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Our Indian Army

General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh
K.C.S.I., &c., &c.

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The Journal

OF THE

Royal United Service Institution

VOL. XXVI.

1882,
27 P

No. CXVIII.

Friday, June 9, 1882.

LIEUT.-GENERAL LORD CHELMSFORD, G.C.B., &c., &c., in the
Chair.

Members intending to take part in the discussion on
any paper can obtain a copy of it Four days before the
reading of such paper on application to the Secretary by
letter, or personally.

By order,

BOUGHEY BURGESS, Capt.,

Secretary.

WHITEHALL YARD,

30th December, 1882.

discussion that then took place will doubtless be present this afternoon; whilst I am afraid I have no new ideas, no fresh suggestion to offer for their consideration.

All who are acquainted with the military history of our country, in which our Indian campaigns occupy so prominent a place, must equally be acquainted with the history of the rise and progress of the Indian Army, and the circumstances under which a force, originally consisting of a few native levies, gradually increased until it almost overshadowed the military power of the Crown, and numbered in its ranks nearly 300,000 disciplined troops. I will not, therefore, weary you by describing the several features that distinguished the Sepoys of the different Presidencies, or by giving you an account of the various changes that from time to time took place in the organization of the regiments until the bulk of the native Army was placed upon

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OUR INDIAN ARMY.

By General SIR ORFEUR CAVENAGH, K.C.S.I., &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN: You will allow me to introduce to you Sir Orfeur Cavenagh. No doubt he is well known to many of those present, and to all by reputation. Sir Orfeur Cavenagh comes before you to give a lecture on a subject which must interest everyone, no matter whether he belongs to the Indian or to the British Service, and he comes with experience gained by long and faithful service in India not only with the experience gained in peace time but also with the experience gained in war. Sir Orfeur served in the Gwalior campaign, and lost a leg at Maharajpore; and also in the Sutlej campaign, where he was again severely wounded in the arm; so that he has practically seen what the Indian Army can do both in peace and in war time. I have no doubt that the suggestions that he will have to offer for consideration will be those that have been carefully thought out by one who has made the Indian Army since he left the country a subject of very careful study.

I HAVE had considerable hesitation in acceding to the request of the Council that I would read a paper upon the Indian Army, because but a short time has elapsed since I prepared a paper upon the same subject for the India Association. Many who were present at the discussion that then took place will doubtless be present this afternoon; whilst I am afraid I have no new ideas, no fresh suggestion to offer for their consideration.

All who are acquainted with the military history of our country, in which our Indian campaigns occupy so prominent a place, must equally be acquainted with the history of the rise and progress of the Indian Army, and the circumstances under which a force, originally consisting of a few native levies, gradually increased until it almost overshadowed the military power of the Crown, and numbered in its ranks nearly 300,000 disciplined troops. I will not, therefore, weary you by describing the several features that distinguished the Sepoys of the different Presidencies, or by giving you an account of the various changes that from time to time took place in the organization of the regiments until the bulk of the native Army was placed upon

uniform footing, each corps having a full complement of Europe Officers. There is, however, one point to which I would particularly advert, viz., the fact that from the commencement of the introduction of the regular system there were never less than eight Europe leaders to every native battalion, whilst the tendency was always to increase the number of European Officers to meet the various demands that were continually being made for their services. Unfortunately with the increase to their numbers there was a decrease of their power.

In the early days of our rule, an Officer commanding a battalion was vested with authority to chastise or reward; to use the Hindustani phrase, he was the father and the mother of his men, an authority to whom alone they looked for punishment or promotion, and there can be no doubt that in an army of Asiatics commanded by Officers who are aliens as regards race and creed, this is the wisest system that can be adopted. A spirit of insubordination rapidly spreads, and punishment should be therefore prompt and steady; equally there should be no delay in granting well-deserved preferment.

How far in those days Commanding Officers delegated any portion of their authority to their subordinates I have been unable to discover, but certainly, when I joined the Service, Officers did command the companies, and were held responsible for their due efficiency. On the standing orders of the Bengal Infantry required every Officer in charge of a company to hold a private inspection parade once a week, transmitting a report of the result for the inspection of the Officer commanding the regiment. These inspections were real, not the nominal inspections that subsequently took place (although in direct opposition to Army Regulations) at a regimental parade under the command of the Colonel.

The private inspection parade afforded the company Officer an opportunity—I may almost say the only one—of becoming acquainted with his men, and showing his interest in them, for when the parade was dismissed he generally entered into conversation with some of the seniors, who, if allowed, would gladly indulge in references to their past services, or, during any current campaign, to the news from the seat of war. I remember well an old native Officer who was only delighted to give a history of the expedition to Egypt, which he frequently had letters submitted for my perusal from the relatives of my men who were engaged in Afghanistan.

Under the old system a reciprocal good feeling existed between the European Officer and his native followers, a feeling no doubt enhanced by the *esprit de corps* that then prevailed amongst the native regiments and pervaded all ranks. Gradually, however, in this respect a change took place, of which the causes and effects are described in the following extract from a paper submitted by me for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor-General shortly before the breaking out of the Mutiny.

“As mercenaries the Sepoys have hitherto been bound to the British Government by two great ties, the first and most powerful being the regularity in the issue of their pay, and the grant of pensions to themselves when incapacitated for the performance of further

and to their families in the event of their being killed in action dying from disease whilst on foreign service.

"The second, although perhaps not equally strong, yet still of considerable importance, being the bond of individual attachment to European Officers.

"The first, notwithstanding that it must still necessarily have weight amongst the men of the native Army, has certainly been considerably weakened since the introduction of the present system awarding comparatively speaking high salaries to *Suddur Amee* *Moonsiffs*, &c. Until lately the native Officer was one of the best functionaries under the British rule: he was consequently respected accordingly, and held amongst his fellow-countrymen a position superior to that enjoyed by any other servant of the State. In respect, however, a great change has recently taken place, and he finds himself, both as regards allowances whilst serving and pension retirement, in a pecuniary point of view, infinitely worse off than native uncovenanted Officer, in all probability a Bengali, and thus of a race which the Hindustani of the North-West is accustomed most thoroughly to despise. No doubt his own status has also of years been much improved by the grant of full pay after forty years service, and by the institution of the Orders of Merit and of *Bharat* *India*. Still it has not been advanced in the same ratio as that of the members of the uncovenanted service, and there can be no question that amongst themselves a comparison is often drawn between native Officers between their position and that of the *Moonsiffs* *Suddur Amee* at the station where their corps may happen to be located; a comparison that, in former days, would have been to their favour, but is now the reverse. In this respect, the Officers of irregular cavalry are on a much better footing than their comrades in the line, hence in that branch of the Service, notwithstanding the troopers are decidedly underpaid, mutinies are, I may say, almost unknown, and, though there may be many other causes combined to lead to this result, I feel tolerably convinced that the respectable amount of pay granted to *Ressaldars* and *Resaidars* tend greatly to maintain the spirit of subordination that has always been evinced by the men of this arm.

"The second tie has been still more weakened than the first, in that it may be said to have been almost entirely severed. There are still a few cases where the Sepoy would willingly risk his life for that of his Officer, but these are the exceptions; the reverse is the rule. Many causes have led to this, and unquestionably the Government is not entirely blameless in the matter. For years past every order has tended to confirm a system of centralization, under which the European Officer has become a mere cypher at the head of a regiment or company. He ceases to take an interest in his men, is satisfied with receiving the usual daily reports and performing his duties with a listless indifferent spirit, not calculated to inspire affection or respect those under his orders, who are keen observers of character, and who, on their part, cease to look upon him as a natural friend and protector, and only approach him when con-

to do so in the execution of any prescribed duty. The system of centralization is not, however, the sole origin of this very unsatisfactory state of affairs. Another great cause has been the recent large additions made to the list of Officers on Staff employ. An Officer no longer looks upon his regiment as his home. If he has ambition, talent he naturally turns his thoughts towards the field where his ambition may be gratified and that talent obtain scope for development. In time of peace that field is certainly not to be found within his corps. Is it, then, to be wondered at that he should seek wealth and distinction either in the ranks of an irregular corps where, whilst still a young man, he may rise to command with all concomitant advantages, or that, if endowed with a less soldierly spirit, he should wish to enter one of the civil commissions open to the military Officer, and acquire, as an administrator, that fame he is unlikely ever to obtain in his own profession? Now, it cannot be denied that the fact of there being so wide a field in India in which Officers may have an opportunity of exhibiting their various talents has tended to improve the tone of the Service, and to instil into the minds of those who enter it a spirit of emulation which should be in the heart of every soldier, but this spirit may be carried to too great an extent, and when it has so far passed its legitimate bounds as to render regimental duty wearying and irksome, it should at once be curbed and restricted to its proper limits. This is the case at present; it is therefore necessary that proceedings should be adopted towards remedying an evil likely, in its results, seriously to impair the efficiency of our native Army, and thus probably lead to the gradual diminution, if not eventually to the total subversion, of our supremacy in the East. On this subject I need not expatiate; unfortunately the evil is too glaring."

I suggested several changes towards remedying the evils upon which I had animadverted, amongst them the extension of the powers of the regimental courts-martial, the grant of increased authority to Officers commanding regiments and companies, the formation at certain stations, in the neighbourhood of the Sepoys' homes, of reserve battalions, to afford the necessary opening for native Officers, the appointment of a native Adjutant to every regiment, the introduction of a system of examination for native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and of more stringent rules relative to the employment of European Officers upon the Staff.

The breaking out of the Mutiny, an event I had for some time anticipated, prevented the question as to the necessity for reform in the native Army being taken into consideration, and, when the storm blew over, that Army, as far as Bengal was concerned, had in a measure ceased to exist, and the Government had almost a *tabula rasa* upon which to operate. The levies raised during the war upon the irregular system had done good service, whilst even previous to that some enthusiasts as an argument for placing the whole Army upon irregular footing, the able men by whom this argument had been advanced having totally ignored the fact that, as a body, native Officers of

gular cavalry, the branch that had been most distinguished, were of better class, and, owing to the numerous augmentations that had been made to the irregular service, as a rule much younger, than the compeers of the line. The European Officers also were all necessarily young, for upon an Officer attaining the rank of Major he usually rejoined his line regiment, and, although it would have been unjust to their comrades to say that the irregular Officers were the *élite* of the Army, yet, as a rule, they were all selected for their knowledge of the native languages and general military qualifications.

The irregular cavalry offered a suitable field for the employment of the native gentry, who were willing to accept military service. Hence, as already remarked, the native Officers were often superior men quite competent, under the supervision of a few selected European Officers, to perform all the ordinary duties connected with the command of their troops and squadrons. These troops, however, rarely acted in large bodies, and their most gallant feats were achieved by small parties under distinguished European leaders. Indeed, owing to their being admirably adapted for the performance of all the harassing duties that devolve upon light cavalry in the field when employed with a large army, they were never spared, and a regiment was so cut up and being called upon to furnish innumerable guards and escorts that often there would be scarcely 100 men present at headquarters, and with these there would be three European Officers, a larger proportion than with the same number of regular troops.

The new levies were composed of men taken from the finest race in the East, the Sikhs and Goorkhas, yet during the Mutiny and the campaign in China it was considered advisable to attach a large body of European Officers to each of the regiments actively employed, as this alone saved them from becoming inefficient. In one corps alone nine or ten Officers were killed or wounded in the course of a few months. During the operations in Bhootan, regiments became not only unfit for service, owing to the Officers having been rendered *hors de combat* by sickness, whilst in the Umbeylah campaign the irregular system equally broke down, and Officers had to be despatched at a great expense from all parts of India, to fill up the vacancies caused by casualties in the European commissioned ranks. Had the campaign in Abyssinia been prolonged, or strenuous resistance been offered to our troops, the same result would have ensued.

Many Officers who had given the matter due consideration were opposed to any radical change in the organization of a native regiment; but there was a bait that could be offered by the advocates of the irregular system that could not be resisted. This tempting bait was the supposed saving to be effected in the reduction of the cost of the European element. Whenever you wish to induce John Bull to sanction some unwise reform, you have only to raise the cry "Economy." He is far too apt to forget that true economy can only be based upon efficiency, and that when that fact is forgotten, in the hour of trial there is often a needless sacrifice, both of lives and money, to rectify defects which ought never to have existed.

There can be no doubt that previous to the Mutiny, consequent

the great extension of the irregular force, the native element in our Indian Army had increased beyond its due proportion, and that subsequently, owing to the augmentation of the British contingent, the necessity for a large number of native troops of the line had ceased.

Had the Government then reduced the number of infantry troops of the line by one-half, at the same time offering liberal inducement to Officers to retire, and absorbing one step in three, there can be little doubt that by this time the number of Officers would have been but little in excess of that required for 78 regiments, viz. (allowing for each regiment an establishment of 24 Officers, to admit of a fair proportion being employed upon the Staff or with irregular troops) 1,872, of which, as shown below, but few would have been in the higher grades.

Lieutenant-Colonels	78
Majors	78
Captains	624
Lieutenants	1,092

Total..... 1,872

As, however, already pointed out, the cry of "Economy" was too powerful to be opposed, and all native corps were therefore directed to be organized on the irregular system. In the first instance five Officers, a Commandant, two Wing Commanders, an Adjutant and a Quartermaster were sanctioned for each regiment; subsequently two more Officers, now styled Wing Officers, were added.

The result is shown below.

Return of Officers borne on the Lists of the Indian Staff Corps.

	1876.	1878.	1879.	1882.
Lieutenant-Colonels	650	620	607	518
Majors	400	491	552	454
Captains	650	475	349	323
Lieutenants	220	215	345	540
Total.....	1,920	1,801	1,853	1,835

This return does not include 143 Lieutenant-Colonels, 217 Majors and 14 Captains of Her Majesty's Indian forces. As it must be remembered that for several years past bonuses and increased pensions have been granted to Officers for the purpose of facilitating retirements, and that the burthen upon the pension list must be now very heavy, I am afraid that, in a financial point of view, the framers of the new scheme can hardly be congratulated on their success. This array of five Officers must often give the Finance Member of Council a *mauvais quart d'heure* when he prepares his Budget Estimates.

Having examined the question in its financial point of view, I will now proceed to study it in its military and political aspects.

There is an old saying that in a well-regulated household there should be "a place for everything, and everything in its place." Now this saying is certainly applicable to a well-ordered regiment; hence it was to be supposed that under the new formation the duties of every Officer, whether on or off parade, would have been distinctly defined. I cannot, however, discover that, up to the present, anything definite has been determined as to the duties to be performed by a wing Officer. He is certainly to be mounted on an inexpensive charger, but that does not convey to the mind any exact idea as to the duties he is to perform when astride on his gallant steed; again, it is stated that he is generally to assist his Wing Commander, but the notion of the assistance to be rendered seems of a vague and indeterminate character. Is he to exercise command over, and be responsible for, the movement of his companies, or is he simply to follow at the heels of his commander, to act as his mouthpiece and repeat his orders? This is a point that should not be allowed to remain unsettled, yet I am not aware of the issue of any edition of the "Field Exercise Manual" prescribing the positions and duties on parade of seven (now eight) mounted Officers with an infantry battalion. One Colonel of my acquaintance, who was a very smart Officer, never allowed more than three of his Officers to appear at the same time on parade, as he stated the others were only in his way.

There can be little doubt that in actual warfare the wing Officer would often dismount and place himself at the head of any portion of his wing that might require leading, but is that system a wise one which entails upon an Officer the necessity for exercising, for the first time under heavy fire, a command the duties of which he has never practised on parade? With the present loose formation for attack it is more essential than ever that the men should have confidence in their Officer and be accustomed to his mode of command; mistakes might be committed in the presence of an undisciplined though gallant enemy such as we have recently engaged in Afghanistan, which would prove fatal before a better disciplined foe.

If the Indian Army is to prove a source of strength instead of weakness to the Empire, it must be prepared to meet the best troops of civilized Europe, for the struggle to check the invasion of Hindostan may take place in Egypt or in Asia Minor.

I have already pointed out that one of the evils that arose under the old system was the gradual weakening of the bond that previously existed between the European Officer and the Sepoy, this evil, apparently, the introduction of the new organization has served to intensify. Many Officers join the Indian Army solely with the view of obtaining Staff employ; even if an Officer has made up his mind to continue in the performance of regimental duty he has no special tie to connect him with any particular regiment; if he is a wing Officer he naturally strives to secure promotion to the post of Adjutant or Quartermaster, and, if an Adjutant or Quartermaster, to that of Wing Commander. If, therefore, he has interest at headquarters, it is quite possible that in the course of a few years he may be attached to five or six different corps; hence, instead of attaching himself to his

regiment, taking an interest in its institutions and a pride in its good character, he naturally thinks mainly of his own advancement.

I was much struck once by a remark made to me by an old native Officer that, under the present system, with the exception of the Colonel and the Adjutant, who had to maintain their own reputations no Officer took an interest in his regiment and every one would be quite prepared to join another corps to suit his own convenience. On a former occasion a very gallant friend of mine objected to the old organization on the ground that the Officers gave too much support to their men. I am of opinion that an Officer must stick up for his men if he expects his men to stick to him. I was once posting a picque when the Brigade-Major, unwittingly I am sure, owing to ignorance of the language, addressed a native Officer in abusive terms. I immediately called him to account, and that distinguished Officer Brigadier Cureton, who was present, held that I was right.

