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BATTLES OF CHILLIANWALLA AND GOOJERAT.

By General Sir CHARLES J. S. GOUGH, V.C., K.C.B.

CHILLIANWALLA.—13th JANUARY, 1849.

THE Sikh army, under Shere Singh, having been driven after the battles of Ramnuggur and Sadoolapore from the banks of the Chenab, retired to a strong position at Russool, on the left bank of the Jhelum. Lord Gough took up his position at Heylah on the 5th December, covering the fords of the Chenab, and awaited the fall of Mooltan, it being his intention to unite all the troops of the army of the Punjab, and bring the war to a conclusion by one crushing defeat; but Mooltan proved a more difficult nut to crack than was anticipated, and it became apparent that a considerable time must yet elapse before the hoped-for reinforcements could be expected. Meantime, the Sikh position improved. Chuttur Singh, having gained possession of Attock, was now on his way to join his son, Shere Singh, whose force was already estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 men, and fully sixty guns. On the 10th January, Major Mackeson, the Governor-General's political agent, informed Lord Gough that Chuttur Singh was on his way to join, and urged His Excellency to strike an effectual blow without delay. The force at Lord Gough's disposal amounted to about 24,000 men all told, and sixty-six guns, and was composed as follows :—

Cavalry Division, Sir Joseph Thackwell, Commanding.

1st Brigade, under Brigadier M. White.

3rd Light Dragoons; 5th and 8th Light Cavalry.

2nd Brigade, under Brigadier Pope.

9th Lancers; 14th Light Dragoons; 1st and 6th Regiments Light Cavalry; European Cavalry—about 650 men each; and Native Cavalry, 500.

Infantry, 2nd Division,* under Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert.

1st Brigade, Brigadier Mountain, H.M.'s 29th Foot; the 30th and 56th Regiments Native Infantry.

* The 1st Division of the army of the Punjab was employed in the siege of Mooltan.

2nd Brigade, Brigadier Godby; 2nd European Regiment; the 31st and 70th Regiments Native Infantry.

Infantry, 3rd Division, Brigadier-General Colin Campbell, Commanding.

1st Brigade, Brigadier Pennycuik, H.M.'s 24th Foot; the 25th and 45th Regiments Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, Brigadier Hoggan, Commanding; H.M.'s 61st Foot; the 36th and 46th Regiments Native Infantry.

3rd Brigade, Brigadier Penny, Commanding; the 15th, 20th, and 69th Regiments Native Infantry.

Artillery Division, under Brigadier Tennant.

Six troops of Horse Artillery under Brigadier Huthwaite; the troops commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, Majors Christie, Huish, Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce; and in mentioning these troops hereafter they will be designated by the names of their commanders.

Two batteries of four 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers each, under Majors Sir R. Shakespear and Ludlow; Major Horsford commanding the two.

Three Field Batteries. No. 5 commanded by Lieutenant Walker in the absence of Captain Kinleside, sick; No. 10, commanded by Lieutenant Robertson, in absence of Austin, wounded; and No. 17, commanded by Major Dawes.

The European Infantry numbered about 1,000 each, and the Native Infantry Regiments about 900.

As the force was, in Lord Gough's opinion, equal to the occasion, it did not require much urging to induce him to attack, and accordingly, on the 12th January, the army, which had previously moved to Lussooria, advanced to Dinghee, twelve miles to the North. Dinghee lay almost due east of the position taken up by Shere Singh at and about Chillianwalla. A reconnaissance of the country was made that afternoon, and it was ascertained that Shere Singh had concentrated his force in the dense jungle and about the villages of Chillianwalla, Lullian, and Mojeeawalla, fronting almost due east. In his rear was the river Jhelum flowing from N.E. to S.W., distant at its nearest point about three miles; on his left a rugged range of low hills, much cut up by ravines, which lay along the left bank of the river. On these hills lies the village of Russool, by which a pass led from the Sikh camp to the town of Jhelum, which was the direct line of his communication with Chuttur Singh.

The whole country in the vicinity for several miles to the south and east of Chillianwalla was a dense and thick jungle, covered with low, scrubby trees and thick bushes, extremely difficult, but not impenetrable.

On the evening of the 12th, Lord Gough assembled the commanders of his divisions and brigades, and communicated to them his intention of attacking the Sikh position; but to ensure correct information it was determined to move in the first instance on Chillianwalla, and make a careful reconnaissance. At this meeting the general officers commanding impressed upon Lord Gough that, as the battle would have

to be fought in the jungle, it was advisable that he himself should take up a position in which he could be found with certainty, and not expose himself in the forefront of the battle. This he reluctantly agreed to. Consequently it will be found that the striking personal episodes which occur in his previous actions have no place in Chillianwalla.

At 7 a.m., on the 13th January, the army advanced from Dinghee, formed in line of contiguous columns—Pope's brigade of cavalry on the right, and with it three troops of Horse Artillery, those of Lane, Christie, and Huish. Next, on their left, came Gilbert's division of infantry; Godby's brigade on the right, with Mountain's on the left, and between them Dawes' battery, No. 17, of Field Artillery; on their left, and occupying the centre of the line, the two batteries of Heavy Artillery under Major Horsford. Then came Colin Campbell's infantry division—Pennycuik's brigade on the right, and Hoggan's on the left. Attached to this division were No. 5 Light Field Battery, under Lieutenant Walker, and half of No. 10, under Lieutenant Robertson—the two under Major Mowatt. On the left of the army were the three troops of H.A., under Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce, flanked by White's cavalry brigade. One brigade of infantry formed the reserve, under Brigadier Penny, composed of only two regiments of Native Infantry—the 15th and 69th Regiments—whilst the baggage guard was formed by the remaining half of No. 10 Light Field Battery, the 20th Regiment N.I., drawn from Penny's brigade, and two regiments of irregular cavalry.

