



## The Military Resources of the Island of Jersey

Captain Herbert Plumer

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# THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE ISLAND OF JERSEY.

By Captain HERBERT PLUMER, York and Lancaster Regiment,  
D.A.A.G.

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THE Channel Islands, of which Jersey is the largest and most important, are well known for the beauty of their scenery, the fertility of their soil, and as favourite resorts for summer excursionists, but they are not regarded as of more than secondary importance from a military point of view, and are all but ignored in all schemes for the defence of our Empire; and yet, should we at any time unhappily find ourselves at war with France, the seeming prosperity of these islands, added to the proximity to the shores of that country, cannot but render them a tempting object for attack.

Sir Charles Dilke, in the chapter on Imperial Defence in his work "The Problems of Greater Britain," asserts that it has been practically decided that Jersey and the other Channel Islands must be left to make what defence they can, because it is certain that they will remain in the hands of the ultimate victors in the more important struggles which must be fought out elsewhere. He adds, however, that it is doubtful whether this decision, if acted on, is one which would meet with the approval of the people of Great Britain. It is certainly one which would be deeply resented by the people of Jersey, who might naturally consider that their unswerving allegiance to the English Crown for so many centuries had earned for them the right to expect assistance in the hour of danger.

*Previous Attempts at the Invasion of Jersey.*

Jersey and the other Channel Islands may be said to have been under English rule uninterruptedly since the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, they having been dismembered from the Crown of France and added to the Duchy of Normandy in 912. France recovered Normandy from King John in 1203, with the exception of these islands, which she has never been able to reconquer, notwithstanding the efforts she has made at different times to do so.



The first attempt at an invasion of Jersey by the French was in the latter part of the reign of Edward III, when Bertrand du Guesclin, then Constable of France, landed at Gorey, on the east coast of the island, at the head of 10,000 men. No attempt appears to have been made to oppose his landing by the inhabitants, who, according to the usual custom of that period, relied for their defence on their great stronghold—Gorey Castle. A long siege ensued, lasting several months; but the garrison of the castle held out successfully, and at length the appearance of an English fleet off the coast compelled the French to raise the siege and quit the island.

A second attempt at invasion, and one which for a long time seemed destined to meet with success, was in 1461, during the Wars of the Roses, when Jersey was made over to a powerful Norman baron named De Brézé by Queen Margaret, wife of Henry VI, in return for certain services rendered by him in her cause in England. De Brézé sent to occupy the island a force which landed at Gorey, and, owing to the treachery of the Commander of the Castle there, which by this time bore its present name, Mount Orgueil, obtained possession of that fortress. The Jerseymen, under the leadership of Philip de Carteret, organized a most determined resistance, and for six years maintained the struggle, during which period repeated conflicts occurred, the French obtaining possession of the eastern portion of the island, and the Jerseymen retaining the western. At length, in 1467, an English fleet arrived, and, with their co-operation, the French were in turn besieged in the Castle, and eventually compelled to surrender.

In a third attack on the island in 1548, in the reign of Edward VI, the French failed to effect a landing, being repulsed by the Jerseymen at Bouley Bay, on the north coast.

After this Jersey was free for more than two centuries from any attacks by France; but, during the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, the island, whose inhabitants had been firm supporters of Charles I, was invaded by a force of Parliamentary troops, who effected a landing in St. Ouen's Bay on the west. The Governor, Sir G. de Carteret, retreated into Elizabeth Castle, where he held out for some time, but was eventually compelled to surrender.

It was in 1779 and 1781 that the last attempts of the French to conquer Jersey were made. In the former year, a fleet, transporting a force of between 5,000 and 6,000 men, set out for the island, and attempted to effect a landing in St. Ouen's Bay, but the attack was repulsed from the shore by the 78th Regiment and the local Militia.



In January, 1781, a Baron de Roncourt attempted to obtain possession of the island by a *coup de main*, and, though his force did not number more than 2,000 men, the attack was very nearly successful. The force was assembled at the Chaussey Islands, some rocks south of Jersey, and, guided by a treacherous Jersey pilot, the vessels approached by the Violet Channel to La Rocque, on the south-east extremity of the island, where the bulk of the troops managed to disembark unperceived, and marched on St. Heliers, the capital. The Governor was surprised in bed, was made a prisoner, and forced to sign a capitulation. Major Pierson, however, the next senior Officer, collected together the various detachments of Regular and Militia troops available, and attacked the French in the town, and, after a desperate struggle, during which both he and Roncourt were killed, defeated them, and forced them to surrender. Thus ended the last attempt at an invasion of Jersey, and for more than a century the inhabitants have enjoyed uninterruptedly the blessings of peace.