One of the great arguments that has been advanced in favour of the present system is that it affords greater power of selection. Now although opposed to the opinion of doctrinaire writers, I am convinced that practical soldiers will agree with me in thinking that, except a regards the highest posts, promotion by selection is neither just to individuals nor advantageous to the State; for, with every desire to act fairly on the part of those high in authority, it must often to a great extent degenerate into promotion by favouritism. There is, I am sure not one here who, in the course of his career, has not known quiet, steady Officers in whom, in case of emergency, their comrades, both Officers and men, would have had perfect confidence, yet devoid of those showy qualities likely to attract notice and lead to their promotion. The Officer who shines in the study and class-room is not necessarily the best in the field, where sound judgment, fertility of resource and perfect self-command in the hour of difficulty and danger, qualifications that cannot be tested by examinations, are of more importance even than scientific attainments. The two greatest disasters that have of late years befallen the British arms, Maiwand and Majul Hill, occurred under the command of specially selected Officers, one of whom bore the highest reputation; whilst that brilliant achievement, the defence of Rorke's Drift, was accomplished under the guidance of an unknown subaltern.

If an Officer is unfortunate in his regimental promotion, although he may feel sore at finding himself superseded by his contemporaries in other corps, he knows that he has no just cause for complaint; moreover, he often solaces himself with the hope that, on the theory averages, he may yet reach his proper level by obtaining more rapid advancement in the higher ranks; but when he is superseded by transfer from another regiment, he is deprived of that hope, as frequently attributes his supersession to his want of interest, hence spirit of discontent is engendered which must be extremely prejudicial to the interests of the Service.

That an inefficient Officer, and inefficiency is easily discovered, should be passed over as disqualified for the exercise of the duties of his command cannot be denied, but such disqualification, of which d

intimation should be given, is very different from promotion by selection.

It may be said that under the existing organization our native troops have behaved well during the recent campaign in Afghanistan, and that the want of Officers has not been felt; but it must be remembered that throughout the campaign our troops have never been exposed to a heavy cannonade or suffered as on the Sutlej and in the Punjab a loss, as shown in the margin,¹ of five and six Officers per regiment in a single action. Had only half the number been rendered *hors de combat* the results might have been most disastrous. Moreover, without in any way detracting from the skill of the Generals or the bravery of the men, it may, I think, be fairly asserted that no episode of the last war, however brilliant, can as a military feat, be compared with the defence of Jellalabad and subsequent defeat of Akbar Khan by the illustrious garrison; the defence of Candahar and advance to Cabul under Nott; the defence of Kalun, or even the defeat of the Ghilzais by the 38th Regiment B.N.I. under Wymer, when the corps was surrounded, and yet by the steadiness of its fire completely discomfited its assailants. In those days our troops were all Hindustanis and armed with a weapon inferior to that possessed by their enemy, hence they triumphed solely by their discipline; recently the superiority of weapon has been on our side, whilst many of the troops engaged were composed of the best fighting material to be found in the East.

The only advantage that has accrued under the new system has been the increase of authority granted to Commanding Officers, but as that might have been accorded without involving any change in the organization of regiments, even from the mere military standpoint, it can hardly be regarded as a success.

I will now proceed to consider the question from its political point of view, as mentioned in the paper submitted for the perusal of the Governor-General in 1857. Native Officers had for some time previously regarded with disfavour the improvement that had taken place in the status of the Government civil employes, and contrasted, with a grudging spirit, their comparatively high rate of salaries with the pay they themselves received. Since then, whilst greater opportunities for rising have been afforded to the native civil servants who are now eligible to succeed to the high office of Judge of the Supreme Court, but little change has been made in the general position of the native Officers; and, although one or two exceptional promotions have been made, as a rule the

1. *Return of Officers killed and wounded.*

Sutlej Campaign.—2nd Regiment, 2 killed, 4 wounded; 16th Regiment, killed, 3 wounded; 42nd Regiment, 2 killed, 5 wounded; 48th Regiment, wounded.

Ferozeshuhur.—26th Regiment, 2 killed, 2 wounded; 12th Regiment, 4 wounded; 14th Regiment, 5 wounded.

Sobraon.—41st Regiment, 1 killed, 7 wounded.

Chillianwalla.—30th Regiment, 2 killed, 9 wounded; 36th Regiment, 1 killed, wounded; 45th Regiment, 4 wounded; 56th Regiment, 3 killed, 5 wounded.

highest rank to which they can hope to attain is that of Ressalda or Subahdar. To make matters worse it has been suggested that native gentlemen should be allowed to enter the Army as Officers; that is, you are to place an educated man, whilst still in his youth, in a position where he may acquire great influence over his fellow-soldiers, and at the same time hold out to him no hope of ever rising. Human nature is the same in Asia as in Europe, and you cannot expect intelligent men to commence their military career as Officers and then remain all their lives in the lower grades without feeling extremely discontented. Native gentlemen did not consider it derogatory to their rank to enter corps of irregular cavalry or troopers (I had an orderly whose uncle was Nawab of Jujhur), and although their promotion was often rapid, yet they had to pass through every grade before they became Officers; hence, for a considerable portion of their period of service they had some advancement to look forward to. Any change in this respect is greatly to be deprecated; at the same time, however, some additional openings must be provided, some further incentives than heretofore to induce the sons of the small native landed gentry and yeomanry, who are thorough soldiers at heart, to enter the Army. They must be able to calculate upon attaining commissions as Captains and Lieutenants, with prospect of succeeding to higher rank as a reward for distinguished service in the field; but where are those openings to be found? They do not exist under present arrangements. Regiments are neither regulars nor irregulars. If it is intended that European Officers should merely exercise general supervision, and natives command troops or companies, of the former there are too many; if, on the contrary, they are to become in action the actual leaders of the men, there are too few.

It must be acknowledged that the native military servants of the Crown cannot much longer be debarred from rising to higher rank than that to which they now ordinarily attain, but to increase the stability of our Indian Empire, and avoid running the risk of imperiling our military supremacy, it is imperative that the majority of the leaders of our native troops should be European.

In the Army as now organized, whilst we have in a great measure abolished *esprit de corps*, and thus seriously impaired the bond between the European Officer and the Sepoy, we have increased the influence of the native Officer, though we still rigidly check the indulgence any hope of succeeding to higher rank and pay, which must be a natural result of such influence; thus we are training in military knowledge and to habits of command a large body of natives the gratification of whose legitimate ambition we offer no suitable field.

Is this just to men who may at any time be exposed to great temptations, and their allegiance assailed and shaken? That it is not one would, I think, presume to argue.

I have now reviewed the prevailing organization of the Indian Army in its financial, military, and political relations, and, I am afraid in neither one of these respects can it be deemed worthy of praise.

It is, however, very easy to point out defects and to condemn them, but not, perhaps, equally easy to suggest an appropriate remedy.

In determining the organization of an army, it is essential in the first instance to consider the nature and extent of the duties it is called upon to perform.

When an army is required to protect an open and extended frontier exposed to attacks from an immediate and powerful neighbour, so that in the event of war the whole military strength of the country may be at once needed to repel the threatened invasion, then it may be wise, as a financial necessity, in time of peace, to retain the cadres of regiments on a reduced footing so as to admit of their being rapidly augmented on the outbreak of hostilities; if, on the contrary, a State from the nature of its frontier is free from the risk of invasion except by a comparatively speaking limited force, whilst its Army may be constantly engaged in what may be styled minor wars, either within or without its boundaries, then it tends both to efficiency and economy to keep its fighting line always at its full strength, but with suitable reserves to take its place for the preservation of the peace of the country when its services are otherwise needed. In the one case the mobilization of the whole Army is a gigantic task, requiring much previous thought and labour, whilst the slightest friction may neutralize all the ability and energy of the military authorities; in the other the task is an easy one, the regiments composing the first line, being always in a state of readiness for active service, can at once be placed in motion, whilst the mobilization of the Reserve takes place in the stations they have vacated; hence, there is no delay in throwing a small but thoroughly efficient force upon the theatre of war, and thus an insurrection may be crushed or the fate of a campaign decided which otherwise might be protracted for months or years, and lead to an infinite expenditure both of life and treasure.

India may certainly be classed under the second category: almost surrounded by the sea, an attack in force by a disciplined foe is only to be anticipated from the north-west. It is, therefore, in that direction that our attention should be mainly turned. At present it would be difficult to calculate with any degree of confidence on the circumstances under which the campaign might open, the probable strength of the invader, the opposition he might experience from the people of the country he would have to traverse, or the support that they might be willing to accord to ourselves. These must depend upon political changes which are still in the womb of time, regarding which, therefore, we can only indulge in speculation, and it would be unwise to express any very decided opinion. The ablest military writers are, however, in accord on one point, that in the event of a struggle for supremacy in the East, it would be necessary to prevent an enemy from seizing upon the important position of Candahar, hence assuming that, both in a military and political point of view, it would be advisable to advance to the neighbourhood of that city, it is not unreasonable to suppose that we ought always to be prepared to place a force of 50,000 men in the Turnak Valley; here, should success attend our arms, it would in all probability prove decisive, whilst if

we met with a reverse we should retire upon our reinforcements, and be again in a position to arrest the enemy's progress, whilst in the meanwhile peace and quietness would prevail throughout our own dominions.

I have already remarked that an attempt to threaten our position by an advance on Herat might, perhaps, be checked in its outset by counter-attack in which India might be required to take a part; but in such an event, probably a force of 50,000 men would equally be the utmost strength of the contingent she would be called upon to furnish. Although in the case of complications arising with either of the native States on our eastern frontier, in order to prevent a prolonged contest it would be requisite to employ a respectable force in the first instance, and not carry on the war by dribblets, yet to evince our superiority over either Power, an army of 50,000 would scarcely be needed; thus we have a basis on which to calculate the numeric strength of the force which should be maintained in readiness to meet any extraordinary emergency, and I will, therefore, now proceed to consider the details of the military establishment that would admit of such a force being always available for active service, without, at the same time, too heavy a burthen being flung upon the finances of the country; of course, of that force a certain proportion, perhaps one-third, would be European troops, to which my paper does not refer, but, as it must be remembered, that to place 50,000 men in a fighting line, at a distance from our frontier, allowance must be made for numerous detachments employed on escort duty along the line of communication, the native portion might possibly be fairly estimated at 44,000, viz., 12 regiments of cavalry of 720, and 39 regiments of infantry of 900 each (exclusive of European Officers).

In accordance with the changes recently authorized in the native Army, its present strength may be computed at 114,000, viz., regiments of cavalry, 17,000; and 113 battalions of infantry, 97,000. I would increase that strength to 124,000, divided into 27 regiments of cavalry and 117 battalions of infantry; of the former 24 regiments and of the latter 78 battalions being always kept complete, the remainder forming a reserve. This arrangement would provide in time of peace a garrison of about 105,000, to be disposed as follows:

Lower Bengal and Assam	6,000
Central Bengal and Oudh	10,000
North-West Provinces and Rohilkund....	10,000
Central India and Gwalior	10,000
Punjab and North-West Frontier	30,000
Bombay and Sind	15,000
Madras and Hyderabad	20,000
Burmah	4,000
	<hr/>
	105,000

On the active list, every regiment of cavalry should consist of four squadrons, with the usual complement of native commissioned and non-commissioned Officers, and the following European Officers:—

- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel,
- 1 Major,
- 4 Captains,
- 2 Lieutenants.

The Captains to command squadrons and the Lieutenants to perform the duties of Adjutant and Interpreter and Quartermaster.

Every regiment of infantry should consist of eight companies, with one native Officer per company, and the usual complement of non-commissioned officers, and the following establishment of European Officers:—

- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel,
- 1 Major,
- 8 Captains,
- 10 Lieutenants.

The cavalry should be divided into three groups of eight regiments to each group a reserve regiment being affiliated, whilst every two regiments of infantry should have a reserve battalion attached. The European staff for reserve regiments and battalions would be a Commandant, with an Adjutant for cavalry, and an additional Officer as Quartermaster, for infantry, all selected from their corresponding corps on the active list; the establishment of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be complete, but only one-half of the troopers or Sepoys should be permanently embodied in case of emergency the ranks being filled up by men from the reserves, liable to be called upon to serve in the event of war, but ordinarily only required to attend annually for one month's training during the rest of the year residing at their homes and receiving a small sum as reserve pay. Reserve regiments and battalions should be permanently located at central stations in the vicinity of the districts from which their affiliated regiments, to which they should act as depôts, generally obtain their recruits. Every soldier having served three years with the colours, if of good character, should be permitted to join the reserve, whilst the men to be permanently embodied in reserve regiments and battalions should all be taken from corps on the active list, which would give Commanding Officers an opportunity of keeping their regiments thoroughly efficient by weeding out men who, although perfectly fit for garrison duty might possibly soon succumb if exposed to the hardships of a campaign.

There should be but one Indian Army under one Commander-in-Chief; a certain proportion of the 78 active battalions of infantry should, however, always be recruited from each Presidency, within the limits of which, although available for general service, they should be ordinarily stationed. As regards the European Officers there should be no distinction, and they should be eligible to succeed to divisional or brigade commands, or to Staff appointments in any part of India, without reference to the Presidency in which they may be serving.

All Officers now in the Staff Corps would, of course, retain their

present rights and privileges, but for the purpose of regulating promotion, their names should be placed in the cadres of the new regiments, the existing 156 cadres being reduced to 78, by the process of doubling up the 1st and 38th Bengal, the 1st and 27th Madras, and 1st and 16th Bombay, and so on throughout the whole number.

Young Officers, after obtaining their commissions at Sandhurst should all be posted to infantry regiments according to vacancies, but after having performed two years' regimental duty, and passed the prescribed examinations, an Officer should be eligible for transfer, on probation, to a cavalry corps as Interpreter and Quartermaster; the expiration of a year, if recommended by his Commanding Officer, he might be permanently appointed to that branch of the Service and his name removed from the rolls of his previous regiment.

As at present, Officers should be employed upon the Staff, but appointments should only be for five years, and the number absentees on this account from any one corps should be strictly limited. In the event of its being the desire of Government to retain the services of an Officer in either of the military departments or civil commissions for a longer period than five years, he should be seconded, whilst after ten years he should either rejoin his regiment or be removed to a Staff Corps. This arrangement would prevent the evil of which regimental Officers under the old *régime* justly complained, that the sweets of Staff employ, by inducing Officers remain in the Service, acted as a bar to promotion; at the same time it would be advantageous to the State, as it would enable brave men, without sacrificing their military prospects, to remain in departments for which they might prove themselves peculiarly fitted.

I will now revert to the native Officers. I have suggested that within the active infantry battalions there should be only 8 native Officers, 4 Subahdars and 4 Jemadars; with a proper establishment of European leaders, more are not needed, but with the reserve battalions there should be two native Officers to every company, and in the battalions and in the reserve cavalry regiments would be afforded opportunity of improving their positions by conferring upon certain number commissions as Captains and Lieutenants; it would prove a great incentive to men of respectable families to enter the Service, and, at the same time, allay the feeling of discontent amongst the soldiery, occasioned by the great change that has, already remarked, of late years taken place in regard to the relations of native military and civil servants, more especially as the prospect were held out of attaining to even higher rank as a reward for good service or for gallantry in the field; it might, indeed, be a question whether ultimately some of the reserve regiments battalions might not be placed under the command of distinguished native Officers. Should Her Majesty be graciously pleased to permit upon her military Staff two native Aides-de-camp, to be relieved periodically, a means would be offered for creating a steady, but too rapid, flow of promotion, for every Officer thus honoured would of course, receive the rank of Captain, which he would retain or

return to India. The more the native soldier can be induced to identify himself with the British Army, and the more he sees of the extent of our power as evinced by our ships and colonies, the more likely he is to remain faithful to our Government and attached to our rule.¹

When Maharajah Jung-Bahadur, on his visit to England, was told by a Minister that he might possibly form an erroneous estimate of our power as compared with those of other European States, he replied that he was not likely to do so, as he had observed *en route* from India, that our flag was flying over every post worth possessing that he had passed. His Excellency's loyal support of our Government during the Mutiny was the happy result of his observations.

In accordance with the order recently promulgated in India, the number of Officers to be attached to each native regiment is to be increased: had, at the same time, their duties been re-defined, so as to place a European Officer in charge of every grand division of two companies, this would have been a move in the right direction, but apparently wing Officers are still to be left without any specific command, and thus one of the evils of the present system is to be perpetuated. The total number of Officers now authorized for regimental duty is 1,152,² whilst under the scheme I have submitted, the fixed establishment would be 1,752,³ but in the one case the majority would in all probability be Field Officers, whilst in the other, one-half would always be subalterns, and except in the cavalry, there would be only two Field Officers to eighteen of the lower grades. Moreover, several of all ranks would be on Staff employ, so that even in a financial point of view, some advantage might ultimately be derived from the proposed change; but efficiency is much more to be regarded than economy, and I believe that most Officers who have served with native troops under a heavy cannonade would agree with me in thinking that if India is to throw her weight into the field against a European foe, and if she is to take her legitimate share of the defence of her own interests, she must be prepared to meet any enemy by whom her safety may be menaced; and it would be unwise to allow her battalions, with only eight European leaders, to confront a well-disciplined and well-officered force.

It must not be supposed that I am seeking to disparage native troops, on the contrary, having witnessed their gallantry in the field, I cannot but look upon them as brave and courageous soldiers, ready to follow wherever they are led, and for skirmishing or engagements needing a display of individual daring, perhaps unsurpassed by those of any nation in the world, but when manœuvring in masses, more especially if exposed to the effects of a withering fire, they must be commanded, and I hold that it would be impolitic to allow the reins

¹ A wise step in this direction has been lately taken by bringing the Indian Contingent to England.

