

to the lost, but only to those who can either obey them, or who are to be led by a sense of their sinfulness to appeal to the divine mercy for pardon and salvation. That God tells us how to live, proves that He still cares for our obedience; nay, His precepts indicate, not so much the measure of the strength to obey Him that we naturally possess, as the measure of the help which he intends to afford to our obedience. "Thy statutes have been my songs in the house of my pilgrimage."

But look at those passages in Holy Scripture which are properly called Promises. They are so numerous, that when collected they make a volume. Read every one of them, remembering that "*He is faithful that promised.*"—R. W. DALE.

A POOR old woman, of great worth and excellent understanding, in whose conversation Dr. Brown of Haddington took much pleasure, was on her deathbed. Wishing to try her faith, he said to her: "Janet, what would you say if, after all He has done for you, God should let you drop into

hell?" "E'en's he likes; if He does, He'll lose mair than I'll do." There is something not less than sublime in this reply.—JOHN BROWN.

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Christian Quietude.

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THERE are certain great features of the Christian ethic which stand out with such clearness that even those who refuse to allow them to be distinctively products of the faith, yet pay them the respectful tribute of careful consideration. For charity, humility, forgiveness of injuries, and the like, differ so completely in character from the products of other moral systems; and they are happily so much in evidence that every intelligent inquirer must at least be interested in their origin. Effects so striking must on philosophical grounds spring from correspondent causes, and no student of ethics can be excused from a study either of the origin or the issues of these most conspicuous traits. But there are other inner circles of the Christian ethic less familiar to the student which will amply reward his penetration. There are its less familiar features which will repay attention and discernment; and this whether the inquirer's standpoint be that of friendship or hostility to the faith once for all delivered to the saints.

Our present design is to take one of these less familiar features for consideration, and to examine, especially by the light of New Testament teaching, the distinctive character of quietude as a department of the Christian ethic.

Now, in this inquiry, we have at once an advantage and a difficulty. An advantage in perceiving that quietude, regarded as a habit of mind and temper, is universally held in high esteem. This is an advantage, for here the Christian apologist may largely spare his pains. No one dreams of challenging the benefit that comes from the possession of a quiet mind. On the other hand, there is a difficulty, although not an insurmountable one, in the definition of Christian quietude, in distinguishing this from those *simulacra* of it which appear now in the experience of ordinary human lives, now in the emphatic suggestions of philosophy, ancient and modern.

It is a truism to assert that in affairs of the world, quietude is great gain. In these constant crises of our modern life, where men are pitted against each other, the survival of the fittest is most commonly the survival of the quietest. The results, often so surprising of competitive examinations, make strongly for this conclusion. The nervous candidate is never a good candidate, although his very temperament often suggests a higher order of intellect. The quiet man is in the true sense of the epithet a "safe" man. If his character seems now and again less forcible, or less impressive than that of his fellows, it is always

well balanced and steady. Hence there is always a reserve of regulated power upon which he is able to draw upon emergency. That inestimable quality, presence of mind, is nothing less than the ready resourcefulness of the quiet temperament. The point need not be pursued or illustrated further, the practical value of quietude in affairs of the world is at once and universally conceded. The calm, cool, steady way of the professional man or merchant is often the result of a careful self-training; at least, he has become aware that a boisterous, restless, fussy manner neither invites confidence nor secures success on the part of his clients; in a word, quietude, like honesty, is the best policy.

No less high an esteem is put upon quietude in the judgment of philosophy. Without it philosophy declares that it can neither live, move, nor have its being. All independent and pure thinking is conditioned by circumstances; it must not only have an atmosphere of its own, but the atmosphere must be *still*. As far as they have been able to arrange their lives, philosophers have refused or striven to avoid disturbance. They have in every age ill-brooked the coarse material interruptions to their calm. The academic grove, the cell, the study represent methods ancient and modern, refined, distressful, congenial, by which thinkers have striven to shut out the world, and so to let in the illumination of pure reason. Horace's gay utterance might yet be taken as the watchword of the searcher and teacher of truth—

Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.

Philosophy and philosophers are not to blame for raising these barriers against intrusion. According to it and them, thought must have its sacred enclosures, off which rude trespassers must be warned. The mind itself, the delicate machinery of thought, is perpetually liable to disturbance from the dust raised by the ignorant or unsympathetic, and it must be wholly occupied in its own proper tasks, or rather, so the best spirits declared, in its one task, the search after truth. "A life without distraction" has been the passionate plea put forth by many a philosopher, ancient and modern, who has justified it by declaring that his message cannot be delivered to the world otherwise, and he too, as the man of the world, is right in the high esteem he puts upon quietude. But here a distinction may be noted, of which more account

may be taken hereafter. Whereas both alike set a high value on quietude, the man of the world often arrives at it in and despite of distractions by a stern self-discipline. The philosopher, Stoic he may be, and trained to self-control, here often complains that circumstances are too strong, if not for him, yet for his enterprise;

Magna est veritas, et praevalabit.

