

Prof. Strong relies on a false interpretation of the physiological point of view can, I think, be proved by such a line of argument as that which Avenarius presents in his *Menschliche Weltbegriff*. Prof. Strong further objects to my assertion that he regards experience as purely subjective. But it still seems to me a sufficiently accurate description of his position. Experience, he holds, does not immediately reveal objective reality, and it cannot be transcended by any process of immediate or mediate inference. Knowledge of the existence of other minds, and even of our own past experiences, rests, he therefore contends, neither on reason nor on experience, but solely on instinct. This surely amounts to the assertion that experience is purely subjective.

I am, etc.,

NORMAN SMITH.

ON A NOTE OF MR. BRADLEYS.

Mr. Bradley's note at page 329 of the July number of *MIND* might easily mislead readers unacquainted with my books and other writings. It is worth while therefore to set down the following corrections on matters of fact.

First, it is untrue that I have ever had any inclination towards the kind of scepticism which Mr. Bradley here calls philosophical; and grotesquely untrue that in the article he mentions I claimed to be its champion. If the reader cares to look up the point (*MIND*, N.S., No. 11, p. 386 ff.) he will find that the expressly stated intention of that article was to champion another form of philosophical scepticism in place of this old and untenable one which has usurped the name. The same thing is stated again in § 51 of my book on the *Use of Words in Reasoning*.

Secondly, while it is obvious that I welcome Mr. Schiller's view as important, and as having whatever novelty the notion of importance involves, and that I cordially agree with much of it, still its "assured victory"—in the sense of freedom from further improvement—is not among the results that I think possible, or desirable. And I should be much surprised to learn that either in my review of *Humanism* or in any of my other writings—say, within the last twenty years—any phrase occurs which points to my expectation of the assured victory of any 'ism' whatever. One may hope, indeed, that the permanent defeat of certain philosophical traditions is possible, in due course of time; but permanent victory is something that, in philosophy, seems to me reserved, not for systems as such, but only for the recognition of the occasional uses of distinctions ignored in them. All this however I have expressed before at greater length.

If Mr. Bradley would try the simple method of quoting, or giving definite references, when he wishes to attribute ridiculous views to other writers, he would often see the need of correcting his misrepresentations before they get into print; and would incidentally save himself from encountering this kind of answer.

ALFRED SIDGWICK.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,—In my review of Mr. Haldane's "Pathway of Reality" there occurred—doubtless through my own fault—a misprint so absurd that I should be glad if you give me the opportunity of correcting it. I am printed as saying "Mr. Haldane's version of Religion may be described as Religion with the clerical element left out". I am sorry to find that some of my friends think me capable of having written such a sentence. What I wrote was "the ethical element".

H. RASHDALL.