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Colonel G. B. Malleson C.S.I.

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LECTURE.

Friday, June 7th, 1878.

GENERAL W. A. McCLEVERTY in the Chair.

THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA IN SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I., late Bengal Staff Corps.

It will be my object this afternoon to place, in a concise form, before the members of this Society, some materials from which they may draw conclusions regarding the strength of those native states in India which are in subsidiary alliance with the paramount power, and the chance of success which might await them in any contest with that power.

Throughout Hindustan there are six groups or divisions of native states. They may be classified under the names applied to the parts of the country they inhabit. These are—Rajputana, Central India, Western India, Southern India, Eastern India, Northern and North Western India. For aggressive purposes, four of these, for reasons which will be given hereafter, may be dismissed at once from consideration. There remain the fifth and sixth—Southern and Central India—comprising Haidarabad, Mysore, and Travankor, the great Maratha states of Gwalior and Indur, the Mahomedan state of Bhopal, and the small Rajput principalities of Dhar and Diwas. Of all these, Haidarabad, Gwalior, and Indur are alone really formidable.

Before alluding to the aggressive capacities of the states of Southern and Central India, I propose to glance at the conditions of the native states in the other parts of the country, and to show why it would be impossible for them seriously to incommode the paramount power.

In Northern and North Western India the most important native province is Kashmir. A glance at the map will show that Kashmir is shut in between lofty mountains and British territory. The mountains


are behind it; British territory lies in its front and on either flank. It is, in fact, a portion of British territory severed from it, protected by passes inhabited by a race always content to serve, always governed by alien rulers. Kashmir has ever obeyed the ruler of the great province—the Punjab—from which it was severed in 1846. When Mogol rule was dominant in that province, Kashmir was Mogol; it subsequently succumbed to the great Sikh ruler who rescued the Punjab from Mogol sway. It was ceded to the British in 1846, and by the British was transferred, the same year, to the father of the present ruler—the Sikh chieftain of Jammu. The population is 150,000; the number of armed retainers amounts to about 20,000; the number of guns to 96. But the armed retainers include a number of undisciplined men, but slightly armed, and the guns are of the rudest description. For aggressive purposes against the British the country is as though it were disarmed, and no one is more conscious of this fact than the Raja of the country himself.

On the same side of the Satlaj as Kashmir are the states of Kapurthala, Mandi, Chamba, and Saket. The joint population of these states is under 600,000, and none of them are or could be, in the smallest degree, formidable for aggressive purposes.

The Raja of Patiala, on the south bank of the Satlaj, is more formidable. The area of his country exceeds 5,000 square miles; the population numbers more than 1,500,000. His territory joins the territories of the Rajas of Jhind and Nabha. The three Rajas are Sikhs, all descended from the same stock. The joint population of the three states just exceeds 2,000,000. Yet, of armed retainers of all sorts, there are but 3,500, and of guns but 27. The people are Sikhs, given greatly to agricultural pursuits. A glance at the map of India will show how entirely these small states are hemmed in by British territory, and how impossible it is that they could successfully lend themselves to aggressive action.

The smaller states of Kalsia, Maler Kotta, and Faridkot, may be dismissed without remark. Bhawalpur, which is more important, is mainly so because it is a link between the Punjab and Rajputana. A long narrow tract, it is bounded on the north-west by Sind and the Punjab, and on the east, south-east, and part of the south by the Rajput states of Bikanir and Jaisalmer, and by Bhattiana. The majority of the inhabitants are Mahomedans of Beluchi and Afghan descent. They number only 365,000. The Nawab or ruler has but 3,000 armed retainers of sorts, and 80 guns of kinds. Regard being had to the straggling nature of the country, its exposed position, its scanty population, Bhawalpur may be relegated to the list of those states which, under no circumstances, could be formidable for aggression.

