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## TRAJAN'S FIRST DACIAN WAR.

(Plates II—V.)

By G. A. T. DAVIES.

In the early summer of 1914 I undertook to prepare for the *Journal of Roman Studies* an abstract of a paper read at a meeting of the Roman Society in the March of that year on the subject of Trajan's second Dacian campaign in A.D. 102. This manuscript was sent from Munich in the last fateful days of that July, and for obvious reasons never came to hand. The sketch which follows should be regarded as merely an outline of this abstract.

That Trajan in the campaign of 102 followed a different route from that taken in 101 is agreed. The agreement does not altogether stop at this point, for the majority of writers on the subject have inclined to believe that the advance in 102 was made by way of the Red Tower Pass, although the Vulcan Pass has also found supporters, e.g. Petersen. Cichorius on general grounds (these with him do not seem very satisfactory, but there are others) elects for the Red Tower Pass, from which point he makes Trajan advance along the valleys of the Alt, Maros and Strell against the Dacian capital. But his difficulties begin after the crossing of the Carpathians, and his particular identifications in this section of the reliefs have been most incisively criticised by Petersen. The fact is that the pictorial record shews us nothing at all of an advance by the Maros valley. The story which it does tell us, on the other hand, is in complete accord with the epitome or rather epitomes of Dio Cassius—we have versions of this campaign both from Xiphilinus and the Constantinian excerptor. On this joint basis the problem may be stated thus—to find that route by which, the Carpathians once crossed, the Roman line of advance lay entirely in a mountain region until the capture of certain Dacian fortresses brought the army out at no great distance from Sarmizegethusa. If this be so—and a comparison of the literary and pictorial evidence will show, as I believe, that I have not coloured the formula in order to prove a thesis, then this route can only be over the Red Tower Pass, and thereafter not, as Cichorius contends, NW. to Mühlbach and SW. along the Maros and the Strell, i.e. along the line of the later Roman road, but directly westward across the Mühlbach mountains from a point not far from Hermannstadt. That 'mountain warfare' in the strict sense is shown on the Column seems certain, and the testimony of Dio is quite decided and emphatic on this point.

In this view, the main objective of the Roman advance was a



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**TRAJAN'S FIRST DACIAN WAR.**



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i.



ii.

**TRAJAN'S FIRST DACIAN WAR.**

cluster of Dacian fortresses in the Mühlbach mountains,<sup>1</sup> the remains of which I was in 1913 enabled to visit through the generosity of the Carnegie Trust from its Research Fund. The chief of these 'Cetați' are (1) the Muncel Gredistye (or Cetate), with its huge wall, (2) La Grebla, some six miles below the Muncel, at a point where the gorge of the Városviz opens out into the valley, (3) Piatra Rosie holding the Lunkany, and (4) the Kudsir Cetate on the stream of that name. The defences of these fortresses rise gradually, as on the Muncel, or sharply as elsewhere, in a series of terraces, protected laterally by ravines and precipices. These Cetați seem to be confined in Transylvania to the western half of the Mühlbach triangle,<sup>2</sup> or 'Old Dacia' as we should be justified in calling it in view of coin finds and its protohistoric, Dacian and Roman remains. Thousands of coins have been found on the Muncel and the adjoining slopes—gold pieces of Lysimachus, of the Thracian prince Koson (the ally of M. Brutus), and Roman coins of all kinds, especially those of Titus, Domitian and Nerva. These, however, break off with Trajan, and on the few of his coins which have come to light there he is not yet *Dacicus* (A.D. 102). Cichorius, therefore, would recognise the Muncel in the Dacian stronghold shewn at LXXI on the Column, and Petersen somewhat doubtfully concurs; but this does not fit in with the routes which they respectively adopt, since this site lies quite apart from the advance on Sarmizegethusa by way of the Vulcan Pass which Petersen suggests, while Cichorius makes Trajan capture it by a lateral stroke delivered from the Maros valley, which is for a variety of reasons improbable, and is certainly not indicated in the reliefs.

This was one of the greatest feats of the Roman arms, and its difficulty and hazard were only compensated by the importance of the objective. It is certain that this well-contrived system of defence commanding the Városviz valley, as well as the two minor streams Lunkany and Kudsir, which flow respectively into the Strell and the Maros, was originally planned as a whole, in a more or less 'heptarchic' Dacia, to hold 'Old Dacia' against attack from the side of the 'Gold-district.' In thus advancing across the mountains Trajan secured the enormous advantage of descending upon it from the rear (via Surian and down Godian).


It was also suggested that the importance of this mountain

<sup>1</sup> It seems convenient to use this term for the *massif*, bisected by the river Mühlbach, which is bounded on the east by the Red Tower Pass, on the west by Petroseny and the Vulcan Pass, and on the north by Mühlbach (Szász-Sebes). It is usually divided into Sebeshely Mts. (west), Mühlbach Mts. (centre), and Cibin Mts. (east); but this demarcation into definite ranges is neither practically precise nor scientifically justifiable. Its chief heights lie about the source of the river Mühlbach—Cindrelul (2243 m.), Stefesci (2244), Piatra Alba (2180);

Verfu lui Petru (2133) and Surian (2061) are farther west.

<sup>2</sup> The only exception known to me is Tundervár near Torda, which Finály (*Arch. Jahrbuch*, 1910, 390) compares with the Muncel Cetate. (In the maps of the Austro-Hungarian Military-Geographical Institute (Zone 22, Col. xxx) a Cetate is marked near Orlát, about 15 km. west of Nagyszében (Hermannstadt) i.e. in the eastern half of this triangle.)

triangle, which is indeed, owing to its control of the Red Tower and Vulcan Passes, of an indestructible nature, has never been adequately recognised by writers on the Roman conquest and occupation of Dacia. In our days the attention of Hungarian archaeologists has for the most part been directed northward from Kolozsvár (Klausenburg) to the Limes.<sup>1</sup> The Muncel, too, is not easily reached save from Broos (Szaszváros) up the Varosviz valley, a distance of some twenty miles. Broos is the most westernly



outpost of the original Saxon settlements in the Transylvanian Alps, and there first the German element, and in its turn the Magyar also, have long had to fight a losing battle with the less advanced<sup>2</sup> but more prolific Roumanian. In this region the Saxon, and in lesser degree the Suabian, was in the past the *Kulturträger*, even

<sup>1</sup> This district was visited some years ago by Professors Finály, Lange, and Kuzsinszky of the University of Budapest, commissioned by the Hungarian Government to report on the desirability of reserving these remains from the operations of the Forestry Department. I understand

that they visited the Muncel and Piatra Rosie, which sites are marked on Finály's wall-map of Roman Hungary, but I am not aware that any formal report on the antiquities as such was published or contemplated.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. in Transylvania.



if his part in its history may finally be seen to have been the lowlier but still indispensable one of *Kulturdünger*, to use the bitter word of Bruno Bauer. Certainly the remoteness of Broos from the centres of light and learning at Schässburg and Hermannstadt, connected with the names of Ackner, Teutsch, Friedrich and Heinrich Müller, and above all Karl Gooss, has been unfavourable to the investigation of this most interesting district as a whole, although some of these scholars have given us valuable descriptions of the Muncel, as the result of flying visits made from Broos. The remains in this region are no longer what they were in their day—*quod non fecerunt barbari, fecerunt Barberini*—the latter find a counterpart here in their remote and humble Roumanian relatives, who have cleared whole plateaux of ancient stones and swept marble wholesale into their limekilns.

