute blending of himself with the object-self in the subject's entire consciousness of the situation. This initial and fundamental difference between the subject's self and the object's self is something which can perhaps be understood to better advantage when we come to the history of sympathy in the race.

Considered in its broadest aspect, a sympathy is simply a reminiscence of my struggle for existence, where the reminiscence is embodied in another who is at the very moment in the struggle for existence. As a very important factor in the process of sympathy we have stated that the reminiscence or representation in terms of my own personality should grow dim and be displaced by the representation in terms of the presented personality; and in order that this substitution may take place, it is necessary that the presented personality occupy the focus of attention to the exclusion of my own personality. We have discussed the immediate conditions in *B*, and it may be well to mention a more remote, but no less essential, condition. *B*, no matter how recognizable he is, cannot readily become the actual object of recognition, if *A*, at the moment, is concerned with himself, his own interests, etc. We may lay it down as a law that, other things equal, the possibility of sympathy is in inverse ratio to my concern for myself at the moment. Obversely the possibility of sympathy is in direct proportion to my leisure from myself¹ from severe engrossing activity of my own. As Adam Smith has observed:² "Before we can feel much for others, we must in some measure be at ease ourselves." And Mr. Spencer more broadly:³ "Sympathy can reach its full height only when there have ceased to be frequent occasions for anything like serious self-sacrifice." That is to say, sympathy flourishes in an atmosphere of rest from the struggle for existence. The deliverance from the sheer struggle for my own existence — the pleasurable sense of repose and peace with the world — these things determine the possibility of sympathy in even the most susceptible natures.

¹ Certainly 'the characteristic of being susceptible to the impressions of the senses generally' is another precondition (Bain, *lib. cit.*, p. 115).

² *Lib. cit.*, Pt. V., Ch. II., p. 297.

³ 'Prin. of Ethics,' Pt. I., p. 251.

Before leaving this introductory part it will be useful to clear up one or two other points in connection with the conditions to sympathy in the consciousness of the subject. Some theorists speak as if it required some effort of the imagination in order to sympathize. Thus Dr. Sully,¹ defining his so-called 'higher' sympathy, writes: "Sympathy is the imaginative entering into others' feelings through recallings of our own similar experiences — sympathy is feeling with and for another, which involves an imaginative 'intuition' or realization of his affective state." For sympathy as we daily experience it, the imagination has indeed a most important function, yet from the trend of the argument it is clearly seen not to be essential to sympathy. In a systematic or habitual sympathy, that is at the same time a reflective sympathy, it is true that I sympathize by putting myself in another's place through an effort of the imagination; but this is not the case, nor is it necessary, in the simplest form of sympathy, as we have tried to define and illustrate it. To say that in sympathy I put myself in another's place, would be to say that I identify myself with another. But in the first instance rather the reverse is true, that when I sympathize the other is identified with myself. Suppose *B* is an explorer whose legs have been frozen off in Greenland. I, who have always lived in the temperate zone, do not readily put myself in *B*'s place, yet in an instant I sympathize with *B*. There is no constructive imagination present. In the first outburst of sympathy I treat *B*'s condition, not as it actually is to *B*, but as it looks to me. We say that my sympathy is spontaneous. It is a direct function of my consciousness of kind, the recognition of my most fundamental self in another.

So far as the sympathy alone is concerned I perceive only that something in another which is like myself in my own experience. Thus it is invariably the perception of some feature of myself (essential or unessential to the other's particular personal condition, is indifferent) which arouses my sympathy. We may say that the instant I sympathize I become the other, yet only the other so far as I perceive it to be myself. I appear for a moment to be losing my identity in sympathizing, yet as a

¹ *Lib. cit.*, Vol. II., pp. 86, 107.

matter of fact I am asserting it in the strongest terms. There are really only two ways in which imagination affects sympathy. Imagination intensifies and renders more intelligent a sympathy already operative. Then, in sympathy with a fictitious character or with one's self, imagination creates the object, and thus becomes a remote condition to sympathy.

Sympathy being in each and every instance a case of feeling, it tends inevitably to express itself. This expression is exhibited primarily in the lines of the face and movements of the head and body. Such 'diffusion' (Bain) of feeling which is the phenomenon of emotional expression, exists to a greater or less extent in every sympathy. It is the one order of 'observable activity,' by which we detect the presence of feeling, hence also the presence, under the conditions given, of sympathetic feeling.

Another, and for our problem a most important tendency of sympathetic expression, is exhibited in what may be called its volitional outgo. When one is so stimulated as to feel pleasure or pain on one's own account, the tendency is to promote the pleasure or inhibit the pain. Now when that pleasure or pain passes over or refers itself to another, the tendency persists and the sympathizer tends to act in the same manner. The sympathizer is wholly bound up in the one sympathized with, not because he is what he is, but because in the first instance the one sympathized with became identified with the one sympathizing. Therefore the sympathizer no longer remembers the pain or pleasure as in his own person, but — and this is the indefinable 'illusion' of the sympathetic attitude — he undergoes again the experience in the person of the other; and as he would promote the pleasure or inhibit the pain in his own person, so he must behave likewise to the other, which is himself as he perceives himself.

This tendency to express itself volitionally is bound up in every sympathy. It is often called vicarious sympathy, and is thus considered part and parcel of the sympathetic reaction. From this standpoint, one writer speaks of sympathy as 'the faculty of entering into human conditions, so that another's burdens become our own. Thus he who offers sympathy offers a part of himself.' Professor Bain¹ considers as part of sym-

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 111.

pathy 'to act out these feelings for behoof of that other, as if they were our own.' Being a matter of the motor consciousness, this volitional outgo cannot be considered by us a factor of sympathetic reaction itself, even though the worth of sympathy in ethical altruism is dependent upon this vicarious expression.

THE RISE OF SYMPATHY IN THE RACE.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

In the foregoing introduction we have taken a phenomenon which is called by men generally a phenomenon of sympathy; and we have endeavored to define it closely. In the discussion which is to follow we must needs take for granted the accuracy of our analysis in this definition. We have furthermore called this phenomenon (here the difference of opinion arises) the type of all sympathy, and the definition of it as of universal application. Assuming for the present that this definition does cover any and every phenomenon of sympathy, the following discussion will endeavor to show the history of this phenomenon in the evolution of consciousness.

The inquiry, which is genetic and mainly phylogenetic, will take consciousness in its 'growing developmental activity,' and investigate in the successive stages of its history the factors which condition the possibility of sympathy, as we have defined it. Then, when that stage of life-history has been reached which coördinates these factors, we shall endeavor to show how they may bring a sympathy into being. The investigation, taken throughout its length and breadth, will justify us, we believe, in having confined sympathy to the particular lines indicated in the introduction.

There are one or two considerations which must be clearly recognized before we proceed.

1. Since we do not confine the term 'race' to the human orders, the term 'race-history' of consciousness will mean the evolution of consciousness, starting with its earliest beginnings in the lowest orders.¹

2. It is impracticable for the present purpose to define the

¹ *Vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and Race,' Ch 1, Sec. 2.

evolution of consciousness according to the lines of organic evolution. Our position is that of M. Ribot,¹ whom we quote: "Without troubling ourselves about the frequent disagreement between zoölogical taxinomy and sociological psychology, we shall follow the ascending march of the social instinct, no matter in what order or class, or at what point of the genealogical tree it shows itself."

3. According to the genetic method, as here conceived, we are not concerned, first of all, with pointing out any particular instance of sympathy in the race. Such an inquiry would result in finding merely the earliest *observable* instance, not the rise or actual first instance, which is anterior and non-observable. We simply determine when sympathy arises in the race, by determining when the causes are first coördinated. That will yield indeed the first instance, yet far too feeble for actual observation.

The most general and fundamental factor in the state of consciousness immediately underlying a sympathy, is the consciousness of kind. "The consciousness of kind," writes Professor F. H. Giddings,² "is a state of consciousness in which any being recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." The recognition of kind here denotes that the subject in his consciousness of such an object is conscious of himself in that object.³ This state of consciousness has already been treated as the fundamental condition of the sympathetic reaction, and the ensuing discussion will hinge about the genesis and evolution of the consciousness of kind considered as just such a recognition of self in another. At the same time, as sympathy is not a simple conscious process, but a complex of conscious processes, there are also certain affective factors (feeling of attachment, tenderness) to be taken into consider-

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 276. *Vide* also Romanes, 'Mental Evolution in Animals,' p. 248.

² 'Principles of Sociology,' 1896, p. 17.

³ A. T. Ormond, 'Foundations of Knowledge,' p. 289. 'The sense of kind is the sense of that which is congruous with the sense of self'; also, 'Consciousness of kind is consciousness of self, however vague, as having something in common with another.' (Baldwin in his 'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,' art. 'Consc. of Kind.' This work is hereafter referred to under the abbreviation 'B's Dict. of Philos.')

ation before consciousness can be fully capable of sympathy. The investigation aims: (1) To trace up consciousness to the point where the consciousness of kind emerges; (2) to explain and connect up the affective factors with the consciousness of kind; finally, to show how, out of such a conscious-complex, sympathy may arise and function.

If we consider that consciousness of kind, as defined, may mean in its broadest sense the consciousness of a resemblance, then it appears that the object's resemblance to the subject must be the great outlying fact in the problem.¹ Yet assuming this fact as the starting point of the investigation, we are immediately confronted with various questions as to the meaning of resemblance. (1) Is the resemblance imaginary as well as real? (2) Is the resemblance both organic and representative? (3) What are the conditions of life in which the resemblance inheres?

In adult consciousness the resemblance underlying the consciousness of the resemblance may be either real or imaginary. The object may actually resemble the subject, and thus, for the sake of simplicity, we considered it in the definition of sympathy. On the other hand, it may happen that the subject has read his own feelings into an object, or finally, even the object itself may be quite imaginary. For example, one reads of the poet's sympathy with 'the crags and peaks,' the trees and the running brooks, and sympathy with the personalities of fiction is normal to an imaginative mind. In such cases the subject establishes a resemblance by having already read himself into the object through sheer imaginative activity. Since the problem before us is the investigation of sympathy in the race, where such imagination does not factor, the cases of what may be called 'created object' fall out of consideration. The first question is therefore answered by saying that the resemblance of creatures in the phylogenetic series is always an actual fact.

¹ Cf. F. H. Giddings' formulation of consciousness of kind in 'B's Dict. of Philos.,' art. 'Consciousness of Kind.' Upon the above statement the following bears especially: 'The consciousness of kind is awakened by the presence or thought of an individual who, in important respects, resembles oneself.'

The answer to the second question depends upon where we start in the phylogeny to trace up the conditions to the consciousness of kind. Certainly the consciousness of kind implies the function of representation with all that representation involves;¹ and furthermore, since we are speaking of resemblance as an actual fact, it is difficult to see how a creature can be conscious of his resemblance to another unless that resemblance be also representative. Hence a representative resemblance is the fact immediately underlying the consciousness of the resemblance, considered as consciousness of kind. On the other hand, we should fail utterly of understanding representative resemblance and its meaning for consciousness of kind, without thoroughly investigating its ground and precondition in the organic resemblance of creatures. For this reason the organic resemblance of creatures will be the proper starting point of the investigation.²

As to the biological conditions of resemblance, when we consider that at the primitive period of which we are speaking mutual resemblance simply implies that creatures have reacted to the same conditions in the same way, it is plain that this factor inheres in the very nature of what we call species. Therefore, the term 'resemblance' will be used coextensively with the term species.³

Gathering together these three considerations about the character of resemblance in phylogeny, we arrive at this preliminary determination upon the investigation. Inasmuch as creatures must actually resemble each other in order to the consciousness of kind, and inasmuch as actual resemblance means being of the same species, the investigation is not hampered by any apprehension that consciousness of kind will first take its rise among creatures of different species. This limitation also shows—at least in the earlier manifestations of the consciousness of kind—what we mean by 'kind.' Until otherwise defined

¹ *Vide* p. 43 f.

² Obviously this is a resemblance only to the observer. If we speak of consciousness of kind at this period it would be termed an organic consciousness of kind. As Professor Baldwin has remarked: "The creatures have consciousness which in some way reflects the resemblance without the actual consciousness of the resemblance taking place." (*Vide* 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 320.)

³ Cf. 'B's Dict. of Philos.,' Art. 'Kind (in Biology).'

‘kind’ means ‘species,’ and a resemblance between individuals neither more nor less thoroughgoing and essential than the resemblance which goes with being of the same species. The actual task of investigation takes, as its starting point, the period of organic resemblance among creatures, but since the creatures are of the same species, the resemblance is a matter of the entire creature; and we find ourselves actually starting with the period of organic consciousness pure and simple.

CHAPTER II.

RISE OF THE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP.

We now pass on to the end object of the investigation contained in the question, how creatures thus resembling one another become conscious of the fact. Starting, as we have done, with organic consciousness, it is obvious that a growth of consciousness into the representative stage is necessary, in order to consciousness of kind. It is also obvious that the conditions of growth from the organic to the representative consciousness, considered in and of themselves, are not sufficient to bring creatures to a consciousness of kind. The impulse of self-conservation is found at this, the organic period, expressed wholly in terms of the creature's own resources; and under the conditions necessary merely for the growth of the representative power, so it would remain. The creature would appear like a closed circle, completely individualistic and 'self' centered, in his expression of the impulse of self-conservation; he would never come into a position where he could observe his fellow-creatures and become conscious of kind.

In order to the consciousness of kind, there must first of all obtain a certain interaction of activity (habitual attitudes) among creatures of a species, whereby creatures become forcibly conscious of each other. This interaction, as we show, may take the form either of opposition or of coöperation. While the interaction of opposition¹ (as well as the interaction of coöperation) may possibly give rise to a consciousness of kind among creatures, yet this possibility, being in any case an affair of later mental evolution, falls out of consideration in this investigation, which has to do with origins.

Interaction of coöperation is another name for a social relationship in its simplest aspect. By a social relationship we

¹ A. T. Ormond (*lib. cit.*, pp. 194, 195) uses the term 'Collision of Agencies,' cf. with F. H. Giddings, 'Prin. of Soc.,' p. 109.

understand in general such a relationship as requires individuals to partake of or share in one another's experiences or life-interests, directed toward a common end. More particularly, for the problem in hand, a relationship, in order to be social, requires that any individual's impulse of self-conservation, expressed in the form of some habitual attitude, shall be modified so as to include, to a greater or less extent, all other similar habitual attitudes, and all others shall in the same way include it. Thus when we speak of a social relationship we shall mean in the first instance just this alteration of the impulse of self-conservation whereby creatures come into such relations as will make the consciousness of kind possible. Others, like Mr. Spencer,¹ appear to find the rise of sociality in the very presence of creatures together, while the *actions*—we mean those which Mr. Spencer characterizes as having 'a marked significance'—the actions of others like itself, serve merely to strengthen the social relationship already operative. We give the feeling of inclination,² springing out of mere 'presence,' full credit for being at the root of the social consciousness. We prefer, however, to fix the actual rise of social consciousness at the point of some distinct *relationship*, which we consider must be a matter of *activity*, to which the pleasure of mere presence is auxiliary.³

The first part of this investigation will endeavor to determine (1) the rise of social relationship and the corresponding social consciousness; (2) the evolution of the social consciousness up to the point where the consciousness of kind emerges. Then it will be a comparatively simple matter to show the rise of sympathy.

Following out the lines already laid down we assume as our starting point: (1) Each creature is impelled to conserve himself simply and solely through his own resources. This, as explained above, is the significance of the pre-social state. (2)

¹ 'Prin. of Psych.,' Vol. II., pp. 560-3.

² *Vide* p. 23.

³ Ribot (*lib. cit.*, p. 283): 'Social tendencies arise from the nature of things, from the conditions of the animal's existence; they are not based on pleasure but on the unconscious affirmations of the will-to-live; they are auxiliary to the instinct of conservation.'

The creatures that are to become socially related are necessarily of the same species. This is implied in the very definition of the term 'social relationship.' There does exist, indeed, a relationship between the hippopotamus and the hippopotamus-bird, for example, but the relationship is not and cannot be social, for it is not a mutual or reciprocal relationship between 'creatures engaged in the same action' (Espinas). But creatures engaged in the same line of action have the same order of needs; they are, in other words, of the same species. Speaking genetically, as we have already determined that consciousness of kind is possible only among creatures of the same species, so we now determine that a social relationship is only possible among creatures of the same species. (3) The creatures of the species have attained, on the one hand, to some specialization of sense-function and also to memory that is simple revival, in distinction from the memory-image and recognition;¹ creatures have attained, on the other hand, to motor processes, which are instincts in distinction from consciously initiated adjustments. Corresponding to these instinctive motor processes, we assume also characteristic forms of emotional expression. This is a sufficiently adequate statement of organic consciousness, as we here conceive it.

Feeling of Inclination.