Bhawalpur takes us from the north and north-west entirely, and leads us to Rajputana. The times have been when Rajputana concentrated within herself the fighting strength of Hindustan. They were princes and people of Rajputana who opposed the most stubborn resistance to the earliest Mahomedan invasion from the north. They were princes and people of Rajputana who first nobly resisted Akbar and the Mogols, who subsequently, submitting to the overlordship of



the dynasty of Baber, constituted the most important portion of the vast empire ruled from Agra and from Delhi. They were princes of Rajputana who commanded the armies of their Mogol overlord, and who brought to every field contingents of their own kith and kin who would die rather than quit the ground. In those days the Rajputs of Rajputana were the life-blood of Hindustan. Where are they now? They fell with their Mogol tyrants. The crash of the great empire they had upheld carried them away with it. They fell with its fall. The Maratha freebooters who rose, no one knew how, out of the ruin of the Mogol empire, overran their territories, and sucked out their very life-blood. History offers no nobler story than that presented by Rajputana for the period intervening between the rise of Akbar and the successful installation of Aurangzib; no sadder picture than it presented during the hundred and odd years intervening between the death of Aurangzib, in 1707, and the final crushing of the Maratha power by the Marquis of Hastings in 1817. It was the history of the decay, the ruin, the abasement of a great people.

Rajputana exists still. Its kings are the lineal descendants of the heroes who flourished long prior to the time of Akbar. Its people are the sons of those who defended Chitor, and who fought for empire at Kanua and Biana. But her life has died out. The good blood that was in the veins is now dry and hard. The charms of opium have succeeded to the song of battle, and the pleasures of the harem to the joys of strife.

Yet it may excite some surprise to hear that throughout Rajputana at the present moment there are 93,000 armed retainers of whom at least one-fourth are horsemen, and about 2,000 guns of sorts. But the remark made regarding the guns and the retainers of the Raja of Kashmir applies equally to these guns and to these men. The guns are all of the oldest pattern and for the most part small and worthless. The armed retainers are not soldiers, nor do they pretend to be so. At the most they have a sword or a matchlock. They have never been drilled, and in no respect are they formidable.

There are in Rajputana eighteen states in subsidiary alliance with the British Government. They are called Udaipur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bundi, Kota, Jhalawar, Karauli, Kishngarh, Dholpur, Bharatpur, Alwar, Bikanir, Jaisalmer, Sirahi, Dongarpur, Banswara, Pertabgarh, and Tonk. Of these the last alone is ruled by a Mahomedan—the descendant of the famous freebooter, Amir Khan; Bharatpur is governed by a Jat prince; the other states by Rajputs. The population is mainly Rajput. It is among these eighteen states that are apportioned the 93,000 armed retainers and the 2,000 guns of which I have made mention. To utilize these men and these guns, if indeed they were capable of being utilized for aggression against the paramount power, the union and combined action of eighteen different independent states would be necessary. The history of the past in India shows such union and such combined action to be impossible. Ceremonial and etiquette constantly interfere even with social intercourse amongst these high caste princes; much more would it prevent joint and secret action. Of Rajputana, then, extensive as is the country, brave and

warlike as were once the people, it may be said that even were her princes united she would not be formidable for aggression, and that, divided into eighteen states independent of each other, she is powerless.

Turning now to Western India I find here five principal states, the remainder being minor and subsidiary. The five principal states are Barodah, Kolhapur, Sawant-wari, Kachh, and Kathiwar. None of these are formidable for aggressive purposes. Barodah, with a population somewhat below 2,000,000, maintains an armed force of about 14,000 men and 30 guns. Some of these 14,000 men are well dressed and well drilled, but they are essentially show soldiers. The Gaikwars of Barodah have never played a prominent part in the history of India; they have been always second to some one else. They are so now to the English, and they will, if they are wise, be content to remain so.

Kolhapur, though ruled by a descendant of the younger branch of the family which gave birth to the famous Sivaji, is even more debased than is Barodah from aggressive power. Disaffection or misgovernment in this state has always been easily suppressed by a small British force. The armed retainers number about 1,600 men, and though there are said to be 258 guns in the country, none of them are worth much. Sawant-wari, Kachh, Kathiwar, and the minor states, may be summarily dismissed without remark.

Passing from Western to Eastern India we find there only petty chieftains, none of whom possess power for aggression. The states are all mediatised or minor, and their rulers, though nominally Rajas, are really only large landowners.

In Southern India, as perhaps in all India, the most formidable state is Haidarabad. Mysore, which in the last century, under its Mahomedan sovereign, used to threaten Madras and lay claim to give law to the southern portion of the peninsula, has long been powerless for aggression. The masterly policy of Marquis Wellesley reduced her in 1799 to nothingness. She was shorn of half her dominions, and salient positions in her territory were occupied by British troops. The misgovernment of the representative of the restored Hindu ruler rendered it necessary for the British, in 1833, to tighten their hold on the country. British troops, native and European, occupy Bangalor, and a station close to the far-famed but dismantled fortress of Seringapatam. The once renowned horsemen of Mysore are now under British command. The armed retainers of the minor Raja number but 1,000 infantry, some 35 cavalry, only half of whom are mounted, and 6 small guns. The people are industrious, much given to the cultivation of the soil, the yield of which is ordinarily far more than sufficient for the wants of the population. Out of a population of 5,000,000, the Hindus greatly predominate.