The Muncel after the conquest became the site of a Roman settlement, as the remains still attest, especially a fine porphyry bath which lies outside the eastern gate of the enclosure, with sides chipped away by vandals from Broos who in former days were wont to make a 'Roman holiday' here. Three inscriptions have been found in its immediate vicinity, two set up to, and one by a governor.<sup>1</sup> Apparently for the notables of the province, who took the cure at Aquae (Kalan-Furdö) or near Germisara (at Feredö-Gyógy), the Muncel was a *villeggiatura* or a convenient centre for hunting excursions. And there must always have been, not very far away, bigger game than the bear or wild boar. There is a Roman fort in the neighbourhood of Mühlbach,<sup>2</sup> one on Verfu lui Petru near the Roumanian frontier,<sup>3</sup> and equidistant between the latter and the Muncel I found in 1913 two Roman castella (300 × 195 m. and 300 × 260, with traverses) about four hundred yards apart, on the broad summit of Mt. Comarnicelul. Even as late as 165 Sarmizegethusa was threatened *incipiti periculo*,<sup>4</sup> i.e. from Germans and Sarmatians on the west, and from the Dacians in this quarter; and soon after we find a detachment of the V Macedonica at Alsó-Városviz.<sup>5</sup> It is probable that the dates of all these castella fall in the early decades of the occupation; but the size of the two on Comarnicelul would seem to set them somewhat apart from ordinary auxiliary castella, and a conjecture may be hazarded, for what it is worth, that we may have in this region some of the *φρουραί* which Dio Cassius mentions as established after the first war to hold down 'the rest of the country,' evidently, if the Red Tower advance in any form is accepted for 102, in particular *this* part of Dacia. However

<sup>1</sup> C. iii, 1415, 1416, *Arch-epig. Mitt.* xiii, 194.

<sup>2</sup> Téglas, *Ung. Revue*, 1893, p. 438.

<sup>3</sup> For this and generally Gooss, *Chronik der archäologischen Funde Siebenbürgens* (= *Archiv für siebenbürg. Landeskunde* xiii, Heft 2, pp. 203-338), which is by no means superseded by Martian's *Archäologisch-prähistorisches Repertorium*

*für Siebenbürgen* (*Mitteilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, 1909, p. 321 ff).

<sup>4</sup> *Eph. Epig.* iv. 188.

<sup>5</sup> Alsó-Városviz was an important point, for it was here that the old Dacian road which ran from near Mühlbach across the mountains (parallel to Maros) reached the valley of the Városviz.

that may be, it is certain that these mountains were for long after the conquest a troublesome Dacian enclave, and there is no need to look too far afield for the 'Daci rebellantes' mentioned by the historians. This region, in spite or because of its wild and desolate character, has at all times given sanctuary to desperate and broken men, and has harboured fugitives from all the stricken fields of Transylvanian history.

Further, it has long since been noted that Statius' allusions to Dacia<sup>1</sup> appear to refer to some particular part of the Transylvanian plateau as the stronghold of the Dacian race in his day. His language does indeed appear to carry a more specific reference than the *Daci montibus inhaerent* of Florus or the *corona montium* of Jordanes. If this be so, I cannot conceive that any part of Transylvania has a right to be considered as the Dacian 'mons' at all comparable to the claim of the Mühlbach mountains; and will risk the most gratuitous form of error by predicting that an investigator of the rarely trodden region east of Surian will soon find that he is hot on the scent of Dio's 'entrenched mountains,' and in a position to settle decisively the question of the Roman advance in 102.

The identifications which I suggested in my paper were (according to the Cichorian division into scenes) LXX Piatra Rosie, LXXI Muncel Cetate (these two strongholds are indicated in advance in LXVII), LXXII La Grebla, LXXIII Alsó-Városviz, LXXIV Aquae (Kis-Kalan). I append (p 76) a rough sketch map, for which I am indebted to Mr. G. A. Clarke, the Observatory, King's College, Aberdeen.<sup>2</sup> To this subject I hope to return at an early opportunity. Meanwhile, to supply the place of the missing article, I venture to offer some suggestions (after a genuflexion to Nemesis, this time at least not left unperformed) on what might seem at first sight the decidedly ungrateful subject of the first Dacian campaign, in A.D. 101.

From the seemingly monotonous and on the artistic side decidedly overcrowded series of castella and camps which occupy so much of the pictorial record of this campaign, I think it possible to elicit certain conclusions as to the pre-war situation on the Danube frontier, which will show us the nature of the *damnosa hereditas* which Trajan at the beginning of his reign took over from Domitian.

#### FIRST DACIAN CAMPAIGN.

The chief authorities referred to are Cichorius, *Die Reliefs der Traianssäule*, plates and text, Bänder ii and iii, Berlin, 1896 and

<sup>1</sup> *Theb.* i, 20, *conjurato dejectos vertice Dacos. Silvae.* i, 1, 7, *domus ardua Daci*; i, 1, 80, *tu tardum in foedera montem Longo Marte domas* iii, 3, 169, *quaeque suum Dacis donat clementia montem.*

Vollmer refers in his note to Dio's *ὄρη ἐντρετειχισμένα.*

<sup>2</sup> Redrawn for the *J.R.S.* by Mr. J. Addison. The illustrations in plates II-V are from Cichorius.

1900, according to his (often unsatisfactory) division into scenes, or where greater precision is required in Arabic numerals (bracketed), according to his spacing of the spiral; the incisive criticisms of Cichorius in Petersen's *Trajan's Dakische Kriege* (i and ii, Leipzig, 1899 and 1903); and occasionally the essay of von Domaszewski in *Philologus* (1906, p. 321 ff.) and his second thoughts in his *History of the Roman Emperors*. The essay on 'The Historical Interpretation of the Trajan Column' by Mr. H. Stuart Jones (*Papers of the British School at Rome*, v, 442 ff.), whose destructive criticism of the 'Double Advance' theory in the first campaign, and brilliant reconstruction of Trajan's route at the beginning of the second war have contributed so much to redeem the study of Trajan's wars from the dominion of unsound and retrograde hypothesis, falls for the greater part outside the scope of this article, though the view of the terms of peace in 102 which my argument carries with it causes me to side, in general, with Petersen, rather than with Cichorius whom he here supports.

The Adlocutio at x marks the formal opening of the campaign. There follows a succession of scenes depicting the stages of the advance which it is not difficult to distinguish and localise<sup>1</sup> by the help of the Tabula Peutingeriana which gives along the route Lederata—Tibiscum the following stations—Lederata, XII Apus Fluvius, XII Arcidava, XII Centum Putea, XII Berzovia, XII Azizis, III Caput Bubali, x Tibiscum.

The pictures in this section fall in a general way into pairs, 'marching camp' going with permanent fortress, usually as the covering of a river crossing (bridges at xi, xiv, xvi, xix; xv goes closely with xiv and does not come under this head). The usual conventional division of scenes by a tree is employed, but the divisions are not, in the nature of the route, to be regarded as abrupt (xiii and xiv = Arcidava, xv–xvii = Centum Putea, yet the scouting party of auxiliaries connects xiv and xv). Division is further secured as usual by the recurring figure of the emperor (xii, xiv, xvi, xviii, xx) and the indication of his presence at xxi, where only the imperial pavilion is shown. It seems convenient first to sketch in outline the actual stages of the advance.

xI–xII, Apus Fluvius (Udvarszállás). A castellum in construction

<sup>1</sup> A fragment of Trajan's own Commentaries, as is well known, indicates that the advance was made by this route. I am glad to find myself, in the localisation adopted, in agreement with Mr. Stuart Jones, and, with the exception of one detail, with von Domaszewski; but this is in no way essential to the main subject of this paper, which is concerned with the three fortified places shewn at xiv, xviii and xxi, irrespective of their identification, highly probable as that may be, with Arcidava, Berzovia and Tibiscum. It tends, however, to come into conflict with the 'Double Advance' theory, which has

forced Petersen, its chief exponent, into difficulties in the later halting-places. He whisks away the 'marching camp' and permanent fortress of xxi and xxii (Caput Bubali and Tibiscum) to the neighbourhood of the Key of Teregova, and reintroduces here his 'Lower Moesian army.' One result of this (the only one which here concerns us) is that he is forced to telescope Centum Putea, Berzovia, Azizis, Caput Bubali and Tibiscum into the three stations shewn, xv–xx, and is condemned (practically) to forego identification after Arcidava, surely a confession of failure.

