

from the moving matter; these two are regarded as separately constant, though the motion is allowed to be transmitted from body to body; in fact, the orthodox mechanical doctrine might be compared to the Transmigration of Souls. Thus the principle is not applied to the real, but to an intellectual and abstract construction of the real, resting on the distinction of substance and attribute. Its efficiency in Mechanics, which depends throughout on this distinction, is thus comprehensible; but it remains a question whether some theory in which cause and effect are less homogeneous, in which there is still some idea of activity, might not be necessary in other sciences, *e.g.* Psychology; at any rate, Psychology is not yet in the state where its laws can be *seen* to flow from the indestructibility of existence. Dr Heymans has not discussed any other sciences than Pure Mathematics and Mechanics; it would have been interesting to see how far it was possible elsewhere to apply the same view.

The chief value of the book seems to me to lie in the analysis of the laws of motion, and in the exposition of the *a priori* elements contained in them. The whole account is thoroughly self-consistent, and shews a distinct superiority to his opponents, Mach and others, who maintain a more empirical position. In the first volume there is some good critical work, for instance in connection with Lange's geometrical theory of formal logic; but the constructive work is impregnated with his psychological view of Epistemology, and I must therefore regard the discussion of Mechanics as the portion of the book best worthy of attention and of most permanent value.

B. RUSSELL.

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*Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics.* (*The Principles of the Critical Philosophy.*) By Dr A. RIEHL, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Freiburg i. B. Translated by Dr ARTHUR FAIRBANKS, Lecturer on the Philosophy of Religion in the Divinity School of Yale University. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. (The English and Foreign Philosophical Library), 1894. Pp. xvi., 346.

PROFESSOR RIEHL's work on Philosophical Criticism is already well known in this country; and the appreciative article on it by Professor Adamson in this *Journal*<sup>1</sup> has rendered any further introduction superfluous. The volume now before us is a translation, with some slight omissions and alterations (sanctioned by the author), of the third part of the work, the part to which Professor Adamson's article chiefly referred. This is no doubt the most interesting portion of the book; yet one cannot but feel some

<sup>1</sup> Old Series, vol. xiv., p. 66.

regret that it should be presented to the English reader without the other two volumes which led up to it. The chief value of Dr Riehl's book consists, I suppose, in its being one of the most serious and systematic attempts (perhaps the most serious and systematic attempt) to carry out the views of those who believe that philosophy ought to be limited to epistemology. Those who hold this view may perhaps think that the work retains its substantial interest even when it is presented thus naked and unabashed without its introductory apology; but those of us who are more sceptical with regard to its fundamental position will be apt to think that the chief justification for its existence lay in its historical connexion with the ideas of Locke, Hume, Kant, and one or two others, and that it loses much of its significance when this historical justification is suppressed, even if it be true (as I believe it is) that the attempt to apply the ideas of Kant to the problems of modern science is the most interesting feature in the book.

And if the book thus loses something by being shorn of its first two volumes, I think it loses something also by the difficulties of translation. For instance, it is doubtful whether the necessity of rendering *Empfindung* by Sensation does not do some slight injustice to the author. I do not think it does him much injustice; for after all *Empfindung* does mean Sensation, and Dr Riehl's use of the term seems to indicate a fundamental weakness in his philosophical position. Still, if we might translate the word, as Professor Adamson suggested, by Apprehension or even Sense-Apprehension, the crudity of the position would at least be a little mellowed. That Dr Riehl does not really mean anything quite so crass as he seems to say (*e.g.* on pp. 33, 42—3, &c.), in representing Sensation as the original datum in all knowledge, is made apparent by comparison with some of his other remarks (*e.g.* pp. 53—4); but I cannot convince myself that he has made his view clear, or that his treatment of the subject can be regarded as sound philosophising, however we may translate his terms.

While we are on the subject of translation, it may be remarked that Dr Fairbanks seems on the whole to have done his part of the work conscientiously and well, though not always happily. His renderings are often rather wooden, and sometimes scarcely convey the meaning of the original. Thus "tendency" on p. 20 does not quite bring out the force of "Tendenz," which implies rather a regulative ideal. "The right form of statement means the same for a metaphysical problem as for a mathematical expression" (p. 33), is not a very clear translation of "Was für eine Gleichung ihr richtiger Ansatz, ist für ein metaphysisches Problem die richtige Fragestellung." "False conclusions" (pp. 90 and 94) is no doubt a fairly literal rendering of "Fehlschlüsse"; but would not "fallacious inferences" make the meaning more apparent to most English readers? Is "denial of a question" (p. 91) good English for giving a negative answer to a question? "The spirit...knows itself ever at its goal" (p. 96) is a curious way of saying that it is continually

anticipating its goal. "Does perhaps the conviction belong" (p. 124) is surely a too faithful rendering of "*Gehört vielleicht die Ueberzeugung.*" "Instinctive or habitual action" is in the original "*instinctiv geworden,*" and without this addition the use of the term "instinctive" would be somewhat inaccurate. To "regard" a thing "more important" (p. 91) and "to go back of the position reached by Kant" (p. 178) are doubtless modes of intellectual activity that are more familiar in America than in this country; and perhaps we ought not to complain of these; but is "*the systematic of phenomena*" (p. 269) either English or American? These are of course slight defects; but they mar what is otherwise a good translation. The omission of "persuaded" on p. 321, line 22, is doubtless only a printer's error.

