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THE ARMY DURING THE REVOLUTION 1789-94.

*(A Review of M. E. d'HAUTERIVE'S Work.)**By Lieutenant-Colonel E. M. LLOYD, R.E.*

THE ARMY OF THE MONARCHY (1789-92).

STATE of the Army in 1789.—The cleavage of classes, so marked in France generally at the time of the Revolution, was especially sharp in the army between officers and men. The latter were tempted to enlist by a few crowns, the sight of a smart uniform, and the promise of a pleasant life; they were prompted by poverty, not by patriotism. They soon found themselves disappointed, and desertion was the natural consequence. The officers did not sufficiently realise that to win their men's hearts they must take care of their bodies; they were feared and obeyed, but they were not loved. The natural gaiety of Frenchmen had to struggle against the influence of crowded, unwholesome barracks, hospital neglect, shoddy clothing, and bad food. On every side contractors batted on them.

The soldier had usually plenty of time on his hands, though little money. He had not more than four hours' duty a day. He strolled the streets, hung about wine-shops, and fought duels like his betters. Laws against duelling were multiplied in vain: everyone combined to ignore them. In other respects discipline had become much stricter in the reign of Louis XVI.: partly from the prolonged peace, partly because captains had ceased to be the owners of their companies, and had not the old temptation to wink at misconduct, lest their men should desert and put them to the expense of new recruits. Prussian fashions were introduced; among them the punishment of strokes with the flat of the sabre, so alien to the French character. "Nothing but the edge of the sabre for me," was a saying that went round the army.

Though the soldiers were not concerned directly with the eighteenth-century philosophy, it had its effect upon them in sapping respect for religion and authority, and raising hopes of better times for themselves. This was especially the case with the lower officers (*bas-officiers*), who were as a rule excellent, but had practically no chance of promotion to officers. The commissioned ranks belonged to the *noblesse*, though a few men of the middle class gained access to them by money, and forced their way upward by merit.¹

¹ This was more difficult in the reign of Louis XVI. than in the preceding reigns. By the order of 22nd May, 1781, all candidates for sub-lieutenancies must give proof of four quarters of nobility. (Duruy, *L'armée royale en 1789*, p. 83.)

The higher nobility were captains or colonels from their cradle. Others bought commissions as sub-lieutenants. But most of the young officers came from the military schools founded by Louis XV. for the sons of men of quality with narrow means. Promotion went solely by the King's pleasure. It was obtained usually through a friend at Court, but sometimes through the report of an honest inspector, as the tardy reward of good service. But in the main, rank had little to do with service, past or future. It was a title to pension, a means of support for the nobility—often the only means. There were 36,000 officers, of whom only 13,000 were upon the active list, and the officers cost more than all the rest of the army.¹

Yet they had hard work to make ends meet, for life was expensive in the army. Play, dress, and the table drew heavily on the purse of an officer, and drove him to many shifts. But honour was a very different thing from common honesty, and all virtue was summed up in courage. They did not serve France, they served the King; and with the King's leave they were ready to transfer their service to a foreign power, and even to fight against their own country.

The States-General.—The soldiers had no votes, and the junior officers took little part in the elections of 1789. Among the deputies of the *Tiers État* only four were drawn from the army. Among the deputies of the nobility there were thirty-five generals and seventeen regimental officers. In the flood of pamphlets which poured at that time from the press, only a few dealt with the state of the army. But the memorials addressed to the States-General on this subject were numerous, and on several points they were nearly unanimous. They asked that there should be some security against the capricious changes made by successive ministers, and against their arbitrary action; that purchase should be abolished, and all ranks of the army be open to all classes of the people, according to merit; that the excessive number of generals and the sinecure appointments should be cut down; that the soldier should be better paid and better treated, and corporal punishment done away with; and that means should be found to reconcile military subordination with the rights of a free citizen. Some, foreseeing the troubles ahead, asked for guarantees that the troops should never be employed against the people.

The First Months of the Revolution (May—September, '89).—Want of food and the fermentation caused by the meeting of the States-General, led to wide-spread disturbances and brigandage in the country. The troops were called upon to help the constabulary, and they did their duty with moderation and discipline. But in the towns they were more in sympathy with the forces of disorder. The French Guards, demoralised by Paris life, and fretted by a harsh commanding officer, gave the first example of mutiny. Most of them lived on the earnings

¹ The total number of officers on the active list is shown as 9,378 by Grimoard. (*Tableau historique de la guerre de la Révolution de France*. Vol. I., p. 348.) There were 1,159 officers on the staff of the army. (Duruy, p. 95.)

of loose women, and these women drew them to join hands with the people. Other regiments followed their example; but some, especially the foreign regiments, were more to be relied on, and were, therefore, brought up and quartered round Paris.