xI on l. bank of the Apus (Karasu) faces, and is connected by a bridge with, a large 'marching camp' on r. bank. The river is protected, so far as it runs between these fortifications, by a palisade (on both banks, we are to suppose).<sup>1</sup> The camp is surrounded in addition by a wall and deep fosse. Within these lines stand Trajan and two of his staff (Licinius Sura to r. and Claudius Livianus, the praetorian prefect, to l.) gazing intently northward. From this point the army (through gate to r. of bridge) is to continue its march upstream to build.

xIII-xIV (left half of plate II, i) a 'marching camp. Sentries posted before porta praetoria and porta decumana. From the latter, Trajan, accompanied by Livianus, ascends a road, protected by a parapet, to the hill fortress of Arcidava (Varadia).<sup>2</sup> In the foreground a reconnoitring party of auxiliaries crosses bridge.<sup>3</sup> The main army is to proceed along the r. (not l. as Cichorius) bank of Apus and Czernovecz.<sup>4</sup>

xv-xVII (r. half of plate II, i and most of II, ii). In xv legionaries felling trees. Their security is indicated by the absence of helmet, i.e. they are preceded by the force which in xvi, under the direction of the emperor, builds a fort at Centum Putea. With this goes the marching camp, showing Praetorium, of xvii. Only after xvii comes the division of scenes (with the two trees).

xVIII-xx (plate II, ii (end) and III, i). Again 'marching camp' and (completed) fort—Berzovia (Zsidovin). Here the first Dacian prisoner is brought bound before the emperor and his two *comites*.

<sup>1</sup> von Domaszewski thinks this the wall of a permanent castellum, but the trees shown within the enceinte, and still more the marching camp, make this impossible. Nor are we to see here, with Cichorius, lines to block and hold the Apus valley. It is simply an extraordinary reinforcement of the camp defences, the significance of which will appear later.

<sup>2</sup> Cichorius' investigation of Varadia showed that the hill fortress lacked a water supply, and this he finds indicated here in the legionary in the foreground of xvi fetching water from the stream. The soldier, however, certainly belongs to the marching camp, not to the fort. C. employs this curious method of identification again at L in connexion with another fort which stands on an eminence at the head of a singular zigzag path. (This path points ahead to xcii and xcvi, where it reappears—the intention is to indicate the identity of the Long Walls, with which it is there connected, with those in L, and thus to signify that they lie north of the Danube, with the important corollary that the fighting in xcvi takes place *north, not south of the Danube*.) The artist who handles freely the detail of sites so familiar as Ancona and Salonac was not likely to deviate into this Baedekerism in depicting these stations in the Western Carpathians. Topographical indication is a primary concern of the designer, but this is a thing of a very different

order from topographical minutiae, although Cichorius only too often ignores this distinction.

<sup>3</sup> A second bridge is shewn in xv but smaller, i.e. in the distance. We may suppose this scouting party to cross the Czernovecz, tributary of the Karasu, and proceed along its left bank in the direction of Centum Putea (Nagy-Szurduk). The second bridge hints that this force later recrosses the Czernovecz, or merely foreshadows its return to its starting-point.

<sup>4</sup> Cichorius' sketch-maps (II, pp. 71 and 85) and Kiepert's map (at end of II) present some not unimportant discrepancies: (1) C's map at p. 71 (rightly) places Arcidava on right, Kiepert's on left bank of the Apus; (2) Caput Bubali. I would retain here the figure of Tab. Peut. (Azizis III, Caput Bubali) which von Domaszewski proposes to alter to XII, with the intention, I imagine, of making a further equidistant stage. In any case it is hard to see why Cichorius should place Caput Bubali so far west as between Ohabica and Ruzs. Kiepert goes less wide of the mark, it would seem, in putting it at Prebul, with the result, however, that C's route, drawn on Kiepert's map, exhibits a (now) unintelligible detour via Ruzs. We may perhaps draw the line of advance (provisionally) direct from Valemare to Zsuppa—Caput Bubali can hardly lie far outside it.



xix shows the bridging of the Berzovia, and xx the construction, on opposite sides of a valley, of two castella at Azisis (Valemare?).

xxi–xxii (plate III. ii; part of Tibiscum shown to r.). ‘Marching camp’ at Caput Bubali, from which auxiliary cavalry cross the Poganis, and ride up to and past the walls of Tibiscum. This fortress, neither defended by Dacians nor occupied by the Roman army, has perplexed the interpreters, who have plainly found it a strange apparition. The aspect of the interior (plainly a Dacian settlement) has debarred them from the mechanical explanation which did duty for Arcidava and Berzovia as ‘built by a force sent on in advance.’

We are now in a position to review as a whole the advance from the Danube (opposite Lederata) to the end station of the later road at Tibiscum. Now the more closely this section of the reliefs is examined, the more numerous are the unusual features which start into prominence. The significance, though not altogether the presence, of these has been missed by the interpreters, who have been too exclusively concerned to read into the later pictures of the series signs of the reappearance of that ‘Lower Moesian army’ which they imagine to have proceeded by way of the Key of Teregova. They have thus been drawn to regard the portrayal of the six stations from Apus Fluvius to Caput Bubali as no more than the artist’s conscientious execution of a monotonous and uncongenial task, and have overlooked certain indications that the real significance of this series is ignored if it is regarded as no more than the construction of a road and its protection by a number of equidistant castella.

The first singularity meets us at the first station—Apus Fluvius. Here—at a distance of no more than twelve miles from Lederata—we find a more elaborate complex of fortification than appears elsewhere on the Column in connexion with a Roman advance. Caution and the imminence of attack is expressed in every detail.

The next difficulty arises when we come to consider those juxtapositions of ‘marching camp’ and permanent fort at the alternate stations Arcidava, Berzovia, and Tibiscum, where in each case the permanent fort has to all appearance been completed, not after, but before, the ‘marching camp.’<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, at the halting-places Apus Fluvius, Centum Putea, and Azisis the castella are, quite naturally, in process of construction after the ‘marching camp’ is completed, or all but so, as in the last of these. At the other three stations, however, it would seem that the advancing army pitches its camps *in the vicinity of already existent castella*. This fact, together with a similar indication of previous construction in xxvi (return by way of the Key of Teregova?) has, I imagine, led von Domaszewski to write<sup>2</sup> ‘Before the outbreak of the war the

<sup>1</sup> This circumstance does not pass unremarked by Petersen (i, 21), whose interest, however, in this series of pictures lies elsewhere, as already observed.

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte der röm. Kaiser*, ii, 174.

emperor had a road made on this line (Viminacium to Tibiscum), held by camps at intervals of twelve Roman miles. The road too in the Mehadia valley was secured up to the Teregova pass.' This is a hard saying, and it is made no easier for us when, passing from conjecture to history, he continues in the next sentence, 'When the emperor in the spring of 101 led the army over a bridge (of boats) from Lederata on the south bank into the valley of the Apus, the Dacians without resistance fell back on the strongly fortified position of Tapae,' since we naturally ask what the Dacians were doing along a stretch already traversed by a military road and held by Roman forts. It is the object of this paper to show that the military situation in the Banat immediately before the war was precisely the reverse of that suggested by von Domaszewski in this passage.

That we find these three fortresses already completed might be set down in part to the necessity of varying the details in this series of pictures, but this does not take us very far in the way of resolving a very real difficulty. We are, at any rate, naturally led to bring them into connexion, and perhaps it will be found that this is the key which unlocks the history of the first campaign, and affords us a valuable insight into the pre-war situation on this part of the Danube frontier.