² Cavalry, 248. Infantry, 904.

³ Cavalry:—Lieutenant-Colonels, 24; Majors, 24; Captains, 96; Lieutenants, 48. Total 192.

Infantry:—Lieutenant-Colonels, 78; Majors, 78; Captains, 624; Lieutenants, 780. Total 1,560.

of command to fall from the hands of their European Officers, to be grasped by natives, to whom, whilst extending their influence by habituating them to the exercise of authority, we hold out no hope of rising from their subordinate position. Should the organization have suggested be adopted, in what might be styled the fighting battalions the European element of command would predominate and the men would consequently look up solely to their European leaders: at the same time, the claims of the native Officer would be overlooked, and, in the reserve battalions, where his influence would be most desirable in securing a supply of efficient recruits, he would obtain that recognition of his valuable services to which he is entitled, and from which, whilst his fellow-countrymen are rising to posts of dignity and emolument, it is unjust that he should be longer excluded.

Although the armies of the three Presidencies would be united under one chief, who, for the purposes of inspection only, should be allowed a second in command, and thus, as regards the European Officers, local prejudices and local jealousies would disappear, the Madras and Bombay Regiments would still continue to garrison their own Presidencies, and recruit from their own provinces, so that the healthy spirit of rivalry would be created, a spirit that might effectually prevent any general disloyal combination against the State.

With an army of the strength and organization upon the system we have advocated, India would always be prepared to commence a campaign with a force of 50,000 highly efficient and well-trained troops, whilst she would at once call out a reserve of about 18,000 these would be available to fill up vacancies in the regiments marching to the front, at the same time the several reserve battalions would complete their ranks by recruits who would rapidly become qualified for the performance of garrison duty, so as to take the place of older soldiers.

As the arms, accoutrements, and uniforms of reserve men would always be kept in store, there would be no delay in their equipment and the moment that the order for the mobilization of a reserve battalion was issued, the men attached to it would join the headquarters quarter station for the performance of garrison duty until their services might be needed with either of their active battalions.

In the foregoing sketch I have merely shadowed out a general idea. Possibly, even if the idea was adopted, it might need modification in various details; for instance, it might be deemed advisable to reduce the Goorkha Battalions on the irregular footing, making a corresponding reduction in the strength of each of the 78 regular battalions. I believe, however, that the principles I have enunciated are correct, and that, in order to secure efficiency combined with economy and sound policy, it is essential—

1. That the regimental system, with its proper proportion of European Officers, should be re-established.

2. That a scheme should be introduced for creating a suitable reserve.

3. That whilst avoiding any weakening of the influence

European Officers, and of the tie that connects them with their most suitable means should be afforded for the further recognition of their gallant and faithful services of native Officers.

By my persistent advocacy of a return to the regimental system it may perhaps be thought that I am opposed to all progress, and am consequently unable to keep pace with the requirements of the age. I may, however, observe, that long before the Mutiny I was urging upon the home authorities the necessity for introducing changes in our military system, to avert the catastrophe I then perceived was impending, but I have deprecated the complete transformation that has since been effected, because, whilst I can recognize the advantages salutary reforms, I always mistrust the results of revolution.

The CHAIRMAN: The lecture we have just listened to opens out a vast field of discussion, and I am afraid that many present will find the ten minutes laid down by the rules of the Institution hardly sufficient; but no doubt, by confining themselves to the salient points raised by Sir Orfeur, a very valuable discussion may take place, and I trust that many whom I see around me who are perfectly capable of discussing the several points, will give us the benefit of their opinions.

Major-General Sir JAMES HILLS, G.C., K.C.B., R.A.: I feel quite unequal to take up the questions in the limited time given me; because as Lord Chelmsford states, the lecture opens up a great field for comment. I am not quite prepared to pick out the points that I specially wish to speak upon. I think that the lecturer has been somewhat mistaken in his views as to the irregular system, because it is carried on very much in the old way. The Officers have special duties to perform, and it is all laid down in certain books. They have certain commands and their whole time is very much occupied in the details of their work both in peace time and in the field. Also one would gather from this paper that there is a want of fellow-feeling and affection between the Officers and the men in comparison to what used to exist in former days. Now from what I have seen of the service the Officers mix very much indeed with their men; they know them thoroughly. There is no Officer, either wing Officer or wing Subaltern, who does not know every man under his command. They are constantly in their lines, I think much more than before the mutiny. Therefore I do not think that the present system would be bettered by returning to the other. With reference to the number of Officers required for the regiment, I think that the additions recently made, are good; but myself wish for one more Officer. I would have a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the regiment; two Majors commanding the wings; four Captains commanding companies, with two Subalterns as Adjutant and Quartermaster. That makes a total of nine Officers. Then the native Officers have full play for their own special duties. They are not too much interfered with by the European Officers and each would have enough to do in following out what is laid down for him to do. The position of the native Officers has been very much improved lately. There is a native Adjutant and a native Subahdar-Major; and I think as a rule they are very fairly satisfied with their positions. The question of the reserves is far too elaborate for me to think of going into it without writing upon it myself. I could not get up and make remarks that would be worth listening to at a moment's notice, but there is no doubt that if after three years you gave every man the option of retiring to the reserve, you would have so many men on hand that you would not know what to do with them. A great many men even now take their discharge after three years without going to the reserve, especially men who come from across the border. I think the commanding Officers might have more power with reference to giving the men their discharge than they have now; but I do not think it would be advisable to give every man a chance of going to the reserve after three years; because you would find, I think, that almost every man would go. Nothing has been touched upon with regard to the elements of which the regiment should be made up—whether they should be kept as they are now—some of them

a distinct class, or whether they should be mixed classes. For myself I prefer a special class in regiments. I think there would be a greater feeling of esprit than there is at present; but I must say that in many mixed regiments I have seen it would be impossible to have greater *esprit* than you find in them, and they hold their own both in discipline and everything else with those that of a special class; but for the safety of the State I think it more advisable to keep them separate.

Colonel J. H. GORDON: I wish to make a few remarks on some of the subjects touched upon in Sir Orfeur Cavenagh's lecture. I have seen a great deal of the Bengal portion of the present Indian Army, and I have commanded a regiment for twenty-one years. I have not served with a regiment under the old system. With regard to the old irregular system under which my regiment was formed, from what I saw of it, the system made the Officers, as they were entrusted with large powers of authority. This brought out their judgment and good qualities where an Officer had anything in him. But as we had the old musket and the fighting tactics, being those of close quarters, we did not require so much scientific leadership at present, therefore the European Officers were few in number. We cannot advance native Officers and make them Captains or Subalterns, or put them par in that respect, with the trained, educated English Officer. Sir Orfeur Cavenagh's ideas on this point are, I think, too far in advance. We demand a great deal from a young British Officer now in the way of scientific education before he enters the Army, and before he is promoted we demand a good deal more. We demand nothing in that way from native Officers except personal influence which is no doubt a great thing, and a slight vernacular education. With regard to what has been said about native Officers being dissatisfied with their position because of the opportunities given to native civil officials, I have seen a great deal of native Officers, both infantry and cavalry, and the thoughtful ones among them know very well the different conditions of the military and civil services. The rule they are uneducated men in our sense of the word; the educated native official must be an educated man and trained specially for the position. The classes from which we draw the native military Officers generally prefer the military profession. In my opinion the native Officers are contented men; they would welcome a change in the pension system by which they could receive pensions after a shorter period of service than at present. That period was formerly a few years ago, now it is thirty-two. An invalid pension is available after fifteen years' service, but this works unsatisfactorily; after twenty years' service many of them long to get home and to retire, as there is no one else to look after the family estates and interests. With regard to wing Officers, in a well-regimented native regiment where the commandant is a practical soldier, every Officer has something to do on parade and elsewhere, and in fact a great deal to do. Wing commanders assisted by their wing Officers carry on all the musketry training, theoretical and practical. There are no musketry instructors in native regiments, and if you look at the musketry returns of the Indian Army the results are shown of very good shooting. This musketry duty keeps all the wing Officers very much employed; it is going on a great deal the whole year round. The wing Officer has to take the place of a wing Commander on leave, to go on detached duty with two companies and has a defined duty and position in field drill and operations under the present system. A young Officer has been trained in an English regiment before he enters the native regiment, and that is a great advantage, as he is at once ready for the service. The English Officer comes to make the native soldier, not as formerly to be under the old system in the native regiment. With all due deference, I think the present system all round, you will find a much larger number of professional Officers and soldiers now with native regiments than formerly. When we have active service we certainly want more young Officers. That made itself apparent in the late campaign now and then; but the remedy for that is the establishment of a regimental reserve of Officers. I think I have seen in some Blue Book propositions that all Officers allowed to go on detached military staff and other duties up to ten years' service should be available for return to regiments on service. This means the free application of the principle of seconding, and to supply a regimental reserve. We want double the number of young Officers.

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active service for the increased important duties incident to a campaign to a combined British and native force. After the capture of Cabul it necessary to send for more Officers for the native regiments, to replace casual and those regiments left in India were used as a reserve of Officers. With regard to returning to the regimental or old system, I do not choose to give an opinion on that, as a regimental system can also be brought about in another way; I know that there is a vast amount of *esprit de corps* now under the present system, combined with efficiency. The Officers as a rule are contented men, professionally well trained. They are much better paid than formerly. Formerly the Officers were tempted off to the civil and staff departments, as there was a small inducement to remain with the regiment, but now the emoluments attached to regimental duties have been placed more on a par with those of civil and staff duties, therefore the regiment has its attractions also. Under the present system Officers know they will get promotion at a certain date, and with it increased pay. There must be some merits in this system of promotion, which has been applied lately to the corps of Royal Engineers. With regard to the Officers lacking interest in their regiments, my experiences have been quite the contrary. Of course there may be one or two such to be found here and there, but taking them as a body I do not think it can be said of them. I commanded a brigade during the Afghan War, and a great many native regiments passed through my brigade. I have seen a good deal of service of late years, and met many regiments, and I always seen the regimental Officers devoted to their regiments and men, and native ranks responding to them. The British Officers have very hard work on such occasions, and it is well known how efficiently the work has been done by the native Army. Efficiency, *esprit de corps*, and the bond of union between Officers and men, go together. With regard to a reserve of men, that is another question, which I believe has been under consideration. I think recruiting departments are wanted; and there we might employ men not fit for the arduous work of a campaign, and native Officers of local influence with increased native rank and power. We have a native Adjutant in both infantry and cavalry regiments.

Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH: That is what I suggested years ago. That part of my lecture was an extract from what I wrote in 1857.

Colonel GORDON: A great deal has been done of late for the native Officers and the ranks. With regard to native troops under a cannonade, I may say that I saw our native infantry twice under the fire of the Afghan mountain guns, they behaved very steadily and coolly. In the Afghan War, the fire discipline of the infantry was the result of very marked excellent field training. Ammunition was most economically expended. I attributed very much the small losses sustained by the troops in action in Afghanistan to our excellent street shooting, which quickly drove off the enemy and enabled us to gain positions with little loss. In the former Afghan War our troops fought under very different conditions as to arms.

Major W. G. THOMAS: Perhaps it is presumptuous in me to address you on the subject of the Indian Army, as I have not the honour to belong to that force. The principle that looks-on and sees most of the game, perhaps I may be considered to know something about it. I have been a long time in India, and have a large number of friends of all ranks in the Indian Army. With regard to the proposal to return to the old regimental system, which means to double or treble the present number of Officers, it appears to me that it would be a very fatal step. The objection made to the present system seems to be that there is no definite duty for the Officers. If that is so, to increase their number would fail to give them a definite position. If you cannot give a definite position, and suitable work, to the men, it is impossible to give it to twenty-one or twenty-eight men. The old system was tried, and found wanting. That great soldier Sir Charles Napier, when he left India, published a memorable General Order describing the position of Officers of the native Army. It is to be inferred from that order, that from want of a definite position and duties a number of Officers under the old system, instead of studying their profession, and devoting themselves to their regiments, spent a great deal of time in amusement and dissipation. At the present moment there

seven Officers in a native regiment, and each has his time fully occupied. With musketry and drill there is now an abundance of work for every Officer, a boon in a country like India.

A great deal has been said of the "inexpensive charger;" he has been a star joke for many years; but it seems to me that the work done by the "inexpensive charger" is such that if he could give his opinion he would not at all agree the lecturer that the wing Officer had not a defined position. With regard to providing an outlet for native Officers, I fail to see how relegating them to reserve would be considered by them at all a boon. The present system is only beginning, I believe, of a greater career for the natives of India. Now they their defined position as Subahdars and Jemadars, and if they are deprived of that by increasing the number of English Officers in a regiment will have nothing to look forward to.

Lieutenant-Colonel TYRELL: I am a wing Commander, and wish to give views on the wing system. There are certain fixed principles of military organization and one of them is the establishment of a definite chain of responsibility from lowest to the highest—soldiers are formed in companies under the command of Captains, and a convenient number of companies is formed into a battalion under a Captain responsible to the battalion Commander. That is the case in all the civilized Powers except the Indian Army, where there has been a link between the company and the battalion, that is the wing. The company Commander is responsible to the wing Commander, who is responsible to the battalion Commander; and the companies are commanded by native Subahdars, and wings by European Officers: but the fact is that the company Commander is really divided between the Subahdar and the wing Commander. The Subahdar commands the men on parade, and the wing Commander deals with the interior economy of the company. The division of duty is not strictly laid down or defined; pretty much at haphazard. I think that is objectionable. The Sepoy hardly knows whether he is commanded by his Subahdar or by the wing Commander: for things he goes to the Subahdar, and for some he goes to the wing Commander. The Subahdars, who are supposed to command the companies, are really responsible for their own companies. The wing Commander's duties are similar to the company Commander's duties for him, and to act as Major on parade. In cases he is not fit to be trusted, therefore he has a European Officer to look after him. The wing Officer has to assist the wing Commander in doing the company Commander's duty for him: in fact there are two wing Commanders and two Officers kept up in every battalion of infantry, simply to see that the company Commanders do their duty, and to assist them in doing their duty. I think it would be a much better plan if there were a European Officer commanding the company directly responsible to the battalion Commander; or I think the irregular system was very good, where the native Officer really did command the troop or company, and was responsible to his regimental or battalion Commander. I think both those systems are good. I belong to the Madras Army; that army the native Officers are not as a rule fit to command companies really they do not. They only do the duty of colour-sergeants, and a European Colonel or Major has to do the duty of Captain for them; and he is overworked, having to do that duty for four companies, and very often a wing Officer to assist him, the wing Officer being frequently detached on duty, or the regiments being short of European Officers. There has been a proposal to double the number of European Officers, and to put a double company under the command of a European Field Officer; but that is rather increasing the number of Officers between the battalion Commander and the company Commander. I think in the Madras Army, at all events, there should be a European Captain at the head of every company. You may have four companies instead of eight if you like. I think the native Officers can do the duty of subaltern Officers very well, and the Lieutenant of the company might be a native, but to lead Madras Sepoys, European company leaders are absolutely necessary. Orfeur Cavenagh spoke of having a Reserve in the Indian Army, but I

think a Reserve could be worked profitably along with voluntary service. All natives of India enlist for long service, and the Madras Sepoys generally stay in regiments till they are obliged to be invalided. But I think it would be a very good thing to have a division of the army into field and garrison battalions, as proposed, and when a man is unfit for field service draft him into a garrison battalion; of course if you send men into the Reserve you have to pay them while they do duty. When they have enlisted voluntarily, they will not stay in the Reserve nothing. In that case I think the game is not worth the candle. We have already had native Adjutants in the Madras Army. You know the Madras Army did mutiny; and in fact nothing in it was changed except the *cadre* of European Officers. The system was not changed at all, and exactly the same duties formerly performed by the European Captains of companies are now performed by European wing Commanders, except that they have four companies instead of two to look after. I think the new organization works rather badly under the present system. The Bengal Army is different, because that army was newly raised, the new system was more adapted to it, because it was the system actually in use in the newly raised army at the time.