The circumstances under which warfare will be conducted in future are so different from those of the period of even the latest of these attacks on the island, that it is not contended that much can be learnt from their history, either as to the measures necessary for any future defence or as to the possibilities of such defence being successfully maintained. Their repeated failure, however, is worthy of attention as showing that there must have been many difficulties connected with them, and that the defenders had certain natural and material advantages on their side which may not altogether have disappeared under the modern conditions of war; while the repeated victories won by their forefathers in the past over the enemies of Great Britain should entitle Jerseymen to expect from that country a certain measure of support, *provided* that they themselves can show that they are doing their utmost to utilize and develop to the fullest extent the military resources of their island.

#### *General Description of the Island.*

Jersey is about 95 miles from Portland and 120 miles from Southampton, while it is only 15 miles from Portbail on the French coast, 30 miles from Granville, and about 50 miles from Cherbourg. It covers an area of 44 square miles or 28,700 acres, its greatest length being 12 miles from Grosnez Point on the north-west to La Rocque on the south-east, and its greatest breadth 7 miles from Sorel Point on the north to Noirmont on the south-west. Its surface declines from north to south, the northern bays being bordered by high cliffs, while on the south the shore is nearly level with the sea.

There is a very great rise and fall of tide all round the coasts, equinoctial spring tides rising to 40 feet, and this, added to the strong currents and the numerous rocks which environ the island, renders navigation extremely difficult, and limits the places at which bodies of troops could be safely landed, to a few of the bays.

The country is remarkable for the extent to which it is cultivated,

the whole island being cut up into small fields, orchards, and gardens, divided from each other by banks and hedges, rendering any extended movement of troops extremely difficult, while affording numerous defensive positions for small bodies of infantry. A series of valleys running from north to south divide the island into sections, narrow on the north, with steep ascents on either side, and gradually widening as they approach the south coast.

St. Heliers, the capital, and really the only town in the island, is situated on the south coast, and is the port for all the commerce and trade. Its harbour and approaches are protected by the forts Elizabeth Castle and Fort Regent.

The average annual revenue amounts to 50,000*l.*, mostly derived from the duties on wines and spirits, and from anchorage and harbour dues.

Of the superficial area, some 20,000 acres are cultivated, and of this about 5,000 are used for raising hay, and 4,000 in orchards and gardens, while 2,500 are under corn crops, 1,500 under turnips and other green crops, and the remainder, some 7,000 acres, are used for the growth of potatoes, of which between 50,000 and 60,000 tons are exported annually.

*Population.*—The population in 1881 was 52,000, of whom 23,500 were males, and of the 52,000 nearly 28,000 were residents of St. Heliers, while, as illustrating the prosperity of the rural population, there are now about 2,600 farmers, who, in most cases, are proprietors.

There are a great number of English residents, and among the agricultural classes there are always in the island a certain number, roughly estimated at about 2,000, of Breton peasants, and this number is largely increased at the time of the digging of the potato crop.

It is a matter for congratulation that the authorities decided that there should be a census taken in Jersey this year. Apart from other important considerations, it is well known that the number of French inhabitants has been steadily increasing during the last ten years, and their presence in Jersey on any outbreak of hostilities must always be borne in mind as a matter which will have to be reckoned with.

It should be noted, however, that, according to the laws of the island, foreigners can be sent out of Jersey at any time at the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor.

*Food Supply.*—One of the most important considerations in connection with the military capabilities of any place, and more especially of an island, is the source of its food supply, and, notwithstanding its fertility, Jersey cannot be said to be self-supporting in this respect.

Although there are some 11,000 head of cattle in Jersey, these are all kept for dairy purposes, and all beasts for slaughter are imported from England, France, and Spain. It is calculated that to supply the inhabitants with meat for two months, giving the Regular and Militia troops their full rations, and allowing the urban population

$\frac{1}{4}$  lb. of meat per head daily, 400 bullocks would have to be imported, together with an equal weight of frozen and preserved meat. The rural population have been excluded from these calculations, as their ordinary consumption of meat is very small, and the pigs, sheep, and poultry belonging to them would meet all their requirements.