On 12th July began the riots, ending on the 14th with the storming of the Bastille. This gave a shock to discipline all over France. It was the starting-point of the struggle between the men and their officers, and of fraternisations between the troops and the rioters in provincial towns. They continued, however, especially the cavalry, to do escort duty for the convoys of grain, and protect them from the peasantry. They would put down pillage, though they would not fire upon a mob asserting its rights. They had still, too, a sense of military honour. A dragoon, premature in his ferocity, tore out the heart of one of the victims of the mob, and carried it in triumph. His comrades voted his conduct infamous, and one after another challenged him till he was killed.

The Minister of War tried to counteract the influence of the people on the troops by shifting them frequently from one station to another. The officers recommended various concessions to them, and pointed out grievances, *e.g.*, that at some of the public gardens admission was refused to "loose women, dogs, soldiers, and beggars." But the men were not to be won now; and though they mostly obeyed from force of habit, they became more and more estranged from their officers.

By this time a new military force had come into existence. The National Guards were formed spontaneously, partly to guard the newly-acquired rights of the people and partly to protect property against the bands of plunderers. Paris had set the example the day before the storming of the Bastille. Other towns followed suit, and before long the total number of those who had inscribed their names was reckoned at more than two millions. The actual effectives fell far short of that number. It was a Volunteer force of townfolk of all ages, armed with such weapons as came to hand. Commandant, officers, and uniform (if any) were chosen by the men. There were 16,000 deserters from the army among the National Guards of Paris.

The Federations (October, '89—14th July, '90).—In deference to the wishes of the Assembly and the Parisians, the King sent away the foreign troops from Versailles. At the end of September the regiment of Flanders came into quarters there. Its arrival was viewed with suspicion by the "patriots," for it was said to be devoted to the King. A banquet was given to it, where loyal toasts were drunk, and the tricolour cockade was trampled under foot. Paris was furious, and the mob marched on Versailles. The girls of the Palais Royal won over the Flanders men, and the King was brought to Paris, lest he should join the army of Bouillé in the east of France. This was a further blow to the Royal prestige in the eyes of the army, though its effect was not immediate.

In the winter and spring there followed the general outburst of fraternity, which brought together peasants and townspeople in all parts of France to swear the unity of the country and the breaking down of all

local or other barriers. The soldiers were invited to share in this brotherhood, and to bind themselves to fight only against the enemies of their country. The great majority of them caught the infection. The bulk of the officers, on the contrary, watched the drift of affairs with unmixed distaste. They were irritated at the change in their own men; they despised the National Guards; they winced at having to take orders from ignorant municipalities. But loyalty to the King made most of them confine themselves to shrugs and epigrams. A few, indeed, thought only of their own safety, and left the country; these were the princes of the blood and the higher nobility.

Some officers tried hard to regain their hold of their men, and to remove them from popular seduction; and with a certain amount of success. But there were frequent outbreaks of mutiny and disorder, especially in the larger garrisons. Regiments rose against their officers, fought with one another, or broke loose and sold their arms and equipment. In one town they joined the rioters; in another they were themselves a terror to the peaceful inhabitants.

On 4th June, the Minister of War brought the state of things in the army to the notice of the Assembly, and begged it to take strong measures; but the Assembly listened and did nothing. It had already congratulated certain corps on joining in the Federation movement, and on 12th June it resolved that each regiment should send delegates to represent it in the great gathering of Federates which was to be held in Paris on the anniversary of the storming of the Bastille.

The Clubs (14th July, '90—20th June, '91). — "This Federation poisoned the troops; the soldiers brought back from the capital all the seeds of corruption, and scattered them throughout the army": so said Bouillé, who commanded at Metz, and who was the man on whom the Court built most. The delegates had seen the strength that comes of combination; they had been welcomed and indoctrinated by the clubs. On their return, or in some cases before it, regimental committees were formed, which corresponded with the more extreme members of the Assembly, sent reports of their officers and organised the action of the men. Instigated from Paris, they put forward claims for pay which they declared the men had been defrauded of. In some cases the pay-chests were seized; in others the officers were made to pay up, as ransom for their lives.