Major-General Sir HENRY HAVELOCK-ALLAN, Bart., U.C., C.B.: I should like to be allowed to offer a few remarks on this subject, probably as interesting as can occupy any assemblage of Englishmen, and one which is becoming of increasing bearings more and more important, and of increased national interest every day. I think this Institution, and the gentlemen here assembled, are very much to be gratulated on the fact that they have been addressed in the first instance by Mr. Orfeur Cavenagh, than whom probably scarcely anyone now living has any greater experience of the old system of the Indian Army. We have also had the opportunity of comparing with his views, the views of Officers of high distinction who have served with the newly organized system, such as Colonel Gordon, an Officer who unites with the experience gained under the purely British regimental system in the old days the practical experience of having commanded a regiment afterwards a brigade, of native troops, and subsequently a larger force in the recent events in India. Therefore we may say we have united the two extremes of experience in the discussion, beginning with forty years ago and coming to the latter days, in which Sir James Hills and others have been able to illustrate that the native Army has at all events shown itself to be under capable leaders of any degree below the standard of the reputation it gained for itself a hundred years ago. The questions of practical interest which have been elicited by Sir Cavenagh's very able paper seem to me to resolve themselves into whether a return to the old regiment system of a very large number of European Officers would be better, or whether the existing system of seven European Officers would be better, whether it would be better to adopt an intermediate system, utilizing the best of both, and avoiding the faults of either: that is, having with a medium number of European Officers a considerable proportion of native Officers. I think at the point we are all agreed, that is to say that any mode of organization which entirely checks the aspirations and ambition of our native Officers would be a retrograde step in the last degree, and one which we should desire to avoid; therefore in all discussions as to any medium between the old system with about four native Officers and twenty-four European Officers, and the new system which has five or six European Officers, and a large number of native Officers, the object is to have exactly that number of European Officers which shall secure complete and efficient leading in the field, consistently with the large casualties which would be incurred in any campaign with modern arms against a modern army. On the other hand, to leave a sufficient scope and outlet for the energy of the native Officers, by giving them the opportunity, if they showed exceptional talent, of rising to a higher position than that of Subaltern or Captain, which is the limit to which their ambition can now rise. Therefore the question resolves itself into the means by which an outlet can be found for the ambition of the native races (who are showing increased capacity in that way every day) by the infusion into our native Armies of such classes as Colonel Gordon had the habit of commanding—Afghans, Sikhs, Bhotans, Goorkhas—and at the same time providing sufficient European Officers to meet the casualties in a campaign.

larger scale than was seen three years ago. After watching during the past several years each change in organization, it appears to me that the happy medium we desire would be best attained by having an organization somewhat half-way between that proposed by Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, and that proposed by those who are of opinion that the present number of European Officers is entirely sufficient for practical purposes. Major Godfrey Thomas alluded to that which is well known that one of the greatest difficulties which military reformers have to avoid is having a superabundance of European Officers who in times of peace have no outlet for their energies, and who would be simply idle, wasting their time in other pursuits, and therefore would not be so well, *pro rata*, accustomed to the duties as those of whom Colonel Gordon has spoken, who, being few in number and having their time fully occupied, are, man for man, perhaps better Officers than those under the old organization. To obtain that object perhaps the best way would be, as regards the native battalion, to have two native Officers, then five European Captains to command each of them, a double company united for the purpose on parade; and then, consistently and conjointly with that, three or four British Subalterns, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, and two supernumeraries; I would retain the present command of the eight companies by a native Officer who, as Major Tyrrell has pointed out, would be far better employed, where he showed capacity, in having the entire control of his company. That would give this result: that you would have in each regiment four double companies, with general superintendence and whose immediate leading on necessary occasions would be performed by a European Officer, who would command the united companies while the native Officer would not feel himself in any sense deprived of the position of honour derived from the fact that he retained the full command of his individual company. But there is another point which perhaps is of still greater importance. It has been sought by all those who have had the greatest interest of the natives of India at heart, and have seen that it was necessary that some greater outlet should be provided for them than the present system gives, to know how it was possible to unite occasional opportunity of falling into still higher positions of command with that proved necessity of the actual leading of the rest of any unit bigger than a company being confided to European Officers in action, and it has often struck me that it is wonderful, considering the vast amount of talent and energy that is to be found amongst the millions whom we have under our control in India, that we should be able to find men who are prepared to endure all the privations and hardships in the comparatively unimportant and unpromising position of native Officers, knowing that their career is barred by the fact that they cannot rise to any higher rank than native Captain. Now the French, in their position in Algeria is somewhat analogous to ours, have solved that difficulty in a manner I think peculiar to their Algerian Army, but which I do not think can commend itself to us. They have allowed the command of one squadron, or even two, or occasionally a native regiment of Spahis, to fall into the hands of a native of Algeria. Well, if, conjointly with other and greater political considerations, it were possible that we could do that in India, then undoubtedly the object we are aiming at would be reached, and would be as a prize put forward to native India of high military capacity (as undoubtedly there are hundreds of them), you would there satisfy their highest aspirations. We are often told by those who have studied the military history of India in former times, that that is the reason why our armies have deteriorated in the present compared with the past, when it is said a native Officer often commanded a native battalion or a regiment of cavalry. It seems to me quite possible, by the adoption of a remark which Sir Orfeur Cavenagh threw out, to retain those two opposite and conflicting conditions, still give an outlet to native ambition, whether by the creation of reserve battalions in which in some instances the command might be entrusted to natives, or having on our establishment a small proportion of regiments, say $\frac{1}{4}$ th or $\frac{1}{3}$ th of the whole, in which it might be recognized that the command might eventually fall into the hand of a native. In some such way I think an outlet should be afforded which the present system does not give, and we should avoid this difficulty, whereas, if at present, by a great extension of native Officers, you were to diminish the European leading element altogether, that would be a defect of the worst

while on the other hand you would be able occasionally to give to a native of exceptional military talent such position as might be held out as a prize, and, at the same time, would maintain the present general efficiency, by having the double complement of battalions and squadrons for the most part still commanded by European Officers. One of the most prominent matters that has attracted my attention with regard to the changes that have taken place in the native armies and their ultimate effect, is one which has forced itself home to the mind of everybody who has seen the altered position of the Indian Army in the last few years as regards other forces. To use an expression which has become somewhat cant one, I think it must be admitted that the contingency, at one time completely removed, of our having to put an army in the field composed in a large measure of native regiments against an army which might be materially, if not entirely, composed of Europeans, has increased within what we may call a measurable distance. It may be remote, or, on the other hand, near at hand, no statesman having the responsibility of dealing with the organization of the native armies of India, for the future, I think, would be justified in leaving it out of consideration as a possible contingency, and we should endeavour in all the changes we desire to make as regards organization to keep that within our view as a contingency that may overtake us at any time. The practical question as to how far command should be allowed to be concentrated in the hands of Europeans, and how far it should be subdivided between natives and Europeans, and what proportion the one should bear to the other, is a question which in importance and practical value is attaining larger dimensions every day.

General NEWALL: I should like to be allowed to put one question. Some of the remarks of the lecturer pointed to a "reserve." I assume that as his lecture is in regard to the Indian Army, any incorporation of an European reserve does not enter into consideration?

Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH: Purely the native Army.

General NEWALL: I pass on to remark that on a recent reduction of the battalions in the Indian Army, it was hoped that the soldiers discharged would immediately enlist into other regiments, preserving their term of service and advantages; but it was discovered that they preferred to take their gratuities and become merged in the population; not to become, I should hope, swabs in the armies of the native potentates; I have always thought the time would arrive to incorporate these armies into an army of reserve, if possible. I should like the lecturer in his reply to favour us with any information or suggestions on any particular branch of a native reserve for India.

The CHAIRMAN: I should not like the discussion to close without rising to make a few remarks regarding the lecture, because I have, for an Officer belonging to the British service, had exceptional opportunities of noticing the native Army, not only in one Presidency, but in two, or to a certain extent in the third. For eleven years I served in the Bombay Presidency with a British regiment, and for the rest of the time in the field with Bombay regiments. During the Abyssinian campaign I saw all three Presidencies represented, and for five years I was Adjutant-General in India, during which time I had the privilege of taking up to the Commander-in-Chief every question regarding the native Army which came to the department. There is no question that the difficulty of reorganizing the native Army is a very great one, and the Committee which has been lately assembled in India must have found it so, seeing that the Blue Books published on the subject would make a pile. After the mutiny the Bengal Army disappeared, and it was then decided that those who were in power that the whole Indian Army should be reorganized on what is called (but rather I think improperly) the irregular system. It was not the irregular system nor the regular system, as Sir Orfeur Cavenagh points out, but was a compromise between the two. I think that those who reorganized the Indian Army in that way, lost sight to a great extent of the impossibility of adapting one system like that to the whole of the troops which garrison India. Even in the Bengal Army there is as much difference between one class of regiment and another, as between a regiment in one Presidency and one in another. I think that our army reformers, after the mutiny, rather seem to have adopted the principle of that famous robber of ancient days, Procrustes, whom no one does not remember, and who used to put his prisoners on a bed: if they were

he cut their legs off, and if they were too short he stretched them to it appears to me to be the principle upon which the native Army was reared. But that is past and gone, and the question is, what can be done to improve the present system? There is no doubt that the Army Authorities soon discovered that the new system did not work, and that the number of Officers was not sufficient, as they began with five and have now increased to eight. The number of eight has also invariably been increased when regiments have been in active service. I can speak myself from the experience of the Abyssinian campaign that the demand for Officers was so great that at last a Bengal Officer said, "I have given you all we can, and you are authorized to stop any Officers coming from India from furlough in Egypt, and make use of their services." In Abyssinia we lost scarcely any Officers, and how was it there was this demand for Officers? because the demands for the Staff were so great. Staff appointments sprang in all directions. There were nearly 400 miles of communication, and a vast land transport, so that absolutely in that small army, I believe I am not far from the mark when I say, there were no less than 132 Staff Officers employed in capacities. Under the present system, there is no reserve of Officers, and the speakers have this afternoon pointed out that that is a very great want. I have not that acquaintance with the details of command which those who have given their opinions this afternoon, but I really question whether the eight Officers now with the native regiments, seeing the multifarious duties they have to perform in peace time, are sufficient. Musketry alone takes up a great deal of time, and then all the paper work is a very severe tax upon the Officers. A certain proportion of whom are always on leave. Then when you have Officers mounted in an infantry regiment it is a very difficult thing on peace time to know what to do with them. I have seen seven or eight Officers on parade, each in the other's way, because in the field exercise and drill is only adapted for four mounted Officers, and with four others in it it is difficult to know what to do with them. Some alteration is absolutely required, but how that alteration can be accomplished passes my comprehension altogether. With the present system of the Staff Corps, with the certain promotion that they get, and the good emoluments they receive, there is no inducement to them. Therefore the proportion of field Officers must become very great, and they naturally would object to go on foot when they consider their rank entitles them to be mounted. With regard to the discipline of native regiments, I can certainly speak from my experience as Adjutant-General, that nobody could have any complaint with regard to that point. Commanding Officers have now very great increased powers. Some of those powers were taken away when I was Adjutant-General, but I think it was unfortunate. Because one or two Officers, who had that power, or perhaps did not understand how to wield it, the good Officers made to suffer and their powers were restricted. There is no question about a commanding Officer dealing with natives must be entrusted with the fullest powers, and the native must look to him and feel that from his decision there is no appeal. What produced the mutiny, in my opinion, was the want of discipline in the Bengal regiments. The commanding Officer was set on one side at headquarters, and when a Sepoy appealed to headquarters, the authority of the commanding Officer was too often ignored in favour of the petitioner. So far as discipline was concerned, I think that we may safely leave that in the hands of the present system of Officers. My experience, which, however, only dates to 1874, when I was Adjutant-General, certainly agrees with what Colonel Gordon said. I am satisfied that on any occasion when the Officers of the native Army of India are called upon they will not want in any respect. With regard to the organization, I think that everyone here will admit that an army is not to be organized for peace time, but for war. The question, which it may be useful perhaps to discuss shortly, is as to whether the native Army under the present conditions is as well adapted for war as it is for peace. My own impression is that it is not. I hold a very strong opinion—I do not know whether it is shared by the majority here present—that, as Sir James Hills says, as I know Colonel Gordon holds (because he wrote a paper on it for the Service Institution of India), class regiments would be a very great improvement. At the present time, the organization which was adopted generally after the

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is that of class companies and class troops. In some regiments there are no than six different classes. That, I think, militates very much against the military efficiency of the army. Although in a good regiment no doubt *esprit de corps* exist in spite of every difficulty, yet it makes it very difficult. Nobody who been in India will deny that caste influence is enormously powerful, and you can ignore it. At the present moment, it appears to me that we do not use influence in a manner to make the army efficient. The regiments that employed principally during the Afghan campaign in prominent positions virtually class regiments. The Goorkhas of course were purely class regiments. Punjaabee regiments were composed of Punjaabee Mohammedans and Sikhs, there were besides two regiments of Musbi Sikhs, and two purely Sikh regiments. In mixed regiments, recruiting and every part of the interior economy of the regiment becomes most difficult, and on service it is, I believe, extremely detrimental to the best interests of the country. If we had a class brigade in the field, composed of three different class regiments, you could then rouse those class prejudices to use them to your own advantage, and you would have the wholesome rivalry of three different classes in the same brigade, each vying to show that his class was the best. Therefore, I trust among any changes that may take place, one should be the reduction of a number of classes in one regiment, if not purely the adoption of class corps. I could go on talking for any length of time on the subject of the reorganization of the Indian Army, but I wish to confine myself to what I feel may be of interest to those present. Of course, the reserve question is the most difficult, and I am sure I do not know whether that difficulty will be able to be overcome. There is no doubt that no army can be considered perfect without a reserve; at the same time it would not do, I think, to encourage men to have only served three years to go to the reserve. It would be getting rid of much of the useful element in the regiment, and you may be replacing it, in part, by others not so good. The best system of reserves I have ever heard of in India is that in the army of the Maharajah of Cashmere. When I was there with Lord Napier, I saw a regiment that had a third of its full strength on parade. Two-thirds were away at their homes, only one-third on pay. Each man had two substitutes, and one of those might come at any moment and replace the other, and then that one would go back to his home, so that the regiment had a two-thirds reserve at home costing nothing at all, but one-third employed during peace time. I inquired about the system, because such a novel one, and it seemed to work remarkably well there, and to be popular indeed. As long as the one-third were present and efficient, that was all that the commanding Officer asked for. I am glad to find that Sir Orfeur Cavagnier recommends that, while having one Commander-in-Chief, the Madras and Bombay Armies should be kept distinct. It is most important in India that the Presidencies, no matter under what names, should be kept distinct; and it would be a fatal day for India if the whole army was ever allowed to become homogeneous. The objection that I have to mixed regiments is that in them the edges of the little class prejudices become rounded off, and the regiment, consisting of five different classes, becomes homogeneous, and I do not think that the safety required in the hour of danger would be found there. I believe the strongest dominant class in such a regiment were to mutiny, all the others would follow, just as the few Sikhs that were in the Poorbeah regiments did during the mutiny.

SIR ORFEUR CAVAGNIER: My task has been considerably lightened by remarks that Lord Chelmsford has been kind enough to make; whilst generally concurred in most of my views, he has certainly answered many objections that have been raised. My friend, Sir James Hills, has spoken in praise of the present system, but at the same time advocated an increase of Officers. Colonel Gordon, too, has spoken highly of the existing system, but he also thinks an additional number of Officers necessary. If the system is perfect, it is strange that this increase should be needed. It must be remembered that Sir James Hills has never commanded a native battalion, whilst Colonel Gordon has a thorough knowledge of the working of the new system, but he had no acquaintance with the old one. I served for many years

regular regiment under the old organization, as well as with a corps of irregular cavalry, and therefore claim to have some knowledge of the interior economy of a regiment under both systems. Major Thomas, in alluding to the old system, stated that owing to there being so many Officers they passed their time in amusement and dissipation. I am afraid Major Thomas has very little knowledge of the subject. In the first instance the Officers did not exist in numbers. There was hardly a regiment with more than twelve present (we would give a Colonel, Major, eight Officers commanding companies, an Adjutant, a Quartermaster, and perhaps a young subaltern not passed his drills), whereas many battalions had not an Officer at the head of every company; thus there were no more Officers than were absolutely needed, and every Officer had a distinct duty to perform. Both Sir James Hills and Colonel Gordon have told us that the present Officers have distinct duties to perform, but they have failed to specify them. I have been unable to discover what are the duties of the mounted wing Officers on parade. Are they to follow their wing Commanders and order the men to obey their orders, or are they each to take the distinct command of a definite body? I am of opinion that every European Officer should have a distinct command, for the efficiency of which he should be responsible, whether his command should consist, as Sir Henry Havelock has suggested, of a grand division of two companies, or of one larger company of 160 or 190 men. I hold that a European Officer with a native regiment should have a defined command or distinct duty to perform, which is not the case at present; even on parade, they have no duties prescribed by written regulation; their employment depends upon the caprice of the Commanding Officers; this is not a wholesome state of affairs, for you may be assured that if you allow the influence of European Officers to diminish, the reins of command will fall into the hands of natives, some day the result will be disastrous. Colonel Gordon considers that native Officers are perfectly satisfied with their present position; I am inclined to think he would change that opinion if he heard their remarks when contrasting their pay with that of the Moonsiff¹ or civil Officer. As regards Major Thomas's allusion to the inefficiency of the Officers of the old Army having brought about the mutiny, as I stated before, he evidently knew little about them. At the same time it must be remembered that the system of military instruction has improved, Officers in former days had not the same scientific training as at present, though they were not the worse soldiers. Lord Chelmsford has, however, explained to you the causes of the mutiny; I told you that Officers had little power, they were mere cyphers at the head of regiments and companies, hence the men had no confidence in them. When a European Officer was in command of a corps of irregular cavalry, a trooper was guilty of gross insubordination to the Brigade-Major. He was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to dismissal, a light sentence, which I confirmed. Some time after he returned to the line and informed the men that he was to be reinstated: sure enough an order to that effect, and implying censure on myself, arrived from Simla. I, of course, felt deeply. I accordingly wrote to Headquarters, sending a full report of the matter and stating that as I felt convinced His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would not have been aware of the circumstances of the case, I hoped I might be permitted to delay carrying out the order until further instructions. My letter was answered, and consequently the trooper was not reinstated. How can you expect Officers to acquire an influence over their men and maintain discipline if all power is taken out of their hands? In justly pointing out the inexpediency of placing European and native Officers with equal rank in the same regiment, Sir Henry Havelock has suggested that there should be merely four Captains to a regiment; this is the organization I have recommended for the cavalry, where there should be four squadrons, with four squadron leaders in addition to the Colonel and Major, but I consider it advisable that infantry regiments should be fully officered. The rule that the native Officers of infantry are not equal to those of the cavalry, a men therefore would require more leading; besides the whole of the Staff have to be supplied from the native corps; therefore, although I have estimated

¹ Third class judge.

number of Officers as twenty per regiment, there really would not be more than about twelve present; but in the event of war the remainder would be available to rejoin.