To begin with, they certainly go together. We note the single gateway tower, peculiar to all three; and Berzovia, like Tibiscum, shows that layer of sawn logs which has been supposed to indicate a gallery from which the defenders man the walls. It is essential to notice that this detail is not distinctively characteristic of Roman fortresses on the Column, since we see it also in the strong place defended by Dacians in LXXII (Muncel Cetate) and also at Sarmizegethusa CXIII. The architecture is in fact Daco-Roman. Tibiscum deserves a word or two to itself. Cichorius makes this a Dacian city, although he admits its construction seems Roman, and explains this Roman character, quite rightly, by reference to the Roman architects and engineers in the service of Decebalus since Domitian. Yet, whether considered as a Roman or a Dacian fortress, it is difficult to accommodate it to the story of the Roman advance as generally told; and the extremities to which interpretation is driven here may be illustrated by Cichorius' note (p. 108), 'If from the favoured position in respect of recruiting which Tibiscum appears later to have enjoyed, as compared with the rest of Dacia, we might conclude that it received preferential treatment from the Romans, such would be easily intelligible on the supposition that it voluntarily transferred its allegiance before or during the War.' Petersen, who from XXI on sees the re-entry of the 'Eastern army' via the Mehadia valley, transfers, as already noticed, the 'marching camp' to a point S. of Teregova, and places the 'Roman fort' between Teregova and Tibiscum. Yet, though he is doubtless right in explaining its irregular

shape as due to the terrain and not as representing two projecting bastions, according to Cichorius' illustration (Abb. 20), I question whether he, or any one, would care to insert over his name in a Dictionary of Antiquities either Tibiscum or Arcidava as representations of a typical Roman castellum.

More important is the part which they do not play in this succession of pictures. Though so closely interwoven into the stages of the Roman advance, they quite definitely stand outside its stir and movement. No sentry guards their gates, no soldier mans their walls. They do not come, it seems, within the purview of the detachments on duty along the route and at the river crossings. This is emphasised by the single exception, Trajan himself, who at xiv (plate II, i) surmounts the slope of the hill on which stands Arcidava. The emotion which with an expressive gesture he invites his companion, the praetorian prefect, to share, is clearly surprise; the latter, hand on sword-hilt, appears to suspect mischief.

These indications point only one way—they lead us to recognise that the fortresses at Arcidava, Berzovia and Tibiscum are not, as we have been used to think them, castella erected by the Romans during their advance, but *fortresses of Daco-Roman construction recently evacuated by the Dacians*, who have fallen back on their defences at Tapae. When this their character is once appreciated, the various detail of this succession of scenes falls easily and of course into its place. The Romans erect so extraordinarily powerful a system of defences at Apus Fluvius, because they believe the Dacians to be still in occupation of the stronghold at Arcidava immediately ahead of them, the direction in which Trajan is gazing.<sup>1</sup>

The situation here is felt to be so insecure that it is impossible, for this reason alone, to account for the fort at Arcidava as 'built by a detachment sent on in advance.' At Arcidava the Romans are still suspicious of mischief afoot—Trajan visits the evacuated fortress, a strong guard is put on at the camp, and a reconnoitring party sent out. It is only when this returns that a track is made through the forest and Centum Putea constructed, and it is not until the army comes up to the second Dacian fortress, Berzovia, and finds this also abandoned (where, too, the first prisoner is brought in) that the unopposed advance through the silent woods begins to seem altogether canny to it. From this point on the Romans find the measure of the situation, and the cavalry gallops confidently forward beneath the walls of Tibiscum.

<sup>1</sup> So, still more intently, at Azisis xx in the direction of Tibiscum. This, according to 'Double Advance' reasoning, there signifies that he momentarily expects the emergence before his eyes of the 'Eastern army' from the Teregova defile. Yet Trajan's attitude is the same in xii as in xx and he is (probably) flanked by the same two

*comites* (Sura and Livianus). At xviii the first captured Dacian is brought before him (again with his *comites*) to be examined, i.e. the artist this time, by a neat variation, gives a different expression to the preoccupation which throughout engages the emperor.

One more detail may find a place, although here one is only hazarding a conjecture. The barbarian at ix who has dashed into the camp immediately before the Adlocutio at x and falls off his mule from exhaustion or excitement, has usually been identified with the emissary or emissaries from the Buri, mentioned in the well-known mushroom story of Dio Cassius 68, 8: 'And when Trajan took the field against the Dacians and had drawn near to Tapae, where the barbarians were encamped, a huge mushroom was brought to him, on which was written in Latin that others of the allies and also the Buri recommended Trajan to turn back and come to terms. But Trajan, engaging the Dacians in battle,' etc. Though this view is held by a formidable consensus, it nevertheless seems to be open to some serious objection.

(1) Dio explicitly assigns a definite time and place to this episode—*ταῖς Τάπαις, ἐνθα ἔστρατοπέδευον οἱ βάρβαροι, πλησιάσαντι*—at the end of the march, not earlier than Tibiscum, but before the attempt to force the Dacian position which resulted in the battle of Tapae. The incident in the reliefs, on the other hand, occurs at the beginning of the march, being intercalated between Lustratio and Adlocutio, i.e. opposite Lederata.

(2) The details<sup>1</sup> of the picture at ix seem to me to offer no point of contact with the historian's anecdote. The disk-like object is probably a shield, to which the handle is wanting by a common negligence on the part of the sculptors. Dierauer's<sup>2</sup> suggestion that the sieve-like indentations indicate some scheme of boss-ornamentation is ingenious and plausible.

(3) The Buri were Germans, and the Germans who appear on the Column are sharply distinguished by their garb and the Suebian hair-knot. If we are to disregard Dio's definite indications of time and place here, I should be more inclined to find the Buri in the embassy (mushroomless, it is true) shewn at xxvii.

If the above reinterpretation of the Roman advance should seem acceptable, may we not reasonably see in this barbarian, who has ridden into the camp from the r., i.e. from the direction of the enemy, a messenger who has brought the news of the evacuation of Arcidava by the retreating Dacians, the credibility of which report Trajan proceeds to debate with his two *comites*?

However this may be, we are led to believe that up to the beginning of 101 the Dacians held along this route at least three strong places: Arcidava at the junction of the Karasu and Czernovecz, Berzovia on the river of that name, and Tibiscum on the Temes. Not only the Marcus Column but the Trajan Column also opens

<sup>1</sup> Some of these are certainly odd, e.g. the immobility of the mule. The barbarian clearly holds a club in right hand. The sculptor seems to have missed his 'points' here somehow, and by inverting right and left legs to have presented

us with one of the (surely few) physically impossible ways of falling off an animal.

<sup>2</sup> *Beiträge zu einer kritischen Geschichte Trajans*, 83 Anm. 3.



with the Roman recovery from a period of humiliation at the hands of the barbarians. It is quite characteristic of the artist who designed the record of the spiral that the situation previous to the war, unfavourable to the Romans, should be indicated in this oblique and indirect fashion. We have indeed a precise parallel at the opening of the Second War. Here we are shown that in the Dacian attack on the Long Walls of Drobetae the defences were nearly carried, and the situation saved only by the advent of Trajan as *deus ex machina* crossing the Danube at a spot not far below Drobetae. Whether we believe with Mr. Stuart Jones that the fighting shown on the Column took place S. or as I would prefer to think, N. of the Danube, it is at least certain that the intervention of the emperor comes only after a period of severe trial for the Roman garrisons on the Danube, the stress and duration of which is left to our inference or imagination.

If the view which I maintain be the true one, and other and still more conclusive evidence for it will be adduced later, it would require some modification in our ideas of Roman frontier policy on the Lower Danube towards the end of the first century. It now for instance becomes clear that when Decebalus through his *πρέσβεις τις* (Dio, 68, 12) required, in return for the restoration of Longinus, the 'recovery (*κομίσασθαι*) of the territory up to the Danube and the reimbursement of the money expended by him on the war,' these demands amounted in substance only to a desire to return to the *status quo* under Domitian, to be reinstated as a subsidised client prince of the empire, continuing to hold his territory and strong places in the Banat, for *μεχρι τοῦ Ἰστρου* must here signify the Western Carpathians, and not the vast plains of Wallachia, in which he had far less interest and which he was only imperfectly able to control.