About 4,000 tons of flour are imported annually, and there is usually a stock of about 500 tons in the island, and this would suffice for the wants of the population for about two months.

As regards forage, oats are almost entirely imported, some 1,600 tons being brought to Jersey annually, and the stock generally in the island would last for the period mentioned above. Hay, too, is chiefly imported; but in the winter months there is barely more in the island than will suffice for one month's consumption.

Fuel is another important consideration. About 6,500 tons of coal are consumed annually; and though the supply of wood in the island is fairly plentiful, it would not be sufficient to entirely replace coal for any extended period.

The question of the food supply of Jersey was carefully gone into by Captain Colville, lately Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and the figures given above are taken from his calculations.

*Roads.*—The roads in Jersey are extremely numerous, there being, it is said, nearly 600 miles of roads in the  $4\frac{1}{2}$  square miles of area. The main roads which run from St. Heliers to all the principal villages are very good, of an average breadth of 15 feet, with a pathway for foot-passengers along their whole length. These are styled military roads, and are kept in excellent order by the different parishes. The island is indebted for their construction to General Sir G. Don, who was Lieutenant-Governor from 1806 to 1814. The country lanes which branch from the main roads in every direction are very narrow, and usually run between high banks; they are unsuitable for guns or for any description of heavy wheeled traffic, but they afford facilities for the rapid movement of infantry, very essential in such an enclosed country.

*Railways.*—There are two light narrow gauge railways in the island running from St. Heliers to the east and west respectively. The eastern one runs as far as Gorey, about 6 miles, while the western is about 7 miles in length, running to St. Aubin's and then on to the Corbière Lighthouse. These railways are mostly used for light passenger traffic, and might be useful for the conveyance of troops in an emergency, or more particularly for the despatch of reliefs for guards and outposts from the town to the eastern and western coasts.

*Telegraphs.*—There is direct telegraphic communication with Guernsey and England, and in the island itself there is a postal telegraph to Sauvarex and Gorey on the east, and to St. Aubin's, St. Peter's, St. Ouen's, and the Corbière Lighthouse on the west. There is a military telegraph recently established from Government House to the district office in St. Heliers, and to Fort Regent and the barracks at St. Peter's, and it is intended to extend this telegraph to other military posts in the island.

It is very desirable that the telegraph should be so extended as to touch certain points on the north coast. If this were done, the outpost work thrown on the garrison, on the outbreak of hostilities, would be considerably lessened, more especially if in addition the different Militia arsenals were connected by telegraph with the head-quarter office. At present, communication between the look-out stations on the north coast and the interior would have to be carried on by means of visual signalling, always liable to be interrupted by fog or mist, or by mounted orderlies or cyclists, entailing a considerable increase in the number of men kept constantly on duty.

*Local Means of Transport.*—There are more than 2,000 horses and ponies in Jersey kept solely for agricultural purposes, and these, together with the farmers' spring carts and vans (of which there are a great number), would be available as a means of transporting rapidly advanced bodies of troops, as well as for the conveyance of supplies and stores.

The farmers have nearly all served in the Militia, and no difficulty should be experienced in cases of war in organizing a transport service for each district, part of which could always be available for immediate use.

#### *Summary of Natural Advantages.*

The natural advantages Jersey possesses for troops defending it may be summed up as follows:—

1. The coasts, from various causes, are extremely difficult for navigation, and can only be approached safely at certain points.
2. The interior affords facilities for defence by small bodies of troops.
3. The roads are ample, and suitable for the rapid movement of all arms.
4. There is a large supply of animals and vehicles always available for transport purposes.
5. The resources of the island, as regards the supply of food, in the event of being cut off, are fairly satisfactory.

To supplement these, additional telegraphic communication is needed, to prevent the outpost duty thrown on the garrison, which must necessarily be arduous on the outbreak of war, from being excessive.

#### *Garrison.*

The present garrison of Jersey consists of one battery of garrison artillery, one battalion of infantry, and the Royal Jersey Militia.

The artillery are quartered in Elizabeth Castle, while the headquarters of the infantry battalion are at Fort Regent, with detachments at St. Peter's Barracks, on the west, and, when their numbers render necessary, at Grève de Lecq, Bonne Nuit, and Rozel, on the north coast, at all of which there are good, small barracks.