Taking life at the earliest stage of mental evolution possible under the conditions named,² we find that the individual, in the struggle for existence, reacts upon the creatures of his environment, each after its kind. Some the individual regards with pain; others he regards with pleasure. To the first class belong (besides the creatures that prey upon him as their natural food) the members of the individual's own species, in so far as they collide with him in the struggle for existence. The pain they cause him contracts the vital processes. In their vicinity,

¹ By this phase of memory we mean what Professor Baldwin (*lib. cit.*, p. 321) calls 'a first degree association.' It is 'memory of the organic type without recognition.'

² We are speaking here of consciousness at a stage of mental evolution found in almost the lowest animals—say at the period of the cœlenterata (cf. with date of 'social' organic imitation, p. 25 f.).

under such circumstances, inhibition is the law of his life. To the second class belong all creatures of any species which in any way expand and accelerate the life processes of the individual. They may give pleasure because the creature needs them for food; they may give pleasure because he finds them useful in defense; finally, they may give pleasure simply because, having always been in contact with them, positive pleasure in their presence has followed upon former indifference. In this last case there springs up in the individual a certain feeling of inclination toward these other creatures for no cause whatever than that he has always been thrown in with them.

Conspicuous among creatures of this class belong (so far as they do not fall within the first class) the other members of the creature's own species. In the first instance, the individual, by the very fact that he happens to live his whole life through in constant contact with these other creatures like himself, must to a greater or less extent adjust himself to their presence, so that if they should be suddenly removed he must surely feel discomfort.¹ This we may say without meaning *necessarily* that they are positively helpful to the creature in the struggle for existence, or that they are regarded by him as having a common nature with himself. It is, as we say, merely an adjustment to one constant quantity in his life-condition.

While this is not the social relationship, yet the social relationship has its roots in this mere—we might almost say accidental—life together of any species. As M. Topinard² has observed, “All assemblages of animals, whatever may be the social form in which they have culminated, began as indifferent assemblages. Vague habits were unconsciously established between a few individuals, and pleasure resulted. The habits were confirmed, and the pleasure grew. The social spirit was the result.” Thus there arises out of this indifference, and gradually as the evolution of conscious life, the feeling of inclination among the individuals of a species, from mere living in

¹ Spencer (*Ibid. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 561): “The perception of kindred beings, perpetually seen, heard and smelt, will come to form a predominant part of consciousness—so predominant a part, that absence of it will inevitably cause discomfort.”

² *Monist*, January, 1897, ‘Science and Faith,’ p. 244.

propinquity; and this is the precursor of the social consciousness.

The feeling of inclination springs out of a passive contact, or as Mr. Spencer terms it¹ a 'passive association,' of the individual with the kind. According to the test of a social relationship already laid down, we know that, even though an individual be felt by any other individual as something neither indifferent nor yet positively hostile, yet if that individual in the gratification of self-conservation still remain without the pale of another's impulse of self-conservation, or so far as it so remains, it cannot be said to have entered into social relations with that other creature. We must therefore conclude that we have not found in the feeling of inclination a real index to the rise of a social relationship. In order to discover such an index, the attention must be fastened directly upon the impulse of self-conservation, as expressed in habitual attitudes.

As preliminary to an examination of the creature in the active struggle for existence, we may make the following important discrimination. Recollecting that the very reason why creatures do not become conscious of kind (under the sole conditions of growth from the organic to the representative stage) comes of their primordial individualism, then any form of activity which, in interaction,² emphasizes this separate singleness of creatures by retarding life processes (interaction of opposition), cannot, at least at this initial stage, contribute the social relationship; contrariwise, any form of activity which, in interaction, diminishes the separate singleness of creatures, by accelerating life processes (interaction of coöperation), contributes just so far the social relationship. In view of this discrimination, it is clear that if we observe the habitual activities of creatures in interaction, and determine which are accelerated by such interaction, we shall at the same time determine the interaction of coöperation and the location of the social relationship. Thereupon we may show positively how those attitudes of the creature which are accelerated by the others of his species, become reformed or readjusted to include all similar attitudes. When

¹ 'Princ. of Ethics,' Pt. I., sec. 52.

² *Vide* p. 19.

this conclusion has been reached, we shall have traced up the rise of a social relationship.

A moment's reflection will show that it is neither to the nutritive functions nor to the reproductive functions¹ that we may look for the initial acceleration of habitual attitudes by interaction. The creatures being of the species and having the same needs must inevitably to a greater or less extent fix upon the same objects for their gratification, whereby there springs up an interaction of opposition in the struggle for existence. Such a situation causes pain, the retarding of life process and the consequent contraction of the habitual attitudes, so far as any interaction may enter in.² While there also springs up a certain interaction of opposition in habitual defense attitudes (seen in the flight of a herd of deer, where the individual is more or less encumbered with the presence of his fellows), yet it is not nearly to the same degree as in nutrition. For the most part, as we shall see, habitual defense attitudes occasion an interaction of coöperation, which accelerates the life-processes. We shall therefore, without further preliminary, show how the impulse of self-conservation along the lines of habitual attitudes of defense becomes modified to include the similar habitual defense attitudes of the other members of the species. In showing how creatures thus become partakers in defense we shall also be tracing up the rise of social relationship.

¹The reproductive functions are very slightly susceptible to interaction, either of collision or of coöperation (an example of such coöperation along this line is nest-building), so they may for the present purpose fall out of consideration.

²The fact that burying beetles (G. J. Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' 1883, p. 226) display active coöperation in securing food, should have no weight against the general rule that nutritive functions are not the first to start coöperation. For it is a rare case. Few instances at this period are known of coöperation for food, while cases of coöperation for defense are normal. Then it is not recorded that burying beetles *regularly* combine to secure food, but only where combined effort is absolutely necessary to secure the food *at all*. Looked at in this light, the coöperation of burying beetles might even be considered a case of coöperation for *defense*. From this fact it is readily inferred that interaction of opposition at this early stage, so far from tending toward a consciousness of kind, by accelerating life-process and producing a social relationship, tends rather against it, by retarding life-process and preventing a social relationship.

'Social' Organic Imitation.

As the starting point in this investigation of the social relationship we fix upon the phenomenon of organic imitation (circular reaction),¹ or, more strictly, a particular phase of organic imitation. This fact of the organic life has been chosen because it is through such organic imitation, as we shall see, that the defense attitudes of creatures come into an interaction of coöperation, which is the social relationship.

As a characterization of the phenomenon in question,² suppose two primitive creatures *A* and *B* of the same species are living in propinquity. Suppose that *B* under certain circumstances invariably emits certain sounds, goes through certain movements, or the like. *A*, being of the same species, emits, under the same circumstances, similar sounds, goes through similar movements, etc. Now if *A* at any particular time becomes aware of certain sounds and movements of *B*, indicating flight, the very awareness reinstates *A*'s own motor processes, which tend to discharge, and that in the same way as *B*'s are discharging.³ In *A*, we have an example of the phase of organic imitation which concerns the present problem. We observe that it is a process of duplication in a creature of motor processes and movements, through what may be called sensori-motor suggestion.⁴ This is the important and differentiating factor about the phenomenon, that it is a sensori-motor suggestion *from the creature's own species*.

If the anticipation be permitted, we may distinguish this particular phase of organic imitation by the term *social* organic imitation. When referred to a period in life history, 'social' organic imitation is probably first observable with the echino-

¹ *Vide* 'B's Dict. of Philos.,' art. 'Imitation.'

² Following J. Mark Baldwin, 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' 1897, Appendix D, 'The Genesis of Sociality.'

³ J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 133: "The stimulus starts a motor process, which tends to reproduce the stimulus, and through it, the motor process again." Since in the phase of organic imitation under consideration the stimulus comes from another organism, we may differentiate further, still quoting from Professor Baldwin (p. 334): "The motor attitude seen, we may say, is itself the copy, which tends to bring about its own duplication in the person seeing it."

⁴ *Vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development,' ch. 6, sec. 3.

derms. Romanes observes that howbeit the echinoderms are unable to profit by individual experience and exhibit no truly mental phenomena, yet 'reflex action in these organisms is full of interest.'¹

Rise of the Social Relationship.

Having now characterized the phenomenon of organic imitation, we pass on to consider how it brings to pass a bond between creatures, or the earliest social relationship. We suppose, in the first place, that *A*, *B*, *C*, etc., of the same species, are each in danger of falling a prey to *X*. The perception of *X* reinstates an attitude of flight (we will say), which is accompanied, on the one hand, by an emotion of fear, expressed possibly in sounds of some sort; and, on the other hand, by a thought-content, which at this stage is a consciousness of movement (when the motor process actually issues in movement), plus a perception of *X*. When an operation such as we are describing becomes racial, the creature's motor attitude is in a state of unstable equilibrium. Ready to discharge at the slightest stimulation, it expresses itself in certain gross movements of attention to anything and everything, suggesting the presence or proximity of *X*. The entire psychosis may be styled the *habitual attitude* in time of danger.

As we have already noticed, a chief suggestion of *X* comes through sounds, etc., from the others of the species. In any particular instance, when *B* upon awareness of *X* has reinstated his motor processes of flight, *A*, etc., through the function of 'social' organic imitation also reinstate the same motor processes, and are thus saved from falling a prey to *X*. The *A*'s who have been saved by thus reacting organically upon awareness of *B*'s movements and sounds, will tend to repeat the reaction as often as the situation arises. The reaction, if it continues to prove advantageous, leads to an actual variation in the species' habitual attitude toward danger.² The reaction

¹G. J. Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' p. 23; also diagram in Romanes's 'Mental Evolution in Animals,' pp. 76, 348.

²K. Groos ('The Play of Animals,' 1898, p. 78) writes: 'The imitative impulse is directly useful in the serious work among most, presumably all, higher gregarious animals'; and Alex. Bain ('Mental and Moral Science,' 1872, p. 336): "The character of gregariousness follows the imitative power.

will develop the emotional expressions of the motor processes involved, and at the same time it will also sharpen the creature's susceptibility to these expressions. In the course of evolution, the thought of danger will come to contain attention-strains directed not merely upon X , but also upon the signs of X which are the sounds and movement of his fellows; and the creature will respond to and reinstate the motor processes of defense quite as readily at the suggestion of the one as of the other. The aspect of the creature's habitual defense-attitude, which is thus directed primarily toward the other creatures of his species, constitutes the most primitive social relationship. We call it a social relationship, because first of all the creatures partake of one another's experience of X in so far as their habitual attitudes toward danger, count upon sounds, etc., of one another, indicating that danger. It is a social relationship because the creature's impulse of self-conservation along this particular line has been so far modified as to make use of or include the impulse of every other creature of the species when stimulated along the same line.

This account of a social relationship would seem also to fulfill Mr. J. S. Mackenzie's notion of society (despite his injunction that animal society is 'nothing but an aggregate,' *lib. cit.*, p. 160), to the extent that it is 'a system in which the parts have a certain relative independence, but an independence which is conditioned throughout by its relation to the system — an independence, in short, which is not freedom from the system, but freedom *in* and *through* it.'¹ On the other hand, there is at present no evidence of 'an inner development toward an end';² for such an 'inner development' becomes possible only when the consciousness of kind has emerged and thus brings the social relationship to the consciousness of the creature. In the example B did not make the cries for the purpose of warning the A 's; nor are the A 's conscious of B in any other way

There could be no community of action without this aptitude." On p. 35 f we mention more fully the fact that so far as mutual aid proves advantageous, the preëxisting instincts of defense will tend to break down or merge into it. This means simply that the creatures are more likely to survive that are adapted to this 'social' way of defense.

¹ 'An Introduction to Social Philosophy,' 1890, p. 130.

² Mackenzie, *lib. cit.*, p. 160 n.

than as the source of certain movements of flight, etc., the very awareness of which reinstates similar movements. At present the creature has no other 'end' in coöperation but his own preservation, so that the social relation is expressed thoroughly in terms of the individual's impulse of self-conservation.

In view of the above statement it becomes clear that in speaking of a social relationship at this period we do not mean a psychologico-social relationship, but rather a biologico-social relationship; that is to say, the social *organism* is present and the parts thereof act as the parts of a human social organism act, yet the consciousness of the creature evidently does not represent to itself a social end or aim. Considering that in the instance cited we have an example of the earliest social phenomenon, it is plain that the phenomenon subsists simply and solely in a reaction. The social relationship at this its inception is the 'social' organic imitation seen objectively; and on the other hand, every expression of such organic imitation is at one and the same time an instance of the earliest social phenomenon.¹

The fact that we have explained the rise of a social relationship so exclusively from the 'social' organic imitations with habitual attitudes of defense, does not imply that such organic imitations are necessarily confined to defense, for 'social' organic imitation operates wherever the motor attitudes express themselves emotionally. It rather implies that the defense attitudes are, as a matter of fact, the first to express themselves emotionally. This should be clear from all that has gone before.² The exercise of the nutritive function produces interaction of collision among creatures of a kind. The interaction of collision causes pain and the consequent contraction of the characteristic habitual attitudes. By this is not meant the literal inhibition of the nutritive function, which would be manifestly absurd, but such a variation as will preclude the inter-

¹ If objections are raised against the term organic imitation, the confusion may seem increased by the addition of 'social.' By 'social' organic imitation we mean what some writers call 'organic sympathy' (which is to us confusion); and the term 'social' organic sympathy is justified precisely in this present discussion because of its aptness in indicating the social evolution, especially in the way it sets off the social conscious imitation, which is imitation proper.

² *Vide* p. 24.

action of collision. We observe that the most obvious variation will be at endency toward inhibition of the emotional expression, springing out of nutrition. A creature exercising the nutritive function in the vicinity of his fellows will so far tend to inhibit the feeling reaction in such a way that his fellows do not become aware of his good fortune and deprive him of his spoil. In a word, he takes his food apart.

From the above conclusion we are able to observe more particularly than on p. 24, why it has been necessary to explain the rise of a social relationship so exclusively from the 'social' organic imitation with habitual attitudes of defense. The emotional expression, which is at once the hinge of 'social' organic imitation and the underlying condition of a social relationship, tends to be inhibited in the exercise of the nutritive functions. The emotional expressions connected with defense attitudes, so far from being inhibited, fall directly in line with the impulse of self-conservation, and are expanded to the utmost. The creature, so far from experiencing any disadvantage from giving vent to his feeling of fear, rather experiences its great utility in self-preservation, so that such expressions will survive. In short, while all other emotional expressions are left comparatively weak, the emotional expressions connected with defense attitudes will continue to expand, forge ahead, and come to have definite and habitual forms through which 'social' organic imitation functions. We conclude, therefore, that social relationship is virtually dependent for its rise upon 'social' organic imitation, operating in defense attitudes. A social relationship, subsisting in motor attitudes of nutrition and of reproduction, we consider, will be a result of the basal social relationship, subsisting in defense attitudes.¹

Summing up our results, we reach this conclusion: The first link in the causal chain which leads to the possibility of the

¹As on page 24, so also here and throughout the essay we build upon the normal threefold order of function in creatures, viz., nutrition, reproduction and defense. Exactly how the social relationship would arise in a species where no defense is needed, is not for this discussion to say. It would obviously have to work out its salvation somehow through the avenues of nutrition, with its collisions and compromises; or possibly, it might arise first along the lines of conjugal tenderness and filial affection.

consciousness of kind is that state of consciousness which involves in 'social' organic imitation with habitual defense attitude, the rise of a social relationship, or such a social relationship, as has been explained above. The starting point in the further investigation of these causes will be this same rudimentary and quasi-social or 'social' organic consciousness, manifested in every expression of the 'organic' social relationship. As the initial step in this investigation, up to the point where consciousness of kind arises, we shall define more closely the primitive social relationship. This will determine what phase of social relationship has the possibility of the social evolution, yielding the consciousness of kind.

CHAPTER III.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP.

The Two Types of Social Relationship.

A social relationship springs out of 'social' organic imitation with habitual attitudes of defense, corresponding to feelings of fear and of anger.¹ We shall first make plain the habitual attitudes, with their corresponding phases of social relationship; then, by a comparison, determine which tends to the larger and more adequate growth in social consciousness.

The first of these attitudes has already been spoken of. The preponderating feeling toward the environment is fear; and the corresponding and habitual attitude is flight at the approach of danger. The species survived at the first by 'social' organic imitation with certain movements of flight and emotional expressions of fear on the part of its members indicating the presence of a hostile force. And it continued to survive by having incorporated within the habitual attitude those particular processes of attention that lead to this very 'social' organic imitation. Thereby the 'social' organic imitation becomes fixed or racial, and the members of the species in whom the 'social' organic imitation has become an expression of an habitual attitude in the face of danger, will form a 'company.'²

The second attitude is that of resistance, associated with the feeling of anger. This attitude is not so clearly manifested at the earliest period of social consciousness as the flight-attitude is. Anger denotes aggression, initiative, which signifies a more advanced stage of mental evolution. There is, however, some disposition to resist (growing out of anger) as low as the mol-

¹ "These emotions are said to be instinctive or organic. They seem to belong to the physical organism and to be so closely knit into the structure of the body by its heredity that they serve to protect us from harm and to secure benefits without assistance from our reflective processes." (J. Mark Baldwin, 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' p. 187.)

