

the Vedic Indians saw Indra, you must go to the Sarasvatī country south of Ambāla.

So with individual hymns. Dr. Arnold holds that the Vimada hymns, X, 20–26, belong to the very oldest in the Ṛgveda, and that e.g. X, 20 is much older than I, 1. We confess that we prefer the ordinary view that the Vimada hymns, instead of being early, are badly written and late imitations in elaborate metres much beyond the powers of the poet. The first line of X, 20, 2, which is unmetrical (*agnim īle bhujām yāvīṣṭham*), is surely deliberately put at the head of the collection (for v. 1 is merely a fragment of a refrain) in imitation of the famous *agnim īle* of I, 1, 1, and shows that the Vimada hymns are later than even that not very early hymn and the collection associated with it. What may be marks of antiquity may equally well in some cases, as in this, be signs of the incompetence of the poet.

The doubts we feel about Dr. Arnold's results apply mainly to his treatment of the first four of the periods into which he divides the hymns, and he has rendered a valuable service by the careful examination and determination of the features characteristic of the 'popular' Ṛgveda.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS. By PAUL DEUSSEN.
Translated by Rev. A. S. GEDEN. (Edinburgh, 1906.)

Mr. Geden has rendered a valuable service to students of Indian Philosophy by this translation of the second part of vol. i of Professor Deussen's General History of Philosophy, which originally appeared in 1899. Professor Deussen's work has long been recognised as the most important treatise on the Upanishads; it has proved a great stimulus to their study, and has raised in a new form the old controversy as to the meaning of these treatises.

Professor Deussen is a follower of Kant and Schopenhauer, and, like the latter, regards the Upanishads as containing one of the great philosophies of the world. With a vastly

wider philosophic knowledge, he supports the interpretation of the Upanishads assigned by Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara, and endeavours to trace through them the development of subsequent Indian philosophy. His view may perhaps be summed up in the following propositions:—(1) *Upaniṣad* originally meant a secret word such as a name of the ātman like *tajjalān* or *tadvanam*. (2) These names were the expressions of a doctrine of the ātman as first principle of the universe, which, though possibly originating in Brāhmaṇic circles, was developed by the Kṣatriyas in opposition to the principles of the Brāhmaṇic ritual. (3) The Brāhmaṇic *sākhās* soon took up these ideas and developed them, bringing them into accord with the ritual tradition by interpreting the latter in the spirit of the ātman doctrine, as in the *Āraṇyakas*. Later arose the Upanishads, which represent the final results of much enquiry. (4) The oldest and most fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads is that of Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, which asserts (1) that the ātman is the knowing subject, (2) and as such unknowable, (3) and is the sole reality, all else being illusion (though the word *māyā* does not occur before the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*), (4) that on attaining true knowledge the individual is brahma, whereas other persons go through successive transmigrations. (5) This doctrine, which he styles 'Idealism,' is easily changed into Pantheism by regarding the universe as real, though identical with the ātman. This is a view found in even the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* itself, and is a concession to the empirical belief in the reality of the universe. By regarding the relation of the universe to the ātman as causal is obtained the cosmogonic point of view found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* and later. This develops into Theism, when in the *Kāthaka* and *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads* the ātman enters into the created universe as an individual soul. The next step leads to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, when the universal soul is dispensed with and *prakṛti* evolves itself unassisted by a deity for the individual *puruṣas*, now regarded as unlimited in number.

Attractive as the development is, it is open to some

criticism. The derivation of *upanishad* as meaning a secret word seems too restricted, and it appears better to adhere to the more general meaning of secret doctrine or secret explanation,¹ especially as the explanation of such secret words is not relatively a great part of the Upanishads. Nor can it be regarded as very probable that Kṣatriyas especially developed the doctrine. The instances of kings instructing Brāhmaṇas (pp. 17 sq.) do show that, as indeed we would expect, at the date of the composition of the Upanishads the severance of priest and warrior had not gone to extreme lengths, but we must also remember that priests were human and flattered princes generous givers of cows. There seems no satisfactory ground for doubt that the development of the ātman doctrine was a continuous one and conducted by the Brāhmaṇas.

More important is the question of the historical relations of Idealism and Pantheism, and the relative importance of either in the Upanishads. Professor Deussen's theory regards Idealism as expounded by Yājñavalkya as the fundamental doctrine, which merges into Pantheism and later into 'Cosmogony.' This view is natural, if it be accepted that the Yājñavalkya sections of the *Brhadāranyaka Upanishad* are the oldest representatives of the Upanishads extant. As a matter of fact, they are undoubtedly older than the *Chāndogya Upanishad* (cf. pp. 105, 205, 233), the *Taittirīya*, and the *Kauṣītaki*. But it may seriously be doubted whether there is not an older stage of doctrine to be found in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. That work contains three Upanishads, corresponding to *Āraṇyaka* ii, 1-3, ii, 4-6, and iii respectively. Of these, ii, 1-3, and ii, 4-6 are probably anterior to the *Brhadāranyaka*, and ii, 1-3 is the older. This seems to follow from the facts which we will now enumerate:—(1) The doctrine of the *Āraṇyaka* is mainly an allegorical account of the *Uktha*, and it fits itself very closely on to the Brāhmaṇa. The philosophical context is not large and is obscurely expressed. On the whole, it

¹ Max Müller, S.B.E., I, lxxxiii.