*The Jersey Militia.*

*Constitution.*—The Militia of the Channel Islands is a force peculiarly constituted. In Jersey, under an Act passed by the States, in 1881, and approved by Her Majesty in Council, entitled "Law on Militia," every man who is a native, or the son of a native, of the island, or who, being a British subject, is possessed of real property in the island, or who carries on in it any profession, trade, or calling, is liable to serve in the Militia from the age of 16 to that of 60, and this service is, according to the clause, "personal, gratuitous, and obligatory." Lists are furnished by the Superintendent Registrar of Births, at the beginning of each year, of all boys who have reached their sixteenth year, and on an average about 300 are enrolled annually; but during their preliminary training a great number leave the island, or become non-effective, and not more than half this number are passed annually into the ranks. There are the usual exemptions from the Militia Service, the most noticeable being the Bailiff, Jurats, Crown officers, members of the States, clergy, persons in the Government service, and others holding official positions, and persons found physically unfit, while the Lieutenant-Governor has power to grant exemptions in certain special unforeseen cases.

*Service and Training.*—The service in the Militia is divided into three categories, viz.:—

1. The preliminary service.
2. The active service.
3. Service in the Reserve.

The preliminary service consists in the drill of lads and recruits from the age of 16 to 20, or till such time after attaining the age of 18 as their Commanding Officer may consider them fit for admission to the ranks of a regiment. Lads and recruits undergoing preparatory service attend 40 drills annually, as a general rule for 2 years, being drilled without arms during their first year, and subsequently with rifles.

This system of early training is an admirable one—the boys are thoroughly well grounded in the rudiments of drill, and the effect is noticeable in the general upright and soldierly bearing of the young men of all classes in the island.

The active service commences from the date of a recruit being embodied in the ranks of a regiment, and lasts for 10 years. During this period the Militiaman is compelled to attend 9 drills annually, in addition to musketry drills, and his annual course of target practice. These drills are divided, as regards the infantry, by the Militia Regulations, as follows:—3 company drills, 3 half-battalion, and 3 battalion drills, one of the last being the annual inspection. The whole force is assembled, in combination with the Regular troops, to celebrate the Queen's Birthday. There are in addition, voluntary drills for all who care to attend throughout the year, under the superintendence of the Adjutants.

In these compulsory annual drills, the absence of any progressive course of instruction for either Officers or men attracts immediate

attention. The lads and recruits, after completing their preliminary service, are passed into the different regiments, having received the drill and instruction necessary to enable them to take their places in the ranks, and during their active service they should make annually some progress in the practical military training requisite to render them efficient defenders of their country; but at present men in their tenth year of service are called upon to go through precisely the same drill and exercises as they executed in their first.

During the last three or four years, a great step has certainly been made towards practical instruction, by requiring each corps to carry out, during their training, a scheme for the defence of some portion of the coast, in combination with Regular troops, under conditions probable in actual warfare.

The number of drills permissible by law is admittedly very small; but if it is established that this number cannot be exceeded without hardship to the men, having regard to their various occupations and pursuits, it is all the more important that the utmost use should be made by the Officers of the limited time at their disposal. It cannot be expected that with the amount of training allowed the men can acquire the steadiness under arms, in battalion drill and the inevitable "march past," to compare with a battalion of Regular troops, as well as receive instruction in minor tactics, outpost duty, the construction of hasty entrenchments, and the occupation of defensive positions, all of which are so essential to this particular force; and surely the former should now give way to the latter.

Company drills might very well be dispensed with, except, perhaps, for men in the first year of their service, and one, or at the most two, battalion drills should be sufficient. The remainder of the drills could then be devoted to practical instruction of the men by their own Officers, in the subjects mentioned above, while a scheme for defending a section of the coast line, carefully worked out in every detail by the whole corps, would be a suitable conclusion to the training for the year.

As regards the artillery, the difficulties consequent on the number of drills being so limited are still greater, and it is only by a very general attendance at the numerous voluntary parades and drills that any degree of efficiency can be maintained. It has been recognized, however, that steadiness under arms at infantry drill is of small importance compared with proficiency in the multifarious duties peculiar to the field and garrison artilleryman, and the amount of infantry drill executed by the Militia artillery has been reduced to a minimum.

*Service in the Reserve.*—A Militiaman is transferred to the Reserve on the completion of his term of active service, and remains in it until he attains the age of 60. Men who have completed their 10 years of active service may, at their own request, and with the sanction of their Commanding Officer, continue to serve for terms of 2 years, till they reach the age of 45, but after that age none, except Officers, non-commissioned officers, and bandsmen, are allowed to serve, except in the Reserve.