² *Vide* Appendix.

lusca,¹ and this justifies us, so far as the present problem goes, in placing the second attitude upon the same general level of consciousness as the first. We shall show its workings by reverting to a general example, using the signs *A* and *B*. Suppose the creatures *A* and *B* upon a level of consciousness corresponding to that in the previous instance, yet actuated in this case by a primitive feeling of anger, with a corresponding inclination to *resist*. We will say that under the present circumstances *A* (as well as *B*) has in times past resisted more or less successfully some creature-*X* that encroaches upon him. If then at any particular time *X* appears against *B* in the vicinity of *A*, we have, it is clear, an expression of 'social' or organic imitation on the part of *A*. Just as in the former case, *A*'s perception of *B*'s movements, etc., indicating resistance, tend in that very perception to reinstate *A*'s own movements, etc., of resistance, with the result that *A* also resists (or tends to resist) along with *B*.

A social relationship may rise out of habitual attitudes of resistance in precisely the same way as we have shown it to arise out of habitual attitudes of flight.² The creatures of the species survived at the first by their movement of resistance in common, and the species survives in the form of a company by a 'social' organic imitation on the part of its members with the habitual attitudes of resistance.

As the social relationship forms, we can picture how it has happened that creatures have come to involve or implicate each other in the attentions to danger, and then, when the dangerous thing actually appears, to include each other also in defense. The thought-content of *A*, in habitual defense by resistance, will come to have two thoughts of *B*. (1) In the thought ex-

¹ *Vide* Prince Kropotkin, 'Mutual Aid among Animals,' *Nineteenth Century*, 1890, p. 343. The disposition to resist is strong in spiders, placed by Romanes ('Animal Intelligence,' p. 205) just below the fishes; but they live so solitary a life as to be otherwise not a good illustration.

² *Vide* Appendix. We have found actual animal companies in which fear constitutionally predominates. We hardly find an actual animal company in which anger constitutionally predominates. The reason for this is that fear arose first, and remains now along with anger, so that a species which has grown to resist from anger in one direction, may still remain in habitual attitude of flight from fear in another direction.

pressed as movements of attention to danger, there is contained the awareness of *B*, suggesting the danger from *X*. (2) In the thought expressed as movements of defense, there is also contained the awareness of *B*, assisting in resisting *X*.¹

Finally, lest we fall into psychological error, we must bear in mind that since *A* is aware of *B* (and *vice versa*) in no other way than as merely the source of movements, etc., indicating resistance, and since his assistance results organically from the simple awareness of *B*'s movements, etc., there can be no consciousness on *A*'s part of a social relationship. This must be the inference so long as we consider social consciousness in its first period expressed as 'social' organic imitation.

With this statement of the two attitudes and their respective phases of social relationship, we pass on to consider their respective values in the growth of social consciousness. The two phases of social relationship are alike in the matter of their origin. Each springs out of 'social' organic imitation with habitual attitudes of defense. But with this one fact in common the resemblance ceases; they are precisely as little alike in operation as their emotional expressions, fear and anger. In the phase of social relationship subsisting in fear and habitual flight, we observe that the interaction of coöperation is found only in the habitual attitude toward the *danger*. When the danger materializes and as soon as ever the habitual defense attitude is reinstated and issues in movements, the members of the company are straightway thrown back upon their own individual resources; each individual shifts for himself and the social relationship with its very inception ceases to exist. On the contrary, the social relationship springing out of anger only reaches its climax after the signal has been given and the reaction has actually set in. By the same inherent law of nature which compels creatures surviving by flight to separate, the habitual resistance-attitude compels creatures to unite. Not

¹ It is difficult to avoid speaking, at this stage, of *A*'s attitude as that of intelligence, and of the variation as due to 'functional' selection or even conscious choice. For the reason that intelligence, even if it does operate at this stage, is not *social* intelligence, we prefer to hold off incorporating the intelligent or as we call it the 'representative' factor until the first stage of 'social' evolution is reached.

only does *A* become keenly and habitually perceptive of sounds and movements by *B*, signifying the presence of a hostile force, but also and by the same process *B* (standing for any creature directly attacked) 'counts' upon *A*'s reinstatement of the same positive defense-attitude. They resist together, and as long as the hostile force continues each looks for the other's presence and aid. Thus from the start to the finish of this positive defense-attitude there functions a social relationship.

The question as to which of these two phases of social relationship yields an adequate growth in social consciousness has now been all but answered in the very comparison of the two phases. The social consciousness of the creature of fear and flight has not such possibilities for the growth of social consciousness as has the social consciousness of the creature of anger and resistance. True, the creature, as we explained, tends to improve the variation in defense, which may bring the eyes and ears of other creatures between him and the hostile force. But even such modification of the original defense-attitude is incidental to the defense-attitude as a whole, which, consisting in flight, continues to remain (as in the presocial state) unchanged. As already shown, the creatures surviving by flight do not reckon so completely upon one another. Their safety lies in the keen eyes and nose or the long legs; it is along these lines that variations in defense tend principally to appear, and such variations, it is clear, do not necessarily include the other members of the company, but are individual-regarding. Therefore we may conclude that, beyond the point already noticed, the flight-attitude will tend to exclude as essential positive factors to the individual's well-being the other members of the species.

The habitual attitude of resistance, on the contrary, in its very nature demands a coöperation involving the entire defense-attitude of the creatures. Just as surely as each creature counts upon each other creature to apprise him of the hostile force, just so surely, when the warning of attack is given, does each creature also count upon each other creature to resist with him. If we assume that that coöperation, involving the creature's entire impulse of self-conservation along the line of defense, is the

social relationship which makes for the largest possible growth of social consciousness, then it is plain that we are concerned with that phase of social relationship which subsists in the attitude of combined resistance. Under the rubrics of this phase of social relationship we shall look for the consciousness of kind.

We have stated these phases in social relationship so antithetically in order to bring out clearly and simply the respective values of the two attitudes. As already noted, the phase of social relationship subsisting in attitudes of resistance is naturally found in actual life along with the attitude of flight. Indeed, if we were to take a cross-section of those forms of social consciousness to which we should naturally look for instances of the consciousness of kind, we should find a striking mixture of fear and anger, flight and resistance. All we may say with certainty is that, since it is the 'anger and resistance' element out of which we expect consciousness of kind to spring, this element so far preponderates in the general conscious content.

The Mutual Aid Instinct.

Proceeding now to the evolution of the social consciousness, we recall the meaning of this discussion of primitive social relationship, and its tendencies in social consciousness. The fact that sympathy arises at all, means that consciousness must become socially representative to the extent that creatures in their representations, recognitions and reflections will become conscious of other creatures as being of the same kind. The social consciousness has emerged, and though rudimentary, and so far as yet disclosed organic, shows, nevertheless, distinct tendencies. The discussion of these tendencies has served to indicate along what line we may expect consciousness to evolve, in order to become more thoroughly social and socially representative. Social consciousness is now fixed at a period in its evolution when, through the expression of 'social' organic imitation in attitudes of resistance to a hostile force, there tends to arise a certain mutual aid among creatures.

From what has gone before it is plain that this tendency to mutual aid, capricious as it is at first, has in time a decided in-

fluence upon the defense attitudes of the species. The instincts of the defense, operating hitherto, become modified to include or reckon with this new preservative factor. As Professor Baldwin has expressed it,¹ "Each instinct is shaped to fit into the same instinct in other individuals. This is what coöperation means." This aspect of the habitual defense attitude we shall now term the instinct of mutual aid,² by which we understand: (1) on the cognitive side of the habitual defense attitude, an instinctive susceptibility on the part of the individual to certain sounds and movements of his species, signifying danger; (2) on the motor side, a corresponding instinctive readiness to reinstate certain motor processes of defense in such a way as to involve the aid of the species. At this stage of mental evolution the instinct of mutual aid is the whole of the social consciousness, and constitutes in its operation the social relationship in its entirety. Strictly speaking, it is the phenomenon of 'social' organic imitation, functioning according to the means of defense already at the creature's command; yet, just because these means reckon with the other creatures of the species, the mutual aid instinct has the utmost importance for the problem in hand.

It is clear that with the genesis of the social defense attitudes of the mutual aid instinct the relationship between creatures becomes a well-defined fact of the life together.³ The mutual aid instinct, thus started in connection with habitual defense attitudes, tends to extend itself to all forms of activity. A species that displays aid in defense, tends also to aid in nutrition, and also, so far as possible, in reproduction. But such extensions of mutual aid are, at this period of 'instinct' sociality, rather sporadic. We have already pointed out that interaction in nu-

¹ 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' p. 281.

² There is an instinct, the parental, which may be said to have a marked influence in strengthening the mutual aid instinct. Thus a creature which assumes the attitude of resistance in behalf of its eggs (we find instances of this upon the level of the fishes, *vide* A. Sutherland, *lib. cit.*, Vol. I., pp. 34, 36, 38) will tend more easily and naturally to assume that attitude in behalf of the species generally.

³ For many instances of active coöperation see especially Prince Kropotkin (*lib. cit.*). It must be held in mind, however, that very many of these instances display a level of social intelligence which we have not yet reached in the evolution series.

trition is an interaction of opposition; it tends to retard life processes, emphasizes the primordial individualism of creatures, and prevents any social relationship. The interaction in defense, which is an interaction of coöperation, expands life process, produces the social relationship and tends to counteract the interaction of opposition as we have just noticed; yet even under the mitigating influence of common defense we find but few, if indeed any, instincts of coöperation for nutritive purposes.¹

Let it be said, furthermore, that as nutrition is the chief end of the creature's life, so aggression is and remains the most palpable fact in the animal world. 'The collision of agencies'² does indeed lead to coöperation, but only after a mutual toleration between the wills concerned, 'an equilibrium of toleration,'³ when the creature recognizes, so to speak, that 'half a loaf is better than no bread.'⁴ But such recognition involves at once a clear consciousness of ulterior ends and a high order of self-control, which we can hardly accord to the comparatively early orders of consciousness here under investigation. Professor Baldwin⁵ seems to take this view of the situation, where he sets animal activity as 'violent, straight away,' over against human activity as 'docile, deliberative, plastic.'

Before proceeding with the evolution of the social consciousness up to the point where the consciousness of kind arises, and in order to the correct understanding of this evolution, it is necessary now to explain and incorporate two factors which are absolutely essential to the consciousness of kind and sympathy. These are: (1) The representative consciousness, which we have already mentioned, and shall explain on p. 40 ff.

¹ The nest building of the land crab (*vide* Kropotkin, *lib. cit.*, p. 343) is an example of coöperation for reproductive purposes. Among fish the shark, the dogfish, and the carp practice coöperation for nutritive purposes (*vide* P. Topinard, *lib. cit.*, p. 222). It is not noticed that they divide the spoils: when it comes to the actual feast it is 'might makes right' (*vide* Bullen, 'The Cruise of the Cachelot,' p. 109).

² *Vide* A. T. Ormond, *lib. cit.*, pp. 194-5.

³ F. H. Giddings, *lib. cit.*, pp. 113.

⁴ Professor Giddings ('Prin. of Soc.,' pp. 109-10) believes that conflict is always strong, and imitation even tends only to mitigate it.

⁵ 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' p. 303.

(2) The consciousness of self. The same conditions that evolve social consciousness, evolve at the same time the whole mental equipment of the race. In the previous discussion it has been difficult to speak without involving especially these two factors. The reason their treatment has been held off arises from the necessity of holding clearly before us the *social* consciousness. So far as intelligence and self-consciousness have been existent at all up to this period, they have been non-social or antisocial. The investigation in general needs the representative consciousness and the consciousness of self only in so far as they are socially constituted, and the ensuing discussion deals with them solely with a view to a *social* self-consciousness and the consciousness of kind. In the process of evolution they overlap; yet in view of the fact that the creature has a certain consciousness of self before the representative consciousness has emerged, we shall explain the consciousness of self first.

Rise of the Sense of Self.

We assume to start with, that the lower animals may have a consciousness of self. "In one sense," writes Mr. Mackenzie,¹ "there is every reason to believe that the animals are as much conscious of a self as we are, or at least that the consciousness of self is present in them, relatively to the general distinctiveness of their consciousness of things, as it is in us." There is a sense in which self-consciousness is coeval with consciousness itself. Hegel speaks of the primitive self, which he calls the sentient self, as a bundle of habits, and of self-consciousness as immediate feeling, or the bodily feeling, accompanying habits. Later researches have emphasized the essential motor nature of these habits, or instincts, strictly speaking.

The first sign of consciousness is found, according to Professor Bain, in *spontaneous* movement, by which he means movement as reaction upon organic stimulation, or 'simple contractility' (Baldwin). Such reaction is the original 'Wille zum Leben,' the first symptom of self-conservation in anything that has become conscious. The notion of the self is grounded in this

¹ *Lib. cit.*, pp. 160-1.

conception of vital activity,¹ and when the reactions upon the external world become determined and then differentiated into more or less definite or adaptive motor processes of expansion and contraction, we have arrived at a notion of the primitive self. The consciousness of this 'self' is simply the consciousness of the active and conative disposition.² This is 'the bare presentation of the self' (Ward), but it is plainly not yet a true consciousness of self. "As sentient the soul is no longer a mere natural but an inward individuality, yet being immediate it is not yet as itself, it is not yet a true subject, reflected into itself."³ The creature is indeed conscious; but the consciousness of the *self-identity* is a matter wholly in the mind of the observer.⁴ We might say with Mr. Mackenzie⁵ that the consciousness of the identity is *implicit* in the creature's consciousness of pleasure and pain.⁶ It is not until consciousness has advanced to a period where along with the sensory process there is also a perception of the stimulating impression and along with the motor process there is also a perception of the movement, as giving pleasure or pain, that we approach true self-consciousness.

Perception is a distinctively psychological notion, and marks the beginning both of true self-consciousness and of representative consciousness. We will suppose that the creature has a perception of all other bodies and also of his own body. Now as the creature begins to perceive and remember bodies he re-

¹ 'The earliest and to the last the most important element of self is that variously styled the organic sensations, vital sense, conæsthesia or somatic consciousness,' James Ward, 'Encycl. Britannica,' art. 'Psychology,' p. 83. Professor Wm. James speaks of the feeling of bodily activity as the nuclear self, the self of selves ('Prin. of Psychol.,' 1890, Vol. I., p. 301.)

² Dr. Bradley ('Appearance and Reality,' 1893, p. 80) speaks of the kinæsthetic feelings as 'the inner core of feeling,' which is the basis of the sense of self.

³ Hegel, 'Philosophy of Mind' (tr. Wm. Wallace), pp. 27, 28.

⁴ Vide A. T. Ormond; *lib. cit.*, p. 257.

⁵ *Lib. cit.*, p. 164 n.

⁶ The 'implicit' consciousness of self may be placed at a stage of mental evolution corresponding roughly to the period of the echinodermata. We consider also that this 'affective period' of selfhood arises rather earlier than the period in which 'social' organic imitation functions and a social relationship arises.

members this one body as unique among bodies. First, it is always present, the center of position and the type of occupied space. Second, this one body, now that the *perception* of its movements is bound up with the feeling accompanying movement, is also perceived as a feeling-body.¹ Thus while the creature perceives other bodies, it both perceives and *feels* its own.² We may say that it is this inwardness (Ward) about feeling which is the first sign of true self-consciousness.

The next stage in the evolution of self-consciousness involves some treatment of voluntary attention, for self-consciousness is properly speaking a function thereof. Inasmuch, however, as voluntary attention is also a process of intelligence, we shall pass at this point of contact over to the discussion of intelligence, or, as we have termed it, the representative consciousness.

The Rise of the Representative Consciousness.

The rise of representative consciousness is fixed at the point when presentation becoming complex demands a correspondingly complex coördination in order to a successful adaptation. We take as the index of the representative consciousness the *recognition* of an object. In order to recognition two things are necessary. Recognition we observe could not arise so long as the creature's environment was stable. Stimulation would be revived regularly and reacted upon in a uniform manner. Recognition becomes possible when there is a variation off the normal. But change in the environment cannot of itself produce recognition. Changes have been occurring and recurring constantly without the creature's necessarily distinguishing them; and then when these changes have become sudden and catastrophic the frail lives have been swept away. The cause of recognition is a brain which is complex enough to support multiplicity of presentation and effect a corresponding complex coördination of muscular movements. This involves habit, acquired by the individual; and the habit in turn presupposes at

¹ The analogy with child development is clear in this observation by Professor Preyer ('Mental Development in the Child,' p. 146): "A child does not easily recognize its own body from foreign bodies. Merely seeing its own arms does not serve to distinguish its own from others. It does, after it has recognized certain movements of it as giving feeling — especially pain."

