

ETHOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

In the *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW* for September, 1899, Mr. C. B. Bliss reviews my pamphlets on Ethology in sympathetic and appreciative fashion. These pamphlets were prepared primarily at the suggestion of one of my colleagues at the University of California and for the purpose of giving the University people some idea of the work I was trying to do. New work is always in great need of both criticism and sympathy. I hungered and do hunger for both. Knowing that my colleagues could find out more about the work if they wanted to, I ventured to pack into a very few pages an amount of material far too great to be clearly set forth in anything less than a good-sized book. As some of the readers of this *REVIEW* may agree with Mr. Bliss that the work is important, perhaps I may be pardoned if I comment on the impression my work has produced on—may I say—my fellow-psychologists. The history of the terms 'Education as Related to Character' and 'Ethology' cannot well be discussed here; suffice it to say, they have a history and are largely due to local conditions. I certainly have no desire to give new names when they can be avoided.

In a sense, all the sciences that have to do with consciousness may be called psychology. I do not plead guilty to the charge of holding unworthy views of psychology. Unless, however, the social sciences, philosophy, and the study of education must all be called psychology, I cannot agree that the science of the development of concrete character ought to be called a chapter in psychology. If we agree that all the sciences concerning themselves with consciousness should be called psychology, I see no reason why the term 'ethology' should not be changed to 'ethological psychology.' In one sense, geology may be called 'geological physics.'

I am exceedingly sorry if I have given the impression that I regard psychology as 'unsympathetic, mechanical and lifeless.' Such an assertion certainly does not occur in my writings. For instance, I regard the teaching of psychology by my colleague, Professor Stratton, as sympathetic, organic and full of life. Perhaps Mr. Bliss will agree with me that what is *ordinarily* spoken of as 'empirical psychology' does not deal with concrete character, however much it may concern itself with interesting and concrete psychical experience. The other psychological sciences deal with various aspects of our complex character-life; ethological psychology deals with these aspects in their interrelation as functions of actual characters. Hence, for instance,

ethology is particularly interested in the study of scientific biography. Most of my advanced students are working on biography. 'Child-study' is regarded by us as a phase of biography. We try to keep the characters we study 'all of a piece' as far as we can. Hence the necessity of using diagrams. "A science of character must make the whole man significant, must show his development in all its aspects, must integrate the ethological aspects of biological, psychological, social and historical sciences, as well as relate itself to the various philosophical disciplines." In the sentence just quoted I am willing to strike out all of the adjectives qualifying the word 'sciences' except the term 'the psychological.' Ethology would still remain as a chapter of psychology very different in its method and standpoint from all the other chapters.

The 'cone' diagram in my pamphlet is not intended to show all aspects of the subject. Diagrams are like parables; they must not be taken too literally or pushed too far. Not only are we careful in our work not to put too much dependence on mechanical devices; we are also careful to provide ourselves with diagrams that show to some extent the varying value of the different aspects of character. To illustrate: we use a diagram showing the spiral movement in the development of character *from* the predominance of self-assertion, *through* the predominance of religious instincts, *to* the primacy of logical insight. In another diagram we indicate the connection of self-assertion with the instincts or tendencies for play, art and ideality.

As my work at present is in connection with a department of pedagogy, it is natural that I should seem to put too much stress on the school-studies and too little on the influence of authority and personality. Mr. Bliss would not find that fault with the actual ethological work. I meant what I said when the following words were written in the pamphlet on ethology: "Each one of us reflects the universe from his own peculiar standpoint. Each is himself and not another. Each character is unique; particular and universal; social, individualistic and personal. The universe's interests are ours and ours are the universe's. We seek to bring about the society of which each one of us is a member. We seek not the society apart from ourselves, or ourselves apart from the society. So far as we interact with others we are simply natural agents, products and not creators; so far as we *really* coöperate with others, we are creators, and are members of the Kingdom of which God is the Integrator." Indeed, the 'studies' are partial results of character-life, and cannot take the place or even share the place of real living. My 'ethology' would have a poor out-

come if it made me exalt the machinery of education. In an essay recently published (*Love and Law*, San Francisco, 1899) I take strong ground against the dispensation of the 'Hoe with the Man.'

It is only fair to say that our study of ethology is being applied to the school-work. With the aid of Mrs. Frances Bracken Gould, a graduate of the University of California, and a very clear-headed kindergartner, we have been able to see many of our ideas put to the test of practice. Work is also being done on history in the schools, and in other directions.

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SENSATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND SENSATION.

Professor Calkins, of Wellesley, in the last number of the *REVIEW*, brings up a topic still much in need of similar discussion by psychologists; it, however, seems to me that she makes her conclusions, demonstrated by excellent arguments, tend in rather the wrong scientific direction, her logic assisting, moreover, the contention of the present writer, namely, that these conclusions do not go far enough.

The very fact that introspection at once belies the common assertion of the best text-books that sensations do have attributes, and this despite the circumstance that by definition they should not have them, would seem to argue that the definition itself is useless, or worse. That the term is, indeed, worse than useless is, in short, the contention of the present writer. No one term in current psychology seems to be more misleading or, as Miss Calkins shows, more illogically used than that of this very concept.

The expression sensation seems to be one that indicates little, if anything, more than a somewhat which if it did exist might serve as a basis for the better understanding of something else, namely, the term feeling. It is as if one precise about technical terms, in teaching psychology should say: You all know what a feeling is—well, imagine all the attributes taken away from feeling and you have a notion of a sensation. Indeed, to current usage, a sensation is nothing more than the unnecessary Ding-an-sich of a feeling, or its logical substance in the Spinozistic sense.

It is not here the place to sketch a history of affective terms as used in mental science, nor is it needful to do so clearly to suggest