Two lists of the Reserve are kept, viz.:—(a.) Those up to 45 years of age. (b.) Those between 45 and 60. The whole, or any portion, of the Reserve may, at any time, be called out for service, by order of Her Majesty in Council; but, unless so called out, men in the Reserve have only to attend one roll call annually, and they, therefore, receive no training whatever, and gradually drift out of all military habits.

It would be of considerable advantage to the general efficiency of the force if men of the Reserve could attend only one drill even, instead of the annual roll call, and it does not seem as if this could be accounted a hardship. A drawback to this being carried out at present is the fact that, although arms for the Reservists have been supplied by Government, as yet no accoutrements have been provided for them, nor any description of clothing.

*Musketry and Gun Practice.*—In addition to the compulsory drills, each man goes through, annually, a course in the artillery of gun practice, and in the infantry of target practice. In the artillery 100 rounds are fired during the year from the different guns, and in the infantry each man goes through the "range practices" prescribed for a battalion of infantry, with the exception of the defence practice, individual firing at 700 and 800 yards, and volley firing at 600 and 800 yards. After this, volunteers from the marksmen and 1st class shots execute further practice at the moving and vanishing targets.

Rifle shooting is very popular with the Jersey Militiamen, many of whom are, individually, first-rate shots. Being permitted to shoot as Volunteers in the meetings at Wimbledon and Bisley, a large contingent attend there every year, and meet with no small amount of success. There is an annual rifle meeting for the island on Gorey Common, and a large number of prizes are offered for competition. Each corps has its rifle club, and throughout the whole force the greatest possible interest is evinced in shooting.

But with such excellent material it seems a pity that some further advance is not attempted in musketry instruction. The number of rounds expended in individual firing is 50, and some of these individual practices might very well be dispensed with in the case of men known to be good shots, and the ammunition devoted to further instruction in some of the many useful "field practices." Further, there should be no difficulty in carrying out annually a day's "field firing," which might be executed by the artillery and infantry together, and which, under careful supervision, should be invaluable as a means for instruction in "fire discipline," and in giving to all ranks a practical idea of what effects they can reasonably expect, under service conditions, from the weapons entrusted to them.

*Miscellaneous Instruction.*—As regards other forms of instruction, each battalion of infantry is in possession of a machine-gun, and a certain number of men are trained annually with these guns. Machine-guns would be of special value in Jersey for the defence of the coasts and as helping to supplement the small numbers of the garrison, and the importance of having a comparatively large number of them available in the island has been repeatedly advocated.

A detachment of six men from each corps is trained annually to act as a bearer detachment, under the superintendence of the Medical Officers, of whom there are one or two belonging to each regiment. With these Medical Officers in charge, and with the facilities which would exist for the establishment of field hospitals, there should be no fear of any difficulties arising in the organization of a very effective medical service in case of war.

A matter which has hitherto not received much attention in the Jersey Militia is Army Signalling. On the outbreak of hostilities a considerable portion of the troops would necessarily be constantly employed on outpost duty, and for communication between the different outposts and the interior, even supposing the additional telegraph lines advocated were established, visual signalling would have to be resorted to to some extent. Some of the non-commissioned officers of the Permanent Staff have recently been trained in army signalling with a view to their being able to impart instruction; and, in view of the extreme importance of having always available a certain number of men for this duty, certain inducements, such as exemption from all other training, might be held out to Militiamen to qualify themselves in signalling.

To further aid rapid communication in time of war a cyclists' detachment would be of great value in Jersey. There are no cavalry in the island, nor is the country suitable for their employment, and cyclists could perform efficiently all the duties of mounted orderlies. In the present day cycling is so general among young men of all classes that in the Jersey Militia there must be many in possession of cycles who would prefer that kind of training to the ordinary drills, and no difficulty would be found in organizing a detachment of the required strength.

*Officers.*—Under the law of the island, commissions in the Jersey Militia are granted by the Lieutenant-Governor, by whom also all promotions and appointments are made other than those of the Militia Staff, who are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. The service for Officers, who are Jersey men, is compulsory, i.e., they are liable to serve in the ranks if they do not accept commissions, but all after ten years' service can, if they so request, pass to the Reserve.

