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Note on Demosthenes, *De Pace*, § 11

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have οὐδ' ἐρεῖς 'οὗτος ὠνθρωπος ἐν μὲν εἶδεν ἐν δ' ἀπηρηνήθη,' ἀλλ' οἱ ἐπὶ νοῦν γένοιτο, καὶ θέων¹ ψαύειν ἡπείγετο 'this was not a man that

¹ Liban. IV 727 ἀνέστρεφον οἱ θεοὶ θέοντες, νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ὁμοίως ἐπειγόμενοι. Here καὶ θέων is merely a synonym of the phrase καὶ ἐπιδραμών, Dem. 831. 10 κὰν ἐπιδραμῖν ὥστε γενέσθαι αὐτῶν κύριον, Ael. V.H. 3. 17 τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην κὰν ἀρπάζσαιμι ἐπιδραμών, Hdt. 3. 135, Plat. Legg. 799 c.

liked one subject and disliked another; whatever was suggested to his mind he was ready and eager to essay off-hand.' Since ψαύειν governs a dative in Babrius 87. 3, we might take ᾧ to be governed by ψαύειν understood, but it seems as likely to be a crasis for ὃ οἱ 'to him.'

W. HEADLAM.

ARISTOPHANES, KNIGHTS 414.

A NEGLECTED IDIOM.

MR. RICHARDS hardly makes enough of his tempting conjecture that ἐκτραφεῖν has replaced ἐκτραφεῖς ἦν, for he omits to notice a nice point of significance introduced thereby.

ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι σ' οἶομαι τούτοισιν, ἢ μάτην γ' ἂν ἀπομαγαδάλιας σιτούμενος τοσοῦτος ἐκτραφεῖς ἦν.

'I shall beat you I think on your own ground. Otherwise I should be none the better for *actually* growing as big as yourself (see Neil 842) on hunks of discarded bread.' There is another instance of the idiom at l. 854 εἰς ἐν ἔστι συγκεκυφός: 'is *positively* in conspiracy': and a third at Pl. 867 ἔστιν ἐξολωλεκός:—'has *actually* ruined.' In Ach. 434 those who take εἰ as from εἶναι ought not to have been scouted as they have been. The line must remain ambiguous; but there is a good deal to be said for εἶναι as against ἰέναι: ἔστηκας; οὐκ εἰ καταπιδὼν Εὐριπίδην;—'afraid to go! not *effectually* saturated with Euripides!'

The idiom is not uncommon, and attention to it always improves, sometimes makes, the meaning of a passage. Soph. O.T. 126 δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἦν:—'that was *actually* thought.' Ph. 1218 ἐγὼ μὲν ᾗδῃ καὶ

πάλαι νεὼς ὁμοῦ | στεῖχων ἂν ἢ σοι τῆς ἐμῆς:—'long ere this I should have *actually* been nearing my ship':—Eur. Hec. 579 οὐκ εἴ τι δώσω τῇ περίσσο' εὐκαρδίῃ:—'hast thou indeed nought to give her for her high hardihood?': Antiphon Fr. M. 3 67 ἦν ὁ γρίφος ἐνταῦθα ῥέπων:—'the puzzle *did* indeed mean as much': Alex. Fr. M. 3 427 τά τε κυμβία | ἄρ' ἦν πρόσωπ' ἔχοντα χρυσὰ παρθένων;—'had they *actually* girls' faces?': Ly. 12 6 ἔλεγον ὡς εἶν τινες τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἀχθόμενοι:—'how certain men were *actually* out of humour.' Many of the instances quoted by Mr. Richards when read with their context illustrate the idiom even better than these. There are frequent examples in Plato and the orators, but I shall be afraid of them until I have time to test each by Blass's rhythmical theory. Like rhyme and metre, rhythm ends in slightly modifying syntax.

Long ago (F. G. Syntax 369) I brought this idiom into rank with that of τυγχάνειν, λανθάνειν, etc., quoting Thuc. 3, 68 and 4, 54. The latter instance is conclusive:—ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι:—'some proposals were even *actually* made to Nicias.' No doubt, however, the point had been noted scores of times before.

W. G. RUTHERFORD.

NOTE ON DEMOSTHENES, DE PACE, § 11.

οὐδὲ προσποιήσομαι δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο γιγνώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι πλὴν δι' ἃ ἂν ὑμῖν εἴπω δύο κ.τ.λ.