The Assembly tried in vain to stop this movement. It found it necessary to send general officers as inspectors to inquire into the charges made, and these inquiries gave rise in some places to new outbreaks. That at Nancy, originating with a Swiss regiment (Châteaueux), was so serious that Bouillé marched from Metz with 4,500 men to suppress it. A considerable number of his troops were killed and wounded, and sixty-three men of Châteaueux were sentenced to death or the galleys. Bouillé had managed to maintain more discipline among his troops than was the case elsewhere, but he considered that he could rely only upon the foreign battalions of his infantry, and upon rather more than half his cavalry. The latter, recruited from the country population, mostly

quartered in villages and actively employed in escort duty or in preventing the exportation of corn over the frontier, was less contaminated than the foot.

In the early part of 1791 the control of the clubs over the army became more complete. The troops were the chief possible obstacle to the execution of the Jacobin plans, and no pains were spared to win them over and alienate them from their own officers. "The friends of the Constitution" kept vigilant watch on them in all parts of France, denounced officers, and memorialised the generals or the Minister of War to leave this regiment, or remove that, according as they found them more or less amenable to their influence. On 1st May the Assembly resolved that soldiers, when not on duty, might attend the meetings of these societies, but that the societies were not to interfere in regimental matters. The prohibition was of no effect, and the growing disorder, especially the agitation caused by the refusal of most of the clergy to take the civic oath, loosened the bonds of discipline still further.

The Emigration (20th June, '91—end of '91).—On 20th June began the King's flight to Varennes. On the 25th he re-entered Paris, passing through a silent crowd, to whom warning had been given:—"Anyone who cheers the King will be beaten; anyone who insults him will be hanged." This fiasco destroyed what remained of his prestige with the army. A sense of honour and duty to him had hitherto kept the officers at their posts, though they saw with disgust the change in their men and the influence of the clubs, and were themselves exposed to humiliations and danger. Now they felt free to follow the example which he had set, and could even serve him better by swelling the numbers of Frenchmen beyond the frontier who were ready to join foreign Powers in restoring the Royal authority.

Many of them went, partly moved thereto by the imposition of a new oath to the Constitution, in which no mention was made of the King. Bouillé and a large number of his officers were hopelessly compromised by the failure of the King's attempt, which they had pledged themselves to help. But, besides those who emigrated of their own accord, either out of fear for themselves or loyalty to their Sovereign, there were others who were driven away by their troops. Suspicion was everywhere, and was easily directed upon anyone whose strictness made him unpopular, or who had provoked some private grudge.

To fill up the numerous vacancies the Assembly resolved, on the 1st August, that sub-lieutenants should be obtained, half of them from the under-officers¹ of the regiment, and half from civilians 16 to 24 years of age, sons of men who had full rights of citizenship, and known to be attached to the Constitution. Three-fourths were to be taken from the latter source, when the regiment had itself made the vacancies by driving officers away. These rules furnished a new motive for insubordination,

¹ *Bas-officiers* had been re-named *Sous-officiers*. La Fayette and others attributed the Republican successes largely to the admission of these men to the higher ranks. Hoche and Soult were among them. By the beginning of 1792 more than 2,000 officers had resigned.

which was by no means counterbalanced by the threat of punishment which accompanied them. Greed now came in to reinforce spite and mistrust. Where the men themselves took no part against their officers, they were not sorry to leave them to the fury of the mob directed by the clubs.

Disorder and insubordination had reached a pitch which could be cured only by war; and war had become inevitable. On 14th December three armies were formed, that of the North under Rochambeau, that of the Centre under La Fayette, and that of the Rhine under Lückner, to guard the frontier threatened by the emigrants and the allies.

THE ARMIES OF THE REVOLUTION (1792-94).

The Earlier Volunteers (end of '91—11th August, '92).—There were gaps in the ranks of the army as well as among the officers, and they were less easy to fill. Recruits were few, deserters many, and the army was more than 50,000 men under strength. The imminence of war made some means of supplementing it imperative. The National Guards, formed only for local use, were quite unsuitable for this purpose.¹ In the beginning of 1791, it had been decided to raise 100,000 auxiliaries by voluntary engagement, to reinforce the regiments of the line as required; but nothing came of this.

In June, 1791, a law was passed that one in every twenty men of the National Guard should be held available for service with the army; and in July and August the Assembly, acting upon this law, summoned at first 26,000, and ultimately 101,000 men, not to join the regiments of the line, but to form separate battalions of Volunteers. The call was met much more readily in the North-east than in the parts of France more remote from invasion. By 25th September sixty battalions were nearly made up; but the remaining 109 battalions of this levy were formed very slowly.

