

it into line with such terms as *vis inertia*. But I have nothing new to say on this head. On the still harder puzzle of *idea idea* I do not think Mr. Joachim and I really differ much. He says (p. 237, a): 'Spinoza's use of the term *idea* is ambiguous, not because it means for him both soul and thought of the body, but because it means both "reflective thought" and "feeling"'. I can accept this with no greater variation than reading 'not only because,' etc.

I will allow myself one more remark in the nature of a personal explanation. It was never my intention to deny (p. 298) that all modes, i.e., finite things, are in one sense eternal, 'in so far as they are conceived in their necessary dependence on God,' which correctly expresses Spinoza's *sub specie eternitatis*. Nor do I understand how any careful reader of the *Ethics* could deny it. But this general property of Modes is consistent with the human mind being capable of eternity in a more eminent sense, namely, by its power of reflective consciousness, which may become a clear and adequate consciousness of union with God; and I can hardly think that Mr. Joachim, in turn, means to deny this.

These notes are brief, but those who are already acquainted with Spinoza will not need anything longer; and it seems only fitting to give Mr. Joachim the same honour that he gives to Spinoza, that of assuming that the reader who is seriously interested at all will have the book before him, and will not expect the comment to be clear without the text. Brief as I have been, I have not thought it necessary to avoid minute points. Whoever walks with Spinoza must be content to walk *inter apices philosophiæ*; and in work so thorough as Mr. Joachim's nothing is too small to count.

F. POLLOCK.

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*The Works of George Berkeley.* With Prefaces, etc., by ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, Hon. D.C.L. Oxford, Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and Edinburgh, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1901. 4 vols. Pp. lxxxix., 527; i., 415; vi., 412; viii., 611.

PROF. FRASER, to whom we owe the most complete collection of Berkeley's Works, has, in his eighty-second year, undertaken a new edition. Comparing it with the four volumes which he published in 1871, we notice that one part of the old edition is not contained in the present, namely the biography which constituted the former half of the volume entitled "Life and Letters". Only the outline of a biography, intended to serve as an introduction to the Works, is prefixed to the new edition, and the old volume (which is still in stock) is to remain "as a magazine of facts for reference". As things are, this was, no doubt, the best course to take, although the old biography can no longer pretend to be

what it was, when it first appeared: a complete collection of the letters and other biographical materials extant. I hope to have another opportunity of offering a little contribution towards the completeness of their list, but must here restrict myself to the matter common to both editions or added in the new one.

Great improvements have been made. The alterations consist chiefly in a new order of the Works, a revision of the prefaces and footnotes, and the incorporation of new discoveries.

The new arrangement of the Works is very satisfactory. The first three volumes contain the strictly philosophical works in chronological order; the fourth volume consists of the rest of Berkeley's writings, also in chronological order. Thus, the first volume contains the so-called "Commonplace Book," the "New Theory of Vision," the "Principles of Human Knowledge," the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," and the Latin treatise "De Motu," in short, all the works constituting Berkeley's metaphysics in its early, i.e., its classical form. The second volume contains "Aloiphron" and the "Theory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained," the third "The Analyst" and "Siris," together with the writings connected with those two works. This distribution greatly facilitates the use of the new edition.

Prof. Fraser has, in great part, rewritten the prefaces, embodying, of course, such materials as were first published in his smaller biography (in Knight's "Philosophical Classics"). Among the numerous footnotes I think those most valuable which refer the reader to other passages dealing with the same question, and those which provide biographical notices about persons mentioned in the text or explain references to contemporary life. I have to correct here only one little mistake which I happened to notice. In the Dedication to the Earl of Pembroke, prefixed to the "Principles of Human Knowledge," Berkeley mentions the "bounty which you have been pleased to show towards our Society". This society was not, as Fraser states in a footnote, Trinity College (Dublin), but the Dublin Philosophical Society, with the Earl of Pembroke as its president and Berkeley among its members. I will also mention here that the fact of the date of one of Berkeley's sermons being earlier than that of his ordination as a deacon (see iv., 86), is to be explained by a passage in the old college statutes, prescribing that all Resident Masters of Arts, whether clerical or lay, had to deliver short sermons in their turn. This biographical and historical commentary is very helpful, and might perhaps even be augmented a little here and there. On the other hand, I am rather doubtful whether it be advisable to introduce, in a standard edition like the present, notes which are intended to explain or criticise the philosopher's doctrine, or to compare it with that of other philosophers. It must be always very difficult, if not impossible, to avoid, in such notes, a great amount of subjective bias, as to their range as well as their contents. Besides, Berkeley's style of writing hardly calls for explanatory comments, except where beginners in philosophy

are concerned, and they would probably turn rather to a book like Fraser's *Selections from Berkeley*, where such a commentary is perfectly justifiable and appreciable. But, however one may think on these points, it must be acknowledged that, in the new edition, Prof. Fraser has striven to condense such notes and to lessen their subjectivity, as will be seen, *e.g.*, by referring to those passages of the first edition which laid stress on Berkeley's supposed "Dualism".