Colonel GORDON: That is merely a reserve of Officers in another way.

Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH: Colonel Gordon forgets that there is such a thing as *esprit de corps*, but I am old fashioned enough to think that *esprit de corps* is very necessary in every army. If you order four Officers who have never seen the regiment in their lives to suddenly join the 40th or 41st, do you think the men will have the same confidence in them as in Officers under whom they have previously served? I am happy to say that the Officers of the Bengal Army were never found deficient in zeal for the service. When the first Afghan war occurred, an order was issued to the effect that Officers were not to volunteer, but were required they would be duly summoned, because every Officer on the Staff belonged to corps warned for service immediately requested permission to throw up his Staff appointment and rejoin. These men, though many perhaps had been absent for years, had pride in their regiments and felt that their own honour was bound up in their good name, and consequently were prepared to make any sacrifice in order to be with them. Although I was not very long with my regiment, for years afterwards I was never in any place where any of my men were near me without their coming to pay their respects and talk about the corps. Would they take the same interest in reserve Officers having no connection with the regiment, and suddenly required to join it? Moreover, in what manner are these Officers to be ordinarily employed; are they to lead idle lives and lose all their military knowledge? Two of the speakers have stated that under the system I have proposed too many soldiers would join the Reserve, whilst a third has, as distinctly, asserted that no man would join. I am therefore induced to hope that the happy medium would be obtained. With regard to Lord Chelmsford's remark, I would observe that I have fixed the period with the colours at three years, with the view of securing the service of men who, under existing regulations, are entitled to claim their discharge after having served that time. Of course transfers to the Reserve would be dependent upon there being vacancies in the Reserve battalions. In conclusion, I would remark that I am not wedded to my own idea, but I am satisfied that, to ensure efficiency and economy, any schemes that may be submitted for the reorganization of the Indian Army should be based upon the lines I have laid down, viz.:—

1. The re-establishment of the regimental system.

2. The promotion of a reserve; and, lastly,

The improvement of the position of the native Officers.

Colonel GORDON: I said it was the application of the seconding system. You say there should be twenty Officers in a regiment, of whom under the old system ten were present. What I said was, second freely. Let me have eight or more on staff service, and call them up for active service, and I think that is what referred to as the reserve of Officers in the Blue Book. I think it is one of the proposals for a reserve of Officers by General Norman. I think he proposed that after ten years' service the Officer would no longer remain on the regimental list. But he had been in the regiment, and the men would know him when he rejoined. Such Officers even now who have served in regiments are often sought out by the men when on leave, and called upon in a friendly way as of old, which shows the good feelings still maintained. The native soldier is now, exactly as he was, very much attached to the English Officer he has served under, and the Officer to the men. I think you misunderstood me. I say, second freely to supply a regiment reserve. Just now we have eight trained Officers permanently attached to battalions. Under the old system, I have heard of a regiment with three or four only; but you then called the absentees up from civil and other duties for war service. Under this system I refer to, up to ten years' service an Officer's name would be borne on the rolls of the regiment; that is, seconded, but available for active service. At the end of ten years, his liability would cease, his name would be struck off the regiment, but another junior could be at once added. The Officers should all have passed through the regiment.

Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH: That is the very system I have advocated.

The CHAIRMAN: I think there has been a misunderstanding.

Colonel GORDON: I never said strangers. I said Officers; by the application of the system of seconding, letting Officers go freely from the regiments to the other duties, who would still up to a certain time be connected with the regiment.

Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH: That was the old system, and it was the system which an Officer kept up the interest in his regiment throughout the whole service. Much has been said with regard to the improved discipline of regiments, and the superiority of Officers at the present day; but you must remember that the whole world is progressing, that the Indian Army is not different from other bodies. Has not there been a great change in the home army? Every soldier is bound to have a thorough military education, which was not the case in former days. Therefore, the great change of organization has no relation whatever to the improvements. It is simply the fact that our whole system has changed. I have only thrown out a general hint with regard to the Reserves; but it is strange that while one speaker thinks all the men would go to the Reserves, another states that nobody would go. I believe a certain number would go; for a soldier is entitled to take his discharge after three years if he chooses, and the men who now take advantage of this right were told that they might be sent to the corps located in the neighbourhood of their own villages, and only turn out for a year, we should retain their services. I am not in any way wedded to my opinion, although to the three points I laid down I do adhere. I do say we have some better system of regimental organization, under which every English Officer in a native regiment should have a distinct command, and be responsible for its efficiency. I equally say it is essential that we should offer more inducements to native gentlemen to enter the Army, and make them contented with the position. I consider it is essential, even as a matter of justice to the natives of India, whilst as civilians we allow them to rise to the highest position, we should give them a greater opening than hitherto to the native soldier. I acknowledge that it is possible for us to have native Officers holding equal commands in the same regiments with Europeans. We must keep them distinct. My scheme may perhaps not be the best, but it is a plan for remedying existing defects, and is therefore worth consideration. I certainly adhere to the opinion that I have expressed upon the three points upon which I have laid stress. At the same time I am quite open to any suggestion. I know that I am not infallible. I think that possibly many have improved very much upon my idea, but I am sure that whoever would attempt to improve the system now in force, must work upon the lines I have prescribed. Thank you very much for listening to me.

Sir JAMES HILLS: Sir Orfeur Cavenagh would lead gentlemen to infer that I have had very little experience with natives. I commanded a native battalion for three years; I commanded a station composed entirely of native troops for four years; I was Assistant Adjutant-General, and saw the inspections for four years. Therefore, although I never commanded a native regiment, I may rightly say I am very well up in the economy of a native regiment.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are very much indebted to Sir Orfeur Cavenagh for his lecture, and I think the discussion which has resulted from it has been extremely interesting, and I trust of some value. I am sure you will all join with me in giving a vote of thanks to Sir Orfeur Cavenagh for his very able lecture.

¹ N.B.—I should like to add here, if this is permissible, what I had to say at the time, "and myself conducted the inspection of several native regiments of cavalry and infantry, when they were under my command in the field."

Friday, June 23, 1882.

GENERAL SIR J. LINTORN SIMMONS, G.C.B., R.E., in the Chair.

THE NEW GREEK FRONTIER—HISTORICAL, ETHNOGRAPHICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL.

By Major J. C. ARDAGH, C.B., R.E.¹

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen: I have to introduce to you Major Ardagh, who is about to give us a lecture on the Greek Frontier. Major Ardagh having accompanied the Mission to Berlin in 1878, under Lord Beaconsfield, is present at the Conference in 1881, and since then having been Her Majesty's Commissioner for the Delimitation of the Greek Frontier, has had exceptional opportunities for studying the subject. I am not acquainted with the details of the paper, but I confidently recommend what he says to your attention.

THE subject upon which I have been asked to address you to-day is new, in the sense that it deals with a settlement lately accomplished, but it is not only old, but even ancient, when regarded from the point of view—more or less familiar to most of us from our education—from which we have been accustomed to contemplate the Greeks. The very essence of the intense interest which has been manifested by European nations in Greece during the last years proceeds from her ancient history, and from the literary legacy which she has bequeathed to all posterity. Perhaps we have been entranced by the glamour of her poets, the rhetoric of her orators, or the subtlety of her philosophers; but the fact is absolutely incontestable, that no one has been able, or even desirous, of resisting their charm. It is not my province to dwell further upon these considerations; I have only alluded to them in order to excuse, or justify the course which I propose to pursue.

When a proposal to rectify the Greek Frontier is made, it is natural to ask, who are the Greeks? Where is Greece? and what would be a fair frontier? In endeavouring to answer these questions as a preliminary to the description of the new frontier, I must refer to their early history; but, as I advance, I must beg to be excused from entering in any way into political questions of a contemporary character.

In order to clear the field, it will be as well to mention certain geographical names which convey to most of us definite ideas, namely, Greece, Thessaly, Epirus, Albania, and Macedonia. These definite ideas are for the most part groundless when analysed, they will serve their purpose. They are, or have been, what mathematicians would call "variable functions," now large, now small, now evanescent. The names have, however, been applied to dis-

¹ Now Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.

little known to geographers, very loosely defined, yet to a certain extent crystallised in a form which is known to us all; which can be found in any atlas, and which is therefore convenient for reference. Besides these geographical names, there are a few ethnic designations to which I wish to call attention at the outset.

First of all, there are the Pelasgians, the bugbear of historians, and the most ancient race to which it will be necessary to allude. These Pelasgians belong to the Indo-European stock, as contrasted with the Semitic and Turanian families; and the general direction of their movement was eastward; commencing, as far as we know, in Asia Minor, and extending westward across Greece to Italy.

Strabo says that "almost all writers agree that the Pelasgians were an ancient tribe spread over the whole of Greece;" and he mentions as Pelasgian, the island of Lemnos, and certain settlements therefrom in the Khalkidic Khersonese; the district of Pelasgiotis in Thessaly, and the Epirote nations in general.

Herodotus, writing about 430 B.C., says: "What the language of the Pelasgians was, I cannot say with any certainty. If, however, we may form a conjecture from the tongue spoken by the Pelasgi of the present day, those for instance who live at Creston above the Tyrrhenians, who formerly dwelt in the district named Thessaliotis, and were neighbours of the peoples now called the Dorians; or those again who founded Plakia and Skylaké upon the Hellespont, who had previously dwelt for some time with the Athenians; or those, in short, of any other of the cities which have dropped the name, but are in fact Pelasgians; if, I say, we are to form a conjecture from any of these, we must pronounce that the Pelasgi spoke a barbarous language. If this were really so, and the entire Pelasgic race spoke the same tongue, the Athenians, who were certainly Pelasgic, must have changed their language at the same time that they passed into the Hellenic body, for it is a certain fact, that the people of Creston speak a language unlike any of their neighbours; and the same is true of the Plakianians; while the language spoken by these two peoples is the same." Herodotus further describes Achæa (Ionia) and Arkadia as Pelasgian.

Homer uses the epithet of Pelasgic to the Dodonean Jupiter; and both Homer and Æschylus make Argos Pelasgic, the latter authority extending their sway to the River Strymon.

The most conspicuous monuments left behind by the Pelasgi are their fortresses, structures built of large polygonal blocks of stone with uncemented joints, and generally known as Cyclopean. These strongholds, the Pelasgic designation for which is *Larissa*, are to be found in Greece, in the west of Asia Minor, in Epirus, and in Italy. Several lie near the line of the new frontier, at Arta, Dodona, Tchouka-Generalis, Smolia, and perhaps Gritzianon and Tchai-Hissar, but the last two are chiefly of the Byzantine period. It may be inferred from the frequency of these fortresses that the Pelasgi were a sedentary and perhaps an unwarlike race.

The Greeks, then, were preceded by, and apparently sprang from, the Pelasgi, whom they either assimilated or expelled in prehistoric

times. The origin of the Greek race, or rather of the Hellen, traced by Apollodorus up to the deluge which Deukalion and Prometheus survived. Hellen, one of their sons, gives his name to the tribe; the substitution of the name of Greeks, which they previously Deukalion is represented as ruling in Phthiotis, which corresponds to the basin of the ancient Sperchius, now called Hellada, but Aristotle affirms that the district of Hellas lay near Dodona and the Achæi (Aspropotamos), a statement which shows that he could not have visited the country, inasmuch as he would, in that case, have mentioned the Aracthus, whose basin intervenes between the Achelous and Dodona.

Homer represents the Selli, who preceded the Greeks, to have been the ministers of the shrine of Dodona, "men who slept on the ground and never washed their feet." Wherever the name originated, it was never used by the Hellenes in historic times, but was conferred on them by the Romans, much in the same way as we call the Skopti Albanians, or the inhabitants of Deutschland, Germans.

Hellen had three sons, Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus. Of these, the Dorians occupied the country on the northern side of the Gulf of Corinth, Ætolia, and Akarnania; the Æolians possessed Thessaly; and the Ionians and Achæans received the Peloponnesus and Attica.

Here then is the origin of the chief subdivisions of the Hellenic race, more or less legendary, and varying somewhat in different accounts, but substantially accepted by the early Hellenic writers. The deluge of Deukalion may be assigned to about 1400 B.C. The capture of Troy to about 1150 B.C. At the time of the Trojan War there were already Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians in Crete. The great Ionic and Æolic migrations to the isles and to Asia were subsequent to that expedition. About the same time the Thesprotians migrated from Thesprotia, in Epirus, into Thessaly, to which they gave their name, in lieu of the previous denomination of Thesprotia. This Thesprotian people was not indigenous in that locality, but arrived there in the course of its wanderings, and was of Hellenic origin; for the Thesprotians of the historic period, in common with the other Epirote nations, were designated as barbarians.

The first detailed account of the Hellenic tribes acting in unison is, of course, the narrative of the Trojan War. The force assembled at Aulis (the Strait of Evripos, between that island and the mainland of Boeotia) consisted of 1,186 ships and from 100,000 to 135,000 men. The catalogue of the ships in the Second Book of the "Iliad" comprises the following states or tribes:—

Mykenæ	Agamemnon.....	100
Arkadia		60
Sparta.....	Menelaus	60
Pylus (Navarino)	Nestor	90
Krete	Idomeneus.....	80
Argos	Dromedes.....	80
Elis.....		40

Dulichium }	Meges.....	40
Echinades }		
Etolia.....	Thoas	40
Ithaka.....	Ulysses	12
Salamis.....	Ajax.....	12
Eubœa.....	Elphenor	40
Bœotia	Peneleus	50
Orchomenos }		30
Aspledon }		
Locria.....	Ajax Oileus.....	40
Phokis.....		40
Athens.....	Menestheus	50
Phthia }	Achilles	50
Hellas }		
Phylaké }	Protesilaus	40
Pyrasus }		
Ormenium	Eurypylus	40
Trikka.....	{ Podalirius }	30
	{ Machaon }	
Phæræ.....	Admetus	11
Melibœa.....	Philoktetes	7
Lapithæ.....	Polypoetes	40
Ænians }	Guneus	22
Perrhæbians }		
Magnetes	Prothous	40
Rhodes	Tlepolemus	9
Symé.....	Nireus	3
Kos and Karpathus.....	Pheidippus	30
Total		1,180

In the catalogue of the ships the most northerly tribes we occupy parts of Akarnania and Ætolia, on the Adriatic side Trikkala, and Alassona, and Magnesia on the Ægean side.

The next evidence which I shall quote as to the limits of Greece is that afforded by the members of the Amphictyonic as which comprised Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Locrians, Ceteans, Achæans, Phocians, I Malians, none of which belong to Epirus, to Akarnania, or to L.

At Thermopylæ (B.C. 480), the forces under Leonidas were from within the late limits of the Greek kingdom under the set of 1832.

In the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 B.C.) Anactorio Punta and Ambracia (Arta) are the most northerly cities and the Epirote tribes are described as barbarians by Thucydides.

There is abundant testimony afforded by the ancient geographers and travellers as to the limits of Greece.

In the travels of Anacharsis (364 B.C.) Greece is said to consist of Peloponnesus, Attica, Phocia, Bœotia, Thessaly, Akarnania, and Greek colonies in Epirus, in which he says there are fourteen

nations, most of them barbarians, dispersed in rude towns. *Ætol* he adds, is inhabited by a warlike nation divided into several tribes in general of Greek origin, though some of them still retain relics of their ancient barbarism by speaking a language very difficult to understand. Greeks then inhabited the Ionian and *Ægean* Islands, with Cyprus and Crete, the coast of Anatolia, and several districts on the shores of the Propontis (Marmara) and Euxine (Black Sea), Byzantium, Selymbria, Panticapæum, besides settlements on the coast of Illyria, numerous States in the south of Italy, almost Sicily, Marseilles, Cyrene, and Naucratis on one of the mouths of the Nile.

Strabo (20 B.C.) says: "On the right of the entrance of the Ambracian Gulf dwell the Akarnanians, a Greek tribe. On the left Nicopolis and the Kassopæans, an Epirote tribe." (7, 7, 6.) "The tribes extending beyond the Ambracian Gulf to the eastward, and contiguous with the Peloponnesus, are Greek." (7, 7, 4.) "The River Peneus bounds Macedonia towards the north, and Thessaly towards the south. The tribes from the Strymon to the Pontic Straits and the Hæmus are all Thracian, except on the coast, which is inhabited by Greeks." (7, 7, 4.)

Scylax says: "From Ambracia Greece is continuous along the coast as far as the River Peneus." (Periplus, 33.)

Dicæarchus "draws the limits of Hellas at the country of the Magnesians" (i.e., up to the Vale of Tempé).

Scymnus describes the Thesprotians, Chaonians, Molossians, inhabitants of the interior of Epirus as barbarians (430-460), and says that above Tempé towards Olympus is the region of the Molossians.

Dionysius Calliphontis states that "Greece is continuous from Ambracia to the Peneus."

Thucydides says that "Amphilochus, the son of Amphiaras, founded Argos of Amphilochia on the Gulf of Ambracia, immediately after the Trojan War. Many generations after, the inhabitants of the city prevailed upon the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of residence brought them to the present use of one common language, viz., the Greek; but the rest of the Amphilochians are still barbarians;" and further on he mentions barbarian allies of Cnemus the Lacedæmonian, the following Epirot tribes—Chæonians, Thesprotians, Molossians, Antitæonians, Paravantes and Orestians.