As he approached the enemy's position, Lord Gough made a detour to his right, partly in order to get clear of the jungle as much as possible, and partly to distract the enemy's attention. The village of Chillianwalla, in front of which was a high and conspicuous mound, was reached about twelve o'clock. It was found occupied by the Sikhs; they were quickly driven out, and our troops took possession. From the mound Lord Gough was able to obtain an extended view of the surrounding country; the Sikh force being observed drawn up in battle array in the front, Shere Singh having moved out of his positions in the rear. The jungle, though not dense, was still difficult. As it was now past one o'clock, and the day far spent, Lord Gough considered it advisable to postpone the attack till next morning, and ordered the Quartermaster-General to take up a position for the encampment in the rear of the village of Chillianwalla; and it was whilst the regimental quartermasters were in the act of laying out the ground that the Sikh artillery advanced and opened fire upon the line of skirmishers in front. Lord Gough ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from the heavy guns, when nearly the whole of the Sikh guns replied, thus exposing the positions of their batteries, which the jungle had concealed. It was now evident that Shere Singh meant to force on a fight, and the order was at once given to form line for attack. The force deployed in the same order as it had advanced, whilst the heavy guns, supported by the batteries of Field Artillery, opened a well-directed fire upon the enemy's guns, as far as their positions could be judged by the smoke. After about an hour's cannonading, it being then about 3 p.m., or a little later, the Commander-in-Chief judged that the Sikh guns were

sufficiently disabled to allow the infantry to advance, covered by the Field and Horse Artillery. The advance commenced on the left; the three troops of H.A. moved forward, and came into action at effective range against a powerful battery of Sikh guns. The three guns of No. 10 moved forward with the line of skirmishers of Hoggan's brigade, when a staff officer rode up to Lieutenant Robertson, and ordered him "to take his guns to the left and assist the H.A. in silencing those guns," pointing to a Sikh battery. Robertson accordingly trotted out to the left for about 500 yards, when he saw a considerable body of Sikh horse on his front; upon these he opened a vigorous fire, and soon dispersed them. Limbering up, he again proceeded in the direction pointed out to him, till a shot or two across his front, apparently fired at the advancing brigade of infantry, informed him of the position of the enemy's guns. He brought up his right and came into action against them, as they were engaged with our Horse Artillery. From where he now was, his fire completely enfiladed the Sikh guns, and after about half-an-hour the enemy's fire was completely silenced. An officer of Horse Artillery, which he never saw, though he knew their position, now rode up to him and told him his fire had been of the greatest use to the H.A., and that they were now about to advance, and Colonel Brind wished to know what he intended to do. Having obeyed his orders, Lieutenant Robertson said he would rejoin his own division, which was out of sight. He accordingly moved his guns to the right, moving along the crest of a low-rising ground, being followed and watched by the Sikh horse. He had no escort, and was guided in his direction by the sound of musketry. He proceeded in this manner at a walk, moving leisurely along for a considerable distance, as he wisely considered this might deceive the enemy, at whose mercy he apparently was, until he came in sight of Hoggan's brigade, when he trotted on, and joined. He passed four guns which had evidently been captured from the Sikhs, and numbers of dead, marking the track of Campbell's movements.

Major Mowatt advanced with No. 5, having some difficulty in getting his guns through the thickets of stunted trees, but could get no sight of the enemy, a distant sound of guns to his right being all he heard. After going half-a-mile or more he caught sight, on a sudden and over the tops of the trees and through an opening in the jungle, of a crowd of the enemy straight in front of him, and about 700 or 800 yards distant. The position being unsuitable, he urged his men forward another 300 yards, during which time two or three Sikh guns opened on his left flank, the shots passing in rear of him. He then came to clearer ground, beyond which he saw on a crest a crowd of Sikhs, distant about 450 yards. Their guns and masses appearing through the smoke, these immediately opened a heavy fire of round shot, shell, and musketry upon him. Here he promptly came into action, bringing as heavy a fire as he could upon the Sikhs, their shots mostly going over the heads of his men and tearing through the trees to his right and left, but, fortunately, not doing him much harm. In about twenty minutes the Sikh fire began to slacken, and through the smoke he saw their numbers melting away.

All this time he saw no sign of any of our troops to his right, where Pennycuick's brigade was expected. He now saw Hoggan's brigade through the smoke emerge from the jungle, and going straight at the Sikhs, keeping up a heavy fire, apparently, as they advanced. A body of Sikh infantry advanced to meet Hoggan's brigade, and upon them Major Mowatt concentrated his fire. They were gallantly led by a few chiefs, who endeavoured to carry them on; but they mostly ran back to the jungle and joined the flight which now took place. He could now plainly see Hoggan's brigade, led by Colin Campbell in person, driving the Sikhs before it; then, bringing up its left shoulders and forming astride the enemy's line, advance again and capture the Sikh guns as it moved along. Major Mowatt continued his fire until the flank movement of the brigade caused him to cease, when he limbered up and joined the brigade.

Nothing could have been better than the action of Major Mowatt throughout this most difficult operation, and he afforded to Hoggan's brigade the greatest possible service. When Colonel Brind, commanding the three troops of H.A. on the left, advanced, after silencing the Sikh guns in his front, he perceived that Campbell's left brigade was taking ground to the right. He detached Warner's troop to go and join him, and this they did about the same time that Mowatt's batteries, No. 5 and No. 10, rejoined.

Brigadier-General Campbell, on receiving the order to advance, disposed his brigades in line, with a company from each regiment, advanced as a firing line of skirmishers, according to the admirable tactics of those days; the nature of the ground being, in his opinion, such that he could not personally direct and superintend the attack of both brigades, and conceiving that his left brigade was more liable to be outflanked, General Campbell informed Brigadier Pennycuick that he should remain with it, leaving the direction of the right brigade entirely with its own commander. Brigadier Pennycuick accordingly advanced. The ground for some distance, being comparatively open, soon became interspersed with trees and thick, thorny bushes, impeding the regularity of the advance and screening from observation whatever might be in front. So serious was the obstruction that the line became disordered, and the companies were reduced to columns of sections. After moving forward for a few hundred yards, the right brigade came under a fire of round shot, which was converted, as it advanced, to an incessant fire of grape, directed principally upon H.M.'s. 24th, the centre regiment. This was the more formidable as the enemy were still completely screened from view. Officers and men began to fall in increasing numbers, nevertheless, the brigade continued to advance most steadily, although the difficulties of the jungle increased as it approached the enemy, until finally, about fifty yards in front of the Sikh guns which at last came into full view, the 24th came upon an impassable swamp, or pond, partially filled with water, and surrounded by scraggy trees and stumps, the ground being much broken. Two companies were obliged to file in rear, and thus it happened that the centre of the regiment, and several of the companies on the left, were brought up