This brings us to another point. The primary object of the Dacian expansion in the Banat, it may be suggested, was to drive a barrier between the two Sarmatian peoples, the Iazyges and the Rhoxolani. To develop this point would require a somewhat exhaustive survey of the relations which existed between the various barbarian peoples north of the Danube in the first century A.D. and especially in its latter half. In general, the German tribes to north and east of the Carpathians, especially the Bastarnae, are in this period friendly both to the Roman and the Dacian; between the Dacians and the Iazyges the relation of enmity is invariable,<sup>1</sup> owing to the fact that the former had been dispossessed of the lowlands of the Theiss by the Sarmatian invaders between A.D. 25 and 35; nor were the Dacians ever well disposed towards the Rhoxolani, even though a common cupidity occasionally united them in more or

<sup>1</sup> Co-operation is not necessarily implied in Tac. *Hist.* iv, 54, 'vulgato rumore a Sarmatis Dacisque Moesica ac Pannonica hiberna obsideri.'

less concerted raids across the Danube. On the other hand these two Sarmatian races, Iazyges and Rhoxolani, did not forget their ancient connexion. Dio (71, 19) tells us, of the emperor Marcus and the Iazyges, *καὶ ἐφήκεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ροξολάνους διὰ τῆς Δακίας ἐπιμίγνυσθαι, ὅσάκις ἂν ὁ ἄρχων αὐτῆς ἐπιτρέψῃ σφίσιν*. It is indeed probable that some such reunions had been at all times celebrated, and this is, if I mistake not, the explanation of the much-vexed passage in Jordanes (*Getica*, 12) where, after giving the boundaries of Dacia in terms of her neighbours (E. Rhoxolani, W. Iazyges, N. Sarmatians and Bastarnae), he adds 'A meridie amnis Danubii terminabat. Nam Iazyges ab Rhoxolanis Aluta tantum fluvio segregantur.' Jordanes, as Mommsen has demonstrated, derives his geography from a second-century writer, and it seems natural to assume that he is here reproducing unintelligently in terms of geography some reference in his authority to this continuance of intercourse between the two Sarmatian peoples.<sup>1</sup> Be that as it may, if Decebalus, entrenched in the Banat, tended to encroach on the Iazyges on the west, 'Great Dacia' constituted a still more formidable danger to the Romans, since it menaced the weaker angle at the base of the triangle formed by Danube, Morava, and Timacus, on which the Roman power in the Illyrian lands in all periods down to Marcus Aurelius ultimately rested, the significance of which for the dominion of the Balkan has been all too pungently enforced in our day.

Further, proceeding from these facts, it is not without relevance to the subject of this paper to seek to compare Domitian's treatment of Decebalus with his policy elsewhere. Dio tells us (67, 7) that by the convention between Domitian and Diegis, the emperor granted Decebalus, besides a subsidy, 'workmen of every craft of peace and of war.' This statement requires some qualification, since the historian informs us later both that there were craftsmen and soldiers whom Decebalus had compelled to enter his service, and that there were others who did so voluntarily; and *δημιουργος πολεμικῆς τέχνης* was no doubt evasive of precise definition then as now. A passage of Tacitus seems apposite here. He tells us (*Ann.* ii, 62) that on the overthrow of Maroboduus and the capture of his capital<sup>2</sup> by Catualda *veteres illic Sueborum praedae et nostris e provinciis lixae ac negotiatores, quos ius commercii, dein cupido augendi pecuniam, postremum oblivio patriae suis quemque ab sedibus hostilem in agrum transtulerat*. But we may well believe, on the other hand, that Domitian of set purpose furthered the extension of the pacific arts, *invitamenta pacis*, across the Danube. He calculated no doubt,

<sup>1</sup> A. von Premerstein, *Das Attentat der Konsulare auf Hadrian*, p. 7, accepts the statement of Jordanes: 'Diese beiden stammverwandten Völkerschaften waren ehemals mit ihren äussersten Ausläufern im Süden Daciens am Flusse Aluta zusammengetroffen.' I cannot suppress my doubts that the

Iazyges at least at any time and in any manner extended to the Aluta.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps Stradonič, the well-known Celtic stronghold on the Beraun south-east of Prague (Pic, *Die Urnengräber Böhmens*, p. 16).

if we judge him without prejudice, on the emollient properties of Romanisation. Professor Haverfield<sup>1</sup> has observed on the encouragement afforded by Agricola to Romanisation in Britain that 'he was rather carrying out the policy of his age than his own.' On the Danube in the same decade we have a further extension of this Flavian *arcanum imperii* and here it was found wanting. But this policy had succeeded in Gaul<sup>2</sup>; it was succeeding, and did finally succeed in Britain; beyond the Danube it failed to triumph over an unusually formidable assemblage of unfavourable circumstances. Anyhow it was after all no more than an experiment which to a statesman of that day must have seemed to possess some prospect of success. It is, it would appear, easy to qualify Domitian's foreign policy with the not very comfortably compatible epithets of feebleness and megalomania, as also to attribute his undoubted successes to *magnitudo populi Romani*; it is certainly more difficult—nor do the historians of Domitian, ancient or modern, help us here—to suggest how the limitations of a tried political device are to be ascertained unless it be further tested in actual practice and working.

Such considerations, though not beside the purpose of this paper, lead us ultimately somewhat far afield. A more indispensable enquiry is concerned with the possibility of finding further attestation of the existence of these Dacian fortresses in the Banat. I am of the opinion that such testimony exists both in Dio Cassius and in the pictures higher on the spiral.

First we may take the literary evidence. Dio Cassius in giving an account of the terms of peace imposed at the end of the first war (68, 9) brings them under four heads:

(a) Arms, engines of war, and engineers were to be delivered up, and deserters to be restored.

(b) 'The forts' were to be rased, and the 'territory taken' to be evacuated—τά τε ἐρύματα καθελεῖν καὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἐαλωκνίας ἀποστῆναι.

(c) Decebalus was to have the same friends and enemies as the Romans and

(d) In general, to harbour no fugitive, and enlist no recruit from the Roman empire.

He then proceeds in c. 10 to show point by point how the violation of these articles by Decebalus led to the declaration of war against him by the senate.

Now (a) and (d) were for reasons of national pride excluded from commemoration on the Column, though the emphasis which these points receive is significant, and reveals to us a side on which the

<sup>1</sup> *Romanisation of Roman Britain*, 3rd ed. p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Cumont, *Comment la Belgique fut romanisée*,

p. 40; also some remarks of Haverfield in a review of Déchelette's *Manuel d'Archéologie*, etc. *J.R.S.* 1914, p. 232.

Column is of necessity defective as a picture of the Dacian wars. How far Romanisation in material things had proceeded in Dacia we do not know, and probably shall never know. We have clear hints here and on the Column of a considerable degree of Romanisation in military matters, and such things do not go alone, they are not, in any age, assimilated in isolation. Anyhow the artist of the Column did not care or dare even to hint the background which they unmistakably presuppose. Again, (c) is the usual general formula, not easily to be rendered in particular and concrete form in the sculptured record. In (b) however we have the condition which was clearly the cardinal article of the treaty of peace, which did lend itself to illustration, and which on both these accounts was in fact, as I shall presently essay to prove, pictorially represented. Dio twice mentions τὰ ἐρύματα and it seems clear that it has for him a definite denotation—evidently, according to the above argument, the fortresses in the Banat which (or more correctly perhaps, some of which) we have seen in the reliefs which represent the Roman advance in A.D. 101. And the 'territory taken' means not as Cichorius supposes the land taken by the Romans from the Dacians in this war, nor quite exactly, as Petersen, the land taken by Decebalus from his neighbours, though this comes much nearer the truth, as we see from the parallelism in Dio's account of the violation of the terms τὰ τε ἐρύματα ἐπεσκέυαζε and καὶ τῶν Ἰαζύγων καὶ χώραν τινὰ ἀπέτέμετο, ἣν μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπαίτησασιν αὐτοῖς Τραϊανὸς οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν,<sup>1</sup> i.e. not only did he not demolish the strongholds in the Banat,<sup>2</sup> but he actually (καί) extended his outposts still further in this direction. Dio's expression must here mean territory taken by Decebalus from the Romans, territory well within the Roman sphere of influence on which he had made encroachment.

