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Raeder's *Philosophic Development of Plato* Platons *Philosophische Entwicklung*. Von Hans Raeder, von der Königlich Dänischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Gekrönte Preisschrift. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1905. 8vo. Pp. 435. M. 8.

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perhaps as late as 550.—What a house of cards! It does not follow that Arctinus borrowed the funeral of Achilles from ω ; Thetis presumably intervened at her son's death from the beginning of legend. It does not follow that ω is as late as 700 because Sicily is mentioned in it. Were Sicilian slaves unheard of till the foundation of Syracuse? Knowledge of a place, and some relations with it, must be assumed to exist before a colony is sent out.¹ ω may be given another hundred years; and Arctinus may

¹ The Sicels it is admitted are mentioned ν 383, and Hesiod discusses the formation of the island fr. 183.

return to his traditional date of ol. 9 (Artemon the chronologer of Clazomenae).

This book will meet I expect with no too warm a reception in its own land. With us, who regard facts, and make light of pseudoliterary canons, it should be welcome. We hope the learned author will try his hand at the *Iliad*, and at the Homeric question generally, for without a place and time for Homer, 'interpolation' has hardly a meaning. My own opinion of the book is doubtful. When I think of all the other critics I say *ὁλος πέννυται*; when I open Homer I repeat the Cambridge epigram, *σφόδρα Τεύτων*. T. W. ALLEN.

RAEDER'S PHILOSOPHIC DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO.

Platons Philosophische Entwicklung. Von HANS RAEDER, von der Königlich Dänischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Gekrönte Preisschrift. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1905. 8vo. Pp. 435. M. 8.

PLATONIC students have no reason to complain of the quantity of the books dealing with their subject which have appeared during the last decade. For, not to mention slighter works devoted to the elucidation of special problems or of particular dialogues, there have been published within this period quite a number of volumes which aim at expounding more or less completely and systematically the whole range of Plato's doctrine, such as those by Lutoslawski, Gomperz, Natorp, and now finally by M. Raeder. It would be interesting to compare the main features of these latest expositors, but I must content myself here with the general observation that they all break away from the Zellerian tradition, and all bear witness to the current popularity of 'stylo-metric' methods and of views which ascribe to Plato what is euphemistically termed 'Entwicklung.'

M. Raeder commences with a chapter on the history and present position of 'the Platonic question,' in which the methods and results of the chief systematic expositors of Platonism—Schleiermacher, Hermann, Ribbing, Zeller, Ueberweg, Grote, Gomperz—are briefly stated and estimated. The second chapter discusses, first, questions of authenticity; and with regard to these M. Raeder is decidedly conservative, vindicating, for example, the Platonic authorship

of the *Hippias major* and *minor*, as against Horneffer, as well as rejecting the more extreme views of Schaarschmidt and Horn. The second section is occupied with the 'stylo-metrists'—Campbell, Dittenberger, Lutoslawski, and the rest; various points in Lutoslawski's method are criticized, and, it is shown that it is open to the charge of what is civilly described as 'willkürliches Verfahren' (p. 35). M. Raeder, however, seems inclined to attach a good deal of weight to 'stylo-metric' results, when carefully sifted, as providing a criterion for chronology superior in objectivity to that derivable from philosophic interpretations. In the following sections the subjects treated are the literary form and dramatic setting of the dialogues, the literary and historical references they contain, and the general character of their philosophic content, whether positive or negative, constructive or critical; and all these matters, like those which occupy the earlier sections, are handled mainly from the point of view of their bearing on the chronological sequence of the Platonic writings. For the main purpose of M. Raeder's book is, in fact, to establish a certain fixed order for the dialogues. And the order he arrives at is this: (1) the Socratic dialogues—*Apol.*, *Ion*, *Hipp. min.*, *Lach.*, *Charm.*, *Crito*: (2) *Hipp. maj.*, *Protag.*, *Gorg.*: (3) *Menex.*, *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Euthyd.*, *Cratylus*: (4) *Lysis*, *Sympos.*, *Phaedo*: (5) *Republic*: (6) *Phaedrus*: (7) *Theaet.*, *Parmen.*: (8) *Soph.*, *Polit.*: (9) *Phileb.*, *Tim.*, *Critias*: (10) *Laws*, *Epinomis*.