This short summary of the present state of Mysore renders it almost unnecessary for me to state that for purposes of aggression against the paramount power she is not to be counted upon.

Similarly with regard to Travankor. The armed force at her ruler's disposal does not exceed that at the disposal of the Raja of Mysore. The people, almost entirely Hindus, are unwarlike in character, and throughout their history have never carried on a war of aggression.

The same remark applies to the people of the small neighbouring state of Kochin. The armed force in this state amounts only to 300 men, and it has but 3 small guns.

It is different in Haidarabad. Independently of a contingent force of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four batteries of artillery, commanded by British Officers, and paid for out of the revenue of lands assigned for that purpose by the Nizam, that prince maintains a separate force little short of 50,000 men. Of these nearly 37,000 are infantry, the cavalry amount to 8,200, and there are 725 guns. These troops are not the rabble which go to form the armed retinue of some of the princes of whom I have spoken. Amongst them are Arabs and Africans, strong of limb, active by habit, and turbulent by nature. These for the most part occupy the city of Haidarabad, and in periods of excitement they have shown themselves extremely difficult to restrain. In the crisis of 1857 they burst the bonds that held them back and attacked the British Resident in his palace. The period was critical. It was the middle of July when the disasters of Mirath, of Delhi, of Cawnpore, of Lukhnow, were as yet unavenged, and when a strong feeling pervaded the native mind that the knell of British rule had sounded. Had Haidarabad, with its population of over 10,000,000 and its army of 50,000 men, turned against us at that moment, it is difficult to see how we could have held Southern and Western India. It happened fortunately that the Prime Minister of the Nizam, the present Sir Salar Jung, was a far-seeing statesman. He believed in the fortunes of Great Britain, and he felt that if revolt were to be triumphant it was neither the Nizam nor the Mahomedan nobles of Haidarabad who would reap the fruits. Without hesitation, then, he summoned troops upon whom he could depend, attacked the rebels, and dispersed them. From that moment the excitement subsided; Sir Salar Jung was supreme, and he gave all his influence to the maintenance of a cordial understanding with the British.

Still it is undeniable that for aggressive purposes Haidarabad might be formidable. Alone, I think, of all the reigning native dynasties in India, the Nizam occupies towards the British the position which his predecessors—the Subadars of the Dekhan—held towards the Great Mogol. The large colony of Mahomedan nobles who form the court of the Nizam are, for the most part, descendants of the nobles who, in the days of Mogol rule, followed the Subadar or Viceroy from Delhi to Haidarabad. The people number amongst them many Mahomedans, but the majority are Hindus. It has so happened that the ruler of Haidarabad has never been embroiled with the English. Inclined, during the war for empire in Southern India between the French and the English, to side with the former, they accepted the decision of fortune and remained—with a slight exception in 1767 of which they speedily repented—true to the English overlordship. The reigning family has been guiltless of producing one man of real ability, and the British Resident on the spot has always exercised great influence in directing the policy of the representative of the house. Still it must never be forgotten, in computing the dangers of India from within, that Haidarabad is a compact state ruled by Mahomedans,

with a population of nearly 11,000,000—an independent Army of nearly 50,000 men, many of them chosen troops, and 725 guns.

Inferior to Haidarabad in extent, in the amount of its population, and in wealth, though scarcely inferior to it in aggressive power, is the Maratha state called Gwalior. The past history of this state, and the past history of the house of Sindia which rules it, make it in a certain view more dangerous than the other. The house of Sindia has a past more brilliant, more powerful, more alluring than the present. It was the greatest representative of that house, Madhaji, who struck the blow which lodged the Maratha in the palaces of the Mogols. It was the successor of Madhaji who, in 1803, contested the empire of Hindustan with the British, and who, dreaming of renewing the struggle in 1817, was outwitted by the Marquis of Hastings and compelled to recognise the supremacy of his successful rivals. In the minds of capable members of ruling families that have been great, the past is always a dominating power. The present ruler of Gwalior is pre-eminently a capable man; he is above all things a soldier; he understands how to manœuvre troops; he is alive to the improvements effected of late years in the scientific branches of the military profession, and he has ever shown himself anxious to secure for himself the advantage of those improvements. He occupies a central position in India; he is in the prime and perfection of manhood; he is his own Prime Minister, and within his own dominions absolute ruler.

