

## SOME IMPORTANT SITUATIONS AND THEIR ATTITUDES.

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The 'situation,' already described by some as the absolute of a certain conspicuous group of thinkers, is in general taking such an important part in current philosophical discussion that to an outsider philosophy must seem very like to an employment bureau, if it does not appear at last to have become an intelligence office. Undoubtedly, too, the very commonplaceness or the plebeian character of the term is one of the most serviceable and hopeful tendencies of current thinking. In the present paper, then, only falling into line with so many others who have written and spoken, I would discuss, let me not be so bold or broad as to say advertise, four peculiarly interesting situations and their induced attitudes; namely, the moral situation, the artistic, the practical and the natural, and their four attitudes, respectively the ethical, the esthetic, the intellectual or cognitional, and the spiritual.

The situation, to begin with, whatever specific variations it may have, in general has its rise, which is to say also gets its widest meaning, in the fact that structure necessarily implies function. Back of this fact, then, I do not propose to go at the present writing. But, this admitted, another is immediately manifest. *Function necessarily implies conflict.* The conflict, moreover, which is the general situation, is between (1) an existing structure, describable either as the body of the individual agent's habits or as the established social environment, the body of the social institutions, to which just through his habits the individual is, as if conventionally or traditionally or unreflectively, always a part, and (2) the natural environment as distinct from the social or definitely and humanly organized environment. In other words the conflict is between man with

his life set to certain norms and nature; between 'second nature' and first nature; between the formal reason and sensation, or the legislative will and impulse. Also it is between one organization and another organization, the latter usually if not invariably being more inclusive than the former and necessarily rising into conflict with the former whenever, to use an annoying but concise and pertinent term, it 'functions' in any way. And, just once more, in order to avoid the serious mistake of even a suspicion that the 'natural environment,' here mentioned, is external to what is human, let me say of the conflict that it is describable also as being between the formal or structural in personal experience and the vital, even the most distinctively personal, in personal experience. Thus, there is a sense, important to a true understanding of what is here meant, in which the characteristically personal and the natural are identical or synonymous. Both the personal and the natural are always coming into conflict with the definite and formal, that is, the structural, in life or experience. The structural is not *distinctively* personal or natural; on the contrary it is 'factional' or socially corporate.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, on the assumption of this identity of the personal and the natural, the situation, or its conflict, must be due not less to personal initiative than to any of the processes of mere 'natural selection' and of course too the conflict can never be with an external nature. Indeed, if the conflict could be with an external nature, then structure simply could not imply function.

So we see that the characteristic condition of the situation in general is conflict and we see too, although the foregoing statement has been very brief, the origin and the nature of this conflict. With this preliminary view, therefore, I turn now to my special task. I would show how, to the end of solving its conflict, which always is as specific and concrete in its terms and issue as the inducing structure is itself definite in character, the situation develops through the following principal moments.

<sup>1</sup> See an article: 'The Personal and the Factional (or formal or structural) in the Life of Society,' in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, June 22, 1905.

## I. THE MORAL SITUATION.

The first moment is naturally that of a presumed sufficiency of the subject's or agent's existing structure or, as the terms are here used, of the formally human. The definite habits or the social institutions are taken and are asserted, not only as quite equal to the presented and confronted emergency, but also as possessing intrinsic worth and normative or structural finality, and the natural, in the sense of that which is formally external to these habits or institutions, is an object only of an unreasoning fear. The natural is feared, blindly feared, just because it is at once quite real and yet external at least to the formal reason, to the reason of the structure-bound human.

So I view the first moment in the development of the situation and it seems to me to present specifically the moral situation. Not, of course, that morality is confined to conditions such as these, but these are the characteristic conditions of the situation as moral. These distinguish the moral situation from other defined situations. In a sense, certainly important, all situations are moral, as also they are all artistic or practical, or natural, but this is only to say, in so many words, that the specific conditions which make distinct situations are themselves in their way functional as well as structural, and so are general to development while being at the same time particular and definable. Functionally any moment or situation, any structure must comprise all others.

