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Author(s): J. Rae

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because the product of labour has increased through one cause or other, and not through a diminished product necessitating the employment of the unemployed.

Coming now to the authors' practical proposals, they naturally devote some space to the prevailing controversy as to the best means of obtaining the eight hours day. They reject the idea of obtaining it by voluntary concession on the part of employers as being 'utopian'; they abjure trade-union agency as being 'cruel, costly, and untrustworthy,' and declare for State interference as the sole efficacious method. Now I am personally no enemy to State interference in this matter, and indeed believe it to be largely necessary; but why should Mr. Webb and Mr. Cox reject as utopian a method which they produce so much good evidence in their work of having already proved effective, and why reject as untrustworthy the method which has made the eight hours day a general and permanent possession in the only community in the world where it is a general and permanent possession at all? Why not try all methods, each in its place? Trade-union action may sometimes be costly, but in this matter of the eight hours day it has certainly shown itself much more expeditious than political agitation. Our authors themselves are quite sensible that law will be powerless in the absence of sufficient trade opinion to secure its enforcement, but when opinion is once there, law is often unnecessary. With all their love for an eight hours law, these writers would still apply the law with considerable reserve. They would not, for example, apply law to any trade unless a majority of the members of the trade asked for it, and they would even then apply no rigid eight hours limit to all trades alike, but would permit a variable maximum, as the trade will bear or desire, ranging between fifty-four and forty-five hours a week. They propose, therefore, no sudden simultaneous introduction of the system—that, they admit, would 'dislocate industry;' but they would first introduce it into government and municipal employment; then by compulsion into trades in which the worst cases of overwork occur—railways, omnibuses, public-houses, shops, bakeries, and gasworks; and finally, into all other industries by 'trade option'—that is by an order of the Home Secretary, obtained at the request of a distinct majority of the members of the trade.

JOHN RAE

Socialism New and Old. By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A., Professor of Political Economy and Jurisprudence, Queen's College, Belfast. Second Edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Co.

THIS work has gone rapidly into a second edition, and it amply deserves its popularity. It goes over a good deal of difficult but at the moment very interesting ground; beginning with a rapid review of previous forms of Socialism, then subjecting the Socialism of the present time—the Collectivism of Karl Marx—to a thorough examination, and finally entering on a discussion of the contemporary Social question and the various remedies proposed for its solution. And no

manual could carry you more agreeably over the ground, for Professor Graham is a lucid and attractive expositor, thoughtful, judicious, and very fair-minded and impartial, with a constant play of generous sympathy which no doubt contributes to juster conceptions of alien modes of thought, although, I cannot help thinking, it has sometimes interfered with due exactitude and firmness of discrimination. The best portion of the book seems to me to be the chapters entitled 'In the Socialist State,' in which Mr. Graham sets himself to see how Collectivism would work if it were once practically established. No other writer, I think, has gone so effectively into this part of the subject. In considering the system of things in the Socialist State, he receives, of course, no help from Marx, who never proposed any constructive schemes, and would probably say, as Liebknecht said at the recent Socialist Congress at Halle to a young follower who wanted a description of the Socialist State to be published for propagandist purposes, that no man can tell what to-morrow will bring in the German State that exists now, and how is any man to forecast how things will shape in the Socialist State of the future? It will evolve as it will evolve. Professor Graham bases his criticisms accordingly, partly on Mr. Gronlund's 'Co-operative Commonwealth,' and partly on necessary deductions from Collectivist principles; and his general conclusion is that 'unless the industrial chiefs are remunerated liberally, unless there be a gradation of salaries, and unless there be free choice of products, or a production suited for a well-to-do if not a rich class—that is, unless the departure from the present system is not great—Socialism would not work.' The weak point in a Socialist view of things, to his mind, seems to be the want of provision for any luxurious expenditure on the part of the chiefs; the general would not think it worth while fighting if he had no better fare than his soldiers, and the industrial manager would grow weary of managing well if his sole reward was the exercise of his power. But would that be necessarily so? One of the deductions he makes which will probably surprise Socialists most is that there will be an enormous increase in the Socialist kingdom of speculation and gambling, and giving of high usury for money advanced in the hour of need. 'There could be no legal or open money market or general market, no recognised function of banker, and all would be done in evasion of the law. But there would certainly be speculation, and there would soon be evolved an individual type to facilitate speculation to speculative buyers not a few, just as surely as the bookmaker has been evolved to facilitate betting.' He says 'this we can scientifically predict'; it is the necessary want of the gambling spirit denied its usual outlet in private undertakings. Mr. Graham shows very well that there are other occupations than that of the bookmaker that must, under any system of State production, be still left to depend on private enterprise. Journalism is the most important of these. If the State were to print everything gratis, it would undertake a function which would swallow up all its time and means, and so freedom and equality both enjoin that the party organ be supported by its subscribers. Socialism must also, for like reasons, dis-