It will be seen from this list that

M. Raeder's order agrees in general with that of 'stylometrists' like Lutoslawski, and of the adherents of the 'later theory' doctrine. There is nothing novel or striking in this order in itself: the interesting question is, what interpretation of Platonism lies behind this order? To ascribe to Platonic doctrine an 'Entwicklung' may mean much or little: how much it means in M. Raeder's case will presently be seen.

M. Raeder deals separately with each dialogue, and in his discussions of relative position and date he furnishes a useful collection of the views of his predecessors. Some of the arguments, however, upon which he bases his conclusions are of doubtful value, and, like most Platonic expositors, he seems guilty occasionally of special pleading. For example, in attempting to fix the date of the *Cratylus* there is very little solid ground to go upon. M. Raeder, however, feels sure that it is inseparable from the *Euthydemus*: possibly he is right, possibly not. But how does it stand with reference to the *Phaedo* or *Symposium*? M. Raeder answers with equal confidence that it must be prior to both these dialogues, because, forsooth, it contains no mention of a separate 'Ideenwelt' or of systematic grades of Being. And if it be objected that the *Cratylus*—and perhaps even the *Gorgias* (dated by our critic before 390 B.C.)—seems to approximate to the still later *Republic* in so far as it mentions an Idea of an art-object (389 B), this must be explained away as something which involves no theory of 'übersinnlichen Ideen.' The *Cratylus* for its sins, must on no account be allowed to set foot beyond the 'court of the Gentiles': it is at the best merely 'introductory' to the dialogues which expound Idealism. Similarly, in a manner that savours too much of Teutonic vigour and rigour, we are assured that the *Symposium* must be posterior to all dialogues which speak of the Notion (Begriff an sich) as inherent (anwesend), because it 'gives us only the 'transcendent' Idea (p. 167). This argument is, to my mind, just about as good, or as bad, as that which makes the *Symposium* comparatively early because it mentions only one Idea.

Apparent inconsistencies in Plato's psychology are used as grounds for equally dubious inferences. For whereas in the *Phaedo*, the soul is represented as a unity, in the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus* it is regarded as tri-partite or bi-partite. M. Raeder insists that all the varied statements must be construed *au pied de la lettre*, and holds that the unitarian doctrine of the *Phaedo*

proves that dialogue to be earlier than the others. He will not allow us to dodge the difficulty by assuming the lower parts of the soul to be non-essential, and due to its corporeal manifestation: he pins us down to the letter of the text, and would force us to believe that the horses in the *Phaedrus* myth are of necessity equally immortal with their driver. The most poetic of writers must be rendered into the baldest of logical prose—when it suits our thesis! And the thesis which M. Raeder seems specially concerned to maintain in this connexion is the comparative lateness of the *Phaedrus*: it is later we are told—as M. Lutoslawski told us before—than any of the 'middle' period dialogues, not excepting the *Republic*. As against Gomperz and Natorp, who refused to accept this conclusion, M. Raeder argues that to regard the *Phaedrus*, with its tone of awe and mystery, as giving the primary exposition of Idealism is to assume an unjustifiable identification of Plato himself with the Platonic Socrates, and to misconstrue what is merely a literary device due to the desire for dramatic effect. Herein we find a recognition of the truth that Plato was a literary artist as well as a logician, and a doubt of the wisdom of interpreting his every expression with the prosaic literalness of the pedant. But for the most part, M. Raeder seems to lose sight both of this doubt and of this recognition in his handling of the arguments and counter-arguments. The method by which he endeavours to extract an argument for assigning a relatively late date to the *Phaedrus* from a comparison of the eschatological myths of the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, strikes one as supremely matter-of-fact. Equally pedantic is the syllogism that, because the τροφή δοξασι of *Phaedr.* 248 B would be a riddle for readers ignorant of *Rep.* v. and because a riddle is inadmissible in a 'Streitschrift,' and the *Phaedrus* is a 'Streitschrift,' therefore the *Phaedrus* is posterior to the *Republic*. Nor are the arguments for proving the *Phaedrus* posterior to the *Symposium* a whit more substantial: in fact, to my mind, there is more to be said for the views of Ueberweg, Bruns, and the others who make the *Symposium* the later dialogue than for the refutation here attempted.