nearly to the muzzles of the guns in masses and in much disorder, and were received by a tremendous discharge of grape and musketry. Brigadier Pennycuick and many officers and men had already fallen as they closed on the enemy. Colonel Brookes was distinctly seen in front of the colours of the 24th, showing a splendid example, and cheering his men on. The 24th never for a moment hesitated, but pressed forward and captured the guns at the point of the bayonet without firing a shot, but only for a moment. The Grenadier Company on the right, having experienced less difficulty in the advance, carried the position in front of them before the rest of the regiment, and Lieutenant Lutman assisted Private Marfield in spiking one of the guns. The enemy's fire was, however, so heavy, the Grenadiers were forced back; but, led by Captain Travers, again advanced to the charge, again carried the guns, and more were spiked. Captain Travers here fell, cut down by a tulwar. The whole regiment was now hotly engaged and numbers fell on both sides. Colonel Brookes was seen to fall close to the guns; Major Harris was mortally wounded and carried to the rear; Lieutenant Collis and Ensign Phillips, carrying the colours, both fell, struck by grape, close to the guns; Lieutenants George Phillips, Woodgate, and Payne fell at the guns. Thus in the short time that elapsed between the advance and this struggle on the part of the regiment to hold the position it had so nobly won, all their leaders and many officers, thirteen in all, were killed and ten wounded, and an immense number of N.C.O.'s and men had fallen; exhausted by their exertions, and the rapid advance for so long a distance and wholly unsupported, for no support was available at the critical moment, was it to be wondered at that the regiment which had made so splendid a fight, and suffered so fearful a loss, at length gave way? For some time the few officers who remained were unable to restore order, nor was the regiment re-formed till it had got clear of the jungle. Its loss, in addition to the officers, amounted to 231 killed and 266 wounded. With the 24th advanced the 25th Regiment N.I. on the right and the 45th on the left, meeting with the same obstacles, and advancing also under a heavy fire of all arms; they also suffered severe loss, and on the retreat of the 24th they also were compelled to give way. Several parties of both regiments were, however, quickly rallied. Captain Clarke kept his whole company, the rifle company of the 25th, together, and about 100 of the 45th Native Infantry rallied round the colours of the regiment under Lieutenants Oakes and Tozer, Ensigns Trotter and Evans. These parties by their fire drove off the Sikh horsemen who attempted to follow up the brigade. They advanced again and moved with White's cavalry brigade when taking ground to the right, and subsequently joined Hoggan's brigade. The 25th Regiment lost one European officer, six Native officers and 105 men killed; two European officers, three Native officers, and eighty-seven men wounded. The 45th lost twenty N.C.O.'s and men killed, four European officers, one Native officer, and fifty-four men wounded.

Pennycuick's brigade behaved with gallantry and exemplary devotion, but its advance was too precipitate, and unfortunately he had no support from artillery.

Hoggan's brigade on the left was led by General Campbell in person; it advanced simultaneously with Pennycuick's, but owing to the jungle it became disconnected; it was covered by the fire of Mowatt's guns on its right, and the H.A. and No. 10 silenced a heavy battery that would otherwise have enfiladed the brigade in its advance. The nature of the ground caused frequent breaks in the line, but General Campbell, by regulating the pace, kept his troops well in hand and preserved good order in the advance, nor did it meet with such serious obstacles as were encountered by Pennycuick. After moving forward about half-a-mile it reached a comparatively open tract of country; on this was now seen a large body of Sikh cavalry and infantry with four guns, which had played upon the brigade in its advance. The 61st Regiment forthwith charged this cavalry and put it to a disorderly flight, whilst the 36th Regiment N.I. attacked the Sikh infantry. It must have been at this moment. Major Mowatt caught sight of the brigade "going straight" at the Sikh line. For the moment the 36th Regiment were thrown into some disorder by an attack of the Sikh infantry on their right flank, but General Campbell instantly wheeled the two right companies of the 61st to the right, charged the Sikhs who were attacking the 36th, completely repulsed them, and captured two guns. The brigade now rapidly formed to the right, astride the enemy's line; in doing so the 46th Regiment on the left was attacked by the Sikh cavalry in considerable strength; these they gallantly repulsed under their commander, Major Tudor. At the same time the Sikhs brought up two more guns and fresh infantry against the right, upon which those who had just been driven back again formed. This was, in the opinion of General Campbell, the most critical moment of the day; but so ably was the brigade led, and so steadily did it behave, that this difficult change of front, whilst actually engaged with the enemy, was effectually and successfully carried out, and the whole brigade advanced to the attack, driving the Sikhs before it, and capturing, one after another, thirteen guns, all of which were obstinately and bravely defended by both Sikh infantry and gunners, and only obtained possession of after a sharp struggle. So close was the fighting that the Brigadier-General himself was severely wounded by a sword-cut on his right arm. The brigade continued to move swiftly on, rolling up the Sikh line as it advanced, and overcoming all opposition, being exposed all through the movement to repeated attacks of Sikh cavalry, who were following up, and which compelled General Campbell at intervals to halt, face his troops about, and drive them off. Thus Campbell completely defeated and dispersed that portion of the Sikhs which just before had inflicted so terrible a repulse and severe loss on Pennycuick's brigade. Seeing a battery of artillery on his right, and finding it to be Mowatt's, he ordered it to join, and continued his movement till he fell in with Mountain's brigade, when he again wheeled to the left, forming on his line on the original front. It was during this flank movement Campbell first heard from Colonel Brooke, commanding the H.A., of the disaster that had happened to his right brigade.

Campbell's loss in this attack and sharp hand-to-hand fight, though

considerable, was by no means excessive, seeing the difficulties of the country and the obstinate defence of the enemy. H.M.'s 61st Foot lost eleven men killed, three officers and 100 men wounded; 36th Regiment N.I., one native officer twenty-seven men killed, six European officers, two Native officers sixty-nine men wounded; 46th Regiment N.I., three men killed, three native officers forty-eight men wounded.

The loss of the artillery was comparatively small. Fordyce lost five men and two horses wounded; Duncan's troop, one officer and six horses killed, two men and one horse wounded; Warner's troop, one man and one horse killed, and one man and one horse wounded; No. 5 Light Field Battery, five men wounded, eleven horses killed and two wounded; No. 10 Battery, only one horse wounded. Although the Sikh gunners stood well to their guns, they had not learnt the art of shooting straight.