Possibly the peculiarly moral character of this first distinct moment is best seen in what my account has certainly, although not openly stated, namely, in the conceit of the freedom of the will. The 'free will' is simply a name for the power of the agent to fulfil and exemplify the structural adequacy. Accordingly, to use now this name, the conceit and practice of a 'free will' and the accompanying unreasoning fear of what is external to this freedom, a fear which may often take the form of bravado, of what can be only an asserted indifference to danger, are the determining factors of the moral situation.

But this, somebody will at once object, makes the moral and the legal identical, and such an identity every reflective man must promptly and emphatically resent. At once I grant that

the moral and the legal are here made identical. I grant also that reflection must separate them. But it is to be said, also promptly and emphatically, that no situation as such is itself reflective. Situations are not attitudes, although they are always springing from attitudes and are also constantly induced by them. Situations, as said before, are structural in so far as definable at all, and the moral situation is in consequence determined by the formal law. But situations, being also functional, induce attitudes, and in the particular case at hand the moral situation induces the ethical attitude. The very difference between these terms, even as they are widely used, tells the story. The ethical is the moral, just by dint of the given legal structure becoming active or functioning, made reflective in an attitude. Again, any induced attitude involves a generalization and idealization of those formal conditions which make the inducing situation, and, although, as we shall see, the attitude itself must make a situation, it should never be confused with the particular situation whose functioning has given it rise. Thus the functional nature of a structure, which here and now means specifically those positive conditions that formally determine the moral situation, makes certain a movement out of formal bondage to those conditions into a state of only mediate dependence on them. They become only means to some relatively undetermined end. They are made mediately rather than immediately, ideally rather than materially, spiritually rather than literally significant. And thereupon the moral situation gives way to the ethical attitude, and by the same token morality is saved at least from a positive, uncompromising legalism.

But not from legalism altogether. The ethical attitude is still *characteristically* legalistic; in terms, however, not of the positive law, but of 'duty,' 'conscience,' or the 'moral ideal,' which is only an abstraction of its spirit or general functional value, from the positive, formal law. The ethical attitude, induced, as was said, by the functional character of the moral situation, asserts the existing structural formalism, the manifest legalism, to be worth cultivating, and a *cultivated* legalism must always value law as a general principle above law as a visible

program, the program becoming henceforth only instrumental to the unseen principle. Lawfulness, in short, rather than the specific law or structure, is the concern of the ethical attitude. How often ethics is called normative, and surely its normative character is nothing more nor less than its abstract legalism.

Further, the ethical attitude, just because, at least in spirit, still legalistic, is also in another respect like its inducing situation. Although not dogmatically indifferent to nature nor quite blindly fearful of her, it is nevertheless humanly conceited or anthropocentric. The principle of law is always more hospitable than a legal program; a structure in use is more widely sympathetic than a structure just *in statu quo*; but the ethical attitude still sees no positive worth in nature except as she is humanly, or humanely, disposed. So to speak the spirit of the fear of her still remains, as if to keep its congenial company with the surviving, albeit only spiritual or functional legalism.

Fear become a spirit loses much of its dread. Law become a principle loses much of its vigor. In a word, the normative, ethical attitude must mean an important modification in the actual situation. Ethical, as distinct from social or political legalism, by its very idealism, which is to say by its devotion to the spirit of law and its feeling only of the spirit of fear, makes man actively hospitable towards the organization of nature, with which morally he was in such dire conflict, and in doing this it induces, or initiates, the artistic situation. The ethical attitude *put in practice* is the peculiar life of art.

## II. THE ARTISTIC SITUATION.

So I pass to the second moment in the development of the general situation, and this I would call, not the moment of assumed and asserted human sufficiency, in which nature is an object of blind fear, but the moment of human condescension, assumed and asserted, towards the natural, towards nature's law, structure or organization. This, too, as already said, is the artistic situation. Art, let it be kept in mind, is characteristically a situation, not an attitude. It is just a living up to a humanly sympathetic nature and in just so far it actually is the practice of what the ethical attitude may be said to preach.