Again it has hitherto been supposed that by τὰ ἐρύματα is chiefly meant the Dacian capital Sarmizegethusa. Dio gives no warrant at all for so understanding this expression. All he says of Sarmizegethusa is that a garrison was left there after the conclusion of peace, doubtless as a security that the terms would be faithfully carried out. The Romans might with every reason of justice and policy alike exact the demolition of the chain of forts which descended the West Carpathians almost to the bank of the Danube. There was less cause for requiring of Decebalus, with whom Trajan at this time was clearly not inclined to proceed to extremities, that he should dismantle or demolish Sarmizegethusa, the central stronghold of a people surrounded by powerful and hostile neighbours. One might further point out that 'dismantle' is not adequate to the Greek, and ask why a garrison should be stationed in a crippled or

<sup>1</sup> This refusal is probably shown on the Column at C, so that μετὰ ταῦτα must mean not 'after the (first) war' but simply 'subsequently.'

<sup>2</sup> Petersen takes τὰ ἐρύματα to refer to Sarmizegethusa. See below.



demolished capital, but all this hypothetical reasoning is superfluous, since I shall go on to argue that the Column does not show, as is commonly supposed, that the defences of Sarmizegethusa were dismantled at the end of the first war.

THE 'FALL OF SARMIZEGETHUSA.'

Both for the above reason, as well as to furnish effective proof of a second appearance of τὰ ἐρύματα on the spiral, it will, I fear, be necessary, as a preliminary, to analyse in some detail one of the best known, and, if the explanation of it which follows be the true one, one of the most misunderstood pictures on the Column—that which represents the so-called 'Fall of Sarmizegethusa' (LXXIV–LXXVI according to the Cichorian division (plates IV, i (r. half), IV, ii, v, i, v, ii (l. half))).

Petersen's notion that the great scene of the submission of Decebalus and his people was inspired by the Polygnotan fresco of the Fall of Troy has met with a surprisingly general acceptance.<sup>1</sup> It has indeed become the sheet anchor of those who believe that Hellenic and Hellenistic art exercised a dominant influence on the Trajanic reliefs, although none would dispute the reality of that influence in details. Instead of examining this highly fanciful theory point by point, it may suffice to oppose to it a very different explanation, which, whether all its details be accepted or not, will at least prove that precisely in this picture, where Petersen claims to have established a striking parallel with a Greek masterpiece, we have a method of composition which affords us, more than any other scene on the Column, a measure of the distance travelled by Roman historical sculpture away from Greek art, and makes it abundantly clear that in the art of the reliefs we are in a domain where older categories no longer hold nor precedents run.

It will be convenient for the time being to leave on one side the scenes which flank the emperor and the mass of Dacians before him (the spring with troopers to left, LXXIV (plate IV, i, r. half), and the highland scenery and enclosure to right, LXXVI (plate V, ii, l. half)) and first to enumerate the various groups which the artist has precisely differentiated in LXXV (plates IV, ii and V, i) (from left to right).

(1) The *pilleatus* kneeling in abject entreaty besides the *suggestus* of the emperor, who steadily regards the train of Dacians before him.

(2) Two *pilleati* on bended knee in supplication.

(3) A singular group of five standing Dacians, two of whom, and perhaps four, have their wrists crossed on their backs. The

<sup>1</sup> Petersen i, 84 ff.

fact that the artist exhibits the fifth with hands free, as well as the whole carriage of the group, makes it clear that we have to do here neither with captives nor with deserters. The singularity of their bearing is enhanced by the position they occupy between kneeling countrymen on both sides.

(4) After the main body of kneeling Dacians we have

(5) Another body of *comati* and *pilleati*, no longer kneeling, but bending forward towards Trajan. Their hands are extended in supplication, and their dragon banners, though still flying, confess the ascendancy of the massed Roman standards.

(6) At the end of the Column, and closing the scene, stands on a shelf of rock, balancing the emperor on his tribunal, a figure who dominates the throng before him, and yields in pride of place to Trajan alone, towards whom he extends his hands in dignified appeal.

This picture has been conceived to represent merely the single and formal act of submission of the Dacian people, and its real content has thus been only imperfectly recognised. Too little attention has in general been bestowed on the careful differentiation of the various groups in the presence of the emperor. Yet here, as always, the designer of the spiral is first and foremost a narrator; and into the pictorial representation of the submission of the Dacian people he has *compressed the episodes which preceded and followed it*. Only so is it possible to explain the various points of difficulty which in the usual view remain unsolved. We may take these singly, according to the above division into groups.

(1) Are we to find Decebalus at (1) or at (6)—at l. of plate iv, ii or at r. of v, i? Now Decebalus is certainly represented at (1) in the *pilleatus*—cf. Dio 68. 9 *πρός τε τὸν Τραιανὸν ἐσελθὼν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν πεσὼν καὶ προσκνηήσας αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ἀπορρίψας*. The motto of the historical sculpture of the Romans at any rate was not *Tros Tyriusve mihi nullo discrimine agetur*. Somewhere, somehow, the Dacian chieftain had to be shown beaten to his knees. Mrs. Strong and Reinach are among the few who have recognised this fact, and they therefore rightly see Decebalus in the kneeling *pilleatus* at (1). But she disposes of the personage at (6) with the words, 'A sturdy figure, somewhat raised on a rock, closes the scene.'<sup>1</sup> Cichorius, on the other hand, finds Decebalus at (6). He considers the identity of the *pilleatus* at (1) impossible of determination, and says 'This may be some quite definite person, who had rendered himself guilty of some especially grave offence, and now in vain implores the clemency of the emperor. He refuses to identify him with Decebalus on the ground that *ἐσελθὼν* in Dio (above) implies that his submission was made to Trajan at a private interview, and not as here before the Roman army and the Dacian people. On

<sup>1</sup> *Roman Sculpture*, p. 185.

this it may be observed that the position of the *pilleatus*, at the side of the tribunal, indeed almost behind the unregarding emperor, sets him apart from the scene so orderly unfolded here, and invites us to conclude that this interview *has already taken place*.

The fact is that *both* these figures represent Decebalus. But how? At this point attention must be called to a feature in the relief, usually overlooked or disregarded, which is of cardinal importance, which is indeed the *clou* to the method of composition. This is a sharp elevation of the niveau, running from before (197) to between (198) and (199), by which the picture is broken<sup>1</sup> into two halves, beginning with group (5) above—the Dacians who are standing and bending forward. A difference of terrain is clearly not intended (how should it be?); we have here a deliberate device employed by the artist to mark an abrupt division in the picture, which is not to be regarded as completely integrated. The break, otherwise purposeless, mediates, so to speak, the two representations of Decebalus, and the two halves of the picture, the one depicting Dacia crushed and prostrate before the victor, the other indicating Dacia resurgent, only for the moment acquiescent in defeat. There is no necessity to dwell further on this point, since the student of Roman art can hardly fail to be reminded of the similar treatment of the emperor in the battle scene on the Arch of Constantine, which once belonged, so it would seem, to the Great Frieze of Trajan's Forum.

The historical character of the left half of the scene is further attested by groups (2) and (3).

(2) Represents the high-born *pilleati* who, as Dio tells us (68, 8), were sent as envoys to Trajan, after he had forced his way through the mountains and advanced near to Sarmizegethusa.

(3) What of this unique group (middle of plate IV, ii) with their characteristic attitude of hands crossed on back? Pollen would like to think them Dacian captives for Trajan's triumph, Petersen Dacians who have broken faith, Cichorius the deserters delivered up by Decebalus in accordance with the terms of peace (they are, however, beyond question, both in dress and type, Dacians). Their proud bearing is inconsistent with these explanations.