White's Cavalry brigade, acting on the left, advanced with Campbell's division. The nature of the country was wholly impracticable for the action of cavalry; unable to see anything in their front, they came suddenly under a very heavy fire of round shot, which mostly struck the ground in front of the line and ricocheted over the heads of the men. The brigade formed in support of the guns. On the Sikh battery being silenced by the H.A. as already related, Sir Joseph Thackwell proposed to follow up the advantage by a cavalry attack, and accordingly ordered the Grey squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 5th Light Cavalry to charge. These two bodies, led respectively by Captain Unett and Captain Wheatley, advanced. The 5th Light Cavalry came upon a mass of Sikhs, and were received with a considerable musketry fire, and, being much broken by the thick and scrubby jungle, were unable to make any impression on the enemy, and were repulsed; they, however, rallied at once very steadily and in good order on the 8th, the centre regiment. Unett's squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons, coming on a smaller body, broke through and swept on right through to the Sikh rear; then, re-forming his men and wheeling about, he cut his way back, but did not rejoin the brigade till towards the close of the action, causing great anxiety to Thackwell, who feared it had been annihilated. This splendid charge was, unfortunately, attended with very severe loss, for the line being broken by the jungle, the Sikh horsemen followed them up, and, falling upon those who were isolated and separated, cut down many gallant soldiers. The squadron lost twenty-three men killed, two officers and fifteen men wounded, fifteen horses killed and missing, seven wounded. The want of success that attended this attack prevented Sir Joseph Thackwell attempting any further offensive movements, and he was obliged to content himself with affording such protection as he could to the left of Campbell's division. He detached the H.A. troop and a squadron of the 8th Cavalry to join Hoggan's brigade, and with the remainder of the brigade took ground to his right, following Campbell's movements. In doing so the cavalry crossed the line by which Pennycuik's brigade had advanced, and the field, littered with the bodies of the fallen, attested the severity of the struggle. Here were picked up some parties of the 45th Regiment who came on, and the

brigade formed up in rear of Hoggan's and Mountain's brigades on about the centre of the position originally held by the Sikhs. Thus fared the left attack. The loss of the Cavalry Brigade was: 3rd Light Dragoons, twenty-four men killed, two officers and fourteen men wounded; 5th Light Cavalry, two European sergeants and four men killed, two officers and fourteen men wounded; 8th Light Cavalry, one man killed, and two wounded.

Shortly after Campbell's division advanced, Sir Walter Gilbert led the right division to the attack, both brigades being covered by a line of skirmishers—No. 17 Field Battery, under Daves, in the centre between the brigades in line with the skirmishers, and sometimes in advance. Three troops of H.A. were placed on his right, and the 2nd Cavalry brigade, under Pope, occupied the extreme flank. The division advanced steadily through the jungle, but its advance was retarded by the action of the cavalry on the right.

Pope, observing a considerable body of Sikh horsemen on his right on the slopes of the Russool Hills, detached a wing of the 9th Lancers, a wing from each of the 1st and 6th Light Cavalry, with Lane's troop of H.A., reinforced by two guns from Christie, under Lieutenant Le Geyt Bruce, for the purpose of protecting his exposed flank. This force was under command of Lieut-Colonel Lane, H.A.; with the remainder he advanced in line with Gilbert's infantry, until presently he observed immediately in his front a body of Sikh horse; his ten guns of H.A., Huish's troop, and four of Christie's, went to the front, and were in the act of unlimbering, to come into action against the enemy, when Pope advanced his line to the attack. The wing 9th Lancers, under Major Hope Grant, was on the right, then came wing 1st Light Cavalry, H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, and the wing 6th Light Cavalry. The Brigadier led in front of the 14th, and proceeded in as good order and as rapid a rate as the nature of the ground permitted, and soon got amongst the enemy; this advance of the brigade masked the fire of the H.A. guns, which were on the point of opening. The charge was delivered at a very slow pace and without any momentum, and Brigadier Pope was himself almost immediately wounded by a sword-cut on the head, and, being disabled, had to be conducted from the field. Now occurred what, happily, is a rare event in the annals of British cavalry. From some wholly inexplicable reason, some of the men, about the centre of the brigade, went about, and a movement began to the rear, others followed, and, notwithstanding the exertions of the officers, the centre gave way, and, followed by the remainder of that portion of the brigade, broke into a reckless stampede and galloped to the rear, as in their advance they had got in front of the guns, so now, in their headlong retreat, they rode right down upon them, overthrowing some and causing the greatest confusion and disorder, completely uncovering the right of Gilbert's division. A few Sikh horse galloped down in pursuit, and, seeing the guns in this helpless condition, cut down many of the men and severely wounded Major Christie, capturing, for the time, the guns. They succeeded in removing and taking away four guns and two wagons. The cavalry could not be stopped until they got clear of the field, and

were with difficulty rallied by the exertions of Colonel Pat Grant, Adjutant-General, and Major Fred Haines and Colonel Gough, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. The loss of the brigade was most trifling, and is proof of the unreasonable nature of the panic. The 9th Lancers lost three men killed, four wounded; the 14th Light Dragoons, one officer and one man killed, and fourteen men wounded; the 1st Light Cavalry, three men killed and four wounded; the 6th Light Cavalry, one European officer, two Native officers, four men killed, and two officers and eight men wounded. Major Christie died of his wounds, and seven of his men were killed and two wounded; Huish lost five killed, and five wounded. But fifty-three horses were carried off by the enemy, and ten guns H.A. rendered useless for the day, four of them being carried off as a triumph by the Sikhs.

This most serious disaster occurred as Gilbert was leading his division to the attack, and compelled him to refuse his right brigade in order, to some extent, to protect his right flank; but his troops behaved magnificently. Continuing their advance with perfect steadiness, covered by the very effective fire of No. 17 Field Battery, Mountain's brigade came upon a strong battery of the enemy in front of the village of Lullian and promptly charged, carrying the whole of the guns at the point of the bayonet; this attack was almost immediately followed by Godby's brigade, who also charged and carried the Sikh guns in their front. Godby now halted his brigade and re-formed his line, and was collecting the wounded, when suddenly a fire was opened on him from his rear. A large body of Sikhs had turned his flank (uncovered, as related, by the retreat of the cavalry) and got into his rear, and, in fact, he was surrounded. The journal of a subaltern of Godby's brigade records in stirring language the incidents of the day. Godby's order was coolly given, "Right about face." Major Dawes' battery, which seems to have been everywhere at the right moment, was splendidly handled, and moving to the right flank poured in a heavy fire and scattered the Sikh horsemen who attempted to charge, knocking over men and horses in heaps. Sir Walter Gilbert at this moment rode up, and, seeing Major Steele, commanding the 2nd Europeans, addressed him coolly and cheerily, "Well, Major, how are you? Do you think you are near enough to give those fellows a charge?" "By all means," answered Steele. "Well, let us see how you can do it." Such conduct was equal to a reinforcement of 1,000 men! In an instant the brigade, led by the 2nd Europeans, marched to the rear and, with a cheer, rushed upon the Sikhs. These fought manfully sword in hand, and strove to break through the line, but after a short, sharp struggle, they were swept away, and the 2nd Europeans again stood masters of the field. Mountain's brigade, equally well led, met with the same desperate resistance and were compelled to face about to repulse the enemy; about this time Colin Campbell, with Hoggan's brigade and White's cavalry, and the whole of the artillery of the left, now moved up and joined to Mountain's left. Penny's infantry, which was ordered up by Lord Gough on hearing of Pennycuik's disaster, and which, in the intricacies of the jungle, had moved diagonally from the centre towards