Once more, though I may repeat myself too much, it is, not the moral, which is politically legalistic, but the ethical, which is functionally, spiritually or personally legalistic, rendered incarnate, and as having such character it shows man actually in a truce with nature. In art the human is seen actively to have assumed a relation of equilibrium, necessarily more or less unstable, or of something very like an armed neutrality, between itself, its structure, the norms of its life, and nature's structure. Actively man moulds nature to his conceits. He makes her glorify his image. In her life, in her powers and processes, he realizes, or presumes to realize, only a deeper and fuller expression of himself. Art is thus, like morality, anthropocentric, but it is man big with nature. It is the little human swelling with the big natural, and as so conditioned it is what we call poetic or creative, all its activities being informed with analogies of the natural to the human and embodying, although never without a violence that only the poetic imagination can have made possible, nature's metaphors of the human. The necessary violence, too, imparts to art as strong a sense of comedy as of tragedy, as is shown in the readiness with which we laugh or weep whenever we see the little human swollen with the big natural. Simply in art, always as comic as tragic, man appears, not as teaching or seeking ideally, but as actually practicing a legalism that has lost the rigor of the formal law and a fear of nature that is tempered by a very real sense of humor.

But here comes an objector. I am accused of narrowing beauty, which is the recognized goal of art, to conditions that require accord, if not literal and prosaic, at least metaphorical, with the positive structure of the human agent, just as before I seemed to identify morality with legality. In a word, I seem to have left no room for objective or natural beauty. To the present objector, however, I have to make just the answer made before. A situation is not an attitude, although it always induces one. The artistic situation, as its structure becomes function, induces the esthetic attitude, by which the very conditions making the life of art are idealized. Thus, for the esthetic attitude, man is not, as in art, the determining center. He is the observer indeed, but only the passive observer. His

structure, losing its character of a sole measure for all other structures or for the structure of nature as a whole, becomes but one among the others, any one of which may be the center from which a judgment is passed. True, for the esthetic attitude, all structures, or all measures, by which nature, so to speak, is thus made to measure or judge herself, are *as if* sensitively human, but this only shows how humanly passive the esthetic attitude is, how for it nature, not man, is the artist. The characteristic object, therefore, of the esthetic attitude truly is beauty, sensibly manifested and sensitively measured, but, instead of the beauty of man to himself, as this is reflected in nature's metaphors just of his life, it is objectively natural beauty. The metaphors are no longer exclusively human, but nature objectively is just a sphere of metaphors, metaphor poised sensitively against metaphor and calling deeply and passionately each to each and through their poise and their passionate call she is beautiful. She is beautiful *to* man; not, as in art, *for* him and his structural conceits. For the esthetic attitude even the works of human art must meet the demands of natural beauty in that they must accord, or sensitively sympathize, with what surrounds them. The setting, or frame, of a work of art is thus an important factor in its beauty.

But where now are the law and the fear? The law, and with it, man's so-called freedom have been lost or merged, nay, they have been fulfilled in the law and the freedom of nature which an objective beauty reveals; and the fear is become awe. Nature is no longer fearful, but awful or sublime. Awe is not man fearing for his own safety; it is man sensitive to the fears of the whole world and in that sensitiveness feeling the lawless law of nature. Yet such terms as these and the seeming grandiloquence to which they lead may very easily obscure the meaning here in my mind. The meaning would take a view of life in its lowest as well as in its highest terms, in its simplest as well as in its grandest expressions. A psychologist could not be more minute or prosaic in his viewpoint than my meaning is intended to be. Simply any structure, whatever its size or its complexity, its significance or its dignity, being always functional, must come to this sensitiveness, which we know,

however grandiloquently, as awe towards the lawless law of nature. What is sensation but structure meeting the violence of nature. What is structure that nature is mindful of it.

But the esthetic attitude, induced, as has been shown by the artistic situation and ideally sensitive, not merely to the unity of man but also, as if actually feeling for them, to the unity of all things with nature, leads man out of the artistic into the practical situation.

