

seeming to indicate that they have not considered with sufficient thoroughness the relation between the individual in his particularity and the individual in his encompassing universality. Professor Baillie wears his 'blind spot' with due physiological propriety, for he seems not even aware that it is there. His principle of Absolute Spirit, as the stimulus to the evolution of experience, is wonderfully effective *once experience of various 'levels' is granted*. But there is just the rub! In short, Professor Baillie has given us a *metaphysical psychology*, if the phrase will be allowed, not an *ontology*: he has described and shown the goal of the *development within experience*; he has not *accounted* either for the *development* or the *experience*.

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LECTURES ON HUMANISM.

Lectures on Humanism with Special Reference to its Bearings on Sociology. J. S. MACKENZIE. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. iv + 243.

These lectures were delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, on the Dunkin Lectureship in Sociology. As the author states in his preface, "the courses on this foundation are short, and open to the public, and so do not furnish an opportunity for the discussion of the fundamental principles of the science of Sociology." Dr. Mackenzie, has, therefore, devoted the first eight chapters of his book to an elementary, popular consideration of a number of the familiar social problems. The titles of these chapters for the most part suggest their contents: The Meaning of Humanism; The Growth of Humanism; Humanism in Philosophy; Humanism in Politics; Humanism in Economics; Humanism in Education; Humanism in Religion; Limitations of Humanism; Implications of Humanism.

The ninth and last chapter, which was evidently not delivered as a lecture, the author has added in order to furnish a fuller statement of the philosophical implications of the point of view that is central in the book. This is obviously the chapter in which students of philosophy will be most interested. The reader is made to look forward with keen expectation to this final chapter by the frequent foot-notes throughout the lectures, which are continually promising further and more adequate treatment of difficult problems in that last chapter.

One finds a disappointment on the first page of the opening chapter, on the Meaning of Humanism. Most readers will be attracted to the

volume because of its title, and will naturally expect to find here a discussion of those recent philosophical theories that have been advanced under the name of humanism. The author says, however, "I ought perhaps to explain at once that I do not use the term in quite that sense that has recently been given to it by a certain school of your younger writers. I do not use it as equivalent to what is commonly — and I think correctly — described as 'pragmatism,' or 'voluntarism.' . . . What I understand by humanism may be most simply described as a point of view from which human life is regarded as an independent center of interest, if not even as containing within itself the key to all other interests, or as being, in old Greek phraseology, the 'helm' by which the universe is steered. In this sense I contrast it with the more familiar term 'naturalism' — the attempt to understand human life in the light of the forces that operate in the world around it — and also with supernaturalism, that which seeks for the explanation of the world in powers that are in their nature distinct both from man and from the world in which he lives."

Dr. Mackenzie has discovered several different interpretations of the term humanism. Of these, three distinguishable current meanings seem to him important to recognize. I give his account of these meanings in brief: The first sense is that in which it simply means that special emphasis is to be laid on the study of human life. It is in this sense that Socrates may be taken as the typical humanist. But it is not possible to rest here. No one who studies the world scientifically can divorce man's life from other things, and treat it in a way that is exclusively its own. Man is, in some sense, a part of a larger whole, and can only be properly understood in relation to that whole. Hence we are led on from this first interpretation of humanism to a theory that maintains that the world as a whole is to be interpreted from the human standpoint. But this again may either mean that the world is to be somehow explained away, as being an illusion, an appearance, or something of which nothing can be known; or it may mean rather that the world is to be regarded as having a kind of reality, but that in the last analysis it must be interpreted in relation to human life.

I think everyone will heartily agree with Dr. Mackenzie that the last of these interpretations is the only one that can ultimately be accepted as philosophically satisfactory, and we should gladly concede that in this sense the term almost loses its specific meaning, and must be no longer opposed to naturalism. Humanism in this larger view, 'seeks to include the facts of the natural world, and to give them a

place as aspects of reality, though subordinating them to conceptions derived from the study of human life.'