Here once more we find the undoubted solution in the account of the historian. They are the deputies who are to accompany Trajan to Rome.<sup>2</sup> Dio, 68, 10, *καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Δεκεβάλου πρέσβεις εἰς τὸ συνέδριον ἐσχήθησαν, τὰ τε ὄπλα καταθέντες συνῆψαν τὰς χεῖρας ἐν αἰχμαλώτων σχήματι καὶ εἶπόν τέ τινα καὶ ἰκέτευσαν, καὶ οὕτω τὴν τε εἰρήνην ἐσπέισαντο καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ἀπέλαβον*. So, too, Petrus Patricius, *Exc. de leg.* (Muller, *F.H.G.* 4, p. 186) has

<sup>1</sup> This is hardly too strong a term for the abrupt division here. Its significance has commonly been missed by reason of its falling between the plates

of Cichorius. It is worth while to inspect it in Fröhner.

<sup>2</sup> So Groag, *O.ŷ.* v (1902), Beiblatt, p. 39.

ὁμοίως τὰς χεῖρας ἔδησαν ὡς ἐν αἰχμαλώτων τάξει. The scene here prefigured would live long in the memories of those who witnessed it at Rome, and the emperor himself, as we learn elsewhere from Dio (68, 15), took account of the city's keen interest in such outlandish deputations.

With (4), as above said, the historical side of the act of submission closes, and there begins the artist's meed of admiration for brave foemen, expressed by setting Decebalus and his entourage in impressive contraposition to Trajan, his staff, and household troops. The whole has for a background the Roman camp with its strong outworks.

And now where is Sarmizegethusa? Certainly, to me at least, the Dacian capital is nowhere discoverable. LXXVI (plate v, ii, l. half, and also r. end of v, i) is sharply separated from LXXV (plate iv, ii and most of v, i) and cannot represent Sarmizegethusa, though the belief that it does is an article of faith—'allgemeine Annahme' as Petersen has it. There appear nevertheless to be reasons, numerous and overwhelming, which prove that this belief rests merely on prepossession. They fall under four heads, the abundant detail of LXXV and LXXVI, the literary evidence, an alternative identification of 'Sarmizegethusa,' and an alternative site for the submission scene. Under the first of these, one may offer the following observations:

(1) LXXV is formally sharply distinguished from LXXVI by the figure of Decebalus, by the shelf of rock on which he stands, and by the ending of the strip above referred to.

(2) The Dacians standing before Decebalus (at right) are not 'advancing,' as we are sometimes told. Cichorius in his reconstruction of the scene (*Abb.* 64) exhibits them as moving forward from 'Sarmizegethusa,' in which he inserts a gate, but no such gate and procession are to be seen on the relief. They are not only not shown, but they are quite incompatible with the artist's presentation, which deliberately excludes them.

(3) The walls which are being demolished in the foreground of LXXVI obviously do not belong to the enclosure above; and the whole content of the picture is as alien as can well be conceived to the scene enacted before the Roman camp in LXXV. We are here transported into a remote highland region, indicated by the *Sennhü ten* and quite unmistakable terrain.

(4) Petersen himself is not unaware that the walled enclosure of LXXVI is something less than adequate to even a modest preconception of the aspect of the Dacian capital. He says (p. 85) 'The fact that it is the camp which predominates in the Roman, and the enemy's city in the Greek picture, is of minor consequence, and is due to the difference in the importance of the two cities.' This seems equivalent to an admission that in his elaborate parallelism half of the comparison is from the beginning surrendered. The magnificent pictures of Sarmizegethusa in the second war show that it does occupy a position



no less central in the artist's conception than Troy in the Polygnotan fresco, and this is the only kind of 'importance' which has any relevance here.

(5) If it should be argued that LXXVI gives us only a 'schematic' view of Sarmizegethusa, one may fairly require that it should in some way, not necessarily by elaborate detail, be rendered recognisable as the Dacian capital.

Here one may cite an exact case in point. We see this city four times in the sculptures which represent the second war. When we first catch a glimpse of it in CXI, it is exhibited, as is agreed, more for the purpose of showing the convergence of the two Roman armies which close from east and west on the doomed city, than with the intention of affording a detailed picture of its fortifications and inner disposition, such as we find in the succeeding more elaborate representations CXIII-CXVI, CXIX-CXXII, and CXXIV-CXXVI. The first picture (in my view the first picture of the city on the Column) is in fact an abbreviated view from the distance—as Petersen says (i, 135, *Excurs. Sarmizegethusa*), 'eine freilich unperspektivische Fernansicht.' Yet his sharp eye, to which the study of the Trajan Column and indeed of Roman historical monuments in general owes so much, has discerned that the single point of detail afforded us here—the outwork (ii, a, in his woodcut)—is reproduced in each of the three succeeding pictures, an identification which one can hardly refuse to concede, though with some reserve as to particulars. In the picture before us we have no such detail. All that we see is the skeleton of two buildings within the wall, and a bare indication of scaffolding, etc. without, of which we may presently consider the significance.

But we are not entirely dependent on the Column for the conviction that the submission of the Dacians did not take place before Sarmizegethusa. Here we may invoke the authority of Dio, and we possess not one but two accounts of the operations which led up to the fall of the Dacian capital, the first from Xiphilinus, the second from the Constantinian excerptor.

68, 8 §3: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ τὰ ἄκρα ἐπεχείρησεν ἀναβῆναι, λόφους ἐκ λόφων μετὰ κινδύνων καταλαμβάνων, καὶ τοῖς τῶν Δακῶν βασιλείοις ἐπέλασεν, ὅτε Λούσιος ἐτέρωθι προσβαλὼν καὶ ἐφόνησε πολλοὺς καὶ ἐζώγρησε πλείονας, τηλικᾶντα ὁ Δεκέβαλος πρέσβεις πέμψας τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πιλοφόρων, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος δεηθείς, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχ ἑτοίμως τῶν προσταχθέντων ἔσχε συνθέσθαι.

ib. 9, §3. ὁ δὲ Τραιανὸς ὄρη τε ἐντετειχισμένα ἔλαβε, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ τε ὄπλα τὰ τε μηχανήματα καὶ τὰ αἰχμάλωτα τό τε σημεῖον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Φούσκου ἄλὸν εὔρε'. δι' οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Δεκέβαλος, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ Μάξιμος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τήν τε ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ χωρίον τι ἰσχυρὸν εἶλεν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχ ἑτοίμως τῶν προσταχθέντων ἔσχε συνθέσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἐμμενεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐμελλεν, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἐκ τῶν

παρόντων ἀναπνεύση. Then follow the recital of the conditions of peace, Decebalus' personal surrender to Trajan, and the despatch of the delegation to the Roman senate. Dio concludes: ταῦτα συνθέμενος καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐν Ζερμιζεγεθούση καταλιπων, τὴν τε ἄλλην χώραν φρουραῖς διαλαβών, ἐς Ἰταλίαν ἀνεκομίσθη.

Dio here twice tells us that it was the Roman successes in the mountains which made Decebalus capitulate before the Roman army reached Sarmizegethusa. This critical moment, in my view, is shown on the reliefs at LXXII, where the Romans, after the capture of Muncel Cetate and Pietra Rosie, force their way out at La Grebla, where the Dacians barricaded the gorge, into the valley of the Varosviz. (Note that the Dacians, fleeing across the mountains, themselves, with outstretched hands, point their direction as (clearly) to Sarmizegethusa.) Dio says nothing at all which might lead us to suppose that the submission of the Dacians took place before the walls of their capital.