### III. THE PRACTICAL SITUATION.

The practical situation, as the third moment to be considered, is the moment of the human structure, the whole body of habits and institutions become — but the right phrase is hard to find — merely a natural utility. Only, I would call it also, borrowing a word from the political vocabulary of the day, a ‘floating’ utility. So does man again put into practice the preaching of one of his attitudes. He comes actively to treat his formal life just as his esthetic consciousness has already revealed it to him, namely, as only mediate to an indeterminate nature, and, as he does this, the last traces of his esthetic sensitiveness disappear and the metaphors, human or objective, in which this had found expression, become only dead metaphors. Man no longer is even an interested observer of nature; he is just a mechanical incident within her unpurposed movement.

In social evolution, where the practical situation in all its phases is written large, the time is one of traditions and human conceits and devotions of all sorts become purely conventional, which is to say useful but not yet put in use, or treasured, as money is treasured, but not yet actually invested, and accompanying these conditions there is also, as if the last defense of the passing régime, a blind fatalism. So long as this fatalism remains blind the old structure of life can at least seem to survive, although the immediate vitality once belonging to it has already gone.

Of course, further, when habits and institutions come, as said above, to be a mere formal utility, a floating utility, the personal in human life has virtually already separated itself from the structural and this separation as a positive condition or



status belongs to the situation now under review. But, although virtually separate, the personal has not yet so found itself. Thus, in social evolution, this condition shows itself in a blind individualism, always so assertive of independence of the existing structure, yet also so helpless without it: but, psychologically or biologically, how best to describe this virtual yet undiscovered or unappreciated separation I am at a loss to know. Certainly it shows the functional self, the vital nature in an agent, become at least blindly superior to the structural or morphological self, and it shows, too, whether psychologically or sociologically, that although nature seems to be on the point of taking to herself the formal life of man, allowing it to crumble or rather to assimilate to herself, man nevertheless really survives, rising in his vitality only to coöperate with her in the use of his establishments. Technically how the psychologist would wish this moment or situation in development, perhaps in the development of volition, described, I am quite unable to guess, and possibly he has no suitable term or phrase for it, but the situation, I am sure, is a real one. Here, however, a possible misunderstanding must be avoided. Thus, in the first place, as indeed already indicated, I am now describing only a situation and the situation comprises rather a division of the self in fact or condition, the structural self having become insensitive or mechanical, than a division of the self in consciousness. To just such a purely factual division the *blind* fatalism, or the *blind* individualism, mentioned before, was clearly an index. Moreover, in the second place, a division of the self, whether in bare fact or in consciousness, is rather logical than psychological or rather social than personal, and this one needs constantly to remember. Logically there may be two selves, the vital and the structural, and sociologically also, in so far as society is viewed abstractly in terms only of so much formal organization, there may be two selves, the individual and the citizen, but mere counting is never real seeing. Function and structure are truly two, but they are not truly two selves.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A question certainly worth asking, at least in a note, is here unavoidable to him that reads between the lines. Is logic, at least formal logic, even such a logic as Kant's 'transcendental' logic, true rather to experience as expressed.

So, to gather together what has been said so far, this third moment, the moment of the practical situation, is the moment of the human in a sense profaned and turned merely useful; it is the moment of life wholly without poetry, the once stirring metaphors being all dead, and subject to the qualification just made—it is the moment of a factual division of the self, the structural self still keeping up appearances through a blind fatalism or a blind individualism and the vital, functional self being as real and also as unseen or unseeing as the blindness.