Having been much troubled some years since by the anomaly of ἂν c. subj. in this

passage, I was interested to find the construction questioned by Mr. H. Richards in the April number of this *Review*. There can be no doubt that the words ought to mean 'the two things which I shall state,' but such a rendering must be pronounced

impossible if the rules of the ordinary grammars are correct (see *e.g.* Madv. §§ 126, 127). My present object is to suggest that the use of *ἄν* (κε) c. subj. to express futurity, which is admittedly legitimate in Homer in various types of sentences, has survived occasionally in Attic Greek to an extent which is not generally recognised. The subject has been exhaustively discussed by Prof. W. Gardner Hale in his article on the Anticipatory Subjunctive (*Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* Vol. I pp. 1-92). He deals, however, mainly with Homer and points out that the subjunctive construction is continually giving way to the future indicative (pp. 29, 37, 63, etc.). Nevertheless, to take one of his categories, the dependent question of fact, represented by *Il.* 22. 130 *εἶδομεν, ὅπποτέρω κεν Ὀλύμπιος εὖχος ὀρέξῃ*, we find accurately corresponding in *Thuc.* 4. 118 *ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλευσάσθαι Ἀθηναίους καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐσῆι ἢ πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου*. This is translated by Arnold 'determine on the manner in which the negociators from Lacedaemon shall be admitted,' and Mr. Graves would evidently prefer this interpretation but for the grammatical doubt. It may be added that the parallel clause—*πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθ' ὃ τι ἔσται ἢ καταλύσεις τοῦ πολέμου*—makes strongly in favour of the rendering quoted. Similarly in *Eur. frag.* 257 :—

δοκεῖς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ξυνετὰ νικήσειν ποτὲ
καὶ τὴν δίκην πον μάκρ' ἀπφικίσθαι βροτῶν
ἢ δ' ἐγγύς ἐστιν, οὐχ ὀρωμένη δ' ὀρᾷ
ὄν χρὴ κολάζειν τ' οἶδεν' ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶσθα σὺ
ὅπποταν ἄφνω μολούσα διολέσῃ κακούς,

the natural meaning of the last lines is :—

'you don't know *when* Justice *will* suddenly come and destroy the bad.' It is true that by common consent Justice comes 'like a thief in the night' (*σίγα καὶ βραδεί ποδὶ στείχουσα μάρπτει τοὺς κακούς, Δίκαι τοὶ δίκαι χρόνιος ἄλλ' ὅμως ὑποπείσουσ' ἔλαθεν*). But here her invisible presence has already been asserted, and the climax requires an allusion rather to the unexpectedness than to the secrecy of punishment. Thus in the end :—*ὁρῶ γὰρ χρόνῳ δίκαν πάντ' ἄγουσαν εἰς φῶς βροτοῖς* (*Eur. fr.* 559). Wecklein's proposal to substitute *ἔως* for *ὅπποταν* (*Philol.* 39, p. 414) is accordingly unnecessary.

Prof. Hale (*l.c.* p. 61 ff.) makes an important distinction in calling attention to

the type of clause which he calls *determinative*, *i.e.* where a relative clause serves exactly to determine a person or thing or a time, which forms part of the main sentence. Under this head would come the passage from *de Pace*, being parallel to Homer's (*Od.* Z 201) :

οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ διεπὸς βροτοῖς οὐδὲ γένηται
ὅς κεν Φαίηκων ἀνδρῶν ἐς γαίαν ἵκηται
δηιοτῆτα φέρων.

And I cannot find any essential distinction in *Plat. Apol.* 20 E *καὶ μοι, ὃ ἄνθρωπος Ἀθηναῖος, μὴ θορυβήσῃτε, μηδ' ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν, οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιώχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω*—'for the word which I will speak is not mine.' (Jowett's translation, with italics added). It should be observed that Socrates has in view a single definite assertion made by the God of Delphi. Determinative, again, surely is *Ar. Thesm.* 5 sqq :—

EY. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκούειν δεῖ σε πάνθ' ὅσ' αὐτίκα
ὄψει παρεστώς.

MN. πῶς λέγεις; αὐθις φράσον
οὐ δεῖ μ' ἀκούειν;

EY. οὐχ ἄ γ' ἂν μέλλῃς ὁρᾶν.

This should be translated :—'No! not those things which you are going to see.' Confusion, perhaps partly due to the presence of *ἂν*, has been introduced into the text of *Eur. fr.* 421 *κέκτήσο δ' ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχῃς ἀνευ φόγου, καὶ σμικρὰ σφύζον τῇ δίκῃ ξυνοῦσ' αἰέ*—'be the true owner of that which thou shalt keep without censure, and cherish little, clinging ever to justice.' The general sense of the first line is fixed by *fr.* 461 *κέρδη τοιαῦτα χρὴ τινα κτᾶσθαι βροτῶν, ἐφ' οἷσι μέλλει μήποθ' ὕστερον στένειν*. Further, I submit that in *Soph. Ant.* 773 *ἄγων ἔρημος ἐνθ' ἂν ἡ βροτῶν στίβος | κρύψω πετρώδει ζῶσαν ἐν κατόρυγχι* the meaning cannot be 'leading her anywhither, wherever the path shall be deserted,' but is rather 'leading her to a place where the path shall be deserted,' or, in other words, this is not a clause of general assumption but a characterising or descriptive clause (I use Prof. Hale's terminology). It is possible, however, that Creon has a definite spot in view, and if so the clause would be determinative and more closely parallel to the cases we have been discussing. *O.C.* 188 might possibly admit of a similar interpretation, but is beset with other difficulties.

I pass to clauses determining a temporal antecedent, where the same principle applies.