is therefore more probably ancient than so definitely philosophical discussions as those of Yājñavalkya. (2) The doctrine of both Upanishads is purely pantheistic or cosmogonic (it is not possible, we consider, to separate these ideas in these early Upanishads). The latter (ii, 4-6) shows a certain development as compared with the former. It adopts the term *ātman* as against *puruṣa-prāṇa*, and recognizes the nature of the *ātman* as *prajñā*, an idea not so clearly expressed in the former (see, however, ii, 3, 2). But though the author of ii, 4-6 agrees with Yājñavalkya in recognizing the *ātman* as thought, he does not show any knowledge of the more special doctrines which constitute the characteristic signs of Yājñavalkya's Idealism. Thus (a) he does not assert that the knower cannot be known. This idea occurs only in the later Upanishad, *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* iii, 2, 4, 19. (b) He does not regard the *ātman* as alone real, the rest being truly unreal. It is indeed doubtful how far Yājñavalkya himself held this view, but it is a logical result of his thought, and the *Chāndogya Upanishad*, vi, 1, 3, already has the phrase *vācārambhaṇam* of plurality. The *Aitareya* is consistently pantheistic or cosmogonic. The *ātman* is the world or produces it, but its reality is not impugned. The point is an important one, because on it depends the question of the validity of interests in the world. To a Pantheist the world is the revelation of the divinity, to the Idealist it is the cloud which hides it. Indian philosophy is not absolutely dominated by Idealism. There is always a strong school of Pantheists, who regard the world as no mere illusion, but a living truth. Dr. Thibaut has recently shown that this is the point of view in all probability of Bādarāyaṇa; it is that of Rāmānuja and of Rāmānanda, and the space allotted to it in the *Sarvadarśana-Saṃgraha* demonstrates its real importance. It assumes, indeed, in these writers a theistic tinge, and is inferior in philosophic value to the system of Śaṅkara, but from the practical point of view it is undoubtedly superior. It may be interesting to note that Viśveśvaratīrtha and Ānandatīrtha have commented in a Vaiṣṇava sense on the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* ii, iii. It

naturally follows that (c) the result of knowledge in the individual is not emancipation. The man who knows the various doctrines of ii, 4-6 becomes immortal. Sāyaṇa, following Śaṅkara, interprets this, of course, as referring to *mukti*, but this is merely scholastic. There is not a trace of evidence that the authors of the Upanishads in the *Āraṇyaka* understood the doctrine of *mukti*. Further (d), there is no clear trace of the doctrine of transmigration, even in the form in which it appears in *Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad* iv, 4, 5. What happens to the unenlightened man is not specified, possibly it was thought of as in the *Brāhmaṇas* (Deussen, p. 327) as recurrent death. There is indeed an apparent reference to transmigration proper in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* ii, 3, 2, 5, in the words *yathāprajñam hi sambhavāḥ*, which Max Müller renders "for they are born according to their knowledge in a former life," as it was taken by Sāyaṇa. This meaning does not particularly well fit the context, and the words should probably be translated "for their experiences are according to their measure of intelligence."

There are other points in which the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* ii is older than the *Brhadāraṇyaka*, but the evidence seems clearly to show that we have in the *Āraṇyaka* a pantheistic view older than the idealistic, and if we accept this result we will be inclined to interpret the Upanishads generally either pantheistically or idealistically, as may best suit each passage. Indeed, probably the idealistic view is the rarer, as it is the more subtle, and able as are Śaṅkara's efforts to explain away discrepancies, we must be prepared to admit that the two lines of thought are not capable of ultimate agreement.

Among the many other interesting questions raised by Professor Deussen, we must be content with referring to his theory of the origin of the Sāṅkhya doctrine (ch. x). He accounts for the curious position of *prakṛti* by the theory that Sāṅkhya is a Theism with the deity omitted, *prakṛti* being permitted to evolve itself. Perhaps the theory of the Sāṅkhya system is deeper; puruṣa seems to be the absolute subject—the transcendental unity of apprehension—made

into a self-existing entity and opposed to the object as *prakṛti*. The system would thus, however illogical, be one of pure Idealism and in full sympathy with the Vedānta.

We must add that Mr. Geden's translation is accurate and readable. We do not, however, know why Yājñavalkya is throughout spelled Yājñavalkhya.

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SOME SAYINGS FROM THE UPANISHADS.

By Dr. L. D. BARNETT.

In this little book Dr. Barnett has made accessible to English readers the most important passages of the Upanishads—the teaching of Uddālaka from the *Chāndogya Upanishad*, of Yājñavalkya from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, and the legend of Naciketas from the *Kaṭha Upanishad*. He has accompanied his renderings with analyses of the parts translated, which will be of considerable assistance to the reader in grasping the thought of the Upanishads, and his presentation of the subject will undoubtedly convey an attractive impression of the philosophic value of these old enquiries.

One or two points on which Dr. Barnett takes views other than those usual seem to call for remark. He considers (p. 47) that the expression *aṇimā* in the *Chāndogya* shows that the absolute was conceived as essentially material substance, though without any attributes of materiality, and that being, thought, and matter were ultimately one to the author. This seems to press unduly the literal meaning of *aṇimā*, and, though the idea of thought which does not think is a strange one to us, yet it seems plain that this was the conception of being present to the mind of the author, whereas matter is a product of being, with which, however, it is not identical. Again (p. 58), it is suggested to take *aśakad* in *Kaṭha Upanishad*, vi, 4, as the negative *a* combined with