There is at the present time a great difficulty in obtaining Officers for the Jersey Militia, especially in the higher grades. There is no lack of young men who apply for commissions, but most of them do so, as in other Militia corps, with a view of subsequently passing into the Regular Army; others leave the island in pursuit of their professions, and even of those who continue residents many avail themselves of the right to pass to the Reserve after they have completed the necessary ten years' service.

The problem is one which is of vital importance to the existence of the force, and one which must be faced by all who have its welfare at heart. No corps can continue without Officers, and in a force constituted like the Jersey Militia it is essential to efficiency that the Commanding and other Senior Officers should be men who by their position and character possess the authority over their subordinates

which Officers of the Regular Army derive from the powers vested in them.

The alternatives seem to lie between an extended period of service for Officers, and an application to the Imperial Government for the appointment of a certain number of Officers from the Regular Forces, as is the case in certain Colonial corps.

The Officers receive neither pay nor allowances during their service, and are consequently put to a certain amount of expense, and this is especially the case with Field Officers, who have to mount themselves as well as provide all the articles of their uniform and equipment.

Officers after joining are attached to a Line battalion for a month's instruction, and all are required to pass examinations in drill before promotion to a higher grade. The majority, however, have no opportunity of acquiring practical experience in handling bodies of troops, nor do they receive any theoretical instruction in the subjects which are comprised in the courses of garrison instruction. There might, perhaps, be established in Jersey classes for the instruction of Militia Officers in elementary topography, minor tactics, and field fortification, so that all might have an opportunity of attending one before attaining the rank of Field Officer. The chief difficulty lies in the fact that a number of the Officers are in business, and could not readily spare the necessary time. Facilities, too, might be given to Field Officers to go to large stations like Aldershot to gain a practical insight into the manœuvring of troops.

*Establishment.*—The establishment of the Jersey Militia is fixed by the Imperial Government, and is as follows:—

*Artillery.*—23 Officers, 10 sergeants (permanent staff), and 420 sergeants and rank and file. Total of all ranks 453.

*Infantry.*—3 battalions, each having 23 Officers, 10 sergeants (permanent staff), and 480 sergeants and rank and file. Total of all ranks 513.

This makes the total establishment of the whole force 1,992.

The strength of the active list is at present only 1,754, but this number will probably be considerably increased by the commencement of the training.

There are about 250 boys under instruction, and 59 Officers and 1,926 non-commissioned officers and men in the Reserve.

*Organization.*—Jersey is divided into 12 parishes, and forms 3 military districts, viz.:—

1. The western district, comprising the 6 parishes in the north and west of the island.
2. The eastern district, comprising the 5 parishes in the north and east.
3. The southern district, consisting of the town and parish of St. Heliers.

A battalion of infantry is recruited from each district, the artillery being recruited from the several districts in the following proportions:—One-sixth from each of the western and eastern districts;

four-sixths from the southern. Recruits for the artillery are selected from the lads prior to enrolment by the Officer Commanding the Artillery Regiment, who also may select at the annual inspection of lads such of them as he may require who have not entered their second year's training.

The regiment of artillery is divided into 2 batteries of position, each with 4 guns, 16-pr. R.M.L., and 4 batteries of garrison artillery.

In each district there are arsenals, where the arms, accoutrements, and clothing are stored, and which are the rendezvous for drill and in case of alarm.

Arms, accoutrements, and clothing are issued to men on the active list at the commencement of each training, and taken in after the musketry practice is concluded. Militiamen become entitled to clothing on being incorporated in a regiment, and the different articles have to last certain prescribed periods. At present, as has been previously mentioned, there is no clothing or accoutrements for the Reserve.

*Discipline.*—The Jersey Militia are at no time subject to Military Law, but certain provisions are made in the Militia Law for the maintenance of discipline.

Men who are absent from parades or drills, or who present themselves at drills with their arms, accoutrements, or clothing in bad order, are considered defaulters, and have to pay fines; while men guilty of drunkenness on duty, or of any offences which infringe the rules of discipline, are brought before the "Court for the Repression of Minor Offences," when the offenders may either be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment by the Magistrate; or the case may be referred by him to the Royal Court if, in his opinion, it deserves a more severe punishment than he has the power to inflict.

The difficulty of enforcing discipline can readily be understood under a system which withholds from Commanding Officers, who are responsible for the efficiency of their corps, all powers to punish those who fail to carry out their orders. Commanding Officers very naturally hesitate to bring before civil Magistrates any but serious offences, and consequently numerous irregularities are allowed to pass unchecked. The authority of all Officers and non-commissioned officers is thereby seriously weakened, and the result is a gradual but certain loss of that moral force we call discipline, the value of which is fully realized when troops which are without it are opposed to those among whom it is strictly enforced.