Prof. Hale (p. 65) cites as typical *Il.* xxii. 358 :

φράξω νῦν μή τοι τι θεῶν μῆνιμα γέωμαι
ἡματι τῷ ὅτε κέν σε Πάρις καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἔσθλ' ἔοντ' ὀλέσωσιν ἐν Σκαίῃσι πύλῃσιν

and translates :—‘Take heed now to thyself lest I draw upon thee the wrath of the gods on that day when Paris and Phoebus Apollo *shall* slay thee for all thy valour at the Scaean gate.’ Now it should be remarked that it is indifferent whether the antecedent is expressed or implied, and this is at once recognised in dealing with the Homeric instances. But in Attic Greek, where the antecedent is implied, the idiom is apt to escape notice. Thus no difficulty seems to be felt in Dem. 28. 21 εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς ἄλλο τι γνώσεσθε, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν (*my mother*) ψυχὴν ἔξειν ὅταν ἐμὲ μὲν ἴδῃ μὴ μόνον τῶν πατρῶων ἀπεστερημένον κ.τ.λ. The speaker is anticipating an unfavourable verdict, and the translation must be :—‘what think you will be her feelings (at the time) when she shall see me...?’ Goodwin (§ 529), in citing the passage, omits εἰ... γένοιτο : with these words added his resolution of ὅταν as ‘if ever’ ceases to be plausible. Soph. *Trach.* 451 ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐκ κείνου μαθὼν | ψεύδει, μάθησιν οὐ καλὴν ἐκμανθάνεις | εἰ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὧδε παιδεύεις, ὅταν | θέλῃς γενέσθαι χρηστός, ὀφθήσῃ κακός requires more detailed examination. Deianeira suspects that Lichas is concealing the truth. ‘If you are relying to order,’ she says, ‘you are following a bad trade ; but if you are your own instructor’ (implying that his motives may be re-

spectable) ‘*at the time when* you shall wish to prove merciful, you will be found cruel,’ i.e. the very occasion for which you are schooling yourself will betray you. Hermann however comments :—‘hic quidem ita loquitur ut de quovis honesto mendacio dicat, non de eo, quod nunc dixit Lichas, quia non scit, quia mente is falsa dixerit. Quod si certo sciret, propterea mentitum esse, ne doleret ipsa, dixisset, ἐν ᾧ θέλει χρηστός γενέσθαι.’ And Prof. Jebb follows on the same lines :—‘the form is general, but the reference is to this particular case.’ In fact, counsel has been darkened by the assumption that ὅταν is necessarily indefinite. What possible object could Sophocles have for making Deianeira say ‘you will always fail whenever you try to be of service,’ if she means ‘you will fail in the very service which you hope to render’? It is true that she does not know the purpose of his dissembling, but she has at least a strong suspicion of what he intends and to this alone her remark is directed.

These illustrations, which are not due to any systematic search, might no doubt be multiplied by further enquiry. But it must always be borne in mind that very many sentences, which are determinative in form and should be so classed, are practically indistinguishable from corresponding sentences of general assumption. Thus Homer’s ὁ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι (*Il.* 1. 137) is determinative, but would not differ materially from a generalising ὄντιν' ἂν ἴκωμαι κεχολώσεται.

A. C. PEARSON.

AN EMENDATION IN *LOGIA JESU* III.

The *Poemandres* of Hermes Trismegistus enables us to make a simple and obvious correction in the third Logion. Two passages of the Hermetic writer are apparently paraphrases of the Logion. The first (c. i. § 27 Parthey) runs : ἡργμαι κηρύσσειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας καὶ τὸ τῆς γνώσεως κάλλος. Ὡς λαοί, ἄνδρες γηγενεῖς, οἱ μέθῃ καὶ ὕπνῳ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδεωκότες καὶ τῇ ἀγνωσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, νήψατε, παύσασθε κραιπαλῶντες, θελγόμενοι ὕπνῳ ἀλόγῳ. The second and closer paraphrase (c. vii. § 1) is as follows : ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὧς ἄνθρωποι μεθύοντες, τὸν τῆς ἀγνωσίας ἄκρατον οἶνον ἐκπίοντες ὃν οὐδὲ φέρειν δύνασθε ἀλλ' ἥδη αὐτὸν καὶ ἐμείτε ;

στήτε νήψαντες, ἀναβλέψατε τοῖς τῆς καρδίας ὀφθαλμοῖς. The gnostic author of the *Poemandres*, then, probably had in view the Logion : λέγει Ἰησοῦς, ἔστην ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ ὤφθην αὐτοῖς, καὶ εὔρον πάντας μεθύοντας καὶ οὐδὲνα εὔρον διψῶντα ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐπὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι τυφλοὶ εἰσιν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῶν. ‘I found all becoming drunk’ μεθύοντας (note the tense), ‘and I found none athirst,’ is a contradiction. Or at least we may say that the Hermetic writer offers a neater contrast : ‘I found none sober.’ Read therefore νήψαντα for διψῶντα.

FRANK GRANGER.