

character and manifestations of conscious intelligence which fit them to become partakers with man of that new life which awaits him beyond the grave." These quotations sufficiently indicate the purpose of the work under notice. The writer, seeking to follow in the footsteps of the late J. G. Wood, gives a series of instances of 'intelligence,' ranging from the Venus fly-trap through insects, fish and snakes, to the higher mammals and birds. He is evidently an ardent student of natural history, and especially well versed in bird lore. But his main thesis is untenable, and the scientific nature of his book is thereby impaired.

There are eight excellent photographic plates from nature, and many woodcuts of very various merit. The frontispiece, referred to as a portrait of the author, is labelled, Snapping Turtles Fighting. There is no index.

Truth and Reality, with Special Reference to Religion ; or, a Plea for the Unity of the Spirit and the Unity of Life in all its Manifestations.
By JOHN SMYTH, M.A. (New Zealand), D. Phil. (Edin.). With introductory note by Prof. R. FLINT. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1901. 8vo. Pp. xvii. + 244. Price 4s..

This is a dissertation submitted to the University of Edinburgh for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and rewarded with that coveted distinction. The author commands our sympathy, both for what he maintains and for what he opposes, and also for the tone of moral enthusiasm which pervades his work. To quote his own words : "The writer's main aim is to point out that the roots of philosophy and of religion, as of morality and of natural science, lie in the constitution of the human spirit ; and that, therefore, their questionings, methods, inquiries and results are as much a process of reason as is logic itself, and that their basis and objects belong truly to the constitution of things, if anything does". In the course of maintaining this thesis the author has just occasion to find fault both with naturalism and with the idealism which errs by laying stress upon the intellectual side of our nature only, to the neglect of other sides no less essential. As to the philosophic content of the work we cannot say it is commensurate with the enthusiasm of the writer. His is the fervour of the preacher who would call men to the truth by faith rather than the patient analysis of the thinker who dare not say he believes more than he proves by mere human reasoning.

HENRY STURT.

Les Approximations de la vérité ; étude de philosophie positive ou expérimentale. Par HÉRVÉ BLONDEL. Paris : F. Alcan, 1900. Pp. xii., 289.

The object of this study is to give a condensed account of the positivist philosophy, making allowance for the progress in science and speculation since the appearance of the *Cours de philosophie positive*. Although emphatic in his allegiance to positivist principles, M. Blondel repudiates Comte's later teaching. He argues that towards the end of his life the master was unfaithful to true positivism, and made dangerous concessions to mysticism and the recognition of the Unknowable. Thus M. Blondel is closely in alliance with the "hyperpositivism" of a better-known writer, M. de Roberty. Granted that this is a valuable form of philosophic doctrine, M. Blondel's book has value as a lucid and agreeable compendium. His explanation of psychology is that of biological sociology ; and he regards the primary qualities of matter as unexplained, though hardly unexplainable.

Dix années de philosophie ; études critiques sur les principaux travaux publiés de 1891 à 1900. Par LUCIEN ARRÉAT. Paris: F. Alcan, 1901. Pp. vi., 179.

This little volume skims lightly over the philosophical literature of the closing decade of the nineteenth century. The author has done a good deal of reviewing in French and American periodicals, and here we have apparently a *rechauffé* of his contributions. The material is very much that of the average book review, a short statement of the main points of the works dealt with, and a little discriminating criticism. English philosophy is almost entirely left out, the exceptions being the æsthetic writings of Prof. Haddon and Vernon Lee. But the book may have some usefulness in England as a short guide to what has been done recently on the other side of the Channel.

Prolégomènes à l'Esthétique. Par L. DIMIER. Paris: Aux bureaux de la Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. Pp. 37.

The author proposes to himself three questions:—

"Est il possible de fournir une définition du beau en soi?"

"Peut on constituer l'esthétique sans le secours d'une telle définition?"

"De la science constituée d'accord avec la réponse qu'on fait à ces deux questions, quel est le rôle et l'utilité tant à d'autres égards qu' à celui de la philosophie elle-même?"

The answers which he provides to these questions are: to the first, that no such definition can be found because beauty-in-itself can only be a property of the thing-in-itself, of which we can know nothing: to the second, that since we certainly do attain to a certain phenomenal beauty, and since this, to which we always really refer by the name of beauty, is realised by definite processes of imitation, we can study these processes without a definition of beauty-in-itself: to the third, that Æsthetic thus constituted, avoiding any question as to what is metaphysically implied by imitation, will content itself with the elaboration of technical laws; that the advantage of such a science to the artist is obvious; that to the philosopher it will be at least as interesting as mathematics or natural science.

The conception of Æsthetic thus set forth seems to treat it less as a part of philosophy than as one of the sciences with which philosophy will deal.

Contenting itself with a registration of methods, of the rules of perspective for instance, and the harmonising and even the mixing of colours, it will relegate to philosophy such insoluble questions as the meaning of beauty and of imitation.

Though the author draws an analogy between this science of imitation and the sciences of logic and of morals, he surely should in strictness compare it only to grammar and to law. For not on their most formal side can logic and ethics entirely disregard metaphysical problems.

E. F. CARRITT.

Mein Recht auf Leben. Von Dr. HEINRICH SPITTA, a. o. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Tübingen. Tübingen, Freiburg in Breisgau und Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1900. Pp. xi., 468.

Both for the general reader and for those who are especially occupied with moral theory, Prof. Spitta's book is likely to have considerable