At first they were left in their own towns; but some of the men dropped off, others were insubordinate, others demanded that they should be sent to the threatened frontier, and it was thought best to gratify them. Intoxicated by the language of the clubs and journals, they behaved, when they arrived there, as if they were in a conquered country, pillaging at pleasure, and disregarding all authority. To make matters worse, the Assembly decided, in the absence of the Minister of War, that the men should elect their own officers, with the sole proviso that they must not be officers of the line. This led to the choice of schemers, talkers, and drinkers, who neither knew the value of discipline, nor had courage to enforce it.² Narbonne, the Minister of War, appealed to the

¹ The provincial militia (the old reserve of the army) had fallen into neglect and disfavour, and was abolished in March, 1791. Men were drawn for it by lot, but there were many exemptions, and it practically fell on the peasantry.

² While there is abundant evidence to bear this out, it must not be forgotten that among those elected were Davout, Jourdan, Lecourbe, Marceau, Masséna, Oudinot, Pichegru, and Victor, all of whom had served in the regular army; while among those who had had little or no previous military training were Lannes, Moreau, St. Cyr, and Suchet. One result, indeed, of the system was that it led men to desert from the line in order to obtain commissions in the Volunteers.

Assembly in vain to alter this, nor could he persuade them to allow the regular army to be recruited from the Volunteers.

The emigration of officers increased in the early months of 1792, and they now tried to persuade their men to go with them. Of the Twelfth Cavalry, fourteen officers and 150 men set out for the frontier, but three-fourths of the men changed their minds and turned back. Much the same happened with other regiments, but the Royal-Allemand went over in a body.

On 20th April, in reply to the Austrian summons to restore the King's prerogatives, France declared war against Austria. Dumouriez, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, hoped that by a prompt offensive the Austrian troops would be driven out of the Netherlands; but the disgraceful panics which seized the troops of Biron and Dillon as they were advancing on Mons and Tournay respectively, frustrated his scheme. These panics originated, not with the Volunteers, but with Regulars—the Fifth and Sixth Dragoons. Dillon was killed by his own men, and Rochambeau resigned in disgust. Lückner succeeded him in command of the army of the North. It was the worst of the three armies, and he complained to Servan, the Minister of War, of the state in which he found it. In reply, Servan remarked that the correspondence of the French generals fifty years before contained many complaints of the want of discipline of the troops, and the neglect of the officers; yet, nevertheless, they won the victories of Fontenoy, Rocoux, and Laffeldt. At the same time, he admitted that the efforts of agitators, and the wholesale change of officers, made the general's task a hard one.

Other things contributed. The supply of stores and necessities of all sorts was lamentably deficient; the whole administration was disorganised; and the depreciation of *assignats* made the troops unable to buy things for themselves. Marauding was, in fact, forced upon them. The local clubs formed committees to watch the military operations, to advise the generals about their duties, or to report their incompetence to the Minister of War, and suggest substitutes for them.

The war stood still, but while the Austrian and Prussian Armies were mustering on the Rhine events moved fast in Paris. In anticipation of the national *fête* on 14th July, which would bring a fresh flow of Federates to the capital, the Girondist Ministry proposed that a camp for 20,000 of them should be formed near Paris. This proposal was vetoed by the King, together with the law passed by the Assembly for the expulsion of refractory priests; and on 13th June he dismissed the Ministers who had brought them forward. Dumouriez resigned three days afterwards and joined the army of the North. On 20th June the mob invaded the Tuileries, demanding the withdrawal of the veto. On 11th July the Assembly met the advance of Brunswick by declaring the country in danger, and summoning the Volunteers who had not yet joined;¹ and in

¹ The strength of the regular army was estimated at 178,000 men at the end of June, but nearly half of them were required for garrisons. The Volunteers were reckoned at 84,000. (Roussett, p. 66.)

the beginning of August, in reply to Brunswick's proclamation, the question of deposition was raised.

The Downfall of Royalty (10th August, '92—21st January, '93).—

On 10th August the Tuileries were again invaded, the guards were massacred, and the Royal family took refuge with the Assembly, which was forced to suspend the King, and to summon a Convention to decide on the future form of government. It sent off commissioners to the different armies to reconcile them to the steps taken, and to remove such officers as would not accept them.¹

La Fayette made a last effort to arrest the Revolution and save the Monarchy, but his troops would not follow him. On 19th August he crossed the frontier with a few officers of his staff, and Dumouriez took his place. Lückner was practically superseded at the same time, under guise of promotion to generalissimo. The army at large accepted the constitutional change with indifference, if not with pleasure. It was more concerned about the war. But many officers who had hitherto held on now left, and many others were denounced and driven away. The Minister of War thanked the denouncers for such marks of civism.