And now, for the third time, an objector confronts me with a question. In reducing the formal structure of human life to a mere natural floating utility am I not confusing the practical with the economic? Well, let me concede that so far I have defined the practical situation in terms which directly suggest the sort of mechanicalism or hollow conservatism and naturalism in life that economics demands. Economics characteristically demands no interference with the 'credit of the country,' which is to say the *status in quo*, the existing structure or organization, but its loyalty to the organization is formal, not substantial. It requires mankind to be both morally and esthetically without emotion. Its typical man must be just a money making machine, and what is money but the incarnation of a floating natural utility. Thus, with its peculiar abstraction, economics knows only utility, and in the practical situation utility certainly seems supreme. It is so supreme that any purpose for it is quite forgotten! Accordingly, as already conceded, the objector is right; he is right, so far as he goes; and he has, in fact, as before, only assisted my exposition. But, to repeat the refrain, a situation is never an attitude, although it always induces one. For the case in hand, the practical situation induces the reflective attitude and this saves the situation from its bondage to a mere formal utility.

socially, which is to say, of course, structurally or formally, than to experience as personal, vital or functional? This question, as put, almost begs its own answer, an affirmative one. Only real logic, in the sense of a logic that, although recognizing form in experience, treats experience as also imbued with a vital superiority to its form or structure, as if with a 'legal supremacy,' can possibly satisfy the demands of what is characteristically personal. Moreover, in this fact it would seem as if the pragmatist must find the method in the reputed madness of his philosophy.

The reflective, which, as here understood, is also the cognitional attitude, only appreciates or idealizes the actual conditions of the practical situation. Thus, it takes as something real the end which the formal utilitarianism, the idle conventionalism of the practical situation has certainly implied but as certainly concealed in its blind individual or in its blind fate and just in recognizing or facing this end it shows the vital, functional self, on the one hand, become conscious — or seeing — and assertive independently of mere structure and the structural self, on the other hand, made positively mediative, that is, mediative of something quite real although formally external to it or 'objective.' The conscious reality of the vital self and the objective character of the mediation of the structural self are thus here considered to be just that which makes the attitude now in question reflective or cognitional. For so-called reflection structure is become only means, instrument or method and it is method to what is regarded distinctly real but is, in the words used before, 'formally external.' This phrase, let me say further, signifies (1) formally or structurally indeterminate,<sup>1</sup> a character clearly belonging to whatever is said to be objective, and yet also (2) real. The reality is not *necessarily* apart from the structure; it is so only in form, that is, only relatively; it may be, nay, I think it must be actually in the structure, in its very character as only means or method, just as any true end must be immanent in, or vital to, the means to it. But *as an attitude*, reflection naturally holds the conscious, vital self and the real end to their formal unlikeness or aloofness and so treats the now insensitive structure as the medium of what very commonly is known as an *abstract* idea, a universal, a principle, or — not to prolong the list further — a conception, that belongs, not to the world of sensation or body, but to the world of thought or mind.

So, to recall a mode of statement already employed, a conception, which is the typical 'object' of reflection, while in just the sense indicated negative only relatively to form or subjective structure, nevertheless, in so far as negative or outside, can be merely a logical rather than a psychological datum; although,

<sup>1</sup> That is, of course, so indeterminate relatively to the positive structure of the subject or agent.

as a matter of course, a psychologist may still be directly interested in the peculiar conditions that determine the data of the reflective attitude as thus amenable to logical treatment. In other words, psychologically, there can be no independent conception, and the supposed independence of the conception can spring only from the standpoint, essentially logical, that would view the reflective attitude wholly in terms of the dichotomy of what is formally structural and what is not.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the reflective attitude itself is the psychological moment for logic, although the very dichotomy, on which it rests, makes the moment only a passing one, as we shall see.

But, the issues between logic and psychology aside, it is now apparent, I think, in what important way the dying of the metaphors in human art or in nature, or the accompanying birth of an insensitive human structure, or — once more — the development of that purely formal or floating natural utility was destined to serve the progress of the general situation and the solution of the conflict which we found characteristic of it. The insensitive structure, as if a medium, or more narrowly a language, without emotion or metaphor, made possible what somewhat technically is known as strictly scientific research. It made possible a free, thoroughly candid or open-minded, structurally or humanly unprejudiced study of nature instead of the more passive and more restrained observation that belonged to the esthetic attitude. Thus the esthetic attitude showed man not yet free from himself, although his fear had changed to awe; it showed him perhaps free in spirit, but not yet free in letter, not yet really free; whereas the reflective or cognitional attitude shows him at least very much nearer to a complete freedom. Has not his structure become a real instrument? Has he not distinctly found his vital self? Has he not acknowledged an 'objective' nature? The reflective attitude, then, shows him free, free from — or in? — himself, *in just so far as* his no longer sensitive structure has become a mere tool or method in real use; that is, in the use of his new-found self as this confronts nature.