I have gone into some detail in order to show that the limits of ancient Greece were well known, and that all these eminent authorities of antiquity display a remarkable unanimity in describing them. If a comparison be made between their definitions and the line of the new frontier, it will appear that as the main range of Pindus is the boundary between Thessaly and Epirus, the new frontier corresponds to a portion of Epirus on Greece, which certainly was not Hellenic in very early times. On the other hand, Oloosson and the valley of Titaresius were Greek, at any rate, in the Trojan War, and are left to Turkey. These slight variations may be considered equivalent.

and therefore we may affirm that the new boundary is virtually coincident with the limits of the country in classic times.

Although enormous changes have swept over the land since the short-lived brilliance of early Hellenic independence, there cannot be a sincere feeling of satisfaction in the hearts of us all at seeing the modern Hellenes installed in the identical seats of those who sailed to Troy, who fell at Thermopylæ, and who conquered Salamis.

At the accession of Alexander the Great (336 B.C.) the Greek States were virtually incorporated in Macedonia, and with occasional outbursts of independence remained a part of that nation until the fall of the Macedonian Kingdom at Pydna in 168 B.C., when Roman domination commenced. It is a curious coincidence that this decisive battle, which put an end to ancient Greece, took place exactly two thousand years before the re-establishment of Greek independence in 1832. After the battle of Pydna the Romans devastated Epirus, destroyed seventy cities, and carried off 150,000 souls into slavery. In 146 Corinth was sacked by Mummius, and Greece was transformed into the Roman province of Achæa, ceasing entirely to have a history of its own, and sharing the fortunes of its masters for sixteen centuries until the Turkish conquest. Under the Roman Empire, Greece continued to be the seat of intellectual culture and of the arts and sciences. The tranquillity was broken for the first time in the reign of Gallienus, when a Gothic fleet, starting from the Tauric Bosphorus, passed through the Marmara and the Ægean and captured Athens. "We are told that in the sack of Athens the Goths had collected the libraries, and were on the point of setting fire to this funeral of Grecian learning had not one of their chiefs, of more refined tastes than his brethren, dissuaded them from the design by the profound observation, that as long as the Greeks were addicted to the study of books, they would never apply themselves to the exercise of arms."

Aurelian, although uniformly successful against the barbarians, withdrew the Roman colonies from Dacia (Roumania) to the south bank of the Danube, thus concentrating the stock from which the Wallachs of the Balkan Peninsula are sprung (270). The important epoch is the foundation of Constantinople by Constantine the first Christian Emperor, in 324.

That the city of Byzantium which preceded it was a Greek settlement, it is hardly necessary to observe; but Byzantium was thrown into the shade by its more important neighbours, Chalcedon (Kadi Nicomedia (Ismid), Nicæa (Isnik), Cyzicus (Artaki), &c.; which city founded by Constantine rose at once to pre-eminence, and was essentially Roman, Latin, and Christian, the cities of Greece and Asia being despoiled for its adornment. The centre of the forum was marked by the "burnt pillar;" and the triple brazen serpent offered to the victorious Greeks at the Delphic oracle after the defeat of the Persians still stands in the middle of the circus. Under the new régime the department which administered public affairs, there were secretaries, of whom one was allowed for the Greek language. I mention these, among a host of evidences, to indicate that the J

Empire was not Greek in its foundation. Julian, "the Apostate" was educated at Athens, and considered the language of the Romans as a foreign dialect. His orations were written in Greek, and it is interesting to observe that in his letters he gives the sun (ἥλιος) a very eminent place in his theological system, and had, indeed, a domestic chapel to his tutelary deity, a fact which bears on the nomenclature of so many elevated positions throughout the East. Along the line of the new frontier there are several hills bearing the name Agios Elias, which undoubtedly is a mere corruption of the Pagan name. Julian calls the sun God, and the throne of God.¹

In Greece, the temples of Minerva were opened by his express command, and there was a general revival of the ancient religion during his short reign, but for the last time. (360).

Under Valentinian, the school of Constantinople had an equal number of Latin and Greek grammarians. Latin was the military idiom even of the Eastern Empire (364).

In 388 the question was put to the Senate whether the worship of Jupiter, or of Christ, should be the religion of the Romans, and Jupiter lost by a large majority. A general destruction of the magnificent temples of antiquity followed. The edicts of Theodosius (380) abolutely prohibited Pagan worship; yet so late as 680, the 6th Council of Constantinople forbade "the mysteries made in the names of those who are falsely called gods among the Grecians," and "the invocation of the name of the execrable Bacchus."

The festival of the Lupercalia was certainly celebrated up to the fifth century, during which Christianity was embraced by most of the great barbarian nations. The Goths first crossed the Danube in 249, and after many years of oppression by the Romans, at last revolted in 378, and marched against the Emperor Valens, who was slain in the battle of Adrianople. On the death of Theodosius they again revolted, and advanced southward, under Alaric, into Greece in 395. A few cities purchased immunity, but the bulk of the population was put to the sword, the female captives became the prize of the victorious barbarians, and every article of value was carried off. Alaric escaped the attack of Stilico, and retreated through Epirus, ravaging as he went. The western Emperor Honorius, powerless to oppose him, promoted him to the post of Master-General of Illyricum, in the vain hope of diverting his attention from Rome, which after three sieges was sacked by the Goths in 404. The next barbarian inroad was that of the Huns, under Attila, who penetrated through Thessaly, as far as Thermopylæ in 449. It was reserved for Justinian to suppress the schools of Athens, which even the Goths had spared (529). The stipends of the professors were devoted to the construction of fortresses along the frontiers of the decaying Empire.

¹ Libanius (the historian of Julian) says: "The sound of prayer and music heard on the tops of the highest mountains; and the same ox afforded a sacrifice for the gods, and a supper for their joyous votaries." (I have seen something nearly approaching this on Sunday at Agios Elias of Raphthaneus, July, 1881.)

In 539 began the invasions of the Slav tribes. They spread up the suburbs of Constantinople and the Ionian Sea, destroyed Potidaea, ravaged Greece, Thrace, and Macedonia, and put all their prisoners to a cruel death.

Procopius, the historian of Justinian, affirms that each annual road of the barbarians cost the Empire 200,000 of its inhabitants.

Connected with this period are the Code, Pandects, and Institutes of Justinian; monumental works of jurisprudence, compiled by order, at Constantinople, under the supervision of Trebonius, "in Latin not unworthy of the silver age."

Between the reign of Justinian, 527, and that of Basil the Macedonian, 867, the transition from Latin to Greek as the language of the Eastern Empire was effected.

I venture to attract your particular attention to this fact in language. Under Justinian public business in the Eastern Empire was transacted in Latin; the laws were Latin; Latin was the language of the army until the end of the sixth century (Hertzberg). A Greek writer, who was himself a Roman ambassador, says that in the middle of the fifth century, the Greek language was unknown in the countries between the Adriatic, Ægean, and Black Seas, and Danube, except on the coast towns of Thrace and Illyria; and Latin was the ordinary means of communication among foreigners (Finlay).

In the following three centuries all this was changed. From downwards; all decrees were published in Greek (Hertzberg). Under the successors of Basil the Macedonian, a Greek revision of the jurisprudence of Justinian became the acknowledged code; and in the ninth century Latin became generally extinct as a living language, degenerating, where it continued, into the dialects which subsequently revived into Italian in the west, and Vlach, or Roumanian, in the east.

During this same period that Greek took the place of Latin at Constantinople, another and more remarkable change was continued in Greece, viz., the ejection of the Greek population by barbarians. I will not invite you to accept in its entirety the sweet statement of the learned Professor Fallmerayer, that the Hellenic race was extirpated from Europe; and that not a drop of Greek blood existed in the Morea; but there is unequivocal testimony that the process of substitution reached a comparatively advanced stage. The facts bearing upon it I shall endeavour to place before you in as concise a manner as possible.

The first great invasion of Greece after the establishment of Roman supremacy was that of the Goths in 269. They came with an enormous flotilla down the Neister, through the Black Sea and the Marmara into the Ægean, laid siege to Salonica, and marched thence across to Illyria, but were defeated at Naissus (the modern Nish) in the reign of Aurelian settled in Dacia (Roumania), which was evacuated by the Romans (274).

The Goths, being pressed by the Huns, again moved across the Danube into the Eastern Empire, ostensibly as Roman subjects

revolting against their ill-treatment by Roman officers, they marched against the Emperor Valens, whom they defeated and slew in 378.

To them succeeded the Visigoths under Alaric, who, in 389 invaded Thrace and Macedonia, overran Greece, even to the Morea, ransomed Athens, and ravaged the countries they passed through ultimately moving through Epirus towards Rome. During this invasion a large portion of the population of Greece fled to islands. The Goths were fanatical Arian Christians, and were urged by their priests to destroy the heathen temples. Among those of ancient renown which they ruined was that of Demeter at Eleusis.

In 493, the Bulgarians crossed the Danube. In the same year Ostrogoth, a Gothic monarch, occupied Epirus, and styled himself King of Prevalitania. He was defeated by Justinian in 535. In the Bulgarians ravaged Thessaly and Epirus, pushing forward as far as Thermopylæ, and in 540 as far as the Isthmus. To these succeeded various inroads of Avars, Slavonians, and Bulgarians, who penetrated into the Morea, and established themselves there. Orosius maintains that there was an Avar kingdom in the Morea from 568 to 807.

It is certain that Salonica was frequently besieged by these Slavonian invaders from 597 to 681. The holy Wilibald, who made pilgrimage to Palestine in 723, 728, touching at Monemvasia in the Morea, describes it as *Slavinica terra*—a Slavonian country, which fact was true at the time of the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula.

In 783, the Empress Irene sent an expedition to reduce the Slavians in Greece, and they yielded, and promised to pay tribute; but in 797 they rebelled, and besieging Patrae, were there repulsed. An effort was then made to re-people Greece with Greek-speaking colonies, but nevertheless there was in 849 another Slav insurrection in the Morea, and Bryennius, who was sent to quell it, made a treaty with the Slavonians. A few years later, in 861, took place the conversion of the Bulgarians to Christianity, Cyril and Methodius being their apostles. The Emperor Basil the Macedonian was a Slav by origin, Hellenised at Constantinople. His origin appears to have had a material influence on the fusion of Greek and Slav, and on the result, not only of the Slavonian population of Greece, but also of the remnant of the ancient Greeks, which still practise the worship of the gods of Olympus in the wild fastnesses of Mount Taygetus nearly five centuries after the edict of Theodosius. The reign of Basil dates the protection afforded to the religious communities of Mount Athos. In 924, and again in 929, the Bulgarians swept over Thessaly and Epirus, took Nicopolis, and made it the capital of a new Slav colony. A few years later the Slavians in the Morea again rose against the Empire, endeavoured to assert independence, but were subdued.

In the reign of their King Samuel (976), the Bulgarians, whose capital was then at Prespa, and later at Ochrida, again moved southwards, captured Larissa, colonized Epirus and a part of the Peloponnese, and even penetrated into the Peloponnese. Samuel, after a defeat on the Sperchius, was totally defeated near Salonica, and

Bulgarians were taken prisoners (1014). These miserable wretches were blinded, one eye being left to each hundred men to guide them on their return.

In 1015 Ochrida was taken, and for a few years the Bulgarians were tranquil.

In 1040 they again rose in Epirus, and about the same time the Norse prince Harald took the Piræus and menaced Athens. A record of his exploit is engraved in Runic characters on the wall which formerly gave the name of *Porta Leone* to the Piræus, and which was carried thence to Venice in 1688.

The Slavonian domination in Greece for so many centuries left a lasting mark on the topographical nomenclature of the country. A contemporary geography of Constantine Porphyrogenitus gives a very extensive catalogue of names, chiefly of Slav origin, which supplanted the ancient and well-known Greek local epithets, which indeed still continue to hold their own, in spite of the recent endeavours to revert to classic nomenclature. Professor Kiepert states that of the names in Greece and Thessaly, with the exception of islands, three-fourths are Slav, one-tenth Albanian, and one-tenth modern Greek. I can hardly say that this is entirely borne out by my own observation.

In 1081 the Normans, under Robert Guiscard, took Durazzo (Dyrrachium). His son Boëmond subdued Epirus, defeated Emperor Alexius at Janina, and again near Arta; and marched into Thessaly and Macedonia. Trikkala was taken, but Larissa, after being out for six months, was relieved by Alexius, who appeared with a fresh body of troops, comprising 7,000 Turks. The Normans in 1084, were defeated and retired to Avlona. In 1146 the Sicilian Normans took Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, and in 1185, in capturing Durazzo, they laid siege to Salonica, and advanced toward Constantinople, but were defeated at Demetritza (Amphipolis) between Gumurdjina and the Maritza. They still, however, held the Ionian Islands and Durazzo in 1186, after which year little more is heard of them.

I have already stated that, in the fifth century Latin was the language of the Balkan Peninsula, and I will now call your attention to the fate of the Latin-speaking people. Those settled in Dacia Trajan had been withdrawn south of the Danube by Aurelian in 271 and continued to occupy the principality of Bulgaria concurrently with the Bulgarians, during many centuries as a Vlach-Bulgarian Kingdom.

In the south, the Latin element was still stronger. Roman colonies were transported into Epirus to replace the 150,000 inhabitants enslaved by Paulus Æmilius. Again, in the reign of Augustus, Nicopolis was founded, an extensive Latin immigration took place. During the frequent invasions by the barbarians, these Latin-speaking peoples appear to have found a refuge in the more inaccessible parts of the country, and there to have remained. Anna Comnena, biographer of her father the Emperor Alexius, speaks of

collected from "those who lead a nomad life, called Vlachs in the common dialect." She also mentions Vlach villages in Thessaly (Alexius, v, 5), and speaks of the Komani, a Slavonian tribe with whom the Emperor was at war, being shown other passes of Zygos by the Vlachs; and in reference to the garrison of the Chortarea Pass she mentions Pudilus, a person of eminence among the Vlachs (Alexius, x, 2), evidently implying that the whole district was Vlach.

The Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, who made an inquisition into the state of the Jews in the East in 1170, writes at Sinon Potmo, which appears to be Zeitoun or Lamia (the excellent Rabbi's own names are phonetic, and in Dr. Gerran's translation are rendered phonetically into English): "This is the beginning of Wallachia, the inhabitants of which dwell in the mountains, and are called after their country—Wallachians. They are as swift as mountain goats, and make frequent inroads upon the Javanitish territory for spoil and plunder. None are able to contend with them in war, nor can any king subdue them. They observe not the religion of the Nazarenes, and give themselves Jewish names; from whence, some assert that they are Jews, that they call the Jews their brethren; and that when they meet with any of our people, they rob but never kill them. Upon the whole they are a set of lawless people."

Thessaly was in fact, at this period, and for long after, called Greater Wallachia; and Ætolia and Akarnania, Lesser Wallachia.

In a commercial treaty between the Emperor Alexius III and the Venetians, in 1199, Greater Wallachia is mentioned in connection with the towns on the Ægean coast near the Gulf of Volo.

Nicetas compliments the Vlachs by stating that they were able to defend themselves against the Crusaders, which was more than the Byzantine Empire could do.

In the 13th century, the Northern Vlachs recrossed the Danube, reoccupied the seats abandoned by their progenitors a thousand years before, and there established a new Wallachia. They all called themselves Roumouni or Romans, and they do so to this day, both in the north and south, and continue to speak a language which more nearly resembles Latin than even Italian.

The Southern Roumanians, or Vlachs, are still to be found in countries where they were met with by Benjamin and the other chroniclers, and in many respects are, as Anna Comnena describes them, nomads. Their chief occupations are those of carriers and shepherds. All our baggage and riding mules were hired from the Vlachs, who have almost a monopoly of the carrying trade in Thessaly and Epirus; and in all the grazing districts most of the shepherds were Vlachs.

The Crusades.

In the 11th century, the Turks already menaced the Eastern Empire. The Seljukian kingdom extended to the shores of Bosphorus, and the Emperor Alexius appealed to the west for assistance; holding forth as incentives to religious zeal, the wealth

the east, the delicious flavour of its wines, and the beauty of the Grecian women.

The Koran then reigned from the Pyrenees to the mouths of the Ganges, while the Gospel was limited to Europe, with the exception of Spain. At the holy shrines of Jerusalem, the Turks extended no longer to pilgrims that tolerance which was displayed by the early Kaliphs. A pious enthusiasm inspired the faithful to rescue the tomb of their Saviour from the hands of the infidel; and after the Council of Clermont (1095) more than a million engaged themselves to support the holy enterprise. The First Crusade set out; a horde of savage adventurers, who ravaged Europe on their way to Constantinople, where Alexius made all haste to relieve himself of their presence by transporting them into Asia Minor, where the advance guard was speedily massacred by the Turks at Nicæa. By force of numbers, however, they overran Asia Minor, took Antioch, and at last Jerusalem itself (1099)—destined to be retaken in 1187.

The First Crusade was so far advantageous to the tottering Empire that it temporarily drove back the wave of Moslem conquest from Anatolia; but the remedy was destined to be more immediately fatal to the Greek Empire than the disease itself.

A Frank domination of a feudal character was established in the Holy Land. Godfrey de Bouillon became King of Jerusalem; Edessa and Antioch were erected into principalities. There was a Count of Tripoli, a Marquis of Tyre, and Lords of Nablouse, Jaffa, Ramleh, and Tiberias. This singular mixture of Biblical names and feudal institutions displays the true character of the Middle Ages—the intimate union between religious faith and military life.

The connection between these Eastern settlements and Western Europe was maintained by a variable stream of pilgrims, swelled chronically, according to the exigencies of the occasion, to the dimensions of a Crusade.