the right, suddenly found itself on the right of, and in front of Godby, where it also was attacked from front and right and rear, until Dawes, the ubiquitous, came to his aid and, by the fire of his guns, drove off the Sikhs. Campbell having joined on to Mountain's left, the whole of the artillery were brought forward, and opened a destructive fire upon the Sikhs, who were now in full retreat and in great disorder, moving towards Russool. That portion of Pope's cavalry brigade which had been detached to watch the enemy on the right took but little part in the fight. Colonel Lane, who does not seem to have been aware of the disaster to the main body of the brigade, remained far away to the right, nor did he afford any protection to Gilbert's right, as he undoubtedly should have done, but he watched a considerable body of the enemy who menaced an attack from the slopes of the Russool Hills, and opened fire on them with some effect; and, subsequently, after moving forward, he came upon large bodies of the Sikhs retiring from before the attacks of Gilbert and Campbell, upon whom he opened a heavy fire of grape from all his guns, completely dispersing them. About this time the action ceased. The Sikhs were driven from the field in the utmost disorder, and with the loss of almost all their guns, and an immense loss in killed and wounded.

Lord Gough had taken up a position in rear of the centre during the early part of the action—on hearing of Pennycuik's repulse he had ordered up Penny's brigade—and moved to the right on learning the still further disaster to Pope's brigade of cavalry, being anxious as to how matters stood in that direction. He followed on in rear of Gilbert's attack, and rode up to the centre where Campbell and Mountain still stood, the artillery pouring in their parting shots upon the Sikhs retiring upon Russool. Here, after a discussion with the Generals Commanding, it was decided to withdraw the army to a position in the rear, near the village of Chillianwalla. The infantry, exhausted by their long day's work and hard fights, and the want of water, were unable to continue a pursuit, which was the more impracticable, it being now past five o'clock and rapidly getting dark. Gilbert's Division lost of Godby's Brigade:—The 2nd Fusiliers, two European officers wounded, six men killed, and sixty wounded; 31st Regiment N.I., three men killed, one European officer, one Native officer and fifty-four men wounded; 70th Regiment N.I., two Native officers and three men killed, and twenty men wounded. Mountain's brigade:—29th Foot, thirty-one men killed, five European officers and 203 men wounded, and three missing; 30th Regiment N.I., two European officers, one Native officer, and sixty-four men killed, nine European officers, nine Native officers, and 200 men wounded; 56th Regiment N.I., two European officers, four Native officers, and thirty-nine men killed, and thirty-six missing (who may be added to the killed), six European officers, six Native officers, and 227 men wounded.

Dawes' battery No. 17, lost two officers wounded, and three men; three horses killed, one missing.

The loss of Penny's brigade amounted to twelve men killed, five European officers, one Native officer, and 103 men wounded.

As many of the captured guns as possible were tied up behind the

guns of our own artillery, but the greater number were left upon the field; and the British force withdrew for the night from the battle-field, and formed a bivouac about the village and Mound of Chillianwalla.

The Sikh army, after a hard struggle, had been completely defeated, driven in the greatest confusion and disorder from the positions they had occupied, with the loss for the time being of almost all their guns and an immense number of men. During the night they succeeded in removing the guns left by us upon the field, and took up a position at and about the village of Russool, on the rugged hills along the banks of the River Jhelum.

Early the following morning the British cavalry were out over the field; the dead were buried or removed to camp for interment. The Sikhs remained on the slopes of the hills, but did not venture to come down into the plain. Heavy clouds came rolling overhead, and rain, which had been threatening for some time, broke, and for several days it continued to pour in torrents, rendering the ground perfectly impassable, and putting out of the question any attempt to move.

The total loss of the British force was twenty-two officers, sixteen Native officers, and 561 men killed, and ninety-eight men missing, who may be added to the number; sixty-seven officers, twenty-seven Native officers; and 1,547 men wounded. Grand total, 2,338 men.

REFLECTIONS.

Chillianwalla has been called by some a doubtful victory, and by some even as a defeat; and by others as a specimen of Lord Gough's Tipperary Tactics.

Some errors of judgment may have been made. War is, even in the hands of the best commanders, a risky venture, but, notwithstanding the chequered events of the day, and the strokes of most evil fortune, Lord Gough stood, at the close, with his splendid troops, complete master of the field.

If Lord Gough was still doubtful as to an immediate attack, the force should not have been brought up within striking distance of the Sikhs. This must be conceded. It gave to Shere Singh the option of fighting or not; but Lord Gough perceived the situation with true military instinct, and without any hesitation accepted it rightly.

His orders for the delivery of the attack at Chillianwalla were precisely the same as those given subsequently at Goojerat, and it was his intention that the whole of the guns should have preceded the infantry and covered their assault.

The extraordinary and unparalleled disaster to the Cavalry brigade on the right was no fault of Lord Gough's. By it Gilbert's right was entirely uncovered, and he lost the protection of the Horse Artillery, as well as of the cavalry, which he otherwise would have had; and, by the repulse of Pennycuick's brigade, his left was also exposed to attack. Yet, in spite of these misfortunes, Gilbert's two brigades overcame all obstacles, captured the enemy's guns in their front at the point of the bayonet, and drove the Sikh infantry from the field.