The dominions of Sindia comprise 33,000 square miles. The population, mostly Hindu, numbers nearly 3,000,000. The annual revenue is about 1,000,000*l*. By the last treaty with the Government of India Sindia was empowered to maintain a regular army of 5,000 men and 36 guns. He does maintain a regular army of that strength, but in addition to it he can dispose of an irregular force numbering about 17,000 infantry and cavalry, and 170 guns of sorts.

The past history of the wars of Sindia with the English gives an apt illustration of the advantage accruing to the native army from the presence in its ranks of European officers. Until the battles with the Sikhs on the banks of the Satlaj in 1846, there had been no more hotly contested engagement than the battle of Laswari. Laswari was fought on the 1st November, 1803. The Maratha army numbered but 9,000 men, of whom 1,500 were cavalry, and they had 74 guns. But the 7,000 men who composed the infantry were the picked soldiers of India. They had been trained in the European system by the famous De Boigne, and were armed with the best muskets then procurable. Until within a few weeks of the battle the regiments had been drilled and commanded by European officers. Under the leading of these officers they had beaten every enemy whom they had encountered. But their European officers, ready to lead them against the native enemies of Sindia, had felt a great repugnance to do battle against English troops. Possibly they were not uninfluenced by the offers made them on the declaration of war by Marquis Wellesley—offers which secured to them their property and a provision for life. This at least is certain, that they left the trained battalions to shift for themselves. Here, then, were 9,000 trained troops—splendidly trained

troops—but with no Europeans to guide them. On the morning of 1st November Lord Lake attacked them in a very strong position with his cavalry, composed of three regiments of dragoons and five of native cavalry. The position of the Marathas was so strong, and they had been trained so well, that the cavalry attack was repulsed, and Lord Lake was constrained to draw off and await the arrival of his infantry. At noon the infantry, who had marched twenty-five miles, came up. They consisted of one English regiment, the 76th, and four native regiments—in all about 4,000 men. Lord Lake's whole force, including cavalry and artillery, numbered about 7,000 men. The disparity then was not very great. It is interesting, especially at the present day, to notice how these trained sepoy, commanded by their own countrymen, met and encountered the English soldiers, and the sepoy commanded by English officers.

Lord Lake allowed his soldiers an hour to rest and take their food. He then formed his infantry into two columns, the first of which was to turn the enemy's right concentrated round the village of Mohalpur, the second was to support it. Whilst this real attack was taking place one-half of the cavalry were to threaten the enemy's left, whilst the other half should hold itself in readiness to take advantage of any confusion in the hostile ranks.

These dispositions having been effected, the first column moved on; but its advance was no sooner noticed by the Marathas than they throw back their right, and concentrated on the advancing column the whole fire of their artillery. The fire was most effective. The heads of the advancing column were smitten down, and the losses were enormous. But Lord Lake was aware that the one way to beat Asiatics was to move straight on; the column, therefore, still pressed onward. In vain did the enemy, suspending for a moment his artillery fire, send his cavalry to check the advance. The cavalry were repulsed; the column still pressed on and deployed, whilst our cavalry charged the guns. Admirably trained, formed of the same material as the majority of the attacking force, slightly superior in numbers, occupying a strong position, the enemy showed on this occasion a courage and resolution scarcely to be surpassed; but their leaders were not up to the mark. They had no trained European officers to call upon them to do the right thing at the right moment. In the contest that followed this deficiency decided the day. Whilst their cavalry had fallen back ours had advanced and ridden over the gunners. Our infantry, following up the cavalry charge, took possession of the greater part of the guns. The two arms, acting in concert, then drove the enemy from every position; not, however, before each had been most stubbornly contested.

I have mentioned Laswari as affording the best example of a battle fought by a purely Maratha army against a force of combined European and native troops, the latter led by English officers. It proves, as the actions on the Satlaj and in the Punjab proved subsequently, that native soldiers will fight splendidly, even against Europeans, that they only require to be led. Side by side with English troops, and opposed to an enemy whom those English troops are eager to encounter, they would vie with their English comrades. This spirit of their

English comrades would communicate itself to them and would animate every nerve. At Laswari fighting against the English without officers to lead them, they displayed, writes the historian and eye witness, Major Thorn, "a firmness of resolution and contempt of death" which could not fail to command the admiration of their opponents." But it should never be forgotten that of the regiments opposed to them but one was British. The others were their own countrymen, not better drilled than they were, but led by English officers.