² Wm. James, *lib. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 334.

birth an unstable nervous system with hereditary impulses in the place of ready-to-use instincts. Thus the period of infancy in its broadest significance — the period of development from utter helplessness to self-help — is inevitable as soon as we take up the discussion of intelligence. Without at this point any further remarks upon the character of infancy, we shall take the creature within the period of his development and as low in the scale of mental evolution as possible. Within these bounds we shall indicate the rise of recognition, intelligence — in a word, what we call the representative consciousness, in distinction from the presentative. Speaking psychologically, this period in development to which we must here confine ourselves is the transition from the 'projective' to the 'subjective' stage, where the creature, after reacting upon objects without reflection, begins to deliberate upon these objects.

Suppose that a certain stimulation, for which the creature has had a certain reaction ready, now changes and becomes a complex presentation. For example, the razor fish ¹ when disturbed by the presence of salt over its burrow habitually comes to the surface. But once after beating a retreat in this direction he was forced to leave the water altogether by an inquiring naturalist. Here is the opportunity for a recognition. The next time the deadly presentation of the salt is introduced into consciousness there appears associated with it the representation of the last experience, *i. e.*, his being forced from the water. We say that the creature recognizes the changed situation, and we observe that recognition springs out of the very perception of this difference. Hence, in order to recognition the object must be not only revived but also pictured. It must be not only assimilated to the crass receipt, but also seen in its individual relations, and assigned to its particular experience in the past.²

The recognition of the stimulation enables the creature to effect the necessary adjustment and make the required adapta-

¹ *Vide* Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' p. 26. This is not the best illustration for our present purpose, for it is not drawn from infancy in its narrower aspect. It is on the other hand a good illustration, for the period of infancy finds its rise at the level of the fishes (*vide* p. 72 n. 1).

² *Vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 315.

tion. This means on the cognitive side the function of voluntary attention, and a deliberation upon alternatives. It means on the motor side that there is occurring a clash of reactions; the old refuses to accept and assimilate the new,¹ and the resultant is a coördination of processes which will stand for the necessary adjustment. It is not *absolutely* necessary to suppose an immediate picture of an end with its accompanying desire. The way of escape may have been spontaneous; the coördination may have been accidental. Nevertheless, the next time such a situation arises, we may be justified in supposing that the creature does picture an end. The attention becomes fixed upon an idea which *represents* the desired movement. The creature recognizes the presentation, remembers the movements necessary and makes them voluntarily for that end.² This we consider a sufficiently adequate statement of what we call the representative consciousness.

It is simply any consciously initiated variation upon an instinct or habit, especially such variation as demands a choice between alternatives.³ The operation of the representative consciousness thus implied in making voluntary adjustments is observable as early as the mollusca. See, for example, Romanes's 'Mental Evolution in Animals' (pp. 20, 60), where the term 'mind' is used with the same meaning that we attach to the term representative consciousness. Professor Wundt also records a striking instance of such acquired adjustment in a spider.⁴

The growth of the sense of self involved in this experience should now be indicated briefly. We have said that the sense of self is a function of voluntary attention. Voluntary attention, we observe, begins to function when the creature, recognizing the desired movement, holds up and controls that coördination

¹ *Vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 301.

² J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and in the Race,' pp. 428, 451.

³ In the words of Professor Morgan, 'the creature begins to profit by its own experience.' For further elucidation of the influence of intelligence upon instinct *cf.* C. Lloyd Morgan, 'Animal Life and Intelligence,' pp. 452, 453.

⁴ *Vide* W. Wundt, 'Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology,' 1894, Lecture 23, Sec. 4.

to the exclusion of any other. Now the sense of self is given in the first place in the recurring experience through the 'warmth' of recognition. Such feeling yields a consciousness of possession and ownership. Then the element of persistence in consciousness, due to this very strain and stress of the attention, yields again the sense of self; and it is especially this situation which constitutes a new thought of self.¹ Thus the creature's body becomes perceived as a center of space, as a feeling-body, and finally as a center of action and reaction upon other bodies, and these thoughts of this one body, relative and struggling as they are, keep gradually changing the creature from a consciousness of his body as *outer* percept to a consciousness of it as *inner* percept, all of which marks the first stage of self-consciousness. Such a change occurs very gradually. There is a constant dialectic between the inner and the outer, but the body perceived and remembered under many circumstances attains a certain degree of unity and permanence about which perceptions cluster and to which other bodies are referred.²

The rise of the representative consciousness has a most important bearing upon the social consciousness; for when we consider that creatures now have the power of representation, recognition and reflection, signifying the ability to change at will these habitual motor attitudes in which the social relationship subsists, then the social relationship might appear in danger of being disordered by the rise of the representative consciousness. This apparent difficulty is obviated when we take into consideration the nature of species.

Speaking broadly, it follows as a corollary from the fact that

¹ This has been called by Professor Baldwin ('Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 337) 'the nascent sense of subject' over against the object. We agree with Professor Baldwin in making the determining cause of the developed sense of subject the imitation of a copy, set by a fellow creature. In discussing the rise of social self-consciousness we give this 'social conscious imitation' its full weight, *vide*, p. 55 ff. At the same time we believe that there can arise a 'nascent' self-consciousness by imitation of the creature's *own* copy image, and this is the antecedent presupposed in the above discussion. Such presocial conscious imitation is brought up more fully on pp. 52, 54 f.

² This account of primitive self-consciousness may be supplemented by reference to W. Wundt, *Physiologische Psychologie*, 2. Aufl., Bd. II., S. 217.

common traits of resemblance inhere in the very nature of species,¹ that representations will be common to the species. The individuals of a given species, invariably reacting to the same conditions in the same way, simply continue so to do when they as a species have grown to the degree of making voluntary adjustments. For example, both *A* and *B* make a consciously initiated variation in the mode of defense. This has taken place independently of each other, yet it is the same variation simply because they are the same kind of creature. Here for the first time we come on the representative resemblance, which is the fact immediately underlying the consciousness of kind.² But now if creatures of the same species, as soon as they represent at all, necessarily represent in broad outline the same things, then the social relationship will not after all be disordered by the rise of the representative consciousness. The habitual motor attitudes will change and adopt new forms of emotional expression, but the relative situation remains the same. The emotional expression of *A* will be recognized by *B*; and upon perception of sounds, movements, etc., by *A*, *B* will react, and that in the same way in which *A* is reacting.

The social relationship, it is just observed, has not necessarily been disordered by the rise of the representative consciousness. It is also very necessary as a precaution to point out that the rise of the representative consciousness does not, in and of itself, alter, or render less organic, the existing social consciousness. The fact that the creatures represent, and that these representations, common as they are to the different creatures, involve each other in defense attitudes — this fact cannot of itself even begin to occasion a social consciousness, which is self-conscious and psychological. The creature indeed acts as if he recognized that his social relations — his coöperations — are with creatures like himself; but the recognition does not take place in consciousness.

Furthermore, when we scrutinize consciousness at this period of mental evolution, we observe that it still shows that sharp distinction (howbeit not so bold or pronounced), which

¹ *Vide* p. 17.

² *Vide* p. 17.

was evident both in the presocial and the earliest social state, between the individual and his environment. To the consciousness of the creature, his fellows are still but part and parcel of his environment — mere circumstances, and recognized by him as such in the furtherance of his well-being. To the creature, his individual well-being is his supreme end. At first organic, this end now becomes conscious in specific desires. The benefit gained from active associations with his kind¹ is now brought to consciousness, and brought also, we must say, to the touchstone of individual well-being. When this end is not attained, as under any trying circumstances of defense,² the social relationship would be suppressed, and the individuals would shift for themselves, regardless of their fellows.³

This is a dark picture; it is overdrawn in order that it may make clear the individualism, working from the first, in and through the social relationship; but fortunately the same conditions which bring the creatures to represent, recognize, etc., will bring also the consciousness of kind into existence, and this factor in social evolution becomes the corrective upon reflective individualism.

It is plain that from now on the mutual aid is, broadly speaking, no longer an instinct. Professor Baldwin would term it an accommodation by functional selection.⁴ There may be even an element of intelligent choice in its manifestations. Since, however, these sparks of intelligence are not as yet limited to the direct lines which lead to sympathy, we shall simply ignore them and retain the term 'instinct of mutual aid.' Thus used, the term will preserve its purely social connotation until the rise of the consciousness of kind is shown. At that point the instinct of mutual aid passes into a social intelligence.

These facts: (1) that consciousness is truly representative with a certain notion of self; (2) that representations are com-

¹ *Vide* p. 31 ff.

² *Vide* p. 87 f.

³ An instance of the influence of representative consciousness upon coöperation for the individual's own interest has already been noted on p. 37, where the 'collision of agencies' in nutrition produces the 'equilibrium of toleration.'

⁴ Cf. C. Lloyd Morgan, 'Animal Behaviour,' 1900; also 'B's Dict. of Philos.,' art. 'Selection.'

mon to the species, which is the representative resemblance immediately underlying the consciousness of kind; (3) that the creature has not yet brought his thinking to bear upon his attitude toward the creatures of his species to the extent of recognizing them as his kind — these facts we must bear in mind until the stage of mental evolution is reached which reveals the rise of the consciousness of kind.

CHAPTER IV.

RISE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SYMPATHY.

Consciousness of Kind, Foreshadowed in (a) the 'Real' Struggle for Existence.

Up to this point the discussion has dwelt in general terms upon the working of the mutual aid instinct. The mutual dependence of creatures in social relationship will be discussed in detail when the affective conditions to sympathy are investigated. It is now necessary to fix attention particularly upon that aspect of the mutual aid instinct which is chiefly instrumental in bringing about the consciousness of kind. From now on, or until otherwise stated, we shall confine the discussion to a stage of mental evolution corresponding to a period of life as far advanced and no farther advanced than the birds. Between the mollusca, the lower limit, and the birds, the upper limit, we are able to find the conditions, as we conceive them, to the rise of the consciousness of kind.

The consciousness of kind was defined¹ as a state of consciousness in which any creature recognizes another creature to be himself, as he at the moment pictures himself. There now subsists a representative resemblance between two fellow-creatures, *A* and *B*. *A* has a certain sense of self; but *A* has not, as we have all along borne in mind, the notion of *B* as a self. *A* indeed is susceptible to the active attitudes of *B*; but merely as an object, distinct from himself in point of space and time. In order that *A* may be conscious of *B*, not as such an object, but as an object resembling himself in the sense just defined, it is necessary that *B* become the object of *A*'s deliberation in his own stead, and not as a mere means to *A*'s safety and salvation.² We shall now proceed to determine the rise of such a situation. This will involve at once a psychological discussion of the conditions to such observation and also a delinea-

¹ *Vide* p. 15.

² *Vide* p. 19.

tion of the series of situations in the evolution of sociability, through which such observation is finally brought forth.

Through the gross movements of attention to the signs of danger which characterize the cognitive side of the mutual aid instinct, we have observed that the individual becomes habituated to observe the other creatures of his species, howbeit it is not these creatures considered as *selves* that he observes, but merely as sources of sounds, movements, etc., which may indicate danger to him.¹ Furthermore, whenever a particular movement of defense has set in, by the very fact that the social relationship subsists in resistance-attitudes and not in flight-attitudes, the creature is brought close to his fellows, and they continue near each other in pursuit of the same end as long as the danger is present. Through this propinquity in the expression of the mutual aid instinct the creature has constantly before him the movements, etc., of his fellows, just to the extent that they are involved with him in the coöperation; and thereby he is made to become acquainted with one great activity of the species as it functions in a creature of his kind. This much we may now venture for the rise of the consciousness of kind, while the creature is actively engaged in the struggle for existence. Howbeit the creature's thought is directed wholly toward his own welfare, yet the situation we are in search of is beginning to form. The creature is tending in the very 'social' organic imitation to watch his 'fellow' creatures, and the rise of the consciousness of kind is now foreshadowed.

¹ As already pointed out (*vide* p. 26f) the very fact of consciousness becoming social at all signifies an increased sensitiveness of the individual to the creatures of his kind. This trait of the social consciousness is richly developed on the physiological side by the rise of warm-bloodedness. Here, through the generative energy of warm-blood, creatures become at once more highly emotional and at the same time more expressive. In particular, the vocal power becomes more coherent, so that the creature will express himself not only, as heretofore, by movements, but also much more adequately by sounds. As Dr. Bain ('The Emotions and the Will,' p. 113) writes: 'Probably the foremost place among the associated signs of feeling should be given to the voice.' The individual being made aware of other creatures of his species through the ear as well as through the eye, much is added to the probability of the consciousness of kind, in the reinstatement of the motor attitude. The creatures of his species will come to mean more to the individual, and their presence in the reinstatement of motor attitudes will stand out prominently in consciousness.

(b) '*Play*' *Struggle for Existence.*

So far we have been considering the chances for the consciousness of kind with the creature in 'the thick of the fight.' But there is also a life of relaxation. As M. Topinard has pointed out,¹ the struggle for existence is not so unmitigated as some extreme disciples of Darwin would have us believe. There are frequent lulls; the creature, especially after the appearance of acquired accommodation, is not always possessed of hunger, neither is he obliged constantly to fight for his life. These intervals of relaxation are of two kinds: The creature may pass into a state of *repose*, signifying relief from all struggle for existence, either real or playful. When we reflect that, until the consciousness of kind has reached maturity and established in itself a social relationship, it is only in a social relationship *under the rubrics of the mutual aid instinct* that creatures are kept in a situation where they can possibly observe one another;² then it follows that the form of relaxation called repose cannot, at the very first, yield anything toward a consciousness of kind. Repose thus far will mean a cessation of all *coördinated* activity; the creature, except for the tentative stirrings of tenderness, sinks into a state of blank indifference toward his fellows.

Relaxation may mean a modified struggle for existence, as for example, the activities of flocking or herding, of migration, and the like. It is during such periods, when the social instincts are, so to speak, working freely, that the situation most probably arises which leads to social conscious imitation and then, under the proper conditions, to consciousness of kind. Assuming for the present the above fact, it becomes necessary to define this state of nature from the psychological viewpoint. A study of the conditions involved at this period in the life of a flock or herd goes to show that the activity in such a state of comparative relaxation is most apt to take the form of play. Hence, it is the phenomenon of play which the discussion must now fix its attention upon.

Play may spring up along any line of activity, but the play

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 221.

² *Vide* p. 19.

concerned in the present investigation is, of course, that which brings creatures into situations yielding the consciousness of kind. This is the sort of play in which creatures continue to sustain the same intimate relations to one another which they sustained in the serious business of life. Thus it will be in some sort the play of the mutual aid instinct along which we must work in order to discover the consciousness of kind. Furthermore, since defense is preëminently social and very much more social than nutrition, it is plain that the plays along the lines of mutual aid instinct in *defense* will be the first social activity, if not altogether the only social activity, to yield the consciousness of kind. Professor Groos¹ remarks concerning certain of Mr. Spencer's observations of the quick 'social' organic imitation shown among birds² that this may often be playful, and if so it is certainly an instance of early coöperation in the spirit of play.

Play may be of two kinds, according as the impulse operates in the creature as pastime or for the purpose of development. The same conditions which yielded a period of relaxation must also yield the first kind of play; for certainly relaxation tends to generate a superabundance of vigor, and this factor is a determining cause of play. This kind of play, when indulged in, is retrospective. It is the simple reproduction of the serious business of life, for the mere pleasure of gratifying the instincts involved therein.³

This form of play must deepen the social relationship. If the creature is 'inclined' to recognize his fellows as of his kind, when engaged in the real struggle for existence, how much more will he be so inclined when, being thus relaxed, free either from fear or anger, he exercises the coöperations merely for the sake of exercise. We are of the opinion that, so far as the creatures have up to this point arrived at any intelligence by individual accommodation, this 'retrospective' social

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 206.

² Herbert Spencer, 'Princ. of Psychology,' Vol. II., pp. 562-3.

³ "Nothing is more common than for animals to take pleasure in practising whatever instinct they follow at other times for some real good." Darwin ('Descent of Man,' Vol. II., p. 60), quoted from K. Groos' 'Play of Animals,' p. 81.

play of adult animals would be in the line of evolution, leading to the consciousness of kind. Thus 'retrospective' play would operate in games quite as we shall show the 'prospective' play to work, and whatever will be found true under that head of the latter, might apply in kind, though not in comparable fullness, to the former.¹ We have said, however, that this sort of play operates as a pastime. Just because it is thus recreative, it is neither persistent nor is it so very frequent. Since, therefore, the investigation is not limited to this 'retrospective' play of adult animals for the full account of consciousness of kind, we shall turn at this juncture to the serious play which impels development in and with a view to the struggle for existence.

The phenomenon of play is a good deal more a feature of the developing period than it is of maturity. The child is *par excellence* the creature that plays, and as Professor Groos, in 'The Play of Animals,' has so conclusively shown, play is absolutely necessary to this development. It is not because the young likes to play. It must develop and it develops by playing. The play-impulse is, so to speak, the legacy left by instinct to habit. Thus play is a vastly different thing to the developing creature than to the creature already developed, and just because it is so normal to the former state, it is there that we should especially fix the attention in the present discussion.

