

existence.' 'Plato and Leibniz conceive reality as a pluralism,' and so forth. The formula by which Herbert and Eleaticism are conjoined seems misleading in the same way. The section on Averroism is surely all but worthless. To write two and a half lines on Predicables and refer only to Kant is odd. And *δύνα* does not mean *zweimal*.

Of defects in bringing up to date, the omission of the terminology of Avenarius seems important. Croce has not reached his niche under the heading 'Æsthetics,' though *Ben Crote* (*sic*!) is referred to on page 280. In the article on dreams it is disappointing to have Freud's less important book alone referred to, and his name misspelt beyond recognition. Pragmatism has less than a page given to it, though there is an item on Tuism. In bibliography there is a tendency to appear up to date by the insertion of recent books of relatively no account, with the exclusion of older books of importance. Harth's *Philabus of Plato*, *e.g.*, is surely of less importance for Plato than many books not on Dr. Michaelis' list. It is because the *Wörterbuch* is of a serviceable type and contains much that is useful that it is desirable to offer such criticisms.

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*Bericht über den IV. Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie in Innsbruck.* Edited by Prof. Dr. F. SCHUMANN. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911. Pp. xxviii, 312. Price M. 11.

This volume contains four excellent *Sammelreferate*: (1) "Aufbau und Lokalisation der Bewegungen beim Menschen," by C. v. Monakow (pp. 1-28); (2) "Ueber das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung," by M. Geiger (pp. 29-73), with a bibliography of 161 titles; (3) "Die Funktionen des Vestibularapparates," by Gustav Alexander (pp. 74-94), with a bibliography of fifty-five titles; (4) "Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychopathologie des Gedächtnisses," by Paul Ranschburg (pp. 95-180), with a bibliography of 177 titles. Ranschburg's paper summarises a great deal of work that has not been condensed hitherto, while the paper by Geiger states and arranges all the theories bearing on the empathetic attitude in a most useful manner. All these papers may be heartily recommended to the notice of those interested in the respective subjects.

Of the smaller reports of *Vorträge* mention may be made of two: "Bemerkungen zur Frage nach der Vererbung erworbener psychischer Eigenschaften," by Sigmund Exner (pp. 203-208); and "Ueber die Bedeutung ethnologischer Untersuchungen für die Psychologie und Aesthetik der Tonkunst," by C. Stumpf and E. v. Hornbostel (pp. 256-269), in which four transcriptions of primitive melodies are given. At the end of the volume there are twenty-eight pages of descriptions and illustrations from the exhibition of apparatus held at the congress (text by Dr. H. Rupp). It may be of interest to students of music to know that a metallophon with the Javanese and Siamese scale, constructed by Prof. C. Stumpf, can be had for 60 marks from Berlin (v., p. 306 and illustration).

H. J. W.

*Der Wissensbegriff.* Von JULIUS BAUMANN. Heidelberg, 1908.

This is one of a series of 'historical monographs on philosophical concepts,' and gives in the short space of two hundred and thirty pages a summary account of the doctrines of philosophers concerning the nature

of knowledge from Thales to the present day. It would probably be difficult for any one to treat so complicated a subject in so compressed a form very satisfactorily; and a reviewer would find his task of criticism easier if he were already acquainted with the general position of the author. From a quotation on page 226 from a work of his own one gathers that in Prof. Baumann's judgment knowledge consists in the attainment from 'indubitable presentations' (*Vorstellungen*) of certainty of the 'that' of things and of our souls, and partly also of certainty of their 'what' and their proximate conditions, while the true 'how' of their being and activity remains for ever hidden from us. Naturally he surveys the teaching of philosophers in the past from the point of view thus indicated. He is always ready to insist on the 'individuality' of the various doctrines, which will commonly be found to reflect the characteristic personality of their originators. Great importance is attached to climate as a dominant factor in determining the tendency of national thought. Interesting are the remarks on the resemblance of modern doctrines of 'mind-cure' to a certain aspect of Stoicism (p. 96), on the anticipation by Confucius of Kant's postulate-theology (p. 116), on the development from Gassendi to Hume considered as the working out of a reply to 'occasionalism' (p. 166), on the influence of Montaigne upon Kant (p. 187). Kant is no favourite master of Prof. Baumann's; who prefers, as there is no agreement as to the true meaning of his own words, to take Schultz as an authoritative exponent of them. Prof. Baumann seems to underrate the importance of the quantitative to Aristotle (p. 82); and the only works on scholastic philosophy which he commends to his readers are the unsatisfactory ones of M. Le Wulf. The interesting chapter on Arabian philosophy suggests to an outsider that this has been a subject to which Prof. Baumann has devoted especial attention. We have noticed a few misprints; Holosh for Holcot (p. 163 n.); Origines for Origenes (p. 197); and (unless we mistake) Le Rou for Le Roz (p. 219).

C. C. J. WEBB.

*Verità e Realtà.* Di ALESSANDRO BONUCCI. (Biblioteca di filosofia e pedagogia.) Modena: A. F. Formiggini, 1911. Pp. 518. L. 7.50.

The comprehensiveness of the title of this work is not belied by its contents. Sig. Bonucci as an Absolutist has no fear of the reproach of system-making, and he here attempts to give a more or less complete exposition of the system in which he believes. His book is one of very considerable interest, not so much for anything novel in the way of philosophical doctrine it contains, as for the point of view from which it is written, and for the endeavour which the writer makes to bring his metaphysics into touch with life. For Sig. Bonucci is full of the conviction that man's chief end is transmutation into the Absolute, and he has written his book to aid the wayfaring man on his journey towards that goal.

Neither in the base nor in the apex of his metaphysics does our author appear to improve greatly on his predecessors. To the establishment of the fundamental principle of all Idealism—the identity of existence and knowledge—he contributes nothing new, but contents himself with the ancient story, that because you can't know a thing unless you know it, it can't exist unless it is known. In his exposition of what he means by 'the Absolute' he finds himself in serious difficulties. In order to give us a dim notion of its nature—and it is a very dim notion that we get—he has to sin flagrantly against consistency. For after insisting that