As regards the substance of the work, I find myself in the main in agreement with Professor Adamson, except that some of his commendations are expressed in terms which I could not very heartily endorse. The author's strong point is, I think, his real grasp of modern scientific conceptions. All that he says about the "mythology of physical science" (*e.g.* p. 200), about "the reign of law in nature" (*e.g.* p. 235), about the general significance of "laws of nature" (*e.g.* p. 308), and kindred points, seems to me to be admirably conceived and expressed. Similarly, his remarks on the connexion between the logical and the moral (p. 77, note), on the idea of development, as not a means of explanation, but rather as something to be explained (pp. 77, 113—4, &c.), and various other side issues, have a high degree of suggestiveness. And the whole chapter on "Determinism of the Will and Practical Freedom" (Part II., chap. III.) is penetrating, and even profound. Nor do these references by any means exhaust what might be said in the way of praise. But I find a pretty heavy reckoning on the other side. The running fire against constructive metaphysic does not strike me as very heavy artillery. Much of what Dr Riehl says in this connexion I cannot characterize otherwise than as shallow. It is no doubt true that there is apt to be a personal element in constructive philosophy (pp. 11, 89, 100, 345, &c.), that in a certain sense the desires enter into philosophy (p. 15), and that in several other respects philosophy is not quite similar to the particular sciences. But whether philosophy is the worse for this, and, if so, how much worse, and how it is to be cured, it would require a somewhat calmer physician than Dr Riehl to determine. His treatment of such matters is wholly uncritical. He dogmatizes about them as confidently as Professor Tait or the first man in the street. That his dogmatism is anti-dogmatic makes it none the better, but rather the worse. When he writes, for instance (p. 105), that "The world of metaphysics is a thought-world, an imaginary world of logical shadows, which have lost their reality with their existence for sense-perception; it is not the world of real things and processes, *i.e.*, those which affect sense," what answer can anyone make to such stuff, except "Thank Heaven, it is not!"

We learn further (p. 117) that "metaphysics knows only the syllogistic deduction." After this it is not so surprising to be informed (p. 154) that consciousness is a phenomenon, or that human thought is a "little motion in the brain" (pp. 106, 339). Again, it appears (p. 316) that "Nature develops eyes which never see, *e.g.*, in embryos which perish before they see the light. How then can seeing be the final cause that determines the formation of the eye?" Here at least is reasoning which surely goes far beyond the syllogism. So indeed does the entire chapter on the reality of the external world (Part II., chap. 1.), the whole of which is surely as shallow as any man could wish; though it must be allowed that it contains not a bad joke on Fichte's deduction:—"How is the existence of beasts of prey to be explained, beasts that may sometimes feed on the *ego*, subject of duty and of reasonable action, skin, hair and all?" Much is made, throughout the whole book (see especially p. 66), of the *social* element in experience; but I agree with Professor Adamson in thinking that this idea is not dealt with in a very fruitful way. It is really little more than an attempt to explain away the universal character of thought.

On the whole I do not see what can be said about this book except that it is written by one who has a sound grasp of modern scientific ideas, an excellent appreciation of the work of Locke and of Kant (at least on its more negative side), but a painful lack of insight into the aims and methods of constructive philosophy. These are qualities which the writer seems to share with a considerable number of his countrymen at the present time. It seems to me to be distinctly open to doubt whether the translation of this volume has provided us with an important addition to English philosophical literature. English philosophy is in its youth; but surely we have got beyond this.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

*A Study of Ethical Principles.* By JAMES SETH, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in Brown University, U.S.A. Blackwood and Sons, 1894. Pp. ix., 460.

THIS book consists of an Introduction (containing chapters on the Ethical Problem, the Method of Ethics, and the Psychological Basis), and three Parts, on I. The Moral Ideal, II. The Moral Life, and III. The Metaphysical Implications of Morality (*viz.* the Problem of Freedom, the Problem of God, and the Problem of Immortality).

The author explains that his aim is rather to discuss principles than to develop a system, and that he has had it specially at heart to throw "light upon the real course of Ethical thought in ancient and in modern times."

The question of Ethics is preliminarily stated to be, What is man's chief End? or What is the true normal or typical form of