

their properties. However, we have good reason to believe that thing differs from thing when its phenomena differ, and we can do something in the way of counting external entities.

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*The Nature of Truth.* HAROLD H. JOACHIM. Oxford, 1906.

This work is a criticism of three conceptions as to the nature of truth. No one of these conceptions nor any combination of them is regarded as adequate and final, so that the outcome of the criticism is mainly negative. Although this result is held by Joachim to have a positive value in making clear where the problem lies, it seems to the reviewer that his main contribution to the subject lies in the various criticisms he takes up apart from the rather unsatisfactory negative result. These criticisms we consider to be of the very greatest value.

The first conception with which he deals is that of truth as 'correspondence,' *i. e.*, we have truth when an idea or a judgment of the mind is in one-one correspondence with a reality or a fact other than itself. This is the old copy-theory or representative theory of truth. According to Joachim there seem to be three difficulties with this conception. First, in a one-one correspondence between an idea and a reality, though it may be easy to see the relation between one part of the idea and the corresponding part in the reality, it is difficult to understand the relation between the whole of the idea and the whole of the reality, because the whole is teleological in nature and not a mere sum of its parts. Secondly, if the idea is exactly like the reality, then it becomes identical with it and we have no longer any correspondence. Thirdly, a judgment of the mind cannot be absolutely separated from its corresponding reality, for a judgment is after all something real, and reality cannot be conceived except as in some way given to a mind. Complete separation of reality and mind would mean no relation between them and hence no truth.

The second conception makes truth a 'quality of independent entities.' Truth is independent of the mind, 'experiencing makes no difference to the facts.' Every fact is in and for itself, it may or may not become related to the mind so that the mind may apprehend it. If this conception is accepted, a disagreeable alternative must be faced, The truth which never is apprehended by the mind is unknowable; and such truth as reaches the mind becomes the mind's individual possession, leaving it no means of getting beyond a sort of subjectivism.

The third conception is that of 'systematic coherence.' Just as a

hypothetical judgment involves something beyond itself, so every fact or every single truth leads to some further truth; and just as a hypothetical judgment ultimately falls back upon a categorical judgment, so single truths and facts involve something final. This final something is a 'significant whole' in which every truth and every fact must find its place and in which all parts of the whole hang together in an organic fashion. This 'whole' is 'self-fulfilling, and 'self-fulfilled,' it is a complete 'concrete' individual, an 'ideal experience.' The difficulty with this conception comes out when we consider that all contradictions must be reconciled in the 'whole'; truth and error, the universal or static side of human knowledge, and the side of growth and development must find a place in the 'ideal experience.' But so far as human knowledge goes this reconciliation can hardly be accomplished. For all knowledge there is a kind of dualism between the universal and the particular, between the static and the dynamic; the most perfect truth we can imagine must be true of something, hence it is relative. Are we therefore forced to return to the 'correspondence' conception of truth? Joachim thinks not, because it leaves us in worse difficulties than the 'coherence' conception does. 'Correspondence' is a 'symptom' of 'coherence,' and 'coherence' is a 'symptom' of ultimate truth, the reality of which Joachim never doubts, although he admits that it is unknowable.

Joachim's main difficulty seems to be that he puts reality above knowledge, that he does not develop an idea of truth within the realm of the knowable. We should agree with some form of the 'coherence' conception of truth, but we hardly think that it should be characterized as an 'experience' or as 'individual,' though we should hold to its ideality. A mathematical or physical system of truth ought to give us a basis for the essential characters of truth. Abstractness should not be feared, for an abstract whole is just as much a whole as one which aims at including all single truths and all facts. It may be that through the combination and interaction of a number of relatively independent abstract systems the whole of truth can best be characterized: such a whole would not be 'organic' or 'individual,' but it would be coherent and therefore in some sense one.

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