Subsequently to the campaign which the battle of Laswari virtually ended, Sindia but once again met the English in the field. This happened in 1843. But the circumstances were peculiar. Intriguers had taken advantage of the minority of the present Maharaja to embroil the country with the British. Their army had lost the training imparted to it by De Boigne and his followers. They were a rabble possessing some good guns. Met by the English at Maharajpur they still showed courage, but they made no stand at all to be compared with that at Laswari.

During the mutiny, the Maharaja, in spite of the fact that his very kinsmen revolted against him, remained faithful to the British. His troops turned against us. But it was as an ally of the Maharaja that Lord Strathnairn stormed his capital in 1858, and that subsequently Lord Napier of Magdala restored order in his dominions.

The Maharaja is a good soldier. He has at his disposal, as I have already stated, a small well-disciplined force of 5,000 men and 36 guns, and he can dispose of an irregular army of 17,000 men and 170 guns. Granting that he were ill-disposed towards the British, his means of aggression are not very formidable. It is well, too, to notice that they are not without a very powerful counterpoise. The famous fortress of Gwalior, overlooking his capital, is occupied by British troops, whilst a small but admirably equipped force of the same troops of all arms occupies Morar, a station also within sight of his capital. So long as these positions are occupied the Maharaja is debarred from aggression. As well might a man with disease of the heart attempt violent exercise. In occupying Morar and the fortress of Gwalior we prevent the possibility of extraordinary locomotion on the part of the owner.

Far less formidable for aggressive purposes than Sindia is his fellow Maratha, Holkar. Holkar rules over a straggling territory in Central India containing about 8,400 square miles and occupied by a population of little over half a million, mostly Hindus. His armed retainers number 8,500, and he has 102 guns of sorts. The instincts of the present representative of the house are rather money making than martial.

The Holkars of Indore have indeed twice felt the power of the English. In 1804-5 after a campaign which had begun by the enforced retreat of Colonel Monson, for want, Rao Holkar fled completely beaten to the Punjab, whence he returned—to use his own words—"with his kingdom on his saddle's bow" to the conqueror. In December, 1817, the Pathan chiefs, who during the minority of the minor Raja, swayed the fortunes of the state, encountered the English at Meludpur. They were hopelessly beaten. One day sufficed to place

the dominions of Holkar at the feet of the British. Holkar, then, individually as a state, can scarcely be regarded as formidable for aggressive purposes.

One word regarding another state in Central India—I mean Bhopal. This country adjoins Holkar's dominions to the eastward of them. Its ruler and the court are Mahomedans, as are likewise a large number of the population of the chief town. It contains 6,760 square miles, and nearly 700,000 inhabitants. The number of armed retainers maintained by the Begam is about 6,000, and she has 39 guns of sorts. Bhopal has from the earliest times displayed an unswerving friendship for and loyalty to the British. In the most trying times of the Mutiny, when other states wavered Bhopal was true. The dynasty which rules it has never shown any love for aggression. A small colony of Mahomedans planted in the midst of a large Hindu community at the time of the break-up of the Mogol Empire, the descendants of that colony have been satisfied to maintain the dominion of their fathers. The circumstances of their origin may account to some extent for their early sympathy with the British. Afghans in Central India were as much foreigners to the Hindu population as were the English.

I have now passed in view singly one after another the only native states in Hindustan which might possess the power, had they the will, to cause serious trouble to their overlord. Singly, it will be seen they are comparatively harmless. But to the reader who, glancing at the table which forms an appendix to this lecture, may notice that the native states of India, united, can dispose of 64,172 cavalry; 241,063 foot soldiers; and 9,390 trained artillerymen working 5,252 guns; the question might arise as to how the British Government could meet this enormous force if its component parts were to combine against us.