In his treatment of the *Republic* M. Raeder shows, I think, good sense in siding with the advocates of unity; although, if one is a stickler for Platonic evolution, perhaps consistency lies rather with the dissecting school. Similar good sense is shown in the rejection as worthless of the argu-

ments drawn by Zeller and others for the date of the *Theaetetus* from the statements about the Heracleian kings (175 A) and about peltasts (165 D).

M. Raeder adopts the now familiar view which makes the *Theaetetus* the first of the series of dialogues in which Plato criticizes his own earlier theory and works up to a revised theory of Ideas. Following Jackson and Tocco, he finds in the first part of the *Parmenides* a critique of the earlier Idealism, and in the second part indications towards its reconstruction. Similarly, the 'friends of Ideas' in the *Sophist* are to be identified with Plato himself in his earlier period; and the ascription of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν to the Ideas is not merely, as Apelt contends, a dialectical 'Kunstabgriff' but an innovation seriously intended. The main philosophical doctrine to be deduced from the *Sophist* and its companion dialogues is this: the Ideal world is not made up of simple units, but each Idea comprises unity and plurality: τὸ ὄν is itself a μικτόν, including τὸ μὴ ὄν. This is most clearly brought out in the exposition of the four kinds of Being in the *Philebus* (23 c): instead of attempting to equate the Ideas with some one of the four kinds, M. Raeder maintains that all four kinds are to be found in the Ideal world as well as in the Real world, the latter existing as an exact μίμημα of the former. That an Idea is largely made up of ἀπειρον might strike the uninitiated as a paradox; but, paradoxical

cal or not, it is seriously argued by M. Raeder that this is in fact the Ideal theory of the *Timaeus* as well as of the *Philebus*, and that Plato supposed that by constructing the Ideas out of the same elements as the particulars he had successfully met the objection of 'Parmenides' that the two worlds were unconnected. In much of this, our expositor is following Ueberweg, and attempting also to keep in accord with Aristotle. But to agree with Aristotle is the surest way of misrepresenting Plato. On the other hand, M. Raeder is wise in holding fast to the independent objectivity of the Ideas and refusing to identify them with the thoughts of souls or of God, and wise also in hesitating to educe from the *Timaeus* an esoteric doctrine of the 'self-evolution of absolute thought.'

Space will not allow me to mention more than one other point, the novelty of which lends it special interest: the missing dialogue Φιλόσοφος is found by M. Raeder in the *Epinomis* (p. 354).

In conclusion, I would like to express my sense of the industry and erudition which this volume displays. As a collection of data, clearly and on the whole fairly stated, for the estimating of Platonic problems, it is of the highest value; and if the conclusions arrived at are not always convincing, the same may be said of most books on Platonism.

R. G. BURY.

RYAN'S PETRONIUS.

Petronius: Cena Trimalchionis. Translated and edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc. By MICHAEL J. RYAN. London and Felling-on-Tyne: Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd. Pp. xlii + 284. 1905. 3s. 6d.

THERE was ample room beside Mr. Lowe's version of the most Shaksperian of ancient comedies for a book that should give a text and translation with a brief introduction and a few explanatory notes intended for the very large class of those who take an interest in the life of the old Italians without having a very deep knowledge of the tongue they spoke. The book before us fills the gap fairly well, though a little less ambition would have made it better—and perhaps yet cheaper. The notes might well have occupied less space. Readers who can

master the long quotations from Greek and Latin writers will certainly fall foul at times of Mr. Ryan's construing of Petronius: at p. 27, for instance, *nummos modio metitur* 'she doesn't know what to do with her money,' p. 55 *prae litteras fatuumesse* 'chockful of learning,' p. 65 *haec cum effusissimis prosequeremur laudationibus* 'we applauded this and the like effusions.' Even the mere student of ancient customs and modes of thought will lose something. When one of Trimalchio's cronies says of a deceased friend that he tried all forms of pleasure, 'and with good reason: *hoc solum enim secum tulit*,' it is certainly interesting to find at this Philistine gathering an echo of the Sardapallos epitaph which Athenaeus' Deipnosophists mention more than once. But Mr. Ryan translates 'It's all the same to him