In the chapter on the Growth of Humanism, the author has reviewed the familiar landmarks in the history of philosophy. As a point of view contrasted with Naturalism, the author rightly tells us that Humanism is found far back in the history of philosophy. He sees 'the finest and most characteristic expression of the humanistic position' in ancient Greece. "Humanism is the attitude of mind which seeks the key to the world in the life of man, or, at any rate, the key to man's life within himself."

In the chapter on Humanism in Philosophy the author contends that that which chiefly gives significance to the contrast between Humanism and Naturalism — that is, between the vitalistic and the mechanical view of the world 'is the presence of elements that require a teleological explanation in the former, and the absence of such elements in the latter.' There is, of course, nothing new or striking in this view. The author has aimed simply to state in a modern popular form the old distinction between efficient and final causes. The teleological humanistic world is a world of qualitative judgments; it is a world of values. The mechanical naturalistic world is a world of quantitative judgments of fact. Dr. Mackenzie agrees with Ward, Royce, Bradley, and others, that the category of quantity is not the sole sovereign principle of our human nature.

Dr. Mackenzie uses the term humanism throughout, as the antithesis of naturalism, as expressing the point of view that tries to interpret man in his own light, and the universe in the light of man; whereas naturalism seeks rather to interpret the material universe in its own light, and man in the light of the material universe. And yet, he recognizes that, while these two positions may be regarded as opposed, there is a third, viz., the position of supernaturalism, which seeks the explanation of the universe, or of its most important aspects, in something that transcends both nature and human life.

In the last chapter, the author has given a clear and concise account of his general philosophic position, which may be briefly summarized. He believes that there are only four possible explanations of life. It must be explained (1) from within, or (2) from something still higher than itself, or (3) from something entirely beyond the reach of our experience, or (4) that it must be incapable of any explanation at all. These alternatives give rise to (1) humanism, (2) some kind of supernatural revelation, (3) agnosticism, and (4) pure scepticism. The last is the refuge of despair. The second and third, are hardly distin-

guishable from it, except in so far as they yield some positive principle for the explanation of our life in this universe. But a principle capable of throwing light upon our experience obviously cannot be altogether beyond the reach of our experience. In fact, we find that both agnostics and the adherents of the various forms of revealed religion are continually stating their ultimate explanations, in modes that are essentially humanistic. "On the whole, therefore, we seem to be led to the conclusion that some form of humanism is the only possible method of making our universe intelligible to ourselves."

It is evident that by humanism Dr. Mackenzie after all means hardly more than what is ordinarily connoted by the term Idealism. As a popular contribution to the philosophy of concrete Idealism, these lectures doubtless served their purpose well and in their printed form they will continue to help counteract the current 'veiled materialism.' There is, throughout, a wholesome insistence upon the doctrine that we cannot finally cut off our human life from the rest of the universe and treat it as something to be understood entirely in its own light.

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PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems. MARY WHITON CALKINS, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College. New York, Macmillan Company, 1907. Pp. xxii + 575.

In the title of this work, in the preface, in the introductory chapter, and occasionally elsewhere, there is a lack of precision in the use of the terms 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics.' Among the most fundamental and persistent of philosophical problems are those relating to knowledge and to values, the epistemological and the 'ethico-æsthetico-religious' problems. It is quite clear, however, that it is not Professor Calkins's aim to deal with these problems. She does not aim to give us a general introduction to philosophy, either in the form of a discussion of its persistent problems or in the form of a history of modern philosophy; but to give us an introduction to *metaphysics*.

The main problem of metaphysics is declared to be the nature of the 'all-of-reality.' Concerning this 'irreducible all-of-reality,' two questions suggest themselves: one as to its qualitative character, of *what sort* is it, idealistic or non-idealistic; the other as to its quantitative character, is it one or many, monistic or pluralistic. But as metaphysical idealism may, in turn, be either phenomenalist or per-