In meeting this question the first point to be remarked is that they never would unite. It was the dream of Madhaji Sindia, the greatest statesman India ever produced, to combine during the last decade of the last century all India against the British. He found the task impossible. Whilst he was maturing matters to this great end one chieftain or other would break away and spoil the scheme by too precipitate action. Sometimes it was Tippu Sahib, sometimes the Peshwa. These gave the English the chance of beating them in detail. Madhaji died just when he had attained the pinnacle of greatness and when it might have been possible for him to put his scheme into action. It was not till seven years after his death that the mind of his successor, Daolat Rao, grasped the value of Madhaji's idea. At that time he and Jaswant Rao Holkar virtually governed Hindustan. Jaswant Rao was as completely penetrated as was Sindia with the conviction that if they did not beat the English the English would obtain supremacy in India. But Jaswant Rao was jealous of Sindia. Though urgently pressed to act, and though promising to act, his jealousy kept him quiet when Sindia battled with the common enemy. He experienced far more pleasure in seeing Sindia defeated than he would have felt in hearing of his victory. But no sooner was Sindia crushed than the dread of the English returned and Holkar precipitated with them a war in which

he was all but annihilated. Now both these chieftains were Marathas. If two princes of the same race, having the same interests to defend, found themselves unable to coalesce against a common enemy, is it probable that princes of different races, divided from each other by religion, by descent, by the memories of past wrongs, could join for the same purpose? It is impossible. I have mentioned but one instance of the action natural to native chiefs; but every period, every age of Indian history teems with similar examples. It was so under the Mogol likewise. The feeling of the native states towards each other is well illustrated by the speech made by Charles II to the Duke of York. "They will never wish me dead to make you King." No single native state would wish the supremacy of England destroyed to bestow that supremacy on another native state. One reason for the general acceptance of the supremacy of England is that that supremacy keeps in check rival native claims.

But, granted that union were possible, what then? There is no answer like a practical answer, and the answer to even a greater difficulty was given in 1857. In that year the fortresses, the arsenals, the magazines in India were wholly or partly garrisoned or guarded by native troops. Two-thirds of the guns were manned by them. The native troops were to the European troops in the proportion of fourteen to one. The bulk of the native troops, men trained by us, armed by us, and able to dispose, to a considerable extent, of our fortresses, our guns, and our magazines, rose in revolt. They had all the advantages arising from a surprise. We were unprepared, yet the handful of Europeans that were on the spot kept them in check till reinforcements could arrive by a long sea route from England.

In the present day we possess arms of precision such as the native princes have not; we guard our fortresses, our magazines, our arsenals with Europeans; we have cannon beside which the cannon of the native princes are exploded weapons; the Suez Canal is available for the transport of our troops. If the trained and disciplined, well-armed and well-provided sepoy failed in 1857, what chance would the combined rabble of the native princes have in 1878? Were they to attempt the chance Assaye and Argaum would be repeated.

But they will not attempt it. Undoubtedly there are men amongst them who have a past and who would chafe under any overlord. But these men feel that some overlordship is necessary for their own security. The present Maharaja of Gwalior had no sympathy with the revolt of 1857, mainly because the sepoy connected that movement with the reassertion of the Mogol dynasty. The triumph of that dynasty would have been no triumph for Sindia. It would have substituted a Mogol overlord for an European overlord—a lawless tyrant for a just and considerate suzerain.

The assertion of the English overlordship by the assumption by Her Majesty of the title of Empress in 1876, was a measure not only politic but imperatively necessary. The more it is brought home to the native princes that England intends to be overlord in name as well as in deed, the greater will be their respect for England—the more solid their conviction that they are not independent but vassal princes.

It was the absence of this direct assumption of overlordship that had encouraged men, disaffected to the English, to rouse in the minds of the native princes aspirations to which they had no claim. It is within my knowledge that the summons to the Durbar, held at Delhi on the 1st January, 1877, caused more than one native prince to communicate his ideas on the subject to another native prince. The result of this intercommunication was a conviction that attendance at that Durbar was imperative.

The proclamation of the title, then, followed by the Durbar, cleared away a delusion which might have been dangerous. The position of the native princes was brought home to each one of them. They all, by their attendance, acknowledged the overlordship of England.

It must tend to the general safety of the country when men in that position are brought to see themselves as others see them, and not with the eyes of their flatterers. The Mutiny, the opening of the Suez Canal, the increasing knowledge of the English language, have made the princes of India more thoroughly acquainted with the power and resources of England than were the wisest of their predecessors. Many of them are now, all of them in time will become, of the same opinion as the late astute ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Mahomed Khan. It happened that during the Mutiny year, 1857, three British officers were at Kandahar on a political mission. Haidar Khan, then Governor of that place, sent word to his father, Dost Mahomed, that news had come from India that all the English there had been murdered: "Had I not better cut the throats of these three?" Dost Mahomed replied: "It is useless;—I know these English well. It may be true that all those in India have been murdered, but they will come in thousands from beyond the sea and reconquer the country. Better leave these three alone."