One mistake in the footnotes is rather surprising, coming as it does from such a specialist on Berkeley. The "New Theory of Vision," so very interesting to the psychologist, contains some curious reflexions on the Minimum Sensibile (Minimum Visibile and Minimum Tangibile), which cannot fail to remind one of later speculations on space-perception, such as were carried on for example by Lotze. Now, these reflexions are to be found as early as in the "Commonplace Book," where Berkeley uses the abbreviations M. S., M. V., M. T. (see i., 11). His definition of "M. S." as "that wherein there are not contained distinguishable sensible parts" does not leave room for the slightest doubt that those abbreviations stand for the above-mentioned Latin phrases. But Prof. Fraser reads them "matter sensible," "matter visible," "matter tangible" — an explanation which deprives those interesting passages of all meaning. In reading this I could not help being reminded of Prof. Fraser's somewhat high-handed remarks on the speculations of "some German savants," such as "Lotze, Helmholtz, or Wundt," which he thinks of "little philosophical value," at least "from Berkeley's point of view," and only of "physiological interest". Do not England and the Continent suffer from two opposite extremes, psychology being, in some quarters, as much overvalued here as underrated there? At any rate, Berkeley himself, or, let us rather say, the young Berkeley, was in this respect more modern than his critic, as was already pointed out on a former occasion in this same periodical by George Croom Robertson, its then editor. And some intimacy with recent psychological literature would certainly not be useless to an annotator of the "New Theory". It is, *e.g.*, a little strange to find in a book published in 1901 a list of the more important cases of persons born blind and healed afterwards, ending with a case of 1858 as "one of the last and best described" (see ii., 413).

While Prof. Fraser's first edition was in the press he discovered a third edition of "Alciphron" and the original edition of the "Querist". In both cases he gave in an appendix the differences which he found in these two editions. They were for the first time printed in full by Mr. George Sampson in his more popular but careful edition of *Berkeley's Works* (in "Bohn's Library," 1897-8). Mr. Sampson further discovered, besides another (spurious) third edition of "Alciphron," a letter addressed by Berkeley as Bishop of Cloyne to his clergy in 1745. This letter is, of course, now also to be found in Fraser's new edition. As to the "Querist," the numerous

queries contained in the first edition, and omitted afterwards, are again given in an appendix. No doubt Prof. Fraser was right in deeming it unnecessary to print both editions in full like Mr. Sampson; but would it not have been much preferable to print the complete text of the first edition, enclosing in brackets those queries which were omitted later on? With regard to "Aloiphron" the new edition professes to take notice of the alterations introduced by the philosopher in the second and third editions of these dialogues. But a comparison with the appendix to the second volume of the old edition, as well as with that of Mr. Sampson, would show that this has not been done very carefully.

As the original editions are far out of my reach at this moment, I do not know to what degree the new edition has otherwise followed the principle of noting scrupulously all alterations, even the smallest, introduced by the author in later editions. I think this principle indispensable for every standard edition of a great philosopher. For, however trifling such differences may often appear at first glance, every one who has ever tried to follow the development of a philosopher's doctrine knows that additional light may sometimes be thrown on such researches by differences which, to another reader, would seem quite insignificant. For the same reason, I should have liked to see the "Commonplace Book" edited with pedantic accuracy and without any omissions. That very small and external things sometimes can afford an interesting insight can be seen in the little booklet in the library of Trinity College (Dublin) which contains, in Berkeley's own handwriting, the first sketch of the introduction to the "Principles". The dates written on the margin of the MS. show that the young philosopher wrote his book in small but pretty regular daily portions, as if he had set himself a daily task. This cannot be gathered from Fraser's edition, which gives only two or three of those dates, picked out at random. An exact philologist would further take exception to the method of enclosing extracts from letters in quotation marks, when the original words are abridged and otherwise altered, even though the sense be the same.

Prof. Fraser must himself have seen the little booklet just mentioned, for he says he found it in the library of Trinity College. Under these circumstances, I cannot understand why he did not include in his edition a sermon on "Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven," which is contained in the same little volume. It is of greater philosophical interest than most of the sermons and skeletons of sermons which he has published.

While the new edition was in the press, some more writings of the philosopher came to light. Prof. Swift Paine Johnston of Dublin discovered, also in the library of Trinity College, an essay "Of Infinites," which he published in *Hermathena* (xxvi., 1900), just in time for Prof. Fraser to affix it as an appendix to the third volume. I succeeded myself in identifying an anonymous political tract ("Advice to the Tories Who Have Taken

the Oaths") as coming from Berkeley's pen. It is directed against the Jacobites and was published by me in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (xiv., 312), too late, I am sorry to say, to be embodied in the present edition.

In a former article in the *Archiv* (xiii., 541; see also *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 3rd series, vi., 272) I had proved that a letter, hitherto ascribed to the philosopher, was in reality written by a namesake of his, also a clergyman, and I had mentioned a suspicion that the facsimile of Berkeley's handwriting under his portrait (in the old edition) had been taken from this very letter, not written by the philosopher at all. In the new edition, that facsimile has been replaced by another—I do not know whether for the reason just mentioned. Prof. Fraser does not say anything about it, nor does he state from what document the new facsimile was taken; but he accepts my theory concerning that letter (see i., p. xlii).

I am afraid the confounding of two persons with the same or a similar name has played him another trick. The letters between the philosopher and Lord Egmont can leave but little doubt that there is another Mr. Clerke among his friends, besides the famous metaphysician Dr. Samuel Clarke. But in the short biography prefixed to the new edition these two appear under the name Clarke as one and the same person. (see index).

On the whole, we have to thank Prof. Fraser for having founded a standard edition of Berkeley's Works. And if we point out that there is room for further improvements, no one will probably acknowledge that more readily than he himself, as he says in his preface: . . . "I offer these volumes which still imperfectly realise my ideal of a final Oxford edition of the philosopher who spent his last days in Oxford, and whose mortal remains rest in its Cathedral".

THEODOR LORENZ.