Meanwhile the allies had entered France, and by the beginning of September had taken Longwy and Verdun. The panic caused in Paris gave opportunity for the September massacres. When these were over, the butchers were sent to join Dumouriez's army; but the troops received them ill, and even killed one man who boasted that he had mutilated the body of the Princesse de Lamballe. These ruffians were among the Federates who, having gathered at Paris for the *fête*, had been sent afterwards to a camp at Soissons, to be drilled and formed into battalions, and had been passed on in a few weeks to the armies in the field. There was a large element of Parisians among them, and they were far worse than the ordinary Volunteers, who had at all events some local bond in their battalions. The new levies of Volunteers, too, were inferior to those of 1791, which had contained a larger proportion of genuine patriots. Many of those now furnished were hired substitutes. They knew nothing of drill or discipline, pillaged incessantly, and cried out that they were betrayed at the first sight of the enemy.² Some generals had tried to curry favour by praising the Volunteers. Montsquiou, who commanded the South-east frontier, had even declared that they were better than the troops of the line; but he retracted when he was taken at his word, and his regulars were ordered elsewhere.

¹ Among the officers suspended on this account was Rouget de l'Isle, the author of the *Marseillaise*. He was a lieutenant of Engineers serving at Huningue. About the same time Servan was sending the *Marseillaise* to Kellermann to be chanted instead of the *Te Deum*, in celebration of Valmy.

² Biron, commanding the army of the Rhine, complained to the Minister of War that nine-tenths of them came to him absolutely destitute, and that he had the utmost difficulty in finding clothes and arms for them. Servan, in reply, could only suggest that they should be armed with pikes and fowling-pieces, and supplied with buckshot cartridges.

In the previous year the Assembly had decided that any Volunteer should be free to go home at the end of a campaign (arbitrarily fixed at 1st December) if he had given two months' previous notice. In the beginning of October, '92, a large number of the earlier Volunteers, who had now become of some value as soldiers, gave notice accordingly. Many of them went off at once; and by December some battalions disappeared entirely, though the campaign was in full career.

It was to these earlier Volunteers, and to the troops of the line, that the repulse of the enemy at Valmy (20th September) and his defeat at Jemmapes (6th November) were due.¹ If there were disorder and destitution in the armies, there were also courage and enthusiasm. In January, '93, Custine wrote from Mayence:—"I have not been able to provide shoes for all my soldiers; many are barefoot; yet they show a cheeriness which delights me, and which I cannot understand."

Custine was one of the aristocratic officers whom ambition had kept in the army, and who sounded their own trumpet and denounced one another, in hopes of rising to the highest commands. The example they set was widely followed. Every man in authority knew that others were trying to trip him up; and this, with the fear of provoking desertions, made most men aim at popularity and let discipline go. The action of the Convention and its commissioners helped to relax it. Military prisoners were amnestied, and "patriotic" literature circulated among the men.

Disorganisation (January—October, '93).—At the beginning of 1793, the Revolution seemed to be everywhere triumphant. It had been successful in Belgium, on the Rhine, and in Savoy, and had crushed opposition at home. Only a few voices were raised in the army against the execution of the King. But in a few months the situation was changed. Civil war had broken out in the West and was threatening in the South; England and Holland had been added to the enemies of France; and the French troops had been beaten at Neer-Winden and driven out of Belgium. Dumouriez was already on bad terms with the Jacobins before his defeat, and knowing they or he must fall, he leagued with the Austrians to put them down. His troops would not listen to him, the Volunteers fired on him, and he had to take refuge with Coburg; but he left his army disorganised and dejected.

To meet the emergency, the Convention created the Committee of Public Safety, to watch and control the executive in Paris, and sent "representatives of the people" to the armies to play the same part with the generals. If these representatives often meddled with questions which they did not understand, they carried a weight which was usefully directed against abuses. For instance, they denounced the swarms of loose women who were quartered in the barracks and camps, and were as numerous as the troops themselves. "They enervate the troops," wrote Carnot, "and cause ten times as much loss as the enemy's

¹ At Jemmapes Dumouriez had about 40,000 men, the Austrians 13,000. Two-thirds of his infantry were Volunteers.

fire by the diseases they bring." But the orders against them were largely evaded by their dressing as men.