The splendid stand made by England during the last four months against the threatened aggressions of Russia, will go far to impress this idea on the minds of the princes of India, whilst the employment of native troops in Europe will tend to cement together the bonds of the severed branches of the great Aryan race. I have enumerated the strength of the native princes and their powers for aggression; but I am convinced that every succeeding year will increase their loyalty to our Queen and their Empress—their desire to uphold the great Empire of which they form a valuable and necessary part.

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APPENDIX.

Showing the War Material at the disposal of the Native Princes of India.

States.	Guns.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Rajputana :			
Udaipur	538	15,100	6,240
Jaipur	312	10,500	3,530
Jodhpur	220	4,000	5,600
Bundi	68	2,000	200
Kota	119	4,600	700
Jhalawar	90	3,500	400
Tonk	53	2,288	430
Karauli	40	3,200	400
Kishugarh	35	2,000	150
Dhalpur	32	3,650	610
Bharatpur	38	8,500	1,460
Alwar	351	5,633	2,280
Bikanir	53	940	670
Jaisalmir	12	400	500
Sirohi	—	350	375
Dongarpur	4	632	57
Banswara	3	500	60
Partabgarh	12	950	275
Central India :			
Gwalior	210	16,050	6,068
Indor	102	5,500	3,000
Bhopal	39	4,766	1,194
Dhar	4	790	370
Dewas	"	"	"
Rewa	35	2,000	905
Other States in Bandalkhand	421	22,163	2,677
Western India :			
Barodah	30	11,000	3,098
Kolhapur	258	1,502	154
Kachh	38	600	300
Kathiwar	508	15,306	3,033
Southern India :			
Haidarabad	725	36,890	8,202
Mysore	6	1,000	35
Travankur	6	1,211	60
Kochin	3	300	—
Northern India :			
Cis-Satlaj States	141	7,185	3,191
Kashmir	96	18,436	1,393
Trans-Satlaj States	27	3,275	300
Bhawalpur	80	2,484	360
Petty States	302	18,000	4,000

The CHAIRMAN : Before proposing a vote of thanks to Colonel Malleon for his very interesting lecture, you will perhaps allow me to make a few remarks, in order to substantiate the statement that he has made, especially with regard to the province of Hyderabad, the most formidable of these native powers. There is no doubt that the natives of the province and city of Hyderabad are among the most warlike, turbulent, and robust men in India, comprising Arabs, Afghans, Pathans, Seeds,

Rohillas, Rajpoots, and other warlike races. With regard to the 725 guns, of which Colonel Malleon has spoken, I had an opportunity of seeing specimens of these guns about the year 1870, when I first reviewed a portion of these troops in the city of Hyderabad. I think I saw somewhere about 18,000 men, and I was shown about 30 guns. Some of them were guns that had done duty at the siege of Seringapatam. I also saw some guns from Golconda which they told me had been brought from Persia in the time of the first Nizam, about the year 1720. There is no doubt the greater portion of the guns are perfectly useless. The Army is entirely undisciplined and unofficered, in the proper sense of the term, except a small force called the reformed army that Salar Jung has placed under the control of European Officers; but really from what I saw of specimens of the 725 guns, I do not believe there is a single one that is of any use, and there were no arms of precision. I will now invite any gentleman to put any questions to Colonel Malleon on this subject, and no doubt he will be very happy to reply to them.

Captain COLLEN, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Secretary, Military Department: I have listened with very great attention to the able lecture delivered by Colonel Malleon, and although I had no intention of speaking when I came down, there are one or two points I should like to observe upon. I gather from the lecture that Colonel Malleon believes the armies of the native states of India could not be combined for the purpose of aggression, and I am sure that we must all agree with him in that. But he did not, I think, make sufficient of a point which I would venture to bring to your notice. Many of these native states have, as Colonel Malleon told us, forces of considerable strength; and although not of great warlike power, yet we must admit that though we may term them by the name of "rabble," they are quite sufficient to disturb order in India, if at any juncture of circumstances a portion of the British forces were withdrawn from that Empire. That is a point on which I wish to lay stress. I have only to say, as far as regards the welfare of the native states themselves, that it would be to their great benefit if their forces were reduced to a minimum. They spend a great deal of money on these men, and as Colonel Malleon pointed out, they are of very little use for military purposes. To a certain extent I have always understood, and I have seen portions of most of these forces, they are used as police, and as guards for treasure and so on. Up to that point they are useful, but for military purposes they are quite out of place. They have nobody against whom they could fight except the paramount power, England. My own earnest hope is, and I gather from the newspapers that such a measure is contemplated, that the forces of the native states of India may be reduced to the least possible strength, consistent with our treaty obligations with those states, and with the dignity of those who have been loyal and faithful to us.

