

In past years experimenters generally have looked for an explanation of feelings in the reactions of the respiratory and circulatory systems. Drawing any conclusions from these involuntary movements is a difficult matter. Johnston believes the voluntary types of movement would lend themselves more fully to characterization and classification, and that to describe feelings one must describe bodily attitudes or incipient tendencies to adjustments which always accompany the feeling. Feelings may show themselves by different bodily modifications in different persons so that no definite localization can be made which would apply to all persons.

The author shows the difficulties which are presented in an experimental study of this problem. These may briefly be summarized as follows:

Good introspective notes are difficult. Feelings have qualitative relations to other feelings. Feelings tend to fuse into a single elemental feeling. Feelings cannot exist without the sensational elements. A brief summary of the views held in regard to feelings precedes this discussion.

In connection with this article should be noted the author's earlier published experiment in the *Harvard Psychological Studies* entitled 'Combination of Feelings.'

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Ueber Urtheilsgefühle. THEODOR LIPPS. Arch. f. d. ges. Psych., VII., 1-33.

This is one of Lipps' bits of logical deductions marked, as is usual, by fine distinctions and strict respect for his premises. The premises for the argument are that feeling arises only through checking or furthering of activities. Judgment on the other hand is an act, the goal of a completed activity, and therefore no longer open to the influence of furtherance or retardation. There can then be no feeling attached to judgment itself.

Every object must, however, be apperceived and as this process may be furthered or checked, the perception of every object gives rise to pleasure or its opposite. Similarly, we picture ourselves or others as having acted freely or as opposed in action and these remembered or possible struggles or lack of struggle give rise to pleasure. *Æsthetic* pleasure too is an *Einfühlung* of activity of this kind. There attaches to every judgment a feeling; but it is not inherent in the judgment itself but is connected with the uncontested presence of the idea; it is idea feeling not judgment feeling.

Granted all the assumptions, as I presume few would be willing to do, the author's conclusions seem assured.

Les caractères affectifs de la perception. DR. WAYNBAUM.
Jour. de psych. norm. et path., IV., 289-311.

Dr. Waynbaum attempts in this article to account for the fact that perceptions arouse emotions. He finds that there are two distinct forms of emotion associated with the perceptions, the reflex and the conceptual or sympathetic. The first form arises through the reflex excitation of the emotional center in the floor of the fourth ventricle. Whenever the perceptions are new or unexpected they spread in some degree or other to this center, otherwise they go directly over the ascending paths to the cortex. The more conscious form of affectivity arises through the path that connects the cortical ideational centers with the lower emotional centers. It is this that gives rise to all symbolically aroused emotions, to sympathy and all other emotions that arise through or as the result of contemplation. Music attains most of its charm through the second connection, as is evident from the fact that enjoyment grows on repetition.

The article as a whole is a well written application of the current theory of emotion. The relatively new suggestion of the two paths corresponds fairly closely to the usual distinction between feeling and emotion, but seems difficult to apply in practice, more difficult in fact than the present distinction.

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PSYCHOPHYSICS OF HEARING.

Die Beeinflussung der Sinnesfunktionen durch geringe Alkoholmengen. I. Teil: *Das Verhalten von Unterschiedsschwelle und Reizschwelle im Gebiet des Gehörssinnes.* WILHELM SPECHT.
Archiv f. d. ges. Psychologie, 1907, IX., 180-295.

The purpose of this investigation is the scientific study of the influence of alcohol on mental processes. The difficulty of observations on this influence lies in the the fact that introspection as a rule is impossible. This disadvantage is offset, however, by the possibility of using quantitative variation, by administering different doses of the drug. The subject need suffer no lasting ill effect if only a limited series of experiments is taken.

Since Exner's first publication on the effect of alcohol on mental processes, a great number of investigations have been carried on along