Thirdly, if the conclusions above presented are at all valid—that Dio's τὰ ἐρύματα refers to Dacian fortresses at Arcidava, Berzovia, and Tibiscum (and possibly elsewhere) and has nothing to do with Sarmizegethusa,—then a convincing explanation of LXXVI lies to hand. The entire picture represents the partial and pretended fulfilment of the most important of the peace conditions—τὰ ἐρύματα καθελείν καὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἐάλωκίας ἀποστήναι. The detail, which is symmetrically arranged, is easily, and without the least forcing, interpreted in this sense. Taking first the latter clause, it is evident that a migration is here represented, but the nature of this movement has been misapprehended. It is not a return of the civil population to the homes from which they have been driven by the war, but the evacuation of the territory occupied by the Dacians in the Banat, along with which goes the demolition of the forts situated there. Especially to be remarked are the figures of the boy and the *comatus*, and it is important to observe that this same pair is in this scene twice represented. At the head of the picture the *comatus* is seen cajoling his son to leave their hut in the mountains, while below, descending into the valleys, he drags along the still resisting boy, casting back a last look at the abandoned home. By this double presentation is made unmistakable, what is indeed otherwise sufficiently clear, that the depatriated are to be conceived as moving to the left, i.e. in the direction opposite to that of the Roman army who are advancing from the east or north-east. We thus have indicated the evacuation of the 'Wild West' of the Banat, and the return of the shepherds to Dacia proper. But the evacuation was only partially carried out, and the violation of this condition is effectively signified by the two Dacians who remain, and plainly mean to remain, in their *Sennhütten*. The same combination of partial fulfilment of the peace conditions,

together with the violation of their substance, is also indicated in the remainder of the picture, which deals with the demolition of the forts. The balance in the detail is to be observed—fulfilment of peace terms below, *comati* razing fortress, and the column of the depatriated, violation above, Dacians within the intact fortress, and shepherds abiding in their mountains.

The sole point of value in Petersen's *mentita Troia* would appear to be his suggestion that the whispering Dacians on the wall of the enclosure are a hint of the bad faith of the Dacians in concluding peace, and we may note, in passing, that he proves this less by the analogy he adduces—the head of the Wooden Horse upreared above the walls of Troy—than by his reference to Dio Cassius, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἐμμενεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐμελλεν, ἀλλ' ἔν' ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἀναπνεύση. The *arrière-pensée*, however, seems to me to have a more particular reference. Here we have not only, in the foreground at (199), the dismantling of the fortresses, but bearing in mind Dio's notice of the later violation of this condition, τὰ ἐρύματα ἐπεσκεύαζε, we may ask what can be intended by the shacks within the wall and the equally inchoate frame of boards outside (a *pluteus*?) if not precisely a foreshadowing of this.

However this may be, it is possible to clinch this general argument by adducing convincing evidence from another part of the reliefs. Here I would wish to draw attention to a scene lower down on the spiral, which stands in close connexion with that which we are considering, and is a good example of that system of correspondences by which the topography is knit together throughout the succession of pictures. In xxx (the last picture of the campaign of 101), we see a Dacian princess or priestess about to embark on a vessel on the Danube, or one of its tributaries; now she is unmistakably attended by the same two groups which reappear in lxxvi, the *comatus* and boy, and the Dacian women carrying their children. At xxx, however, it is only the central figure (whom the emperor is addressing) who is to be deported. The inference would seem not to be resisted that we have at the close of the campaign of 101 the beginning of that process of depatriation, which is shown as the fulfilment of the terms of peace at the end of 102, with the rider that we are as distant from Sarmizegethusa in lxxvi as we demonstrably are in xxx.

Finally, it remains to ask, if Sarmizegethusa is not represented in lxxvi, where did the capitulation of Decebalus and his people, shown in lxxv, actually take place? There can be little doubt, in my opinion, that this scene was enacted near the spring shown in lxiv (pl iv, i, r. half). This Cichorius places, by an identification which is to me at least quite convincing, at Aquae, the next station to Sarmizegethusa, marked in the *Tabula Peutingeriana* as the site of baths. I certainly start with no prepossession in favour either of Cichorius' topographical method or of his particular applications

of it ; but a visit in 1913 to the site of what is still a small *Bad* (Kalan-Furdö, in the immediate vicinity of Kis-Kalan) convinced me that here lay ready to hand a distinctive natural feature for the orientation of the route traced for the campaign of 102. Cichorius, of course, comes into difficulties over his assumption that LXXVI represents Sarmizegethusa, and that the submission-scene in LXXV takes place before the Dacian capital, with the result that he does violence to the panorama by divorcing LXXIV from LXXV, surely one of the most impossible of his divisions on the Column, as a glance will show. It is to be regretted that his excellent photographs do not include the channel into which the water flows from the basin, as we see it in the relief. To his description,<sup>1</sup> which should be read (ii, 348), I may add that in the rock at the mouth of the channel are still to be seen grooves for the shutters by means of which the height of the water was regulated for the bathers. Cichorius has little doubt that LXXIV portrays a definite site, and I fully agree with him here ; but it is hardly possible to follow him when he proceeds to argue that its insertion is due *simply* to its value for orientation. Petersen lays just stress on the aesthetic value of the scene, which shows us the troopers refreshing themselves at their ease and watering their horses after the fighting is over. His view, however, is also one-sided, since he denies that we are to find a topographical indication here. The controversy has in fact little substance, for one of the points which again and again commands our admiration for the masterly composition of the designer of this record is precisely this easy ingenuity with which he causes his devices as a narrator to play their part in the artistic ensemble.

One last word on Sarmizegethusa. The defect of Petersen's excursus (i, 134 ff.) will be found, I think, on examination to go back almost entirely to his addition of LXXVI to the four unquestionable representations of Sarmizegethusa in the second half of the Column. This carries one of the soberest, least fantastic (despite his occasional divagations) and most acute interpreters of the reliefs into a region of unreality where his great qualities find no fitting application. He endeavours to show that the strengthened defences of the Dacian capital (according to his interpretation of Dio) in the second war take in the Roman camp of LXXV, and cannot refrain finally from finding the 'river Sargetias' in the spring at Aquae, LXXIV, which he works into some astonishing arabesques of interpretation. This constitutes a considerable discount from the undoubted value of his essay on the topography of the Dacian city. To sum up, three of his principal foundations appear to be of very doubtful soundness :

(1) p. 134. 'Sarmizegethusa, in the second war, as in the first,

<sup>1</sup> See also that in Neigebaur, *Dacien aus den Überresten des klassischen Alterthums* (Kronstadt, 1851), pp. 91-93..

the capital of Decebalus, was rebuilt and more strongly fortified; for Dio's ἐπεσκεύαζε τὰ ἐρύματα must be especially referred to Sarmizegethusa.'

(2) p. 135. 'That LXXVI represents Sarmizegethusa is matter of general assumption.' This may be true, but the assumption is quite unwarrantable.

(3) As to the Sargetias, it is surely time that this 'weary river' should be permitted to 'wind somewhere safe to sea,' and the ocean which waits to receive it is certainly that of Fable. Cichorius has pointed out the striking coincidence between Dio's story of the burial of Decebalus' treasures,<sup>1</sup> and the description in Jordanes (*Getica*, 30) of the burial of Alaric in the Busento, 'quem (Halaricum) . . . Busento amne iuxta Consentinam civitatem de alveo suo derivato . . . huius ergo in medio collecta captivorum agmina sepulturae locum effodiunt, in cuius foveae gremium Halaricum cum multis opibus obruunt, rursusque aquas in suum alveum reducentes et ne a quoquam quandoque locus cognosceretur fossores omnes interemerunt.' He might have added that Jordanes (*Getica*, 49) tells a similar story (without the river) of the burial of Attila. This is perhaps not much, but it is not all. Tzetzes, *Chil.* vi, 53 (after Diodorus), tells how Audoleon, king of the Paeones, had the river 'Sargentias' diverted, and his treasures buried there by prisoners whom he afterwards put to death, and how the secret was betrayed by one of his friends to Lysimachus. No doubt we have here a Balkan or Carpathian saga, later carried to Italy by the Goths.

I have to thank Professor Haverfield for his kindness in reading over my proofs and for valuable criticism of them.

<sup>1</sup> The discovery or at least the transportation of these is probably shown on the Column at cxxxviii, but in a region remote from Sarmizegethusa.