The Minister of War, Bouchotte, had also his emissaries with the armies, and their action was wholly mischievous. They, like himself, were creatures of Hébert's; they were drawn from the lowest classes, and their business was to denounce officers and detach their men from them. Custine was especially chosen for their attacks, because he was an aristocrat who had been successful, and in whom his men believed; also, no doubt, because he treated Bouchotte with undisguised contempt. The filthy libels of *Père Duchesne* and other prints were freely distributed by them throughout the ranks, and partly paid for out of the funds of the War Department. Generals were displaced one after another, and many men shirked so dangerous an elevation, which (as Kléber said) was "an order for the scaffold." Men rose with unheard-of rapidity; some, like Hoche, Pichegru, and Moreau, from real merit; others, like Santerre, Rossignol, and Ronsin, by party intrigue.

Nevertheless, there was at this time little insubordination among the regular troops. Two things, *esprit de corps* and the presence of the enemy, made the men obey chiefs of proved capacity, in spite of lampoons and emissaries. The leaders of the Mountain continued, therefore, to distrust them. Amalgamation between the Regulars and the Volunteers had long been proposed. The Jacobins wished for it in the sense of complete fusion in order to destroy the old regiments; men of military experience wished for it in the sense of linked battalions, in order to improve the Volunteers. On 11th June it was adopted by the Convention in the latter form, though it was not generally carried out till the beginning of the following year.

The successes of the allies on the northern frontier, and of the insurgents in La Vendée, caused other measures besides this. The *levée en masse* was ordered on 14-16th August, but it was abortive. On 23rd August, the Convention decreed a compulsory conscription. Henceforward, all Frenchmen were under an obligation to serve in such ways as they could, and all the young unmarried men were liable to be called to the colours. This gave an ample supply of men, but much else was needed. Generals and representatives agreed that the disasters were mainly owing to the incompetence of the War Ministry, and the anarchic spirit which prevailed in it. A strong Government was demanded. The Hébertists fell in September; while Robespierre, hitherto their ally, became for the next ten months the master of France.

The Terror (October, '93-July, '94).—The tide now turned. While heads were falling fast in Paris, Houchard defeated the allies at Hondschooten (8th September) and Jourdan defeated them at Wattignies (16th October). Both these victories were mainly due to Carnot, who had joined the Committee of Public Safety in August. The representatives, instead of reporting to the Convention, now corresponded direct with that committee, which took into its hands the conduct of the war. The representatives, of whom there were now four with each army, had unlimited powers, which they often abused, but which many of them used

for the benefit of the army, to check pillage, malversation, cowardice, and disorder. "Generals, officers, and officials of all sorts are directed to satisfy the real grievances of the soldiers within three days. After that time we shall investigate them ourselves, and shall give examples of justice and severity such as the army has not yet seen." Such was the warning of the austere St. Just on joining the army of the Rhine, and he kept his word. He found 10,000 men were without shoes. He made the municipality of Strasburg provide them by ten o'clock next morning.

The representatives employed themselves less usefully in hunting out aristocrats among the officers, and forcing generals to fight actions against their better judgment. Everyone had not the courage of the general who replied to the threats of a representative:—"A man like me, who is every day in presence of the enemy, is not afraid of death, and I laugh at your guillotine." Military tribunals were set up after the pattern of the Revolutionary Tribunal, but they did not deal swift enough justice to satisfy such men as St. Just.

Meanwhile, the vigour, of which these things were symptoms, was winning success for the Republicans in La Vendée and on the Rhine, as well as in Belgium. The insurrection of Lyons was crushed and Toulon was recovered. The old faults remained among the troops—pillage, desertion, and insubordination—but there was a tighter rein upon them, and the soldiers had become hardened by much fighting. The material furnished by the conscription of August, vast in quantity, was worse in quality than the levies of the two preceding years, for the men were taken against their will. They were at first formed into separate battalions, and elected their own officers, like the Volunteers; but they were so worthless in this form that the Convention decided in November to incorporate them with the older battalions, by that time much reduced in strength.

On 8th January, 1794, the Convention gave orders that the amalgamation between the Regulars and Volunteers, decided on in June, should be generally carried out. Demi-brigades were formed, consisting of one battalion of the line and (as a rule) two battalions of Volunteers or Conscripts. The election of officers by their men in the Volunteer battalions was abolished. Regulars and Volunteers were henceforward to wear the same uniform, bear the same number, and serve under the same regulations. The army of the Monarchy was thus transformed at the end of five years into the army of the Revolution.