Already in 1054 the final rupture between the Greek and Latin Churches had been solemnized by the legates of the Pope, who deposited on the altar of Santa Sofia an anathema condemning the several mortal heresies of the Greeks. The breach was widened by the conduct of the Greeks during the Second and Third Crusades. The armistice found the Eastern Christians wanting in zeal for the holy cause. The lawless adventurers who followed the banner of the Cross not from the hope of plunder than any sentiment of religion had seen, coveted the wealth and splendour of the Eastern capital. Their cupidity was aroused by that treasury which had been accumulated for centuries all that was valuable or lovely in the ancient world. Constantinople had not yet been sacked. It had suffered but slightly in dynastic revolutions, while Rome had already for centuries been ravaged by successive inroads of barbarians.

The presence of a usurper on the imperial throne afforded a pretext for directing the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople itself. After a brave defence, it was captured by the Latins (1204). It followed a scene of horror rarely surpassed in the sanguinary annals of the world. The victorious Crusaders set fire to the city, and in

light of a vast and awful conflagration entered upon their fiendish work of plunder, lust, and blood. These followers of the Cross, who had bound themselves by oaths not to shed the blood of a Christian revelled in the abominations practised upon the wretched Byzantines "God wills it!" the war-cry of the Crusaders, was fervently shouted by 20,000 pious brigands. The city was devoted to ruin. Those of its opulent citizens who escaped with life, after having seen their houses plundered, their wives dishonoured, and their children reduced to slavery, were driven forth in poverty beyond the walls. Every insult was heaped by the Catholic victors upon the churches and ceremonies of the Greek faith.

After these horrors had continued for several days, the Latin leaders proceeded to divide their enormous booty, and to partition the Byzantine Empire.

Baldwin, Count of Flanders, became Emperor of Constantinople and the adjacent parts of Thrace. Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat ruled over Macedonia, with the title of King of Thessalonica. Two members of the Imperial family of Comneni succeeded in establishing themselves as independent sovereigns—Michael Comnenus as Despot of Epirus, and Alexis Comnenus as Emperor of Trebizond. Theodor Lascaris established a rival Empire at Nicæa; a Dukedom of Athens under various Frank nationalities, lasted until the Turkish conquest the Peloponnesus was converted into the Frank principality of Achaia which subsequently lapsed again to the Byzantines.

It is worthy of remark that the Slavonians in Greece during these changes were sufficiently powerful to live apart under their own law, and that in Thessaly a Vlach principality was established under John Dukas, a natural son of Michael II, Despot of Epirus; and at a later period a Venetian duchy ruled the Archipelago until as late as 1566.

This dissolution of the Eastern Empire by the Latins was more destructive to the ancient civilization than the subsequent conquest by the Turks. A partial consolidation of the fragments was effected by Michael Paleologus, with the aid of the Genoese, in 1261; but a more wretched, shameful history than that of the restored Greek Empire until its final overthrow by the Turks, does not disgrace the annals of mankind.

Othman, the Turkoman chief, whose name is now applied to the whole Turkish Empire, established the seat of the Ottoman power at Brusa in the beginning of the fourteenth century. His successor, Orchan, though content with the title of Emir or Prince, was sufficiently powerful to espouse Theodora, the daughter of the Emperor Cantacuzene. His son, Amurath, crossed into Europe, established his capital at Adrianople (1360), subdued the Slavonian nations between the Danube and the Adriatic, and was assassinated after the Battle of Kossova, where the last blow was given to the Servian kingdom (1389).

Tirnovo, the capital of Bulgaria, was taken by the Sultan Bayezid in 1393. From that date until recent times the Bulgarian Church had no separate existence. Three years afterwards the united efforts of the German, Magyar, Vlach, and Frankish forces were defeated at Nicopolis on the Danube. Bayezid, who had accepted the patent

Sultan from the Egyptian Caliph, then turned his attention to Thessaly, where, in 1397, he established feudal holdings known as "timars," penetrated into the Morea, and took Argos. It is from this epoch that the Turkish settlements of the plain of Larissa date. The colonists took the name of Koniarid from the district of Iconium whence they came. A large settlement of them exists farther north in the district east of Kastoria. They have always been reputed to be quiet, inoffensive people, who lived at peace with their Christian neighbours.

Even Constantinople itself was blockaded by Bayezid for several years, and its fall was only postponed by the subjugation of Bayezid by the celebrated Timour on the plains of Ancyra (1402). In the confusion which reigned after the death of Timour (1405), the son of Bayezid disputed his inheritance, which ultimately was acquired by Mahomet I. His son, Amurath II, again carried his arms into Europe, took Salonica (1430), received the submission of Janina, but subsequently sacked that city, and extended his Albanian conquests over Berat, Castoria, and Croia. Another effort was made by the Christians under Hunyadi, the White Knight of Wallachia, to drive back the tide of Ottoman conquest, but after some transient success they were completely routed at Varna. Amurath now subdued the Morea (1446), and again entered Albania, which had been roused to resistance by George Castriotis, who had long been serving in the Turkish Army as a hostage under the name of Iskander Bey.

After defeating another Christian invasion under Hunyadi on the same battle-field that the first Amurath had perished upon, he died in 1451, and was succeeded by Mahomet II, who came to the throne with the determination to take Constantinople.

Religious enmity divided the Greeks. The Emperor was in communion with the Church of Rome, while his Ministers acknowledged the Greek rite. But 7,000 men, including 2,000 Venetians and Genoese, formed the garrison of the city, while Mahomet encompassed it with no less than 260,000.

On the 30th May, 1453, Constantinople was taken, Constantinople the last of the Eastern Emperors, perishing in its defence.

The city was sacked, its remaining wealth was plundered. Vast multitudes of its wretched inhabitants, after suffering every outrage that the cruelty of their captors could inflict, were chained together in droves, and driven to a distant and hopeless slavery. When the Turks departed, they left behind them a depopulated empty city; but soon returned to make it the seat of their own Empire.

The Greek Empire disappeared from history, though the Franks, Princes of the Morea and the islands had yet some little respite.

Demetrius and Thomas, the two surviving brothers of the name of Paleologus, ruled in the Morea, which was devastated by their rivalries, as well as by tribes of Albanian robbers. Mahomet marched to the Morea in 1460, ostensibly as the friend of Demetrius whom he displaced, assigning him a residence in Thrace. Manuel, son of Thomas, was afterwards hospitably received at Constantinople where he ended his days.

I have now brought the history of the Greek people up to the point where they disappear again as an independent nationality, and I shall proceed to trace—as concisely as possible, and necessarily in the merest outline—their condition under Ottoman domination for three and three-quarter centuries.

It must not be supposed that when Mahomet II obtained possession of Constantinople he thereby became the ruler of all the remnants of the Byzantine Empire. Most of the islands of the Ægean continued for a considerable period to be ruled by Italian Princes.

The Knights of St. John had their seat at Rhodes, and there withstood all attacks of the Turks until 1522, when, after an honourable capitulation, they withdrew to Malta. Cyprus, which had existed as a kingdom under the Lusignans from 1195, was ceded by Katerin Cornara to the Venetians in 1489, and was not yielded to the Turk until 1573, when they gained their point, notwithstanding the crushing naval defeat at Lepanto.

Candia, which had been overrun by the Saracens in 823, and subsequently recovered, was allotted, on the partition of the Empire by the Latins, to the Marquis of Montferrat, and by him sold to the Venetians.

The Officers of the great Republic exercised the most shameful cruelties upon their Cretan subjects, who almost received with thankfulness a change to the rule of the Turks, when the fortress of Candia fell in 1669, after a siege of twenty years—the longest which history records. The Venetians, however, continued to hold many points on the shores of the Adriatic and in the interior of Albania. Even after the collapse which followed the death of Scanderbeg, the Miridits and Chimariotes maintained an independence which has descended to our own times.

From the Greeks themselves there was absolutely no resistance to the Turkish rule when once established.

Strange though it may appear, the condition and future prospects of the Greeks seems to have been improved by the Turkish conquest. I do not assert that all the Christian nations in the Ottoman dominion profited by the change; but it was most unquestionably advantageous to the Greeks, who, had it not been for the protection afforded to them by the Sultans, would have remained in the degradation to which they had sunk in the latter years of the Byzantine Empire.

The Turks classified their new conquests into the Roman province of *Roumelia*; the country of the Bulgarians, *Bulgaristan*; and the country of the Greeks, *Yunanistan*. The latter name—derived from *Ionia*, where the first Turkomans had come in contact with the Hellenic race—applies rather to the Anatolian and Insular Greek and to the inhabitants of the Morea, than to the other subjects of the Byzantine Empire, who still continued to call themselves Roman. *Bulgaristan* had been incorporated fifty years before the conquest of Constantinople, and the Morea was subdued a few years after the event, in 1460.

The last Latin Duke of Athens was hung by the Turks.

To the Turks, all Orthodox Christians alike in their new conquests

were known as the Roman people (*Roum Milleti*). The Sultan appointed the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople to be his acknowledged agent for the government of his Christian subjects, and invested him with almost absolute control over the administrative, judicial, and executive affairs of all who adhered to the Orthodox Church. The administration of justice, the continuance of the civil code which had hitherto been in use, the adjustment of the incidents of tribute and taxation, were all committed to the charge of the Greek hierarchy. The germs of national organization, of municipal institutions, and even of freedom itself were contained in this system. *imperium in imperio* was created.

The Greek hierarchy, by the policy of the conqueror, obtained supremacy, not only over the Orthodox Greeks, but also over Bulgarians, Servians, Wallachs, and Albanians who professed the same creed; a supremacy which lasted for some centuries, and which, had it been equitably administered, might still have been in existence. Corruption, however, was rampant. The Patriarch purchased his appointment from the Sultan, and recouped himself by the sale of bishoprics. Simony became universal. During the two centuries which succeeded the Turkish conquest these concessions procured the complete subserviency of the Greeks at Constantinople, who formed a great and corrupt ecclesiastical corporation, with a vast Christian democracy under its rule.

So impressed was the traveller Macarius with the happy state of the Orthodox under Ottoman rule in 1659, that he fervently exclaimed—"God perpetuate the Empire of the Turks for ever and ever."

This peculiar system of administration adopted by the early Sultans not only gave to the Greeks considerable power in the general government of the country, but it also endowed them with a preponderating influence over all the other Christian nationalities— influence so wide that its consequences are still felt. Devotion to the national Church is still a marked characteristic of the Greeks outside Greece, and the Phil-Hellenes claim as Greeks all Orthodox Christians in communion with dioceses depending on the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Bulgarian Patriarchate of Tirnovo was suppressed at the instance of the Phanariote Greeks in 1767, and it was not until 1870 that the Bulgarian Church obtained a firman of spiritual emancipation. Even as late as a few months before the Congress of Berlin, 1878, Greek statistics were published purporting to prove that the whole country south of the Balkans was Greek. How completely untrue these statements were as regards the province of Eastern Roumelia, is notorious. In Macedonia, where many Bulgarian dioceses still depend on the Patriarch, an ingenious theory was devised by which it was maintained that the Bulgarian-speaking inhabitants were really Greeks, but did not know it. The Vlachs likewise are represented in the Greek statistics as Greek; a statement against which they energetically protest, as do likewise the Orthodox Albanians.

With reference to what I have just said, I will relate to you an anecdote of a circumstance which made some impression on my mind.

I was in doubt as to the nationality of a villager, and put to him the usual question, "What is your nation?" (*Né milletsiniz?*) Knowing that he must be either a Bulgarian or a Servian, I was immensely surprised at his saying that he was a Greek (*Roumi*); which was true in so far as his religion was concerned, and his subjection to the Greek Patriarch; but the man was in fact a Bulgarian, and could even speak Greek.

Since then I have frequently from curiosity addressed the same question to persons who were obviously not Greek, and have very often received the same reply, showing how very strong is the force of habit. Even Albanians have fallen into the error.

The origin of the ambiguity is very simple. The Roman nation subdued by the Turks, was Christian in all its subordinate nationalities, and over these Christians the Greek Patriarch had sway. In later times other creeds obtained *berats* or *firmans*, constituting them into "nations;" and the word has thus become synonymous with religion, rather than race.

The Ottoman Empire, with all its anomalies, defects, and abuses, continued to be for two centuries after the conquest of Constantinople a well-ordered and prosperous State; not merely in contrast to the wretched tyrannies it had succeeded, but even when compared with most of the nations of Christian Europe. Many offices of power and emolument were held by the Greeks, of whom large numbers embraced the faith of Islam, and rose to positions of great eminence in the State.

Von Hammer says (VIII, 421), that of forty-eight Grand Viziers who succeeded to power after the conquest of Constantinople, thirty only were native Turks. So great was the inclination of the Government to adopt Mahometanism, that the Sultans became alarmed lest they should have no tribute-paying peoples at all, and accordingly began to treat the subject Christians with greater kindness.

The tribute of Christian children, whence the Janissaries were recruited, ceased about 1680.

A clique of influential Greek families, known as Fanariotes, in the quarter of Stamboul in which they resided, obtained a monopoly of most of the lucrative posts in the Empire, which could be held by Christians, and have indeed preserved it to this day, notwithstanding the breach occasioned by the Greek revolution.

During the long period from the Turkish conquest until the Russian conquest of Constantinople, the city continued to be the centre from which the Greeks were governed, and the focus of their national life. Greece itself, little was heard of it. The Slav nationalities in the Morea, partly Hellenized, partly turned Mahometan, dragged a uneventful existence. In 1684, the Venetians invaded the Morea, and attacked Athens. It was during this war that the Parthenon was destroyed by the explosion of a mass of powder stored there by the Turks, ignited by a Venetian shell.

By the peace of Carlowitz, 1699, the Morea was ceded to the Venetians. In abandoning it, the Turks carried off everything portable, and left the country ruined. Its population

estimated at only 100,000, increased again under the Venetians; but in 1715 it was recaptured by the Turks under Ali Koumour. During these changes the Greeks appear to have been passive instruments in the hands of both parties, being largely employed by both sides at sea; as for instance in the battle of Lepanto.

It was not until the reign of the Empress Anne that the idea of utilising the Greeks against the Turks was put into practice in Russia. Count Münnich is credited with having suggested to the Empress the policy of stirring up the Greek Christians against their Turkish masters.

The theoretical Phil-Hellenism of Voltaire appears also to have evoked in her a sentimental interest for the Greeks. In 1764, Greeks in the Morea were encouraged by the hope of Russian assistance, and in 1770, a small force of Russians landed, but met with little response from the inhabitants, among whom they had some difficulty in raising 3,000 men. The insurrection was defeated by a force of Albanians, who subsequently possessed themselves of the country, and tyrannized over it until 1779, when they were expelled by Hassan Pasha. During this period, privateers under Russian flag, chiefly Greek, but partly English, perpetrated acts of abominable cruelty in the Greek seas. This piratical fleet was completely destroyed by the Turks at Porto Quaglio in 1792. Under the Treaty of Kainardji, 1774, Russia claimed the right of protecting Orthodox Christians in Turkey, and hence arose a feeling among Greeks as well as Slavonians, that it was to Russia that they should look for aid in their emancipation.

Accident precipitated a catastrophe. The strange career of well-known Ali Pasha of Janina; his rise to power by treachery, violence, and corruption; his adroit intrigues, now with the English, now with the French; his wars with the Suliotes; his resistance to the Sultan; his independent and tyrannical administration of Albania and the long siege he withstood in Janina before his death, are the incidents which have often been recounted. The conduct of this ambitious and unscrupulous satrap had no slight influence on the development of Greek aspirations; although the nature of the influence is often misunderstood.

Ali Pasha, in the days of his power, suppressed the *Armatoloi*, the armed gendarmerie, which had existed as a sort of Christian militia for the maintenance of internal security, even in the days of the Byzantine Empire, and which had afforded some degree of protection to the inhabitants against the Saracens, the Franks, and others. *Armatoloi* had been recognized by the Ottoman Empire, but the institution was uncongenial with Ali's tyrannical and extortionate government. Upon their disbandment as official guardians of the public security, they reappear as *Klephts*, or patriotic brigands, like the Italian robbers. When Ali was at war with the Porte, many of these *Armatoloi* or *Klephts* even joined the Sultan's forces against him; but when expelling the Albanians from their districts, they evinced a disinclination to act further, except for their own interests. Ali, as to his rebellion, was successful, received the support of all those

affected to the Sultan's rule, including even his ancient enemies, the Suliotes, who went over to him during the siege of Janina. The disaffection in Greece, which had been fermenting ever since the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, was stirred up by the French revolution; by the substitution of French for Venetian rule on the Adriatic by the Treaty of Campo Formio, 1797; and by the various changes which took place between that period and the Congress of Vienna. In the Danubian Principalities, too, the cause of Greek independence took root under the auspices of the *Etairia*, or patriotic society.

In 1821, when Kurshid Pasha was ordered from the Morea to take charge of the operations against Janina, the whole population of the Peloponnesus rose against the Turks.

In the month of April of that year, a Mussulman population, generally of indigenous race, amounting to upwards of 20,000 souls, was living dispersed in Greece employed in agriculture. Before two months had elapsed, the greater part was slain. Men, women, and children were murdered on their own hearths without mercy or remorse. At the same time small bodies of Turks in the Danubian provinces were massacred by the *Etairia*.