That is all very true and cheering, he admits, but the messenger of the truth must be free from the vexatious interruptions of life, and so the grove, the cloister, and the library are for him a necessity. Has not, however, philosophy, ancient and modern, suffered from this severance from life? We should have at least been spared the consideration of many a needless theory, if it could have met at once with the bracing and wholesome opposition offered by the realities of experience. Truth yields her greatest secrets up, not to the seeker who is most free from interruptions, but to him who accepts interruptions as a necessary part of mental discipline.

But it follows from this prevalent attitude of philosophers that the calm which they desire is only of the intellect, and only for the few.

Now Christian quietude differs vastly both from business-like coolness and from philosophic calmness. It differs from the former because it is sought for its own sake, with no thought of making profit or gain from its possession. It differs from the latter, for it is spiritual and not striven after with the intention of pure intellectual research and development. One arrives at these primary conclusions about Christian quietude immediately after study, even of a superficial kind, of the literature of the New Testament. Here we find that quietude is the dominant, prevailing characteristic of the various manifestations of the single fruit of the spirit. A glance at the familiar catalogue, in Galatians v. 22, serves at once to show how quietude lies at the root of this fair and manifold fruitage. No wonder, therefore, that it was commended for contemplation to these uncertain and fickle converts of the apostle, if not in name and by positive description, yet by implication and inference, which they could hardly fail to note, and to draw for themselves. Such a temper and habit of mind was suggested as the necessary condition, the invariable accompaniment of real spiritual growth. And this it was to be in spite of hindrances and disturbances. Of these,

there are two which stand out prominently in the New Testament differing widely in cause and origin, differing as widely in effects and consequences to the life of the Primitive Church. There was, on the one hand, the ever-present terror of persecution; on the other hand, there were false conceptions as to the instant Parousia. Both in their measure were paralysing to life and conduct. The Acts of the Apostles illustrate the force of the former; the letters to the Thessalonians show the danger, as well as the remedy, of the latter. But as each of these disturbing elements makes itself felt, the message was the same alike to the terror-stricken or disconcerted. It was not merely a word of consolation, but a counsel of peace and quietness. In the presence of fiery trials they were exhorted to feel no rude alarms; if the Lord were indeed at hand, then a sweet and gentle reasonableness would be seen and known of all men as the chastened issue of such a belief. Such was the comfort and such the lessons addressed by apostolic lips to fainting hearts and disquieted minds. How truly the preachers of the early Church had caught up and repeated the very lessons of the great Master which He had already given to His own before He suffered!

If, however, it is objected that there is no word in the New Testament which precisely answers to the sufficiently clear-cut conception of quietude, the answer to the objection is plain and adequate. We find indeed not a single equivalent expression, but a considerable number of phrases contributory to the general idea. One of these, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς,¹ has already been indicated, and is worthy of a special regard, because it is boldly employed by St. Paul although the philosophic associations of the word still so closely attached themselves to it. We may add to this, without any attempt at an exhaustive list, ἡσυχία, apparently a favourite word with St. Luke (cp. xiv. 3, xxiii. 56; and Acts xi. 18, xxi. 14), marking that quietness of mind and character which finds its truest expression in a dignified silence or reserve, differing thus from σιγή, which marks speechlessness from external causes, or σιωπή, which is simply antithetic to loquacity. This ἡσυχία finds its homelier exercise in a steady refusal to interfere in other men's matters when no spiritual gain can come out of the interference; it stands, therefore, as in 1 Thess. iv. 11 and 2 Thess. iii. 12,

¹ Phil. iv. 5.

as strongly opposed to the officious character and the meddlesome temper.

A suggestion of yet deeper tranquillity is afforded by the rare word ἡρεμία² (cp. 1 Tim. ii. 2), in which quietness seems to have found fixed and sure conditions, or in the ἔδρατος as connoting the fundamental strength and security, if not the comfort and repose of the quiet Christian, indicating as Bengel, with his usual force, puts it: "Internum robur quod fideles ipsi habent."