Captain WEMYSS: I might mention that the regular horsemen in Barodah were the most active swordsmen I have seen anywhere.

General CAVENAGH: I think we must all fully agree with Colonel Malleon in his remarks as to the inability of the forces of the native states to make any aggressive movement upon the paramount power so long as those forces are without proper leaders. It is, however, a question whether, in the event of our ever allowing native states to take into their service men who would be able to train and discipline their troops against us, they would not in the time of emergency be found a thorn in our side. It is also possibly a question whether we ourselves are wise in training up as leaders, natives who may at any time become hostile to us. In support of what Colonel Malleon has stated with regard to the want of efficient commanders amongst the Marathas at Maharajpur,¹ I may mention an incident that occurred to a man in my own regiment, and although a large body of Maratha cavalry were present, they took no part in the action. The troopers were many of them friends and relatives of the very men we were leading. After the battle, when one of our men met a cousin

¹ Notwithstanding this disadvantage, the Maratha artillery and infantry fought well, and stoutly defended their positions; of the British troops, upon whom the brunt of the action fell, about one in five were rendered *hors de combat*; the regiments that suffered the most were the 39th Foot, 214; 40th Foot, 182; 16th Native Infantry, 180.

of his who belonged to the opposite force, he put the question to him, why, with numbers so much greater than ours, they never charged us? The reply shows conclusively what Colonel Malleon has pointed out, that it is in leaders that the native troops are deficient. The answer was given in the shape of an inquiry: "Where were your European Officers?" Upon which, our man replied: "Our Officers led their troops and squadrons." "Our Officers," the Maratha replied, "were in the rear." As to the power of the troops of the native states to meet British troops in the open field, without leaders, it would be impossible; but I think that the British Government ought not to lose sight of the fact that, considering their large numbers, in the event of any general rising, which of course wise statesmen will always contemplate, for it may occur owing to intrigues that may be carried on against us—these men would act upon our flanks and interfere with our communications; and although they might never be arrayed against us in a pitched battle, they would materially affect our operations, and possibly lead to our suffering serious and great loss.

Mr. HADDAN, C.E.: On the question of the value of Indian irregulars I may perhaps mention one experience I gained in India some seven or eight years ago. During the progress of a railway which was being surveyed in Salar Jung's territory, we were supplied with a guard of so-called grenadiers, which numbered twelve in all, and which mustered about one complete uniform among the number; and when there was a review, I think about two of them could muster boots. The flintlocks were destroyed by time, and they used matchlocks. At the prize meeting, held when our Staff assembled, which was not, however, quite up to Wimbledon, they could not hit a chuttee at twenty yards. I happen also to know that Scindia and Holkar, and the princes in general, were very particular about the number of guns that should be fired in their honour at the great Durbar: and Scindia thought he had managed it completely when he was assured of twenty-three, which was rather more than a Royal salute. It was only, however, when 101 were fired for the Kaiser-i-Hind, that he found the real distance which, in our opinion, exists between himself and royalty.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is my duty now to move a vote of thanks to Colonel Malleon for his very interesting lecture.

Colonel MALLEON: I beg to thank you, Sir, and the ladies and gentlemen present, for the manner in which you have received the lecture which I have given. It has been a great pleasure to me to hear that the remarks which I made regarding the difference between the behaviour of the Marathas at Laswari and at Maharajpur have been confirmed by a gallant Officer who played a very distinguished part in the latter engagement, and who, I think, left his leg on the field. I beg further to remark, that I entirely agree with the gallant Officer who rose first, Captain Collen, in the observations that fell from him regarding the power possessed by the levies of the native troops to annoy us very considerably, in case there should be a disturbance in India. I also entirely agree with him in the hope he expressed, that the levies of those provinces would be reduced from their present extravagant number to one more within compass, so that all danger of any such disturbance on their part should be taken away. I have only to express to the meeting my grateful thanks for the attention with which you have listened to me.