The Turks were aroused to exact a sanguinary revenge. Gregorius the Patriarch of Constantinople, a venerable man of ninety years, was hung at the door of his own church in his pontifical robes. There can be little doubt of his complicity with the insurrection, but the circumstances of his execution will for ever leave a stigma on the Turks. In three months the blood of 30,000 Greeks had consecrated the opening of their struggle for freedom.

Upon the first outbreak, the Greeks of Agrapha, the mountainous district between Thessaly and Epirus, and those of the great mountain Pelion, Ossa, Olympus, and Pindus, took up arms, as did the inhabitants of the Chalcidic Peninsula. But being immediately subdued they remained peaceful subjects of the Sultan during the whole of the War of Independence, and at its close refused to avail themselves of the liberty to become Greek subjects.

I will pass over the sanguinary atrocities which characterized the War of Independence, merely observing that its most conspicuous characters (on the Greek side) were chiefly of Albanian origin. In 1825, Ibrahim Pasha came to the aid of the Turks with a fleet carrying 15,000 Egyptians. He overran the Morea, and the cause of Greek independence, coldly regarded by the Governments of Europe, was at its lowest ebb.

England, France, and Russia, however, signed a treaty on the 6th July, 1827, pledging themselves to an immediate and effective interference, for the purpose of putting an end to the war in Greece. The Turks rejected the proposed mediation. Ibrahim continued his ravages, and returned unopened a note from the Allied Admiral. The Turco-Egyptian fleet was attacked and annihilated at Navarino on the 20th October, 1827.

This destruction of the naval power of Turkey—described as a *untoward event* in the King's speech of the following session—was

followed by the Ambassadors of England, France, and Russia at Constantinople upon the refusal of the Porte to admit of interposition in the Greek question. In April, 1828, Russia declared war against Turkey. In August, Ibrahim withdrew the Egyptian troops, and in October a French force occupied the Morea. The struggle was ended.

A Conference, composed of Representatives of England, France, Russia, met at Poros in 1828, to discuss the Greek question. They were, *inter alia*, instructed to answer, "What boundary line would Greece best, giving her a continental frontier clearly defined, and defensible, and which would best separate the populations?"

The Greeks claimed a line commencing at Katerina, a little to the north of Platamona, crossing from thence to the Haliacmon, which followed up to Mount Pindus, to the north of Metsovo; and thence following the River Voiussa or Aoos.

In case this proposition was rejected, they asked for a line including Janina and then following the Kalamas.

The Conference thought that the line from Pindus to Olympus would meet with the required conditions; but considered, "that, as the inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly took little or no part in the war of the Revolution, and, as many of the Chiefs were in the service of the Porte, it would be contrary to the letter and spirit of their instructions to comprise these two provinces in the new State."

An alternative line was also proposed by the Greeks, commencing near Mount Pelion, including Volo and a part of Southern Thessaly on the side of the Ægean, and following the southern watershed to the basin of the Kalamas on the side of the Ionian Sea.

The Conference, however, objected to depriving Thessaly, without any real advantage to Greece, of the Gulf of Volo, the principal necessary outlet for the productions of that province; and ultimately recommended a line from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta; but on its being presented to the Sultan on the 22nd of March 1829 (the Russian Army not yet having crossed the Balkans) he refused to accept it. Upon the submission of the Porte in the Treaty of Adrianople, which would have obtained for Russia the entire settlement, France and England represented that the Sultan did not rest with her alone, and a new Conference was held, at which it was agreed that Greece, instead of being an autonomous tributary dependency, as had been hitherto proposed, should be completely independent; but a less liberal line of frontier was suggested, from the mouth of the Aspropotamos to the Gulf of Zeitoun.

The Throne of Greece was offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who requested an extension of the continental frontier to the addition of Candia and Samos; and upon the refusal of the Sultan the position declined the Crown.

The Greeks now recommenced fighting among themselves. Ioannis Kapodistrias was assassinated; anarchy supervened, and lasted until 1832, when Prince Otho of Bavaria was named King of Greece, and a definitive settlement of the Greek question was arrived at by the Convention of London, which was known as the Arrangement of 1832.

With the exception of internal disorders, brigandage, and occasional revolutions, the new kingdom existed without the interference of the Powers until 1853, when the war between Russia and Turkey emboldened the Greeks to invade Thessaly, and hostilities were only put an end to by the occupation of the Piræus by English and French troops.

In 1863 King Otho was ejected, and Prince Alfred was invited to accept the Throne, a proposal incompatible with the Treaty stipulations between the three Powers. The choice finally fell on the present Sovereign, who ascended the Throne on the 31st October, 1863, bringing with him the Ionian Islands as a dower.

In 1877, as soon as the success of the Russian arms in Turkey was assured, the Greeks seized the opportunity and invaded Thessaly with a force of 15,000 men, and 60 or 70 guns; and organized insurrections in that province, in Epirus, and in Crete. These movements were, notwithstanding her great straits, successfully opposed by Turkey; but at the conclusion of the war, the Porte was informed by the Powers that it could not be allowed to exercise a pressure upon Greece, by employing its fleet for a movement on Athens.

The Treaty of San Stefano completely subordinated the interests of the Greeks in Turkey to those of the Slavonian races, and excited among them a well-founded alarm. Their interests, however, were not lost sight of in the revision of that Treaty at the Congress of Berlin; which, in its 13th Protocol, "invites the Sublime Porte to come to an agreement with Greece for a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and is of opinion that this rectification might follow the valley of the Salamvrias (ancient Peneus) on the side of the Ægean; and that of the Kalamas on the side of the Ionian Sea."

The Greek Government thereupon named Commissioners to discuss the rectification, with others to be appointed by the Porte; but their first meeting did not take place until February, 1879. The modifications proposed by the Porte being in no way conformable to the indications of the Protocol, the negotiations were broken off, to be again ineffectually renewed in the autumn. Meanwhile both sides were arming, and Thessaly and Epirus were overrun with bands of brigands.

The negotiations between the Porte and Greece failed to settle the question, and the Powers, after mature consideration, determined to exercise the right of mediation which they reserved to themselves by the 24th Protocol of the Treaty of Berlin. A Conference took place at Berlin in 1880, and a line of frontier proposed by the French Representative was unanimously adopted.

This line ascended the Kalamas to its source, and thence followed a watershed, leaving the basins of the Arta, Aspropotamos, and Salamvrias to Greece. The award was communicated by the Powers to Turkey and Greece. The Porte replied by a note, in which it argued that the cession of Janina, which was regarded by the Albanians as the capital of Lower Albania, and that of Larissa, three-fourths of whose inhabitants were Mahometans, could not be consented to; and

it requested that negotiations might be entered into by the Representatives of the Powers.

The French Government, which had hitherto taken the lead in pressing the matter forward, now began to hold back. A collective note to the Porte was, however, presented in August, 1880, in which the Powers declined to reopen the question. The Sultan, however, was obstinate, and the pressure hitherto exercised by the Powers upon Greece to abstain from arming was withdrawn.

During the autumn of 1880 the Greek Army was mobilized, and the Turkish forces in Thessaly and Epirus were raised to a war footing. An outbreak of hostilities was imminent. Negotiations with the Porte were recommenced, but the situation continued to be exceedingly critical. The cession of Crete was proposed as a compensation for diminution of the award of the Conference Line, but after frequent discussion was abandoned. In March, 1881, the Porte made an offer which has virtually formed the basis of the present settlement. England appeared to be the only Power still desirous of endeavouring to obtain better terms for the Greeks. All the others were ready to accept this last proposal of the Porte; England yielded to the majority, and on the 6th April the Greek Government was invited to acquiesce in the proposed settlement. A Conference thereupon assembled at Constantinople, and on the 24th May, 1881, a Convention was signed by the Representatives of the Porte and the Powers, laying down the line of new frontier, specifying the manner in which the ceded territory was to be evacuated, and providing safeguards for personal, proprietary, and religious interests.

I have already noticed that the frontier thus awarded coincides, with singular exactitude, with the limits of Ancient Greece. Though it falls short of the line of the Berlin Conference, it must be observed that a considerable portion of the Epirote territory between Kalamas and Prevesa is Mahometan in religion, and Albanian in language and sympathies. It is, indeed, a question, whether the incorporation of that population in Greece would not rather have been a loss than a gain. Throughout these long and critical negotiations the equitable claims of the Greeks have received the steady and unswerving support of Her Majesty's Government; and without there is much reason to believe that this solution might not have been arrived at.

It is not altogether surprising that the Greeks should feel somewhat aggrieved that the hopes founded upon the award at Berlin should not have been realized; but I will venture to point out that it must now be admitted, that in view of the determined attitude assumed by the Porte, and the aversion of the Powers to active measures, it could only have been attained by a successful war. What the result of a war between Turkey and Greece might have been, I will not presume to speculate upon. Such a war would undoubtedly have entailed very great sacrifices upon both countries, and possibly might have led to further complications. That it has been averted, is a matter of general congratulation.

The area of the new accession to the Greek kingdom is al

5,200 square statute miles, or about two-thirds of the extent comprised in the award of the Conference of Berlin, viz., 7,883 miles. In comparison with the superficies of the Greek kingdom, as settled by the arrangement of 1832, it amounts to nearly one-third of the whole, or to two-thirds of the area of either the Morea or of the mainland.

The most striking comparison, however, is the fact that the gain of Greece by this settlement is very nearly equal to the territory of Alsace and Lorraine, ceded to Germany after the war of 1870-71. The Kingdom of Saxony, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, are also nearly equal in area to the provinces in question. Nearer home we may find an approximate equivalent in the south-east portion of England between the south coast and the Thames, comprising Kent, Surrey, Sussex, and Hampshire.

In general terms the new frontier follows the course of the River Arta, the ancient Aracthus, from its mouth to a point nearly south-east of Janina, and thence follows a tributary stream to the highest point of Pindus, Mount Djukarela, or Peristeri. From thence it follows the main watershed of Mount Pindus, leaving the basins of the Arta and Voiussa on the west, and those of the Aspropotamos and the Salamvrias on the east. Upon leaving Pindus it follows the water-parting between the basins of the Salamvrias and the Haliakmon, and subsequently between the Salamvrias and its tributary the Xeraghi which it crosses near its junction with the main stream; and then ascending to the crest of the range of Lower Olympus, follows it to the Ægean coast, which it strikes between the mouth of the Salamvria and the fort of Platamona.

This new frontier was fixed on the ground by a Commission, upon which each of the mediating Powers, as well as the interested States were represented.

I had the honour to be Her Majesty's Commissioner, and had the valuable assistance of Captain de Wolski and Lieutenant Leverso both Officers of the Royal Engineers, who had already had experience in work of a like nature. My colleagues entrusted me with the charge of the topographical work of the Commission; the result of which you now see displayed in the theatre of the Institution. A small portion of the line, near the mouth of the River Arta, was sketched by Turkish Officers, and throughout we had the assistance of Captain Lykoudis, one of the Greek Commissioners. The map, however, was almost entirely the work of the English. Captain Wolski had charge of the trigonometrical and astronomical observations while Lieutenant Leverso and I did the rest of the work. For the reproduction of the map we are indebted to the Intelligence Department. The admirable manner in which it has been executed there. Mr. Hawkins, in the section under the charge of Major Fox, R.E., has elicited well-deserved compliments from my colleagues. A period of seventy-five days, including all losses of time from rain, flood, obstruction, marches, and other causes, was employed upon the survey, which covers 232 miles in length, and about 1,000 miles in area. The rate was consequently about 8 lineal miles or 13 square miles per diem; and the work in the field was completed on the 11

October, 1881, four months after the ratification of the Convention upon the subject.

The evacuation of the ceded territory by the Ottoman troops, its occupation by the Greek forces, was carried out under the supervision of another Commission, upon which this country was represented by General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.M.G., C.B., aided Colonel Clery, Major Swaine, and Lieutenant Edgar Vincent.

The territory to be ceded was divided (according to the terms of the Convention) into six sections, of which the first was to be ceded within three weeks of the ratification of the Convention, four others within three months, and the last within five months.

The first section, comprising the tract between the Arta and Aspropotamos, was duly evacuated on the 7th July, a considerable Greek force, under General Soutzo, marching into Arta upon that day, amid general demonstrations of joy on the part of the inhabitants and the most perfect freedom from disorder.

A pause then ensued, in order to enable the Ottoman authorities to remove the large mass of war material and stores accumulated in Thessaly. On the 20th of August the Greek troops crossed the Gulf of Furka over the chain of Mount Othrys, and marched into Dom from which the Turks retired on the same day. Pharsala, Kardana, and Fanari, towns lying in proximity to the old frontier, were occupied on the 30th August, thus completing the evacuation of the second section, which, in general terms, covers the southern portion of Thessaly and the mountainous district of Agrapha.

Punta, which had been evacuated and occupied by a misunderstanding on the 6th July, was definitely transferred on the 10th September.

The third section, comprising the upper basin of the Salamis with the towns of Trikala and Kalabaka, was handed over on the 13th September. The fourth and fifth sections, comprising Larissa and Armyro, were transferred by the 13th September, with the exception of certain points on the frontier, which the Ottoman troops continue to occupy in spite of the adverse decisions of the Commissioners of the mediating Powers. The Chief Commissioners for the evacuation thereupon left Thessaly, as there was nothing more to be done. The moment arrived for the transfer of the last section, that of which was effected on the 14th November.

With the exception of three localities on the line of the frontier, known as Gounitza, Kritzovali, and Kara-Ali Derben, which the Porte still lays claim, the whole of the ceded territory by that date entirely evacuated by Turkish troops, and occupied by the Greek forces.

Upon the points in dispute, all the Delimitation Commissioners, the mediating Powers held opinions adverse to the Turkish claims, and the Representatives of those Powers at Constantinople likewise rejected the appeal made to them on this subject.

In all other respects the transaction has terminated, and in a remarkably satisfactory way.

Sir Edward Hamley bears testimony to the admirable manner

which Marshal Hidayet, the chief Turkish Commissioner, arranged the detail of the evacuation, and to his courteous desire to comply with such modifications as were proposed by the Commissioners of the Powers for general convenience, and he brings to notice that on the part of the Turkish Officers and men there was never the slightest display of ill-feeling. I must add my humble testimony in the same sense. I have often been associated with Turkish troops, and have great admiration for their military virtues.

All the Greek authorities, military and civil, did also everything in their power to facilitate the labours of both Commissions.

It is most gratifying to record this exemplary conduct on both sides and I am sure that you will share my hopes that the spirit of conciliation and amity which characterized the proceedings in this delicate matter may pervade all their future dealings with one another. It is also most satisfactory to learn that the reception of the King of Greece by the inhabitants of Larissa, two-thirds of whom are Mahometans, was most enthusiastic. Difference of creed is doubt a powerful barrier; but His Majesty's words must have reassured his new subjects. "I bring you," he said, "freedom and complete equality before the law. The Hellenic flag will be a symbol of order, safety, and independence."

Such may it be, and prosperity and contentment will be the lot of those who dwell within the New Greek Frontier after a separation might almost say an obliteration, of two thousand years.

THE CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, you have heard Major Ardagh's very interesting lecture, in which he has traced the history of the Greeks as a nation, and the territory occupied by them from the earliest days to the last phase, when a frontier was established, which now constitutes the boundary between Greece and Turkey. We shall be happy to hear the observations which any one may wish to make upon this interesting subject.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON: I will not enter into the question of the new boundary (of which I know nothing); but Major Ardagh probably has not been as correct as I was with the Treaty of 1827, as I was present in the Mediterranean shortly after the battle of Navarino. It is an error to suppose that the allied fleet "attacked" (which is the expression used) the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino. The orders to the Admirals were to protect Greece from attack; an armistice was agreed upon, but that armistice was broken by Ibrahim Pasha with his fleet attempted an attack on Patras, but was turned back by Sir Edward Codrington with one ship of the line. Sir Edward Codrington thinking that showed a yielding to the power of a small force, entered the Bay of Navarino to secure the control of that fleet, which it was his order to prevent doing in Greece. When the fleet went in and had partly anchored, the first shots were fired by the Ottoman fleet; the "attack" therefore did not begin with the allies.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GREEK MINISTER: I wish to address a few complimentary remarks to Major Ardagh on his paper, to which I have listened with the greatest interest. By his intelligent and conscientious labours with regard to the Greek frontier Major Ardagh is entitled to our esteem and thanks, and I am happy to be the medium of conveying the expression of these sentiments.

THE CHAIRMAN: As there seems to be no intention on the part of any one to occupy your time with a discussion on this paper, I will not make any remarks upon it, except to say that the work conducted by Major Ardagh and his colleagues in the delimitation of the frontier displays great skill. It has been done in a remarkably short time and with very great success, and produced the very beautiful outline map which you see before you. The

had very considerable difficulties in the performance of their duties; difficulties of communication in a country where there are few roads, in fact, I may almost say no roads; where the population is very wild, and where strangers are subject to considerable risks in consequence of the ill-feeling existing between inhabitants of different religions and of different sides of the frontier. Although we read in the newspapers at that time that Major Ardagh had fallen a victim to some disturbance, happily neither he nor any of the European Officers were injured; although, I believe, some of the Turkish Officers did suffer. I may venture to say that we hope that the aspiration which he has expressed at the end of his lecture will be realized, and that the issue of all the turmoil that has been going on for so many years on the subject of this frontier, may be peace and prosperity to the Greeks and Turks each within their own territory; and that those border difficulties which have been the cause of so much trouble of late years, and that the settlement that has been arrived at will be of a permanent and satisfactory character. It only remains for me to ask you to give a vote of thanks to Major Ardagh for his interesting and admirable lecture.