establish the Church while establishing everything else. Mr. Graham's speculations on the Socialist State may not invariably command assent, but they are always acute and interesting.

In the two earlier chapters on 'Socialism before the Nineteenth Century,' and 'Modern Socialism from St. Simon to Karl Marx,' Mr. Graham uses the word Socialism with a strange combination of excessive latitude and excessive rigour. Among the Socialists he treats of he includes Moses, Isaiah—'the greatest of Socialists,' he says—Jesus Christ, Rousseau, Fichte, Carlyle—even apparently Hobbes and Locke; but he expressly refuses to include Robert Owen, the man whose system the word was first invented to describe, because, he says, Robert Owen was not a Socialist at all, but a Communist—as if a Communist were not a Socialist, and as if Owen had not in his writings anticipated that very doctrine of Collectivism to which Mr. Graham devotes the pith of his work. Mr. Graham does not explain his distinction between Communism and Socialism, but he says repeatedly that Communism is 'merely the extreme of Socialism,' and that it is preached in the Gospels; and he describes the *differentia* of Owen's system as being 'the rule of equality in distribution, and the abolition of private property.' What else does any Socialism aim at? Mr. Graham himself states that there are three current senses of the word Socialism, but that what is common to the three, 'the generic feature of all, is the aim at greater equality of social conditions; in the first case to be attained by any means; in the second and third to be attained and maintained by the State.' Equality of conditions through community of property is the principle of all properly Socialist systems, and there is perhaps even more fault in the lax extension of the word to those who befriend the poor and condemn oppression without thinking of this particular principle, than in the hesitation Mr. Graham shows to apply it to Owen and to the Anarchists. Mr. Graham's definition of Socialism is defective. Socialism is more than 'the aim at greater equality of conditions,' for many persons besides Socialists think greater equality of conditions and better diffusion of wealth to be desirable, and would even make that the regular policy of the law. Socialism seeks to realise some false system of equality, some definite but erroneous principle of right, some mistaken idea of social justice, and the word ought not to be applied to those who merely think the present distribution of goods is not an ideal one, without proposing any wrong or unjust ideal to supplant it. Mr. Herbert Spencer has declared the present system to be unideal as emphatically as anyone, but Mr. Graham correctly enough considers Mr. Spencer to be as far on his right hand as the Socialists are on his left. Mr. Graham is always disposed to look on Socialism as if it were an imperfect attempt to realise a higher order of justice than exists at present, whereas in reality it is only an imperfect attempt to realise a lower order of justice. He thinks, for example, with the extremest Socialists, that it is contrary to ideal justice to pay the skilled better than the unskilled, or the gifted than the incompetent, though, of course, he admits it to be necessary to do so on

grounds of expediency, since the world would not last for a year on any other plan. 'It is no doubt, he says, a case of "giving to him that hath" to pay exceptionally the men already exceptionally gifted by nature. It is not ideal justice which would seem to require less material reward for the person with higher qualities, the exercise of which is pleasurable.' Ideal justice, then, according to Mr. Graham, requires that the capable be worse paid than the incapable, and there is only, it would seem, 'a sort of justice after all' in the common rule that pays him better; the 'sort of justice' being that 'if he is the means of increasing society's material products in a greater proportion than other productive labourers, he is entitled on that score to a liberal share of what would not exist but for him' (p. 202). But is not the latter principle much the more ideally just of the two? Why should it be juster to pay a man by the selfish standard of the trouble of his work to himself than by the public standard of the value of his work to other people? Why should a man have a right to get more money because he is able to give less? The supposed higher standard of justice is really the lower and the more egotistic. If it be said that when a man does all he can he ought to be paid with the best, Mr. Graham himself will answer that objection, for he shows that if all were paid alike neither the best nor the worst would continue long to do all he can, and that means that everybody would be inflicting injustice upon his neighbour. The equalisation of competence and incompetence, or of industry and idleness, is really as contrary to ideal justice as it is to practical policy. It is not equality.