<sup>1</sup> Witness the principles of identity and contradiction. Witness, also, the character of the independent concept as an abstract universal.

And yet, although there is this advance, it is necessary now to issue a caution. The reflective attitude must not be understood to involve any mere betrayal of the quondam metaphors; on the contrary, it is only a fulfilment of them. It cannot properly or honestly thank the absolute, I mean the general situation, that it is not as the esthetic attitude was; but, instead, it must realize that as the tool or structure is put to real use, as the utility is really invested, the experience which has gone before, sensitiveness, metaphors and all, is exactly what determines the momentum and efficiency of the activity. True, the 'objective' nature in the case is deepened beyond any mere conformity with man, beyond even the licentious conformity of the esthetic consciousness, but it is still nature, and the same nature too, and the metaphors, although all dead, are dead only as sensitive metaphors, and so to speak as insensitive metaphors are still active in the tool or structure. Indeed, however grandiloquently, I wonder if the method or the medium or the structurally mediated conception of the reflective attitude may not be said to be the very metaphors that died with the rise of the practical situation *spiritually* resurrected. Conception would then be definable as a sort of greatly deepened and spiritualized esthetic experience; an esthetic experience still dependent on metaphor, but so deepened or possibly so purely objective as to be, not human, but just natural. Is not the natural truth, which reflection seeks, I cannot say, which reflection observes, and which is always the peculiar content of the conception, even more awful or more deeply sublime than natural beauty? Indeed man, structural man, *almost* must be declared to be, not numb, but dead, in the presence of its sublimity.

I have just said 'almost,' and before, in speaking of the freedom that comes with reflection I used and emphasized the phrase 'in so far as,' declaring in so many words that the freedom was not necessarily complete but was proportional to the measure in which the structure of human life had come into real use. Now complete use, with that necessary death of the human before the sublimity of nature, is not possible in reflection. It is true that reflection is active and that reflection uses the medium or structure supplied to it, but its use is related to the ideal very

much as the psychologist tells us attention is related to volition. It is true, too, that reflection in its own nature somehow demands the complete use referred to, but reflection, characteristically, must keep means and end, language and idea, structure and meaning, at least somewhat apart. Accordingly the reflective attitude can fulfil itself, can realize its own demands, only by yielding to a new situation, namely, to the wholly natural situation, and to this I now turn.

#### IV. THE NATURAL SITUATION.

Of this fourth and at least for the present study last special situation I shall write somewhat more briefly, concluding my paper rather abruptly, as many stories are brought to an end, and, also as with the stories, at a point where possibly *the* situation is getting most deeply interesting and might seem to demand the longest chapter.

As the foregoing has already indicated, the physical situation belongs to the moment, not of any surviving conceit of human sufficiency, not of any slightest remnant of human condescension towards nature, and not of any merely formal naturalism or blind fatalism, but distinctly of the death or loss of the human structure in the natural. The structural man dies just in order that the vital and natural man may live or rather the death of the one is in and with the rising life of the other. Again, the natural situation is the moment, not of any merely miserly utilitarianism, but of the human structure become, instead of an aimless, formal, floating, hoarded utility, a real, positively natural utility. So, through reflection, has the practical been changed to the natural situation.