Before passing on to the investigation of the main problem, there is still one thing which must detain us a moment. It may be thought that in investigating the play of a growing and learning individual we have passed from the gregarious to the domestic relationship. The transition is apparent, not real. The truth of the matter is that the evolution of the race and the development of the individual coincide at this point. It is strictly a point of contact and we are not really shifting the line of investigation. The concrete state of nature here involved is the flocking of birds or the herding of cattle, and this is essentially a gre-

¹ We consider that the chief difficulty in the way of a consciousness of kind from the above elements of consciousness is that the sense of self not developed through imitation of a fellow-creature will be so very rudimentary. Any discussion of the consciousness of kind along this line would have to be supplemented by a further discussion of social self-consciousness through the process of social conscious imitation, so called (*vide* p. 55 ff.).

gious relationship. The discussion treats of the *developing* creature, and this applies not only to a young but to any creature that is learning.

According now to the presupposition of the inquiry, we shall have first of all in 'play' defense attitudes, the same manifestations of sound, movement, etc., as in the mutual aid instinct when used as an instrument in the real struggle for existence. This stands for the 'social' organic imitation. Furthermore, while the defense-attitudes in the first sort of play were retrospective, we are now dealing with them as prospective. They are pointed toward *future* use and are being learned. This new element stands for a conscious imitation. But it is, as yet, non-social. The creature imitates upon the basis of its own previous attempts at accommodation. The ensuing discussion, let it be said, will signify a shifting of the intelligence from this non-social conscious imitation to the *social* conscious imitation, whereby conscious imitation is brought into line with the 'social' organic imitation in what may lead to the consciousness of kind.

Proceeding now to the investigation in question, we notice that right at the start the prospective play differentiates itself from the retrospective. Over against the latter the play of the developing creature is more violent and unmitigated. It is indeed no pastime, for his future life depends upon it. On this account ordinary prospective play does not help signally toward a consciousness of kind. As we say, the instinct of conservation may be as overpowering in play as in work, and this irrepressible activity of the play-impulse tends to narrow the opening for impressions of others, even as much as the real struggle for existence.¹ It is a refinement of early play that gives us the clue to the difficulty. This refinement arises when variations in play off the original mutual aid instinct begin to appear.²

As the play becomes complicated and games are formed, we find as one of the game's characteristics that it imposes

¹ *Vide* Alex. Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' pp. 115-16.

² Play, just because it is play, has such spontaneous variations off the original useful reactions, and reference to Professor Groos' investigation of imitative play will bear us out amply in this supposition. K. Gross' 'The Play of Animals,' ch. 3, sec. 3*b*, play with living mock prey; 4*b*, play fighting between adult animals; sec. 7, imitative play.

restraints upon the individual's play-impulse. That is to say, the play is no longer the organic reaction upon simple perception of another, but by the very exigencies of the play the tendency to reinstatement is held in check. This situation of voluntary *restraint* from actual movements of self-conservation, brief though it may be, is very pertinent to the present investigation; for while the creature is only *tending* to reinstate a motor process his field of attention is filled with sense-impression, which is the other creature in the play like him. In other words, the creature *A* is thrown into a situation, if only for an instant, where the attention terminates upon another creature *B*, and *B*'s sounds and movements are more the object of deliberation to *A* than his own sounds and movements.

It is said that the above phenomenon of mutual observation in play is important to the investigation. It is not meant, however, that this concrete instance is the final situation in the series leading to the consciousness of kind. And the investigation will be illuminated if we tarry just long enough to explain why this phenomenon of observation contained in the restraint on play, cannot as yet yield the consciousness of kind.

In the first place the situation is that of play, and play having the individual's own well-being as its end-term cannot make the observation of its fellow sufficiently persistent and 'self-forgetful' for a thorough-going consciousness of kind. In the second place, and this is the more immediate reason, self-consciousness is yet too rudimentary for the recognition of self in another; so that even if there were given the opportunity for the necessary observation, it would profit the creature nothing. His selfhood has not been worked out in terms of the other creature. The one creature could not understand the other. He could not think of him as a self. And this is the reason, as was pointed out in the note on p. 51, why adult consciousness could hardly evolve a consciousness of kind. The situation of restraint upon play is important at this stage, not because it yields *of itself* a consciousness of kind, but because it yields what we call the 'social' conscious imitation. This social conscious imitation in the individual develops a social self-consciousness, which finally yields the consciousness of kind when the opportunity to observe his fellows arises.

Conscious Imitation and Social Conscious Imitation.

Conscious imitation has all along been understood to apply to a learning individual, such as is now under consideration. The copy for imitation is grounded in the thoughts of the former movements, which the individual is attempting to perpetuate and at the same time to improve upon. Thus the copy itself is the further thought of what the present movement is to be, in order to satisfy the demands of the present environment. In non-social conscious imitation the copy for imitation that tries to satisfy the new condition is the individual's own, and non-social becomes social conscious imitation when the attention is transferred from this ideal copy to the real copy presented in another creature. The transference could not take place if the two copies were unlike in kind.¹ The transference does take place because the copy image presented in another creature is so much more fit in point of clearness and distinctness to be the copy for the new adjustment. And this is the reason, it may be pointed out in passing, why the social conscious imitation survives and supplants the non-social. In social conscious imitation the individual has discovered a 'short cut' to accommodation, and this makes it the better instrument in the struggle for existence.

We will now take for our object of investigation a creature that has a certain inherited impulse toward intelligent adaptation and a certain sense of self, and who, under the influence of the mutual aid instinct in work and in play, is led to attend to movements made by the members of his species.² In this same heritage it may be said that social conscious imitation is also foreshadowed, for in the real struggle for existence, either real or playful, the creature will begin to detect differences, will begin to apprehend in his fellows the lines of new and better adjustments to his environment.³ A favorable condition is fur-

¹ This signifies that, no matter how much two individuals are thrown together, social conscious imitation will not take place unless they are of a kind. Only in his kind does the individual find the copy he needs in order to secure the accommodation.

² *Vide* p. 47 ff.

³ Professor Bain ('The Emotions and the Will,' p. 63) states broadly this fact when he says, 'next to grass, the proper study of sheep is sheep.'

nished here in the prominence given to certain normal types when used as sentinels.¹ These are the distinguished members most fit to be imitated, and they are placed in a position most favorable for imitation by the others of the kind. Thus the way is paved in the real struggle for existence for the interaction of consciousness in conscious imitation of one another.

We may picture the creature-*A* practising, as it were, a certain adaptation which is necessary for his self-preservation. We will suppose that the adaptation is only partly successful, for his copy is the memory of movements which were successful adjustments to a situation only partly like the present one. Reverting now to the former analysis we will further picture the creature-*A* at play, as already depicted, along the line of this half-learned adaptation. The play, so far as it is social, proceeds by 'social' organic imitation; but since it is the play of a learning creature, there is also, as pointed out on p. 54, the admixture of conscious imitation, as yet non-social. Now through the restraint upon the play impulse, under the 'social' organic imitation, 'the internal excitation alone is produced by the imitative impulse, whose reflex in consciousness consists of feelings of imitation.'² At the same time the field of voluntary attention becomes filled with the presentation of movements of his fellow creature-*B*. The attention of *A* becoming thus occupied with the sense impression of *B*, rather than with his own movement,³ tends to influence this movement whenever a variation off the habitual action is suggested by *B*; and since the sense impression is the movements of a fellow creature, the suggestion makes the imitation, if it occurs, social.

We will once again suppose that at the 'restraint' stage in the play, where 'the æsthetic perception' is at its height, the other creature-*B* reacts successfully along the line which *A* has been attempting. What change now takes place in *A*'s consciousness? In the first place, *A* comes to have two thoughts: (1) the memory of former trials-*A'*; (2) the image of *B* making the adaptation. Each of these thoughts tends to issue in movement,

¹ *Vide* Appendix.

² K. Groos, *lib. cit.*, p. 223.

³ "All conspicuously imitative play must be preceded by that form of æsthetic perception which we have called inner imitation." K. Gross, *lib. cit.*, p. 224.

and since the one stands for an unsuccessful, the other for a successful adaptation, there is a conflict of the thoughts in *A*'s consciousness. On the one hand the memory-thought of *A*' presses for reinstatement; and on the other hand the perception of *B* (according to the principle of the imitative impulse, illustrated on p. 25) tends also to issue in movement; and since the thought of *B* is not the thought of *A*', the percept of *B* will tend to re-instate not the same processes as the thought of *A*'.

The fact that thought-*B* prevails (and this is supposition) means that thought-*A*', while a thought of a habit, is the thought of a habit striving to accommodate itself to a new condition — the very condition, in fact, which *B* stands for, and which *A*'s thought of *B* at this very moment is tending towards.¹ *A*, therefore, meets *B* halfway, 'greet' the thought of *B* with the thought of *A*', and thus furnishes to himself the thought of *B*, as a copy for the desired adaptation. As Professor Baldwin terms the operation,² *A assimilates* the presentation-*B* to the memory copy *A*', and this makes his imitation social.

That *A* now imitates *B* means that *A* for the time being loses sight of *A*' — the memory copy of himself, or of his former trials. Instead of the memory-consciousness of movements — former trials of adaptation — he is conscious only of *B*; and it is the presentation or memory-image of *B* that initiates the new trial after adaptation. So far as the thought-content is copy *B* we might say with Hegel that *A*'s true self is for the time being in this other individuality — *B*, who becomes in very truth *A*'s actuating subject. On the other hand, it is quite clear that, while *A* appears to himself to be reproducing *B* in making the adaptation, yet he is bound to reproduce not *B* but himself. To satisfy the conditions of his own self-consciousness he must make the adaptation in his own way; that is, upon the basis

¹ This uses the view of modern psychology that it is impossible for consciousness to make anything for itself 'out of whole cloth.' The elements of construction are themselves more or less familiar beforehand to the thought of the person who makes the invention. It is the line or way which the construction takes that is quite new (*vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' Ch. III.)

² 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 333.

of adjustments or habits already acquired.¹ Hence, while the copy-*B* has displaced for the moment the memory copy-*A'*, yet so soon as the reaction is started again it is the thought of the new movement, which we might call *A''*, not the thought of *B*, which is attended to. Be the attempt at adaptation successful or not, the thought of his own movement will constantly tend to assert itself as the copy for imitation. Of course the partially successful accommodation continues to be corrected by the thought of *B*, and thought of *B* continues to be *re*-assimilated, as the copy for imitation, until the accommodation is finally acquired.

The fact that in learning the accommodation *A* returns so constantly to the thought of himself, yet also brings this self to a test of comparison with copy *B*, implies that *A* has now what may be characterized as an implicit consciousness of self in another creature.² In order that this consciousness may become explicit and become the consciousness of kind it is first necessary that *A* should have a clear consciousness of himself in the thought of the movements which make up the successful adaptation. Now if the thought of himself is the creature's first and uppermost thought in the consciousness of movement, whether successful or not, how much more keen will be the thought of himself when the accommodation is finally made, and he feels at once the thrill of successful accommodation and the warmth of ownership in this new muscular coördination. In the overpowering assertiveness of the self, which results from successful accommodation, the thought of the copy fades completely from con-

¹ If *A* were reproducing *B* as such, he would be acting in a way *absolutely* new to himself, which is contrary to the procedure of consciousness (*vide* note above). Compare also Professor James (*lib. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 318): "Each of us is animated by a direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence."

² This statement appears to be at variance with Dr. Bain's view ('Emotions and the Will,' p. 203) that we first of all judge others by ourselves, not ourselves by others. While I follow Dr. Bain in this view, yet I believe it has reference to a matured social self-consciousness. Dr. Bain here is stating what Professor Baldwin terms the 'ejective' process of self-consciousness. This ejective stage we are just now in search of, for that it is which constitutes the explicit consciousness of another. At the present stage in self-consciousness the individual has no such consciousness of another, but only a consciousness of a copy-*B*, and a consciousness of an attempted adjustment-*A'*.

sciousness. Dr. Bradley¹ speaks of this consciousness of successful activity as an expansion — a pleasurable expansion of the self within the self against the not-self. Notwithstanding the not-self is now grounded into the very warp and woof of the individual's nature, and in the explicit thought of himself, *A* is at the same time implicitly thinking of *B*.

At this point the creature has passed from the 'projective' stage to the 'subjective' stage of self-consciousness.² He has not, however, arrived at the full consciousness of self necessary to the consciousness of kind, because he has not yet begun to know himself explicitly in relation to another. This *recognition* (*die Anerkennung* of Hegel) of the copy as a self — an alter-ego — is necessary, we apprehend, to full consciousness of kind. The 'self-thought-situation' is given under conditions when *A* observes *B* (standing for any fellow creature) making the movements which he himself through this same copy-*B* was striving after and is able now to make successfully.

The 'self-thought-situation,' it appears at first sight, would arise of itself along the same line of observations as led to social conscious imitations, but a moment's reflection will remind us that this is putting a meaning into these observations which, considering the character of sociality at this period, is not justified. The previous discussion has been far afield if it has not borne in mind that these observations leading to social conscious imitation are made for the benefit of the individual, are in terms of himself, and terminate with himself.³ As a direct consequence of this we had to detail in the psychological analysis that the copy image in the other creature fades from consciousness as soon as ever the creature effects the adjustment. Resulting from this attitude of the individual, the situation in the gregarious relationship, so far as it affects the consciousness of kind, will be plain. In the coöperations of work and in the ordinary exigencies of play, the creature remains at once so irrepressible in his activities and so occupied with the impressions of his own

¹ *Lib. cit.*, p. 96.

² For the present use of these terms *vide* J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' p. 337 f., *vide* also note on p. 57 of the present work.

³ *Vide* p. 54.

movements, that the impressions of other creatures as such will scarcely ever fill to the full the field of attention.¹ Finally, the observations of other creatures, occasioned by restraint upon play, potent as they are in yielding the consciousness of kind, are far too brief (just because they are part and parcel of the creature's play-impulse — itself an element of his struggle for existence) for a sufficient progress along this line, to justify us in assuming that the creature will have the opportunity for a consciousness of kind, in the sense defined. The creature has yet only a vague, nascent consciousness of himself in another creature. And we are forced to the conclusion that in the gregarious relationship taken alone, creatures will never rise above a certain point in their consciousness of kind.

The situation where the other creature is the object of thought in the way leading to social self-consciousness and consciousness of kind, should naturally be given in that form of relaxation which is called repose; but, as already pointed out,² repose, without social relationship, is quiescence and largely indifference; and repose, with the social relationship (*the situation for the expression and growth of the consciousness of kind*), presupposes the presence of the consciousness of kind in its explicit and thoroughly self-conscious form, which is the very thing we are now in search of.

In the domestic relationship we shall find a condition not found in the gregarious social relationship, where one creature is bound instinctively to attend to another over a protracted period of time. This situation, springing up under the conditions of the reproductive instinct, will bring the consciousness of kind to maturity. At the same time, however, that we give over the opportunity for the rise of the consciousness of kind to the domestic relationship, we must not lose sight of the steady growth, from this time on, of intelligence through social conscious imitation.

With social conscious imitation as the main instrument of

¹ Perhaps an exception to this individualism of creatures in coöperative activity is found in the sentinel (*vide Appendix*), yet it is a question whether this refinement of sociality emerges before the social relationship becomes conscious or representative.

² *Vide p. 49.*

adjustment, the social situation becomes the mould in which representations are most naturally formed. The more readily adaptations are made, so much the more will variation tends to appear, whereby there is given a great impulse to the intelligence of the creature. At the same time and in its very making, we find that representations becomes permeated with the qualities of those imitated, and the entire consciousness is shot through with social coloring. Thus we are able to observe how, through the very pervasiveness of the social conscious imitation, the way is well laid for the situation in which consciousness of kind may become explicit.

With this determination of the conditions immediately underlying the consciousness of kind, we shall now discuss, according to the outlines on p. 15, the affective factors in the social consciousness which underlies sympathy. These affective factors, which will be called *The Feeling of Attachment* and *Tenderness*, respectively, are not certainly sympathetic reaction itself. They are, nevertheless, indispensable to sympathy considered as a race product, and should therefore be investigated if an adequate understanding of the conscious-content underlying sympathy is to be reached.

The Feeling of Attachment.

Two specifications may be made at the outset with respect to this. (1) The feeling of attachment is, from first to last, a feeling grounded in the social relationship when the situation is that of activity, either real or sympathetic.¹ The feeling of attachment originates and evolves, just in so far as the individual is dependent for his welfare upon the social relationship in coöperations. Whenever the social relationship operates, either in play or in work, there functions the feeling of attachment; and when the social relationship, as thus considered, declines, there is a corresponding lapse of the feeling of attachment. Thus the mutual aid is 'the reason for being' of the feeling of attachment. (2) The feeling of attachment is both organic and representative. As the accompaniment of the

¹ After the consciousness of kind has grown strong and able, it may constitute a social relationship, even while the creature is in repose (*vide* p. 75); but the characteristic feeling of repose is then tenderness, not attachment.

mutual aid instinct it is organic. When the mutual aid instinct and the social consciousness become infused with a consciousness of kind, the feeling of attachment becomes just so far representative.