Under the head of 'Practicable State Socialism,' Professor Graham points out such measures, legislative or administrative, as the State might simply adopt for improving the industrial situation, but there seems no reason for giving them the name of Socialism, unless it is to be understood that any intervention of authority in behalf of the poorer classes, or any extension of State management, is of itself Socialistic. He sees no remedy for low wages except extended markets, and all he asks from the State in that connexion is to try and get other States to give up their hostile tariffs. The eight hours day he would not introduce by authority except among the miners (and perhaps the shop assistants), and then only if a very large majority of the trade demanded it. And for the unemployed he would do nothing but facilitate access to waste land and the acquisition of allotments. He has no great hope of co-operative production, but he would give a little public money for further experiments in it. He would try to intercept the unearned increment, and would increase the death duties and apply the money by preference to support friendly societies, orphan asylums, and education for 'the benefit of those who may presumably have suffered pecuniary injury from the large accumulations.' He would have free primary education, and he would establish a system of scholarships by which the children of the poor could have the advantage of secondary education, and the way opened for talent in all classes into the professions. Then he would have the State interfere to restrain monopolies, but not in any case to undertake industrial

management unless its superiority to private enterprise in the particular case was demonstrated. The municipalities, besides supplying gas and water, might, when necessary, have a stock of workmen's dwellings to be let at remunerative but not exorbitant rents. Mr. Graham discusses his several proposals with much practical sense.

A Fragment on Government. By JEREMY BENTHAM. Edited, with an Introduction, by F. C. MONTAGUE, M.A., late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. At the Clarendon Press, 1891, pp. xii—241.

BENTHAM is one of those writers to whom it is still somewhat difficult to be fair. He was a man of so marked an individuality that most of his successors have been either his admirers or his enemies. By one set he has been reprobated as the author of the *Pig Philosophy*; by another set he has been almost worshipped as the man who laid the basis of the scientific study of Ethics and Jurisprudence. Mill, indeed, in his famous essay, gave a rare example of impartial and penetrating criticism; and Bentham has had the good fortune of being subsequently dealt with by another master of literary justice, Dr. Sidgwick. But even after all this, it is difficult to treat him without some bias; and one cannot but congratulate him, therefore, on having his celebrated *Fragment* edited by so judicious and able a writer as Mr. Montague.

As Mr. Montague remarks in his Preface, 'the bulk of Bentham's writings has passed into not unjust oblivion': but the *Fragment on Government* is certainly one of the few that deserve to be kept alive. It is not, indeed, in itself a work of supreme importance. The very fact that it was so well done has helped to destroy its interest. Its criticisms were so destructive at the time that they have ceased to be required; while its constructive efforts were so suggestive that they have long since been superseded. It was a brilliant beginning and end of much—a swift charge of cavalry, we might say, perishing amid the rout of the enemy. It is certainly remarkable among Bentham's writings for the brightness and force of its style. It is a sort of *Dunciad* of Jurisprudence, with a Blackstone instead of a Blackmore, and a believer in 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' instead of a believer in epigrams and the heroic couplet. That such a work should be either fair or profound it would be too much to expect. Indeed, these are qualities that we do not naturally look for in Bentham at any time. As Mill said, 'Bentham failed in deriving light from other minds'; and 'we must not look for subtlety, or the power of recondite analysis, among his intellectual characteristics.' Least of all should we look for such qualities in a *Fragment* such as this. All that we can ask is that it should be bright and effective, and this it certainly is. It pillories with irresistible humour that philistine among jurists who took as his 'gig' the British Constitution and the 'attributes' of the king. It pelts him with sarcasm; it breaks his head with logic; it pierces him through and through. But it is poor sport after all. The creature is dead and forgotten; or, if it lives at all, it lives assuredly in