Public feeling in Jersey would be strongly opposed to the Militia being subject to Military Law, and as long as the Force remains as it is—an unpaid one—the idea need not be considered. However, much might be done if Commanding Officers were vested with similar or even reduced powers to those of the Judges of the Court for the Repression of Minor Offences; the latter would be invariably dealt with by them, while all really serious cases could be referred, as at present, to the Royal Court.

Non-commissioned officers, other than those of the permanent staff, are appointed from the ranks as vacancies occur by Commanding

Officers, who have the power to reduce them at any time to a lower grade or to the ranks.

*Expenditure.*—The Force being an unpaid one, the expenses connected with it which fall on the revenues of the island are very small. The Militia Staff and Permanent Staff of the several corps are paid by the Imperial Government, who also defray all expenses connected with the supply and maintenance of arms, ammunition, equipment, and clothing, as well as those for the hire of land transport.

The annual States vote is about 1,000*l.* all told, and of this about 120*l.* is allowed to each corps for incidental expenses, and Commanding Officers keep accounts of all disbursements of this kind. Such expenses as the hire of horses for the service of the artillery, repairs of rifle ranges, arsenals, &c., are paid by the States on the recommendation of the Committee for the Defence of the Island.

This Committee is composed of twelve members of the States, who may or may not possess any military knowledge, but what could not fail to be of assistance to them and to the States, would be an annual report on the general requirements of the Militia for the coming year, drawn up by a Committee composed of the Commanding Officers of Militia corps and the Assistant Adjutant-General for the Militia; men on whom the task of actually defending the island would fall.

#### *Summary of the Special Points noticeable in the Militia.*

The advantages which the Force may be said to possess are—

1. Service being universal, men of all classes pass through the ranks.
2. The men are never called upon to serve out of their own island, the topographical features of which they are all acquainted with.
3. Officers and non-commissioned officers are well acquainted with their men, and are known by them.
4. By the system of training boys, young men of all classes are imbued early with a military spirit.

The disadvantages under which they labour are—

1. Officers have but few opportunities of acquiring military experience.
2. Compulsory service is distasteful to a certain number.
3. It is difficult to enforce discipline under the present law.
4. The amount of training undergone by men in the active service is very small.

#### *Conclusion.*

Such is the Force on which, with the small complement of Regular troops in garrison, would fall the task of defending Jersey from the attack of a foreign Power, and it may be assumed at once that the only Power likely to threaten it is France.

As Sir Charles Dilke has pointed out, in the event of our being at war with a great maritime Power like France, our Fleet cannot be ubiquitous, and their attention must naturally be directed first to the protection of those ports whose safety is held vital to the interests of the Empire. Jersey cannot claim to be considered a maritime port of first-rate importance, and therefore entitled to special protection; but, unless our Fleet has suffered extraordinarily severe reverses, a portion of it will always be located in the English Channel, and in these days of rapid steam a relieving force could be transported to Jersey in a very few hours.

The attack might take the form either of a bombardment, the defence against which cannot be discussed, because it would entail entering into details of the armament, or of an attempt to land a force on the island. In the latter case, it is not likely that an overwhelming force would be despatched from France to Jersey, as their collection and the preparation of their transport could hardly fail to be noticed, and they would be liable to be attacked while crossing; but what is more probable is that at a favourable opportunity, when our Fleet was temporarily engaged elsewhere, a sudden attempt at an invasion of the island might be made by a force of about 5,000 or 6,000 men, previously collected and transferred secretly to some convenient port on the coast. An attempt of this sort might very well be made on the outbreak of hostilities with a view of acquiring the *prestige* of a brilliant commencement of the war.

Such an attack Jersey should be able to repulse successfully if, by means of an efficient outlook system by sea and land, by a well-organized plan for supplementing the defences of those parts of the coast where a landing could be effected, and by a careful previous study of all the details necessary for a rapid mobilization of troops on an outbreak of war, she can rely on being able to concentrate the bulk of her forces immediately at any point threatened.

War with France seems now happily a remote contingency, and that this is so is a matter for congratulation to none more than to the people of Jersey; but, the more the interests of a country are involved in the maintenance of peace, the greater is the necessity for its being at all times ready for war—

“Si vis pacem, para bellum.”