The organic feeling of attachment,¹ in its expression, is similar to the primitive, presocial feeling of inclination. It will be recalled that the feeling of inclination in its broadest signification was the feeling of pleasure toward creatures that were either useful to the individual in the struggle for existence or, while not useful, were not harmful; and, being constant quantities in the environment, are finally looked upon by the individual with positive pleasure. Considered from the standpoint of psychology, the organic feeling of attachment signifies that one creature perceives in another something that does not harm it, something that is necessary to its safety, possibly also to its securing food — something, in short, which is altogether necessary, in order to its well-being, to be with.³ At this period the individual is attached to his fellows in the same way that he is attached to his food and shelter, for their usefulness to him. On the other hand, while this attachment, in view of its content, is of a piece with all other attachments, yet, in view of its end, it is different; and thus the feeling of attachment from the first differentiates itself from the presocial or quasi-social feeling of inclination. The feeling of attachment differentiates itself therefrom, because right at the first it is the feeling-tone of a social consciousness; then later, because it functions between creatures of the same species, who resemble each other representatively; and, finally, because its object becomes also the object of the consciousness of kind.

The organic feeling of attachment develops steadily in point of intensity and complexity as the mutual aid instinct develops; and when we reach the period when the consciousness of kind

¹ Dr. Sully ('Human Mind,' Vol. II., p. 103 ff.) calls this the *bare* feeling of attachment. "The child has this bare feeling of attachment for the mother, who gives it pleasure, which is generally mistaken for love in the child." Sully, however, seems not to distinguish between feeling of attachment and tenderness, as we do.

³ Dr. Sully ('Human Mind,' Vol. II., p. 104). "The simplest manifestation of attachment is that of pleasure or satisfaction when with others, and a correlative pain or dissatisfaction when bereft of their society."

arises, the organic passes into what we shall call the representative feeling of attachment. Just as we cannot say for certain when the consciousness of kind arises, so we cannot say when the feeling of attachment becomes representative. The two affective states, especially now as we enter the play period, overlap. As the mutual aid instinct, shot through with representative quality, is gradually giving place through the consciousness of kind to a representative coöperation, so at the same time the feeling of attachment is passing into the representative feeling of attachment. If we for convenience fixed the rise of the consciousness of kind at the point of restraint on the play impulses, then this fact fixes also the appearance of the representative feeling of attachment in the same situation.

The Representative Feeling of Attachment. — Now that we have reached the period when creatures are in the above sense conscious of kind, we come into the full presence of the facts that evolve the feeling of attachment. On the cognitive side the individual's movements of attention have grown to include the presence and vigilance of his fellows. He now buries his head in the grass, or ruminates placidly in the shade, for he relies most fully upon the other creatures of his kind to apprise him of an enemy's approach. On the motor side the creature's attitudes of resistance have been modified to include corresponding attitudes of his fellows. When an enemy actually appears each shares the burden of resistance; and thus the creature becomes, on the motor side also, thoroughly dependent for his salvation upon the aid of his fellows.

This fact of acting shoulder to shoulder in defense and attack must have a deep and subtle influence in stimulating the creature's feeling of attachment for his fellows. The feeling of attachment in all its fullness and intensity doubtless springs from the very necessity which creatures have for each other when the mutual aid instinct has emerged and they have formed habits of coöperation.¹ Creatures come to need each other, expect each other at certain times and places, just as much as they

¹ 'The Emotions and the Will,' p. 64. In this connection we may refer to the observation recorded by Prince Kropotkin (*lib. cit.*, p. 706) how that, when confidence of a herd has disappeared and the herd disbands, the individuals are apt to perish (*vide* also Sutherland, *lib. cit.*, Vol. I., pp. 323-4).

need food and drink. "The gregarious situation," writes Dr. Bain, "if allowed full scope, would bring about a complete identity of the individual with the flock; there would never be a thought of acting alone or apart from the body."

Furthermore, the need of the life together and the corresponding feeling of attachment is certainly intensified when the individual once experiences the pain of isolation. Creatures like the Damara cattle, which from the exigencies of their life have come to rely almost absolutely upon each other in defense, feel the woe of isolation when thrown upon their own resources. "An ox," writes Mr. F. Galton,¹ "when separated from his herd, exhibits every sign of mental agony; his glance is restless and anxious and is turned in succession to different quarters; his movements are hurried and agitated, and he becomes a prey to the extremest terror. * * * Thus the ox cannot endure even a momentary separation from his herd. He strives with all his might and main to get back, and when he succeeds, he plunges into the middle to bathe his whole body with the comfort of closest companionship."

It is this felt need of the life together, which has sprung up with the social relationship and grown with the evolution of the mutual aid instinct, that gives rise to the feeling of attachment. With this sketch of the feeling of attachment we may now consider very briefly its relation to the general problem.

The exact moment in the defense-reaction for the feeling of attachment is likely at the point when, the motor attitude being reinstated, the creature desires its completion in the aid of the other creatures. The one creature, as soon as the reaction sets in, looks for the others, for he has accommodated himself so as to include these others in his activity. The expectancy and the need bring into operation the feeling of attachment, which then reacts upon the motor attitude and establishes it. Strictly speaking, the feeling of attachment does not produce sympathy; but, being what it is, the feeling of attachment draws creatures together and keeps in the focus of attention the attitude of each other. It is the feeling of attachment which gives sympathy its irresistibility, so that it appears to be, as Professor

¹ 'Inquiries into Human Faculty,' 1883, pp. 72, 76.

Bain has thought, 'a remarkable and crowning instance of the Fixed Idea.'¹

In order to show as clearly as possible the essential nature of the feeling of attachment, we have considered it in its original signification, as confined to the mutual aid instinct. Whenever mutual aid functions along the line of any motor attitude, there functions the feeling of attachment; moreover, wherever a motor attitude that reckons upon or includes within its course a similar motor attitude of a fellow-creature even *tends* to be reinstated, as in play or in repose, there is also reinstated so far the feeling of attachment which drives creatures together in their common cause. On the other hand, it would be missing a very necessary distinction, especially in the relation of attachment to tenderness, if we did not explain that the feeling of attachment persists as by its own weight, and functions as an impulsive sort of passion after the mutual aid instinct has for one reason or another ceased to function. For example, Mr. Gilbert White² has observed that cattle, thoroughly domesticated (and having, therefore, no need of mutual aid), will leave the richest pasturage in order to be with other cattle. This fact seems to show a remnant of the primordial feeling of attachment, springing up with the mutual aid instinct. In connection with tenderness we shall have occasion to enlarge more fully upon this fact.

Tenderness.

We may bring the discussion under three specifications.

1. Tenderness is a feeling peculiar to a state of repose (cessation from all struggle for existence). Dr. Bain emphasizes 'the suitability of the state of repose to the enjoyments of tenderness.' In the 'Emotions' (p. 128) he writes: "The pleasures of slow movements, repose after exercise, repletion, agreeable warmth, sweet odours, gentle and voluminous sounds, mild sunshine, are of the soothing or quieting kind; they induce the conditions of repose and inspire tenderness."

2. All things considered,³ it probably can never be said that to touch a fellow-being and feel tenderness is in the same cate-

¹ 'Emotions and the Will,' p. 121; also 'Mental and Moral Science,' 'Contiguity' (Bk. II., Ch. I.), sec. 13; 'Sympathy,' Bk. III., Ch. II., sec. 5.

² 'Natural History of Selbourne,' Letter XXIV.

³ *Vote* p. 67.

gory as to touch a stone and feel coldness. Tenderness must always have had some social quality. At the first, and so long as social consciousness is organic, tenderness will be extremely vague and incoherent. After the consciousness of kind has arisen, before it has attained self-conscious form, we may suppose a comparatively large social quality in the tender feeling. At the same time, bearing in mind the meaning of repose and the function of the social relationship in keeping creatures *en rapport*,¹ it is plain that tenderness, being peculiar to repose, cannot be distinctly or coherently social, so long as the social relationship subsists merely or largely in the mutual aid instinct. It will not be coördinated social tenderness until that period when the consciousness of kind is strong enough to persist in seasons of repose. Then tenderness will become distinctly social, for then, it is clear, there will function a social relationship through the consciousness of kind.²

3. Tenderness is both organic and representative. The same condition, the consciousness of kind, which makes tenderness distinctly social, makes tenderness representative. Thus tenderness never passes through such a distinctively organic *social* period as feeling of attachment does when it is organic; it is predominantly non-social, and when it becomes social it at the same time becomes representative. Moreover, it becomes representative at a later period than the feeling of attachment; for while the feeling of attachment, functioning in action, develops out of the same conditions which develop the consciousness of kind, tenderness, as we see, becomes representative, distinctly representative, only after the consciousness of kind in its through-going self-conscious form has come into existence and is thus able enough to function and constitute a social relationship in a state of repose. Consequently the feeling of attachment will be representative at a time when tenderness is hardly at all emancipated from the thralldom of the organic.

In the light of these specifications with respect to tenderness, we may now very briefly consider its manifestations and then its

² *Vide* p. 74 f.

³ *Vide* p. 81 f.

relation to the problem in hand. Tender feeling shows itself by a fundamental mode of expression, the movements of attraction and the seeking for contact. According to this test alone, we should place tenderness at an advanced period of life. But there is another and more determining cause of the comparatively late appearance of tenderness. It is that tenderness on its physiological side seems to be a distinct outcome of warm-bloodedness.¹ Considering, therefore, that lower orders of life, the insects, the fishes and the reptiles, show little evidence of the attractive movements of approach, which is the sign of tenderness, we shall take the period of warm-bloodedness as the point at which tender feeling comes into being.

Tender feeling, while functioning in repose, seems to draw its excitant from out 'the struggle,' it may be considered² in large part due to the very set-back from the life of coöperative action. Consequently we can best understand its origin from the view point of coöperations. We will imagine that a motor attitude of defense has been reinstated and with it the feeling of attachment. The creatures, struggling together in a common cause, are sensible in a vague way of their mutual resemblance and the solidarity of their end. The hostile force is repelled, the coöperation ceases, and the creature settles into repose.

The social relationship, so far as the serious business of life goes, has now indeed lapsed, but not so the social consciousness in its entire workings. Principally the feeling of attachment, howsoever self-regarding in itself, must needs persist as a vague social feeling after its original purpose has been achieved. We have already anticipated this in speaking of the feeling of attachment itself,³ and we may now reinforce it from the standpoint of tenderness. For example, the ruff⁴ which remained 'inconsolable' until returned again to its mate, must have felt attachment for its fellow ruff, and this feeling, if it ever vented itself, must almost inevitably have passed into tenderness. As M. Ribot has pointed out,⁴ 'the primary tendency (to tenderness) is di-

¹ *Vide* p. 48, also Sutherland, *lib. cit.*, Vol. II., pp. 235, 251.

² Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' p. 125.

³ *Vide* p. 64.

⁴ Romanes, 'Animal Intelligence,' p. 246.

⁴ *Lib. cit.*, p. 237.

rected in children and animals to those who have been pleasant to them, or who have done them good and from whom they hope to receive it again.' Thus the feeling of attachment, viewed from the standpoint of tenderness, will stand for 'a mass of agreeable feeling' aroused by the mere presence of the kind, which will readily pass into tenderness.

Now that the hardship of the struggle is over, the perception of these kindred beings, intensified by actual contact of body with body, must awaken the thrill which betokens the tender feeling. Tenderness felt in the sight and the sound, the smell and, above all, the touch of fellow-beings, immediately seeks an outlet which is again this very bodily contact. 'Touch,' as Dr. Bain says, 'is both the alpha and the omega of affection.' Touch is at once the keenest stimulus to tenderness and also the characteristic mode of its expression. The expression of tender feeling we consider a form of play, for play takes not only the form of the mutual aid instinct, it may take any form or no form, and may rest upon the indefinable border-land between activity and repose. It is in such playful impulse that tenderness is expressed and maintained and finally brought to mature or habitual modes of expression.

The importance of tenderness in the functioning of sympathy we can best point out by showing its relation to the consciousness of kind. When we recall that consciousness of kind functions in situations where the impressions of other creatures (considered as such) fills the individual's field of attention, and that the typical situation is the state of repose, then it is clear that tenderness is apt to be present as a background in every thorough-going consciousness of kind. Even though the characteristic emotion of the consciousness of kind, when it passes into sympathy, is the feeling of attachment; yet, the individual's condition being not real but sympathetic, he retains throughout, to a greater or less extent, his condition of repose, and with it his tender feeling for the one sympathized with.¹

It is at this point that tenderness differentiates itself from the feeling of attachment. While the feeling of attachment springs out of a situation that aims at individual-conservation, and does

¹*Vide* p. 79.

no more than throw individuals together, tenderness seems to have no end but the other creature. With tenderness we pass beyond the period of the purely egoistic emotions, for in view of its end tenderness terminates upon another creature; and this to a great extent determines the inneity of the altruism in 'vicarious' sympathy.¹

With this conclusion we have arrived at a statement of the conditions underlying sympathy, so far as these conditions are evident in the gregarious social relationship, taken alone or apart from the domestic relationship. In the entire investigation the consciousness of kind is central. It is seen that the evolution of the affective factors hinges upon the evolution of the consciousness of kind. Moreover, if the foregoing argument is any forecast of the rise of sympathy, it is also to be seen that the sympathetic reaction itself is to a great extent an outcome of the consciousness of kind. Therefore, in the ensuing discussion the consciousness of kind will resume its central position and be the center of attack upon the problem.

So far as the gregarious relationship has yet evolved we are able to observe: (1) In the life of activity (work or play) the consciousness of kind is tentative, and at best short-lived. Outside of play and the enforced restraint on play, which is brief as well as infrequent, there will be little occasion for the consciousness of kind. (2) The form of relaxation called repose, where we shall eventually expect to find a clear expression of the consciousness of kind, shows to a large extent only blank indifference and individualism. As already stated, the consciousness of kind is still too weak to rescue repose and save it for further growths of social consciousness and sympathy.

The reason why the consciousness of kind remains necessarily so stunted in the gregarious relationship when taken alone, has been already attributed to the irrepressible activity of the creature while in social relations under the rubrics of the mutual aid instinct. Mere susceptibility to sense impressions (something not lacking even at this stage of mental evolution) is not sufficient for a consciousness of kind. The creature must needs interpret these impressions of other creatures at their real

¹ *Vide Ribot, lib. cit.*, pp. 234, 236.

worth ; *i. e.*, in such a way that he may recognize these perceived movements, sounds, etc., which are part and parcel of his instinct of self-conservation, as belonging to other selves. In order to find the occasion for such interpretation we now turn to the domestic relationship.

CHAPTER V.

RISE OF SYMPATHY IN THE FAMILY.

Coördination of Conditions.

The general instinct or impulse for the conservation of the species, when it reaches the plane of the domestic relationship, operates in the form of two instincts : viz., the sexual instinct and the parental instinct. Mr. J. Arthur Thomson¹ in saying, 'The love of mates broadened into parental and filial affection' seems to believe that the parental affection (tenderness) springs from the sexual instinct. We believe on the contrary that parental tenderness, so far as it is organic, needs no other explanation than the sensations of softness and warmth, which the mother feels when in bodily contact with her offspring. But just as little can we think that parental tenderness, after it has become representative and social, is the effect of sexual feeling after it has become 'the love of mates' or conjugal tenderness. A study of birds shows that parental tenderness sprang up as a variation upon the demand of infancy ; conjugal tenderness meanwhile arose very largely, as one of its consequences, in the common care of the eggs and the young. For this reason, and also because the parental feeling is confessedly 'a more potent socializer than sexual feeling' (Bain), we consider that the parental takes precedence ; and we shall expect to find the consciousness of kind first in the functioning of the parental instinct. Parenthetically it may be added that, if the consciousness of kind is found first in the parental relationship, then conjugal tenderness is indebted not only for its occasion to the parental instinct (in the common care of the young), but also for its very beginnings ; that is, the consciousness of kind, with its accompaniment of tenderness, will be transmitted for the parental, and mere sexual feeling will then pass into conjugal tenderness. On the other hand, the fact should not be overlooked that when the consciousness of kind has once arisen, it will present more en-

¹ 'The Study of Animal Life,' 1896, ch. 6, sec. 2.

during features in the conjugal than in the parental relationship; for the conjugal is a reciprocal relationship, while the parental is, as the term implies, one-sided.¹

Turning now to the parental relationship there are one or two general considerations to be mentioned. (1) We are reminded that the parental instinct has its beginnings with the echinodermata, 'which carry their eggs about, adhering to their body.'² In view of this fact the parental instinct appears contemporaneous with the gregarious social relationship; but at a level of mental evolution below the mutual aid instinct, as we have defined it.³ At the same time we are obliged to say that it has been evolving all this time *pari passu* with the evolution of the gregarious social relationship, each in turn influenced by the other. (2) We have found that the gregarious social relationship subsists largely in the instinct of mutual aid operating in defense attitudes. The parental relationship, we shall find, subsists in an instinct not only of *defense* but also and just as fully of *fosterage*. It is in the fosterage which the mother gives to her offspring that the consciousness of kind first comes to an expression adequate to produce sympathy.