Manifestly the reflective attitude calls for this change. By its very 'self-consciousness,' that makes the human structure only mediative, by its conviction of the inner or vital self as well as of the outer nature being at once real and formally external to the structure, and by its own active use of the structural medium, it calls for just that fatal invasion or overwhelming assertion of nature which makes the natural situation. In history as in psychology the reflective attitude is always an invitation to nature to realize herself. It summons, or already it

has admitted and recognized, what seems barbarian into what has stood for civilization or what seems impulsive, sensuous and irrational into the well-controlled and rational, and being such an invitation or such a cordial recognition it is mainly occupied with a constant — what shall I say? — a constant offering of its humanly insensitive, now only mediative structure which possibly a Teufelsdröckh would call man's cast off clothing, to nature, the world of its 'objective' curiosity. So Alexander, pupil of Aristotle, sought to clothe the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean, and so the reflective life psychologically, as well as historically, would clothe the not less invaded than invading world of sense. The general process is often known as assimilation, more or less benevolent, often as experimentation, but under either name it shows nature trying on the human and it is conducted under the guidance of the dead, in the sense of the dehumanized metaphors of the esthetic consciousness. Perhaps these metaphors become wholly insensitive, should rather be called analogies, even objective analogies, as is suggested by the fact that the experimentation, or the assimilation, strives to use them the nature-end forward, not as with the esthetic attitude, the man-end forward. But certainly they guide the process and testify accordingly to the honesty of the invitation to nature or to the cordiality of the recognition of her, and in the natural situation one sees, again, that nature has only taken reflection at its word.

Nature takes reflection at its word with a new structure, a new organization. The content of this new organization and its form are determined, moreover, by the bounds of the inducing activity, or of what might also be called the functional capacity or versatility of the passing structure, and by the analogies that have constantly guided it. Simply, if there be definite structure at the start, and just this, as will be remembered, was the starting point for the present study, then also that structure is, *proportionally to its structural definiteness*, limited to a certain sphere of activity, or functional character, and the bounds of this sphere measure the extent of the new organization, while the inevitable analogies developed with its exploitation determine the new form. Structure, the definite, can of course be only 'relative,'

but being relative it must be complex and being complex it must be functional as well as structural, and being functional it must induce, through such moments as have been recounted here, new structure; new, because the original structure was relative and functional, and structure, because the definite can induce only the definite. Must not what is new be always true to its origin?

But, without further description or explanation of the natural situation, an objector must now be met; perhaps the same, who appeared before, although he gave no name. Thus, this time I am charged with having confused the natural with the physical. The spiritual attitude, however, for so I have to call it, although also it may be called volitional or even religious, is what I would now depend on to save the natural from being just physical. This fourth attitude arises in the following way. It is but an appreciation of the fact, suggested early in my narrative, that the natural must be also the characteristically personal. Natural and personal were said to be *both* external to, or in conflict with, the formal or structural. Moreover in the reflective process of experimentation must not that trying-on be as truly on the part of the inner vital self, as if the waiting will, as on the part of the outer and 'objective' — or physical? — nature? How often it has been pointed out that the natural was objective and could be objective only in the way of being, not essentially, but merely formally or structurally external to the human. Nature, then, truly is physical only in so far as she is 'objective.' External to the functional or vital in what is human she cannot be, and this being true, in just so far, she is spiritual; in just so far her reconstruction is man's volition; in just so far man says, religiously, of her activity: 'What she does, I will.' She may never appear literally in man's image, but her life is one with his life and the spiritual or volitional or characteristically religious attitude puts just this valuation upon her.

So this paper having accomplished its specific task must come to an end. Of course, as from any narrative, a score or more of 'morals' might be drawn. The distinction, moral or ethical, between good and evil, for example, evidently should be judged relatively to the specific situation or to the induced attitude, within which it manifestly belongs, and the distinction,



practical or reflective, between truth and error, relatively to what is a qualitatively different situation or attitude. Again the need, whenever discussion or explanation would become at all searching or vital, of always carefully distinguishing between the personal and the social, the functional and the structural, perhaps too the pragmatic and the dogmatic, and at the same time also of always making these distinct things work together is also evident. But such 'morals,' however urgent or numerous, may be left safely to the imagination.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The MS. of this article was received December 16, 1906.—ED.