Colin Campbell, unfortunately, conceived the idea that he could not carry out his proper duties as a divisional commander, and the influence of his guiding hand was sorely missed; the consequence was, his two brigades did not act in unison. The fact that the jungle through which the troops had to advance to the attack was dense, made it all the more imperative that the Divisional Commander should thoroughly exercise control over both brigades, so as to maintain the connection and regulate the pace. The right brigade, under Pennycuik, must have been carried too far to the right, and delivered their attack without the support of any guns, and in too hurried a manner; and, although officers and men behaved with the utmost gallantry and devotion, and succeeded in carrying the enemy's guns, the brigade was forced to give way under pressure of masses of Sikh infantry formed in support of their guns. The left brigade was most ably led by Campbell in person. Regulating the pace as he moved through the jungle, he arrived in presence of the enemy with his troops in good order; and, covered by the fire of all the guns on the left, he broke and defeated that portion of the Sikh line in front of him. Then, finding himself isolated from the rest of the army, he coolly, and with perfect steadiness, changed front to his right. Advancing against the Sikhs, he drove them before him, capturing all their guns, until he re-united himself with Mountain's brigade, when he wheeled again to his original front; in this movement rolling up and defeating the Sikh right, and the very troops that had just before repulsed his right brigade, of whose disaster he only heard in the course of this flank movement. In all this Colin Campbell was acting not in his proper and responsible position as a Divisional Commander, but as that of a Brigadier. Had he exercised his proper functions and controlled and regulated their advance, and allowed time for the two batteries of heavy guns to come up into action at a shorter range, they would have crushed and overwhelmed the enemy's central battery and have rendered Pennycuik's task an easy one.

The nature of the country was most impracticable for cavalry, but White's cavalry brigade on the left was carefully and steadily handled; and though Sir Joseph Thackwell attempted an attack, and failed, he yet succeeded in affording protection to the left.

Brigadier Pope was greatly to blame for his manner of handling his cavalry. Without any consideration, and at the very first sight of a few horsemen in his front, he ordered the nine squadrons of cavalry, under his immediate command, to advance to the attack, in one long line, without any support or reserve, thereby preventing the H.A., which was in the act of coming into action, from opening their fire. Broken by the jungle, the charge was badly delivered, and, instead of increasing the pace, the line was brought almost to a trot at the moment of collision; and the Brigadier himself being wounded by a sword-cut on the head, was taken to the rear, and through some unaccountable misapprehension was followed by the centre regiment, and then by the remainder in a panic flight, upsetting and disabling the ten H.A. guns, and rendering them unfit for further service throughout the day. The only fault that

can properly be laid to Lord Gough was his selection of Pope to command a cavalry brigade. It is needless to say that, had this cavalry been handled even with moderate ability and steadiness, the battle would have taken a very different turn, and in all probability the defeat of the Sikh army would have been complete and decisive.

The conduct of Colonel Lane, in command of a very strong body of cavalry—two squadrons 9th Lancers, one-and-a-half squadron 1st Light Cavalry, one-and-a-half squadron 6th Light Cavalry, and eight Horse Artillery guns—is inexplicable. He was detached by Brigadier Pope to the right in order to protect that flank. His attention being taken up by a few Sikh horsemen on the slopes of the Russool Hills, he lost all touch even of the cavalry on his left—so completely, he was not even aware of the disaster that happened to them. Beyond firing a few shots at some bodies of Sikhs who came under his observation, he took no part in the battle, and it was not till late in the afternoon he heard from an officer who rode up to him (Lieutenant de Teissier, H.A.) of the events of the day. When it became dark and the firing ceased, he retired towards the camp; but unable to find his way he bivouacked for the night in the first open space he came to. Had he closed into his left and kept touch with Gilbert's division, and acted with vigour, the force at his disposal and the fire of his H.A. guns would have effectually protected Gilbert's right, and have turned the scale entirely in our favour, and probably have rendered the victory a decisive one, notwithstanding the disaster to the cavalry brigade.

These reflections prove that Lord Gough was perfectly justified in deciding to attack the Sikh army, and that nothing but a chapter of accidents—for which he was in no way accountable—prevented it being a decisive success; and that, even as it was, the Sikh army was utterly routed and driven from the field.

AFTER CHILLIANWALLA.

The Sikhs retired by their left on to the position they had occupied on the range of hills at Russool.

Heavy rain fell the next day, rendering any move on either side impossible, and it continued for two or three days. On the night of the 18th a letter was brought in from Shere Singh expressing a wish for some mutual arrangements, but no notice was taken of it. On the 19th, General Elahee Buksh, commandant of Sikh artillery, with his two sons, Colonels of the same arm, and accompanied by a Colonel of infantry, came in. Elahee Buksh said the Sikh army was so disordered and completely beaten in the fight that, had we had another hour of daylight to follow them up, we must have captured all their guns, camp-stores, and baggage; and that even had we advanced the next day, the result would have been the same, and that out of nearly sixty guns he had taken into action fifty had been captured and spiked. These facts show how demoralised the Sikh army was immediately after the action. But the unfortunate incidents of the day, the heavy loss suffered in the action, the exhaustion of the troops owing to want of food and water immediately

after the action, followed by the heavy rain for two or three days, rendered all movement impossible. Lord Gough resolved that as circumstances had now turned out, he would simply quietly wait and watch the Sikh army until the fall of Mooltan enabled him to gather his whole army together, and with one crushing blow bring this war to a conclusion. Both forces remained quietly in their respective camps. On the 25th January it was rumoured in camp, through native sources, that Mooltan had fallen; and on the 26th official intelligence reached the Commander-in-Chief. A royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired to announce the news to the Sikhs.

Early in February, Shere Singh moved a portion of his force to Pooran, on the north side of the Russool Range, on the way to Jhelum; and on the 5th he occupied Korce, on the southern slope of the hills, and within five miles north of Dinghee—thus threatening our line of communications, which were still carried on by Dinghee. On the 9th, a grand review of this division was held in a very ostentatious manner, a large red flag being planted on the mound at Noor Jumal, and the Sikh Sirdars, mounted on elephants, were plainly visible from our camp. On the 11th, a demonstration was made from Korce on our rear face—the camp was pitched in the form of a square—but Lord Gough adhered quietly and firmly to his resolve to wait for all his troops before he would be tempted to a combat; it was his wish not to frighten the quarry away, but to encourage them to stay. A few squadrons of cavalry sufficed to hold the Sikhs in check. On the morning of the 14th all signs of the Sikh camp suddenly disappeared; but it was soon ascertained that they had marched by the north side of the Russool Range in the direction of Goojerat.

The Mooltan troops were now daily approaching, and it was not possible for the Sikh army to surprise the fords across the Chenab, which were carefully watched. Lord Gough on the 15th marched to Lussoorie, and on the 16th to Sadoolapore, on the banks of the Chenab, moving parallel to the Sikhs on Goojerat. On the 19th, he moved to Shadiwal, about five miles south of Goojerat, now occupied by the Sikhs; and on the evening of the 20th February, the Mooltan force having joined, the army of the Punjab was concentrated under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

The 1st Division of Infantry, under General Whish, in two brigades—1st, under Markham, the 32nd Foot, 49th and 51st Regiments N.I.; the 2nd, under Hervey, the 10th Foot, 8th and 72nd Regiments N.I.