To these we may add again the general conceptions of gentleness, patience, and, last but not least, of peace, itself the keynote of the gospel, as it is the chief and most precious possession of Christian souls. The references here are far too numerous for detailed quotation, but there is one phrase employed by St. Paul in relation to peace in Col. iii. 15, which is too significant in the present inquiry to be passed over. It points at once to the origin of Christian quietude, to the influence by which it is secured and made continuous, to the sphere in which it operates. The source lies in that peace which Christ left to His Church as His supreme legacy. The method of operation is like that of a judge (βραβεύς) or umpire passing verdict, or giving decisions, upon doubtful or anxious issues, the sphere is that of the heart. Hence quietude is a spiritual condition, spiritually gained; it is not of this world any more than the peace which Christ bequeathed to His Church was of the world; it is nothing less than a pentecostal gift, a gift which "calms while it fills."

The history of the Church demonstrates the necessity of quietude. In ages of persecution, in periods of great religious excitement, its influence has been felt as a consolation and a sedative. The Roman communion has dealt with it doubtfully, inconsistently, at once aware and jealously of its force. In England it has fitted in with our characteristic national reserve, and has given rise to Quakerism, that most attractive and least aggressive of the sects. It has penetrated with its spirit the choicest of our devotional handbooks, from that of À Kempis to the soothing numbers of the *Christian Year*.

In the English Church it breathes through the Book of Common Prayer, it has been the note of her most representative minds — of Bede and

² This is also a philosophic word; cp. Aristotle's verdict, *Nic. Eth.* vii. 15. 8: ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει.

Anselm, of Hooker, Andrews, Jeremy Taylor, and Ken, and the sweet singer of Bemerton. Who shall say as he glances even at this imperfect catalogue that quietude is merely self-effacement, or self-absorption, or the dead calm enjoyed by those who refuse to endure the stormy waves of a troublesome world? Rather the quietude of such souls from the apostolic age down to our restless times while it stands upon unearthly supports,

and cannot be disturbed by the fitful fevers of human life, is possessed with a power divine, is bright, active, and energetic through resignation and amid suffering. Such souls have the aspiration touchingly expressed in A. L. Waring's lines—

Father, I know that all my life is portioned out by Thee,
And the changes that must surely come I do not fear to see;
But I ask Thee for a quiet mind, intent on pleasing Thee.

Hebrew Prophecy and Modern Criticism.

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III.

“Surely the Lord God will do nothing, but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets.”—AMOS iii. 7.

THE rejection of the supernatural is a common feature of modern thought. It is a still commoner thing to find a difficulty in drawing a definite line between the natural and the supernatural. This is, after all, only another way of doubting how large a sphere of God's work is properly covered by the word “natural.” Such a discussion is apt to degenerate into a question of words. It is of little importance for us to decide whether prophetic prediction should be called supernatural or not; it is of very great importance that we should form some idea what prophetic prediction really meant. There was a time when among religious believers such an inquiry would have seemed superfluous. It was assumed almost as a matter of course that prophecy was a fore-writing of history,¹ and hence implied a power altogether different in kind, as well as in degree, from any purely human faculty. If the word “supernatural” had a meaning anywhere, it certainly had it in prophecy. But times are changed, and even religious men are seriously asking whether the prophets had any real predictive power at all. We feel, therefore, bound, before we attempt to draw any argument from prophetic prediction, to ask whether the prophets had this power, and if they had, what were its nature and its limits? This inquiry will form the subject of the present article. It will be convenient for the present to limit the discussion to such predictions as are

believed to have been fulfilled in events connected with Jewish history.

That the prophets were believed, and *themselves claimed*, to have a predictive power seems capable of easy demonstration.

(1) It is suggested by some of the names of the prophetic office. We cannot, it is true, prove it from the ordinary name נביא. That word indeed seems to imply a divine inspiration, but this would not necessarily include an insight into the future. It is otherwise with the almost synonymous words ראה and רזוה, both of which are usually rendered in the Authorised Version by “seer.” Even these words do not in themselves absolutely imply a predictive faculty. A vision might be a vision of the past, as that of Michaiiah; or of the present, as that of Isaiah, recorded in ch. vi. But a predictive faculty was evidently thought of in the popular conception of the word, as we see from the figure of the watchman so frequently applied to the prophet. Just as the watchman has a longer range of view than others, so the prophets are able to look farther than others into coming events. Thus in Isa. xxi. 6–9 the prophetic watchman sees from his watchtower the fall of Babylon, which is evidently depicted as future. In the next prophecy (*ibid.* 11, 12) the watchman foresees the chequered career of Edom. One out of Seir anxiously calls out to him, “Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the night?” *i.e.* “How long is it before the dawn of prosperity is to rise upon a night of adversity?” And the watchman, as

¹ As, *e.g.*, by Butler: “Prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass,” *Analogy*, pt. ii. ch. vii. (Angus's ed. p. 272).