Springing up at so primitive a period of mental evolution, before instincts have commenced to slough off into habit, the parental relationship anticipates by very considerable time the period of infancy; thus the instinct at its inception is mainly protective in aim. Aside from the preparation of the eggs for hatching, which might be considered indeed a kind of fosterage, it fulfils its function in watching and guarding the eggs, in warding off marauders, and the like. The rise of parental fosterage depends upon that state of abject helplessness in the offspring which we call infancy.⁴ The new-born brought into

¹ For a discussion of the conjugal relationship *vide* Sutherland, *lib. cit.*, Vol. I., ch. 7.

² Ribot, *lib. cit.*, p. 279.

³ *Vide* p. 36. This statement should not, however, be considered as yielding a point to the theory that a social relationship arose first out of the family. The position here taken is that the social arises independently of the domestic relationship, and develops under the rubrics of the gregarious instinct. The domestic relation does much, as we are now proceeding to show, to strengthen the gregarious social relationship.

⁴ As to the causes of infancy I can do no better than to refer to the admirable account of the influence of intelligence and conscious imitation upon inherited

the world in such a condition needs at every point the fostering care of the parent.¹ Thus the earliest form of the parental instinct, expressed as simple defence, now alters or enlarges to meet this new demand, and the mother comes into existence. We have now the situation of a helpless young, and a parent that both protects its offspring and also nurtures it.

While it is with the period of infancy that the parental relationship really begins to take shape (because it is the helpless young that elicits alike fosterage and protection), yet it is not these first expressions of the parental relationship that contribute a new impetus to the consciousness of kind; these first expressions are instinctive, and considered as such they are in no wise different from any primitive instincts for physical self-preservation. The eggs or the young are not felt by the mother as other than part of herself, and the defensive attitude that may arise in behalf of the offspring is no more than an instinct in the mother to preserve herself; and the same may also be said of the earliest fosterage (suckling the offspring).

It is only when the young begins to grow in the image of the mother that the parental relationship will be able to effect a growth in the consciousness of kind adequate to sympathy. Considered, therefore, that this period of the offspring's life has been reached when it has assumed some individuality and resemblance in form of body and expression of thought to the mother,² we observe the alteration that takes place in the self-consciousness of the mother, first on the side of nurture or fosterage. We presuppose that the mother has come abreast

or stereotyped instinct given by C. Lloyd Morgan, 'Animal Life and Intelligence,' pp. 452-3.

¹ As to where in the race development infancy arises, there is much uncertainty. The present position inclines rather to the view of Sutherland (*lib. cit.*, ch. 1) that in so far as infancy is conditioned by the rise of the representative consciousness, we fix its rise not lower than but as low as the fishes. That there is so slight a manifestation of infancy upon this level, comes obviously of the fact that representative consciousness is still such a slight factor of life. As we know from the facts of natural history, infancy is first clearly manifested upon the level of the warm-blooded types.

² This resemblance would arise, in general, from the fact that the young belong to the same species as the mother; but much more from the fact that the mother has been duplicated by the young in *imitation*.

of her full heritage of self-consciousness, as forecast in the preceding pages.

Rise of the Consciousness of Kind.

Suppose the absence of all hostile force: the maternal instinct on the defensive side is quiescent. The maternal instinct on the nutritive side is active. The massive pleasures of tender feeling are felt to the full, for the young is now like the mother, and every touch, every sound and movement even of her young will minister to tenderness and thrill the susceptible mother-consciousness. We may picture the mother at tender play with the young, or the young at play alone; whatever the situation may be, the young, just because it is her young, occupies the focus of maternal attention throughout a prolonged period of time. For the same reason also her attention is self-forgetful. This is the important fact. This is the fact which brought us to investigate the domestic relation, and again this fact obliges us now in the domestic relation to turn, not to the young in its play, for play is a matter of life and death to the young, but to the mother. Whatever the dialectic of self-consciousness may be, the mother's attention terminates not upon herself, but upon her young.

It is thus that the mind of the mother, 'intensely possessed with the image of the young,' its attitudes and expressions, begins gradually, 'by dim associations and vague comparisons, actually to recognize herself in the young. This recognition means, in the first place, that the mother perceives in the young traits like those she has already perceived in herself; but more than this, it means that the mother becomes conscious of the young no longer as mere body in spatial distinction from her own body: she becomes conscious of the young as really and truly herself. It is the 'eject' of herself — the alter-ego. This identity — the identity of the subject's own felt body and the presented body — is the characteristic moment of the consciousness of kind. At the same time it must be borne in mind that bound up in this consciousness of identity there is also the consciousness of difference. As already anticipated in the Introduction, the mother perceives herself in the young, which makes the young irrevocably herself; yet just because the young

is perceived as it is, another creature separate and distinct from the mother, the mother's notion of herself does not cover her notion of the young. The mother, at the same time that she is conscious of the identity, is conscious that there is more of the young than in the identity. The young, at the same time that it becomes herself, becomes also another self, having a character and individuality of its own, yet bound all the time to the mother in the mother's consciousness that the young is herself, as she at that moment pictured herself. We say 'as she *at that moment* pictured herself'; for it should be borne in mind in this interpretation of the consciousness of kind that the recognition at this comparatively low level of mental evolution is not a recognition in terms of a general notion. The mother has not a general but a receptual¹ self-consciousness; and when she recognizes herself in her young, it is a recognition of herself in certain *definite* situations.

When we reflect upon the course of the argument, it appears that we have accounted for the consciousness of kind by the same processes used in the account of sympathy. This is due to the fact that the consciousness of kind is precisely the recognition of one's self in another, which we considered in the definition to be the determining condition of the sympathetic reaction. In saying that the consciousness of kind is a determining condition of sympathy, we do not mean that it is the sole condition or the entire account of the conscious content underlying each and every sympathy; for inasmuch as sympathy functions in a situation of repose, it is plain that tenderness — the characteristic emotion of repose — is also a condition of sympathy. It seems, then, that consciousness of kind, accompanied by tenderness, is the complex consciousness underlying sympathy. But even this statement must be qualified, for it applies only to the sympathy of the domestic relationship. The feeling of attachment has dropped out of consideration in this discussion of the domestic relationship, but yet it is none the less a factor of the gregarious relationship, and it forms a constituent part of the consciousness underlying gregarious or social sympathy. Thus it will appear that there is a different quality or feeling-tone in social sympathy than in domestic sympathy.

¹ Romanes, 'Mental Evolution in Man,' pp. 34, 40-43.

The relation of tenderness to consciousness of kind at this point it is well to emphasize again. Tenderness, as the characteristic maternal feeling in time of peace and repose, operates from the first in the care of the young. By it the mother was led to observe her young, whence the consciousness of kind arose. With the recognition of self in another, which is the consciousness of kind, tenderness becomes at once social and representative. The mother in the experience of tender feeling at the same time feels that these, her offspring, are of her kind. In each perception she perceives herself, and the impelling power in tenderness is the consciousness of kind.¹ Thus tenderness is, in one view, the cause of the consciousness of kind; in the other view, it is the effect; or, to put it less paradoxically, organic tenderness, a condition of the consciousness of kind, passes into an emotion of tenderness through the function of the consciousness of kind in repose. If we consider, without unnecessary analysis of these notions, that tender emotion is an expression of the consciousness of kind, then we may speak from now on of the consciousness of kind constituting a social relationship in repose² through acts of tenderness.

Tenderness takes various forms, adapted to the habits of nurture, peculiar to the parental instinct of the species in question. The mother bird we see, stroking out the scanty feathers of her brood; the mother dog we see, licking her young; the mother monkey does this too, and also plays with her young, and enjoys the embrace in a manner quite analogous to the human mother. Each one of these expressions of maternal affectionateness becomes a distinct motor attitude, existing not for the sake of the individual as such, but for the sake of a fellow creature. Moreover, as the consciousness of kind functions in each attitude of tenderness, we consider that the social relationship has now come to expression in the states of repose. If it be borne in mind that it is in repose that sympathy is made possible³ — repose that is not indifference, but tender interest like the present — then there is still needed, under such condi-

¹*Cf.* p. 81 f.

²*Cf.* p. 59.

³ *Cf.* p. 10 f.

tions, only the specific situation, such as is portrayed in the Introduction; and the mother will pass into sympathy for her young.

With this outcome we have a fair statement of the conscious content immediately underlying sympathy. Since our main object is the rise and function of sympathy in the gregarious social relationship, we might very properly proceed now to show how the domestic relationship may serve to bring social sympathy into existence. On the other hand, as sympathy, we find, arises or functions first in the domestic relationship, it will elucidate the main investigation very much if we carry the discussion of sympathy in the domestic relationship on to its conclusion. Then we shall understand more thoroughly the exigencies of the main investigation.

Rise of Sympathy.

Sympathy, while distinctly conditioned by repose, is not in its actual operation a matter of repose as repose is here defined.¹

Sympathy, let it be said, is a reflex of life and action. Sympathy is not relief from the struggle for existence, but participation in the struggle *as seen in another*. Therefore, it is not in repose as such so much as in repose from the struggle for self that a sympathy operates. In view of this fact, the statement we have made of the consciousness of kind in repose is introductory to the other aspect of the parental relationship, *i. e.*, the parental defense, to which we turn in order to show the rise of sympathy in the domestic relationship.

The defensive attitude of the parental instinct we found at first to be merely a form of the presocial instinct for individual preservation, because to the consciousness of the mother her eggs or her unformed young were but part and parcel of herself. With the emergence of a more mature consciousness of kind it is plain that the character of the parental defense has altered. Now when the mother fights for the young it is no longer as for something felt to be like food and drink, but for something felt to be a fellow creature. At the same time the sympathetic reaction, under conditions of real struggle, is so

¹ *Vide* p. 49.

slight that we will disregard it here¹ and suppose a special situation in which the sympathy is very striking.

When the hostile force *X* has been repulsed, the further attitude of the mother toward the young will be either parental tenderness or parental defense, according to circumstances. As a special case in point, suppose the young has been wounded. It utters cries of pain and writhes in torture. It was just such cries and movements that first aroused the motor attitude of defense in the mother. As they continue, the motor attitude with its feeling accompaniment continues to be reinstated, howbeit there is no longer a hostile force, and hence nothing to defend. Now if the mother, at the same time that she continues to reinstate the motor attitudes of resistance, realizes that she herself is in safety, the situation is plainly sympathetic; for how can she continue to experience movements of resistance and feelings of anger, realizing all the time that she herself is in safety, except as they are reinstated for the sake of the young, and in the reinstatement are at once referred to the young?² This we consider a possible situation in the history of the race wherein sympathy might arise. But it would leave the situation only half stated if the 'vicarious' sympathetic *expression* of the mother were left unnoticed.

It is certain that just so long as the cries, etc., of the young continue, a motor attitude of some sort must operate in the mother, and we have no reason to believe that this particular motor attitude of resistance will cease to obtain (even in spite of the fact that there is no longer a hostile force present) if it were not for the prior claims (prior, now that there is no hostile force present) of another motor attitude, viz., that of parental tenderness. This is really and truly a motor attitude; for, as will be recalled, the same sense-organs which stimulate resistance and anger do also in times of repose stimulate tenderness, expressed in definite motor attitudes of licking, stroking, embracing and

¹ *Vide* p. 82 f.

² Compare with the above the statement by Professor Baldwin, 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' Appendix D, that the objective reaction of sympathy ('social' organic imitation) becomes subjective sympathy in so far as *A* comes to realize a distinction between a case where he is merely the observer of an attack on *B*, and a case in which he is himself threatened by *X*.

the like. We may therefore believe that the sympathetic state will subside, or rather will emerge into the volitional state of parental tenderness. The parent who was defending is now attending the young; 'the fiery enthusiasm has passed into brooding tenderness,' and to the best of her ability the mother is assuaging her young one's distress. In this final output of tender feeling expressed in definite attitudes which are at once social and representative, we have what is called the *vicarious* expression of sympathy.

We now sum up the contribution of the parental relationship to sympathy. (1) In fosterage: (a) The feeling of tenderness as expressed in certain motor attitudes of parental affectionateness is *sui generis* in the history of the race, for it is not evolved in behalf of the individual—including others merely as a useful variation—but in behalf of a fellow creature. Primitive organic tenderness aroused by the sense of touch is much strengthened in the mother by the evolution of the other sense-organs in the young. (b) We have the rise of the consciousness of kind, as the mother's recognition of herself in her young. This consciousness of kind functions in fosterage and also in defense. (c) The consciousness of kind functioning in specific motor attitudes constitutes what will be a social relationship while the creatures are in repose. Its characteristic emotion is tenderness. (2) In terms of the consciousness of kind, the mother *defends* her young. The attitude of defense becomes sympathetic when it is reinstated, not in recognition of a hostile force, but solely in recognition of the signs of the hostile force, emitted at the time by the young. In the full cognizance of safety, the mother feels as she felt when in danger, upon perceiving the cries and movements of her young. The emotions accompanying the motor attitude center not about herself but about her young, in whose welfare her interest is fixed; and this is sympathy. Finally, the parental relationship returns from defense to fosterage with the infusion of tenderness into her parental attitude toward the young, which gives the sympathy its vicarious expression.

CHAPTER VI.

RISE OF SYMPATHY IN THE RACE.

We have now indicated in briefest outline the contribution to the rise of sympathy in the race from the side of the parental relationship. With the exception of the feeling of attachment (the feeling peculiar to coöperation in the gregarious social relationship) the parental relationship has brought the conditions to sympathy to their full stature. With these results in hand we may now proceed to our end-object, which is the rise and function of sympathy in the gregarious social relationship.

The question may be stated thus: How do these conditions, which have produced sympathy in the parental relationship, get carried over into the gregarious social relationship, and how are they wrought into the warp and woof of the gregarious social relationship, so as to supply its present lack and produce sympathy? This effect is clearly possible, in the first instance, only in so far as the parental nature will survive and continue to a greater or less degree to function after its excitant — the helpless young — has ceased to exist. In the first place, we have already had reason to state that parental defense, in its simplest forms at least, will strengthen the mutual aid instinct, and it seems unreasonable to suppose that the parental relationship in its mature form should die out utterly so soon as the young grow up and pass into the larger life of the gregarious relationship. In particular, the tendency of a herd to mass at a weak point of the defense may to a certain extent be accounted for by the persistence of parental defense in the gregarious relationship. We should also cite Brehm's account of how a baboon saved, at the risk of his life, the life of a younger member of the band, as an instance in support of this view (*vide* p. 87). In the second place, the domestic relationship becomes in time more than the parental relationship, and we would do the domestic relationship an injustice should we fail to incorporate the conjugal and

especially the filial aspects. Conjugal tenderness and sympathy we have considered an effect very largely of the parental relationship, in so far as the parents work together in the care and protection of the young. Besides the intense tenderness bound up in the sexual feeling after the consciousness of kind has reached maturity, and largely because of this tenderness, sympathy in the conjugal relationship will be peculiarly well marked. Although in the higher forms of monogamy the influences of the conjugal relationship upon society are beneficent, yet at this stage it is 'without expansive force of elasticity'; it tends 'rather toward social restriction than toward social expansion.'¹

The filial relationship concerns the problem very especially, because the offspring are learning these traits of the mother directly in view of the larger life of the kind; indeed it might be said that, just in proportion as the young acquire the habits of the mother, they will live less and less to the domestic relationship, more and more to the gregarious relationship. The imitation of the mother, whereby the young acquire the habits of the kind produces, as already explained, a distinct self-modification. The young not only sees the mother, but comes through imitation to feel the way she does, and in the seasons of repose so characteristic of the domestic relationship the young in a dim way will recognize itself in the mother. There again, then, the consciousness of kind comes into being.²

The consciousness of kind, at first vague and tentative but constantly increasing in intensity and in coherency, the young now carries with it into the larger and more varied life of the gregarious relationship. We have considered that the consciousness of kind first arose in play and the restraint upon play and reached maturity in the domestic relationship. It is also emphatic to notice that in the young this experience of the race is now reduplicated. As the young enters the larger circle

¹ Ribot, *lib. cit.*, p. 279.