The 2nd Infantry division, under Sir Walter Gilbert, with brigades under Mountain, the 29th Foot, 30th N.I. and 56th N.I.; and Brigadier Penny, the 2nd European Regiment, the 31st and 70th Regiments N.I.

The 3rd Infantry division, Colin Campbell, the same regiments as at Chillianwalla, with brigades commanded by Carnegie, McLeod, and Hoggan.

The Bombay column, under General Dundas, the 60th Rifles and 3rd Bombay N.I., the Bombay Fusiliers and the 19th N.I.

There were sixteen batteries of artillery numbering ninety-six guns, and the cavalry, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, 3rd Light Dragoons,

9th Lancers, 14th Light Dragoons, the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th Regiments Light Cavalry.

The Scinde Horse, 3rd, 9th, 11th, and 14th Regiments of Irregular Cavalry.

Brigadier-General Cheape commanded the Engineers and Sappers.

GOOJERAT.—21st FEBRUARY, 1849.

The dawn of the 21st February, the British force turned out as quietly and smartly as if for an ordinary field-day. The men all had a light breakfast, and by seven o'clock the line was formed in order of battle. The two armies, which had been facing each other so uneventfully after the last clash of arms at Chillianwalla, now five weeks ago, were drawn up for a still more decisive combat.

Never was there a more beautiful sight or a lovelier day. The British troops, in their bright uniforms, with dark patches dotted all along in front, which meant batteries of artillery numbering nearly 100 guns. The country a beautiful level field of young waving corn, with but very few trees. The force faced nearly due north; beyond, in the distance, was seen the town of Goojerat, surrounded by gardens and trees, and, somewhat nearer, two or three villages lying in the same cultivated plain. Here, in advance of the town, and, using these villages evidently as strong posts to hold on to, was formed up the Sikh army, their flanks protected by cavalry. In the background of this picture stood up, in the far-distant horizon, the magnificent snowy range of the Himalayas, away to the N.W.

The principal feature of the ground is a deep watercourse, or nullah, then dry, which is very tortuous, passing round nearly two sides of the town of Goojerat, winding to the west, it then takes a southerly direction, running through the centre of the ground occupied by Lord Gough with his force at Shadiwal. This nullah in its windings afforded cover to the Sikh infantry in front of their guns.

The left flank of the Sikh army rested upon a wet nullah, which flowed on a southerly course into the River Chenab.

Lord Gough determined to attack along the line of the dry bed of the nullah, previously mentioned, and formed his troops in the following order from the left:—White's Brigade of Cavalry, 3rd Light Dragoons, 8th Light Cavalry, 9th Lancers, and the Scinde Horse, with Huish and Duncan's troops—as they were then called—of Horse Artillery. Then came the Bombay column under General Dundas, in two brigades, and with them Blood's troop of Bombay Horse Artillery; then Colin Campbell's infantry division—three brigades, of which two were in the front line, under Brigadiers Carnegy and McLeod, while Hoggan's brigade was placed in the second line in direct support of the Bombay column. In support of Campbell's division were two light field batteries—No. 5, Major Ludlow; and No. 10, Lieutenant Robertson. This portion of the force was formed on the left of the nullah.

Upon the right of the nullah stood Sir Walter Gilbert, having

eighteen heavy guns on his left, under Majors Day and Horsford, with the batteries commanded by Sir Richmond Shakespear and Captain Shakespear. Gilbert's infantry consisted of two brigades, Mountain's and Penny's. On the extreme right of the infantry was placed General Whish's division, Harvey's brigade in the front line, and Markham's in the second, covered by three troops of Horse Artillery—Fordyce's, Mackenzie's and Anderson's—and for the present, Dawes' battery of Field Artillery, with Lane's and Kinleside's troops of H.A. were kept in reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind. The right flank of the infantry was protected by Brigadiers Lockwood's and Harsey's brigades of cavalry with Warner's troop of Horse Artillery. The 5th and 6th Light Cavalry, with the Bombay Light Field Battery, and the 45th and 69th Regiments Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer, were formed as reserve in charge of the rear and baggage.

At half-past seven the army advanced. The Sikhs commenced the ball by opening at long ranges, exposing both the position and range of their guns. Presently the whole of the British artillery advanced, the batteries in reserve having been brought up, covered by infantry skirmishers, at about nine o'clock took up a position in one long line, about 800 yards in front of the Sikhs, the first shot on the British side being fired by Major Dawes' battery, No. 17. The heavy guns opened fire at about 900 yards. Thus every available gun on the British side was brought up, and for nearly three hours continued a most destructive fire upon the Sikh artillery and infantry. These held on to their posts with most dogged and admirable resolution, but at length, completely over-matched both in weight of metal and efficiency of fire, they began to give way. During all this time very few changes had taken place in any of the batteries.

At about half-past eleven a general advance of the line was ordered, the artillery still preceding, and keeping up as heavy a fire as possible. Sir Walter Gilbert, seeing the village of Kalra apparently abandoned, sent forward a party of infantry to occupy it, but they were received by so sudden and heavy a fire that it was evident the Sikh infantry were still determined to struggle boldly for the honour of victory, and the 2nd European Infantry, of Brigadier Penny's brigade, were ordered to storm it, which was gallantly done under the leading of Major Steel and the Brigadier. The Sikh infantry also made one or two desperate endeavours to stem the torrent of retreat, and made attempts to advance against the brigades of Hervey and Markham on the right, but were on each occasion so severely dealt with by the guns of Fordyce, Anderson, and Mackenzie, that they broke and fled in confusion. Colin Campbell's division, on the left, did not fire a single shot—in fact, the fire of the batteries cleared the ground as they advanced for the infantry, and, except at the villages of Burra and Chota Kalra, they never came to close quarters.

The Afghan cavalry on both flanks had shown indications of a desire to extend round and turn our flanks, and Sir Joseph Thackwell, on the left, determined to attack them. For this purpose—it must have been

about half-past eleven o'clock—he ordered his left regiment, the Scinde Horse, supported by the 9th Lancers, in second line, to advance and charge; at the same time the 8th Light Cavalry and 3rd Light Dragoons, with the two batteries of Horse Artillery, advanced direct upon them, the batteries rapidly coming into action to cover the charge of the Scinde Horse. It was a glorious sight to see the Scinde Horse and 9th Lancers sweeping forward over the open plain, and in a few moments the whole Afghan force of cavalry turned and fled, and Thackwell found himself in possession of that portion of the Sikh camp, still standing round the “Bara durrie”—literally twelve doors, a conspicuous building in the Sikh camp—and that his advance had completely turned the right of the Sikh line. As the ground about here was, however, overgrown with trees, and he was considerably in advance of the left of the infantry, it became necessary to proceed with caution. The batteries were enabled to take up fresh positions, so as to enfilade the Sikh positions and cause them considerable loss, and hasten their retreat—which soon became general. On the right of the British lines the Afghan Horse also showed considerable enterprise and activity. Here there lay a wet nullah between them and us, and they extended so far as even to get into the rear of our cavalry; and a small party of about thirty men actually had the audacity (a peculiar trait of that nation) to pass and gallop along the very rear of the line of the British army, and even approached the spot where Lord Gough, surrounded by his staff, was superintending the general movements, when his Lordship directed his personal escort, a troop of the 5th Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Stanmer, to charge them, and they were cut to pieces after a sharp struggle. The whole of the Afghans were killed, the 5th Cavalry only having Lieutenant Stanmer and four men wounded. But though the constant manœuvring of the Afghan cavalry kept things lively on the right, no actual conflict took place.

By half-past twelve the Sikh army was hopelessly and completely defeated, and driven in disorder from the field. By one o'clock Lord Gough's troops were in complete possession of Goojerat, the Sikh camp, which had been left standing, all their baggage, and almost all their guns. The divisions of Whish, Gilbert, and Campbell passed Goojerat, leaving the town on their left; whilst Dundas, with the Bombay troops and Thackwell's cavalry, passed round to the other side. The whole of the cavalry pressed the retiring Sikhs for ten or twelve miles, and compelled them to drop more of their guns, so that they succeeded in getting away very few, and, but for the ground, which was cut up and intersected by ravines which favoured the retirement of their infantry and hindered the cavalry in pursuit, they would scarcely have been able to get away any body of men at all. Nor did the cavalry desist from pursuit till it was quite dark.

Upwards of fifty guns were captured on the field, and this splendid victory, annihilating the Sikh army, was gained with comparatively small loss—five officers and ninety-one men killed; twenty-four officers and 646 men wounded.

Gilbert, with a strong force of all arms, was despatched in pursuit,

which was pressed with such vigour that, on the 6th March, Shere Singh surrendered the European prisoners that had fallen into his hands at Attock and Peshawur, and was informed that the only terms admissible were an unconditional surrender. On the 14th March, Rajahs Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh, and the remaining Sikh leaders, surrendered themselves to Sir Walter Gilbert with the broken remnants of the Sikh army, who laid down their arms in the presence of the British troops. Forty-nine more guns were delivered up.

On the 30th March the Annexation of the Punjab was proclaimed.

REFLECTIONS ON GOOJERAT.

There are few battles of which it cannot be said that "someone had blundered," but Goojerat is one of them; it was fought with such perfection of combination of all arms that there is no fault to be found with it.

The sudden break up of Shere Singh from his strong position at Russool, and his march on Goojerat, can only be accounted for on the supposition that he hoped to cause alarm at Lahore and perhaps a rising in his favour—it was impossible that he could have crossed the Chenab and marched successfully on Lahore. Lord Gough held the interior lines, and was nearer to the fords than he was, and would have caught him in the act. The fords at Wazirabad and Ramnuggur were held in sufficient strength by us, and the Mooltan force was closing up day by day and would have also caught him. The movement on Shere Singh's part was altogether a mistake.

Both the design and execution of the attack leave little room for comment. The Artillery prepared the way vigorously and effectually, and left the Infantry little to do; it has been shown that Colin Campbell's division never fired a shot, and the only attempt made by the Sikhs to stand was at the two outposts of Burra and Chota Kalra, which were stormed by Gilbert. Thackwell's handling of the Cavalry on the left was perfect, and precisely at the right time and in the right way he delivered his attack. Supported by the fire of two "troops" of Horse Artillery and the advance of the remainder of the brigade, the two flank regiments—the Scinde Horse in first line and 9th Lancers in second—charged the Sikh and Afghan Horse, who were completely defeated and fled from the field. This success placed him on the right flank of the Sikh Infantry, and in an awkward position for those attempting to resist the advance of our centre, and precipitated their retreat.


The Cavalry on our right had not the same chance, as in front of them lay a boggy wet nullah. As soon as the Infantry carried the Sikh position, the whole of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery were launched in pursuit, and pressed the Sikh retreat till quite dark, compelling them to disperse and drop many more guns, and reducing the Sikh army to a rabble.

Chillianwalla and Goojerat must be studied together; the attack in both actions was intended to be delivered in the same way, constantly


supported by Artillery fire. The lessons learnt at Chillianwalla were not forgotten at Goojerat, and the result was a glorious victory, vindicating the reputation of Lord Gough and proving him to be one of England's most successful commanders.

SKETCH MAP
OF THE POSITIONS
IN THE
BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLA.
NEAR THE JELUM. (HYDASPES)
13th January, 1849.

SCALE OF MILES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




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THE BATTLE OF GOOGERAT.

The troops and batteries of Artillery in the above Plan were commanded by the following officers:—

- | | | | |
|------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Huish. | 5. Robertson. | 9. Horsford. | 13. Warner. |
| 2. Duncan. | 6. Lane (previously 14). | 10. Fordyce. | 14. See No. 6. |
| 3. Blood. | 7. Day. | 11. Anderson. | 15. Kinside. |
| 4. Faulow. | 8. Druwe. | 12. Mackenzie. | 16. Shakspeare. |



THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLA.

- | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | |
|---|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. White's Brigade (3rd Lt. Drags., 5th and 8th Light Cavalry). | A 36th N.I. | G 30th N.I. | } Mountain's Brigade. |
| 2. Pope's Brigade (14th Dragoons, squadron of 9th Lancers, &c.) | B H.M. 61st | H H.M. 24th | |
| | C 46th N.I. | I 56th N.I. | |
| | D 45th N.I. | K 31st N.I. | } Godby's Brigade. |
| | E H.M. 24th | L 2nd Europeans | |
| | F 25th N.I. | M 70th N.I. | |
| 1. Heavy guns. | | N 15th and 69th N.T. | Br. Penny. |
| 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Field Bat. & H.A. | | | |