² J. Mark Baldwin, 'Mental Development in the Child and the Race,' pp. 123-4, points out that the child, when imitative, is 'hesitating and watchful.' "The infant waits to see how others act." From this observation it is seen that the consciousness of kind emerges in ontogeny through a situation of 'restraint' analogous to that in phylogeny.

of his kind, his consciousness of kind gains content and character from out the struggle for existence. As he fights with his fellows the common battles of life (either real or playful), he is brought into conscious, end-seeking relations with the others of his own kind. His conscious self grasps its fellow along with itself,¹ which gives the creature real experience of what it means to be of a kind with others. The consciousness of kind, being thus experienced in the life of coöperation, becomes fully recognized in repose, when the creature is relieved from the pressure of the struggle for existence. Thus we observe that in the gregarious relationship the consciousness of kind, after a manner analogous to its operation in the domestic relationship, becomes able in and of itself to constitute a social relationship. Thus social relationship will operate to a greater or less extent throughout the length and breadth of the social consciousness.²

In order to understand sympathy, we should not forget this constant consciousness of kind, with its accompanying feelings of either the feeling of attachment or tenderness (according to whether the creature is in repose or in the struggle for existence). In the words of Professor Volkmann,³ it is 'eine gewisse Solidarität der beiden Persönlichkeiten' which every sympathetic reaction presupposes. On the other hand, it saves us some perplexity when we consider how rare observable instances of sympathy are in the lower orders, if we remember that as the consciousness of kind arose first not along the line of any and every life-habit, but in defense alone, and reached its first mature expressions exclusively in the domestic relationship; so we cannot expect the creature to be conscious of kind throughout the length and breadth of his life. The creature is never thoroughly social; the creature is never thoroughly and completely conscious of kind; consequently, while the creature having the consciousness of kind in defense (*e. g.*) may on occasion experience a sympathetic reaction along that line, yet he may never (possibly) experience anything but anger and hostility along the line of nutrition (*e. g.*).

¹ A. T. Ormond, *lib. cit.*, p. 256.

² *Vide* p. 75 f.

³ 'Lehrbuch d. Psychologie,' 1895, Vol. II., S. 380.

Inasmuch as sympathy is dependent to so great extent upon the attitude which creatures may sustain toward each other in periods of repose, the clearer the conception we have of this condition, the more natural will appear the rise of sympathy. We have just said that the consciousness of kind operates throughout the length and breadth of the social consciousness; and this statement applies especially to the social consciousness in repose, where the consciousness of kind functions as a social relationship in definite attitudes of tenderness.¹ To put the condition concretely, when I ask why I sympathize with one person rather than with another, and I answer, I like the first better, I am pleased with his face, I have shared with him the sorrows of life and doubled its joys, it signifies the presence of the consciousness of kind in some form or other; it signifies also, as the direct occasion or impulse to sympathize, a deep undercurrent of tender feeling toward the object of the sympathy. From analogy with adult consciousness we believe we have attained some such situation in animal consciousness. When we recall this ever-present social relationship in the consciousness of kind, and at the same time the attachments that leave with the creatures a never-ending need and desire of living together, and when in view of these bonds we picture the warm flow of tender feeling, having no end to the creature's consciousness but its own gratification, and consummating itself in definite motor attitudes upon another creature, we have in view the seed-bed for the upgrowth of sympathy. Adam Smith² thinks that such 'affection is in reality nothing but habitual sympathy.' Affection (tenderness), we consider, is in reality nothing but the emotion accompanying consciousness of kind in states of repose. As already pointed out on p. 175, only the situation for the rise of a sympathy is a state of repose. The actual operation of sympathy is that of activity. To repeat our previous statements, the situation for sympathy is determined first by coöperation in work and in play, which gives content and character to the consciousness of kind, then by the expression of the consciousness of kind in reposeful tenderness. Finally,

¹*Vide* p. 75 f.

²*Lib. cit.*, p. 323.

sympathy itself is made immediately possible through the condition of repose on the part of the creature. And then, when sympathy springs up and expresses itself, it functions as active coöperation — coöperation for the self in another. As we come now to point out the sympathetic reaction itself, we understand that the discussion hinges about the consciousness of kind in active coöperations. The two principal factors of the domestic relationship—the parental and the filial—may be considered as interworking in this operation of the consciousness of kind.

The coöperative act will not *appear* different now that it springs from social intelligence than when it was instinctive. The difference is not in the act, but in the motive or the thought that precedes and may impel the act. In the first place, *A* watching *B* for signs of the foe is also conscious of *B* as his fellow creature; this is the permanent fellow-feeling or solidarity-feeling between the two creatures, which we would call potential sympathy. Suppose that the foe appears and *B* gives the warning which signifies an attack. *A* has now reinstated the motor attitude of defense; the feeling of attachment functions, brings the image of *B* into the focus of attention, and *A* is irresistibly drawn toward *B*. This is the instinct of mutual aid in operation, but differs therefrom in that the motor attitude does not pass instinctively into movement. On account of the permanent presence of the consciousness of kind there obtains for a moment, while *A* is still in safety, merely an ‘internal excitation,’ and in this moment the feelings accompanying the motor attitude center around *B* and the sympathetic reference is made.

It is this fleeting instant of repose before the struggle that witnesses to the birth of social sympathy. It matters not how evanescent the sympathy may be, or how individualistic the actual coöperation may become, the impulse of self-conservation has included the thought of another, which is recognized as a self—identical with and yet distinct from itself; and this thought has yielded a sympathy upon which the coöperation follows. Looked at from the standpoint of this sympathetic moment, we might also say that the coöperation is its vicarious expression. When Dr. Sully¹ speaks of ‘active helpfulness’

¹ *Lit. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 111, n. 1.

as 'the most prominent element in the rudimentary sympathy of animals,' he may mean just this conscious coöperation, which, while so largely instinctive, may yet be looked upon, in view of its eventual outcome, as the expression of sympathy.

With this outcome we have in some measure shown the rise of sympathy in the race, and here ends properly the introduction to the ethics of sympathy. It would, however, leave us with very little anchorage for the further investigation of the subject, if the discussion were left altogether without a forecast of the lines upon which the ethical import of sympathy might be determined. Such a forecast we shall now attempt very briefly to make. Our end object will be to show that sympathy may effect a consciously initiated variation upon the existing social relationship (so-called) in coöperations, which will transform the social structure and start a distinctly inner social evolution.¹

¹There have been consciously initiated variations upon the social relationship previous to this period. 'Vicarious' sympathy is *sui generis* among these in that it is the first to make the existing social relationship in coöperations worthy of the name; *i. e.*, it is the first to make it inner and conscious—a social relationship, as we humans know! it.

FUNCTION OF SYMPATHY IN SOCIALITY.

It will be recalled that the social relationship arose in the beginning as a means for attaining in greater degree or more readily the well-being of the individual. In time the creature became representative, but the consequent refinements of the social relationship also arose and persisted in order that the individual might effect certain adjustments and survive in the impending struggle for existence.¹ Coöperations (so-called) were directed not first of all in behalf of a fellow-creature, but in behalf of the individual, and only included in their course the fellow-creature. Thus the end and aim of the creature remained as in the presocial state; the creature only acted differently in pursuit thereof.

With the genesis and evolution of the consciousness of kind we have discovered a change in the social relationship so far as periods of repose are concerned. While the social relationship up to this time has functioned only in the active life of the creature and lapsed when the need for mutual aid ceased, now the consciousness of kind, having reached maturity, functions during repose and operates as a social relationship in definite attitudes of tender feeling.² As Professor Giddings³ has admirably expressed this condition: "When integration has been accomplished a certain internal necessity obliges the social mind to maintain the union after its original purpose has been achieved. The consciousness of kind is the compelling power."

This social relationship is clearly a consciously initiated variation upon existing social structure. Moreover, it is a variation running distinctly counter to the social relationship as already in operation, for it plainly has not individual self-con-

¹ This includes also such social conscious imitations as may arise at this period. The creature imitates, but it does not follow from the imitation itself that he is conscious of his copy as standing for another self.

² *Vide* p. 82.

³ *Lib. cit.*, pp. 169, 170.

servation as its end ; it seems to have no end except the pleasure of expressing tenderness and attachment toward another. This contribution to social structure, from its peculiar nature as terminating upon another creature who is recognized as a fellow creature, is the first step on the road to conscious and inner social evolution. It is the first appearance of anything like society as we know it. Such fellow-feeling and affectionateness does not spring from sympathy, for it is grounded in repose ; but in connection with sympathy it constitutes altruism as we know it.¹

So much may now be said for the first consciously initiated variation upon primordial individualism in social structure. But so much is indeed little contributed to the making of society. Society, if it means anything, means a structure built out of the great life-needs of the creature. It is this thing of activity and struggle that must be varied and transformed through sympathetic and altruistic dispositions, if there is ever to arise a society which is conscious and psychic to its very bone and marrow. Mere tenderness, subsisting as it does in repose—freedom from the struggle for existence—can have little influence upon the active life of the creature. It can do little in and of itself to stem the tide of ‘selfish singleness’ when creatures are fairly in the ‘struggle.’

So far as we can yet tell, coöperations have not lost sight of their original utility, which is individual preservation ; and if this be so, then certainly it is the consciousness of kind, operating in coöperations, which is not yet impressive enough to produce a sympathy capable of transforming the social relationship of active life. We have already noted a wave of sympathetic feeling preceding every coöperation, and it is this sympathetic moment to which we look for the rescue of the social relationship in active life from its primordial individualism. What is needed is a consciousness of kind so tender, so susceptible to others, and at the same time so self-conscious,

¹ This aspect of tender feeling as active altruism we have already dwelt upon in speaking of the vicarious sympathy of the mother toward its wounded young (*vide* p. 77). The importance of altruism in the family group, in order to the development of altruism in the political group, is not by any means a new discovery. See remarks upon this fact by Spencer, ‘*Prin. of Ethics*,’ Pt. I., § 76.

as to hold steadily in view the other creature.¹ Then in the struggle sympathy will function so steadfastly that the vicarious expression must needs follow and work its change upon the stereotyped mutual aid instinct.

We cannot say that such a consciousness of kind will become normal in the lower orders. At the same time, if social progress proceeds not in a straight line but as it were by leaps of equilibrium, it may be that some genius, some preëminently social animal may appear, whose consciousness of kind will override the instincts of self-preservation and thus transform, in his own consciousness, the social relationship which has been existing for his individual well-being. This transformation when once fixed may become a copy for social imitation; and thus the inner, conscious social relationship will be put fairly on its way.

In order to show an instance (presumably) of the phenomenon in question, we shall cite the case of Brehm's encounter with the baboons: we quote in substance from Darwin's statement of the anecdote. 'A great troop of baboons were crossing a valley; some had already ascended the opposite mountain, and some were still in the valley; the latter were attacked by the dogs, but the old males immediately hurried down from the rocks, and roared so fearfully that the dogs retreated. They were again encouraged to the attack; but by this time all the baboons had reascended the heights, except a young one about six months old, who, loudly calling for aid, climbed on a rock, and was surrounded. Now one of the largest males came down again from the mountain, slowly went to the young one, coaxed him, and led him away, the dogs being too much astonished to make an attack.'² In this instance the outstanding features are: the striking coöperation of the band; its failure to assist in the escape of a single individual; the rescue of the individual by a single member of the band. The conduct of the single baboon, thrown into relief against the conduct of the band, might yield the situation we are in search of.

¹ "In order that this feeling attain any considerable degree of development, representation must have acquired a certain vividness, clearness and stability." Sully, *lib. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 104; *cf.* also Spencer, 'Princ. of Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 565.

² 'Descent of Man,' Vol. I., pp. 72-73.

It is a striking instance that we see of coöperation in defense of the males. According to our interpretation, there is working a consciousness of kind, so that the creature carries with him into the defense the consciousness of the other creatures as being his fellows. At the same time, the fact that the band does not return to the rescue of the single individual appears to indicate that even though the consciousness of kind may function, yet it is insufficient to effect any material change in the structure of coöperation. The creatures follow the impulse to mass, and the mutual aid instinct continues to operate in its pristine simplicity; meanwhile the member on the rock is left to shift for himself.

The single individual is also conscious of kind, but in a far more thorough-going and able fashion. The old male, with so clear a consciousness of himself in the stranded member, must sympathize and sympathize again, until the rescue ensues. In commenting upon this instance, Darwin writes:¹ "We may, if we choose, call these actions instinctive; but such cases are much too rare for the development of any special instinct." We consider that this act of the baboon is to be accounted for under a new principle, viz., the volitional or vicarious expression of sympathy. 'Vicarious' sympathy, considered solely in the light of the 'fixed idea,'² is, to be sure, scarcely removed from egoism; it may be egoism in disguise; but considered together with tenderness, vicarious sympathy is given an unmistakable distinctiveness among conscious states. Tenderness fairly buries the act in another self, and thus makes the altruism of sympathy a state of consciousness, *an und für sich*. Thus the act of the baboon, while a consciously initiated variation upon the existing social relationship in mutual aid, differentiates itself from all other consciously initiated variations (upon the mutual aid instinct) in that it fastens upon another creature; it is really and truly the welfare of this other individual that is the end and aim in view. Consequently, since the end and aim of the mutual aid instinct is self-preservation, this variation will so far transform the social relationship in mutual aid, and further-

¹ *Lib. cit.*, ch. 3.

² *Vide* Dr. Bain, *lib. cit.*, p. 121.

more, wherever the two ends clash the altruistic end will so far work to the downfall of the egoistic.

This altruistic impulse, if once set as a copy for social imitation, may react upon the consciousness of kind, enriching and deepening it, to the extent that such acts as that of the baboon will in time become part and parcel of the social environment. Thus the primitive love of self, having become so far a love of self through others, may in time become 'a native sentiment as imperious under certain circumstances as egoism.'¹ This will certainly start a relationship, which is inner in the sense that it involves each other's very life interests — and that, with conscious intent; the individual will no longer fight against a hostile force, incorporating the aid of others in his own behalf, but fights consciously in behalf of another, as well as in behalf of himself.

This change, it must be noted, does not occur through any loss of activity or vitality. It is not because the creature is less ardently in the struggle, but because the consciousness of kind so bright and warm induces spontaneously the sympathy which transforms his individualism. Beginning at this period, and without error of analogy, it may be said that all coöperation, when intelligent and self-conscious, is grounded, at least to a certain extent, in sympathy, whose expression is this very coöperation; this is the starting-point of society as we know it.

While we have thus strongly put the case in behalf of sympathy, it would be false to the first principles of moral philosophy for us to conclude that with the genesis of sympathy in social interaction the genesis of the ethical nature has been properly explained. The ethical consciousness is to be found right within the individual's own development. If we take a creature in process of developing, we will find that, up to a certain point in the growth, the creature's end and aim is his own individual welfare. Even though social structure has become coherent, and certain constraints are put upon him by his community, yet he retains, under the guise of coöperation, his primordial individualism. By this it is not meant that the creature is necessarily unsympathetic. He may sympathize even to the point of active

¹ Topinard, *lib. cit.*, p. 246.

altruism, but it is a sympathy of leisure and luxury. He does not require of himself any sacrifice for others of the self that is being realized; consequently it may happen that at times, when society enjoins altruism upon him, his motives are mixed. Now when altruism, already a recognized law of social order, becomes intrinsic to the creature's own self-activity, the creature's attitude changes. His obligation and his self-realization are now at one, and from this time on he is so far consistently ethical.

By this it is not meant that the ethical consciousness consists necessarily in the choice of another's welfare any more than in the choice of his own. His consciousness is now ethical, because he recognizes a personal sanction in the obligation laid upon him to be altruistic, and the welfare of others, hitherto a compulsion, becomes as internal to his own purpose as his own welfare.

While his motives in coöperation were mixed, now they are pure. Both lines of action, which he now may hold before him, are equally self-originated and autonomous; therefore the end which he chooses does justice to both. They are grounded alike in the consciousness of his own self-realization. The altruistic attitude, which is the vicarious expression of sympathy, contriving to furnish one great sphere of obligation in the creature's social life, must necessarily always remain a component of the end which is ethical.

APPENDIX.—An actual animal society in which 'the natural language of fear' predominates, is that of the herring. Mr. Sutherland writes:¹ "When 10,000 young herring swim together, the prowling monsters which one of them might fail to see will surely be detected by some one or other out of the huge mass, and when it darts away, its neighbors instinctively follow and the whole swarm is instantly in full flight." At this stage the perception of the creature's fellows is dull, his 'social' organic imitation in consequence sporadic, and the social relationship unstable. In higher gregarious forms, such as sheep, we find the creature's perception of his fellow's defense attitudes keener, 'social' organic imitation habitual and the social rela-

¹ *Lib. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 293.

tionship in consequence explicit and stable. For an enlarged statement of the gregarious social relationship *vide* Spencer, 'Principles of Psychology,' 1887, II., pp. 562, 563, and Galton, 'Inquiries into Human Faculty,' sec. on 'Gregarious and Slavish Instincts,' especially p. 75, commencing, 'But a herd of such animals, when considered as a whole, is on the alert; at almost every moment some eyes, ears and noses will command all approaches,' etc.

Moreover, there is not only this general expectation of movements, etc., signifying the imminence of the hostile force, but also in some forms a special expectation from particular sources. An anxious old male, invariably the first to scent or see the enemy, comes to be singled out as the proper danger signal. The members of the herd then instinctively count upon his vigilance to save them from the actual presence of the enemy, and thus a real, if one-sided dependence, is set up. This fact of the sentinel, while not very productive in itself, is a valuable adjunct, as we pointed out on p. 55, in the growth of social consciousness.