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Friday, 15th May, 1857.

COLONEL THE HONOURABLE JAMES LINDSAY in the Chair.

ON THE ARMIES OF ANCIENT GREECE.

BY THE REV. GEORGE ROBERT GLEIG, M.A.,

CHAPLAIN-GENERAL TO THE FORCES.

BEFORE I plunge into the lecture which I have undertaken to deliver, I think it will only be fair both to you and to myself if I state in few words some of the reasons which have induced me to fix your attention to-day upon what some may perhaps consider a very old-world subject. It can be no secret to any one here present that we are on the eve of great changes, and I hope of great improvements, in many points which bear upon the general arrangements of our army. I believe that before long the profession of arms will take its proper place in public estimation—that young men intended for the service will themselves see, and their relatives be taught, that they must exercise their minds as well as their bodies before they enter it; and that officers having received their commissions will be led to perceive that they have undertaken the practice of a great art, which requires as much study as any other art or science with which common men are familiar. Now I am not going to give you my own opinion upon any of these matters; but in one point I think you will all agree with me, that the preparatory education of young men intended for the army can no where be better carried on than at our great public schools. You may depend upon it that the moral discipline exercised in these places is of unspeakable benefit to all who go through it, and that even classical learning, though it be so much the habit to undervalue it, lays no bad foundation for that special training which, when he attains to a certain age, I hope every young man intended for the army will hereafter undergo.

Among other subjects, the mastery of which seems to be required from an accomplished soldier, there is one which cannot but be obvious to all—I mean Military History. It is a great mistake to suppose

that only those portions of military history which we find in works of modern date deserve the attention of the military student. I tell you, on the contrary, that a boy at one of our public schools, if he be under the guidance of a judicious tutor, will find in the Greek and Latin books which he is required to read, not merely the means of acquiring a knowledge of two languages, beautiful in themselves, and lying at the root of all others which are spoken in Europe, but a vast deal of information which he will find useful to him in his after-career. Therefore it is that I propose on the present occasion to talk to you about the constitution, the tactics, and the movements of the armies of the Greeks, and to illustrate my views by describing to you one great military operation. And hereafter, should circumstances enable me to do so, I may possibly go on with the subject, leading you through the Roman armies to the modern armies; for the purpose of shewing you that the principles of the art of war never vary;—that they are the same in all ages and in all countries, though tactics necessarily undergo changes with the changes of arms which the progress of time and invention has brought about.

So much for my introduction.

I dare say that no scholar here present will be surprised when I say that the oldest writer upon military subjects with whom we are acquainted is Homer.

You will observe that, in so expressing myself, I take no part whatever in the controversy which once upon a time taxed so severely the skill and ingenuity of the learned in this and other countries. For it is of very little consequence to the matter now under discussion, whether we accept Homer as a veritable man, the son of Chritheis, the blind bard of Smyrna, or look upon him as a mere myth;—an abstraction like our own Ossian, under the shadow of whose name traditionary poems long handed down from one generation to another were at last brought together and connected. In either case there can be no doubt of the great antiquity of the *Iliad*, to which the best authorities, and among them the Arundelian marbles, assign a date of between eight and nine hundred years before the birth of Christ. It is past dispute that by a countless majority of those who read that glorious epic, either in translation or in the original, little else is

looked for except the imagery with which genius of the highest order can invest any subject with which it has to deal. All beyond is accepted as a description of the barbarous usages of a barbarous age, when men, going forth to battle, entered into it as Irish factions used to enter into their fights a quarter of a century ago; heaving fragments of rock one at the other, or engaging in savage duels, which never terminated except by the slaughter of one, and sometimes of both the combatants. The few who look deeper into things discover much more than this. They perceive that, so early as eight or nine centuries before the Christian æra, war had become with the Greek nation conspicuously an art. They observe that a number of petty and independent states or clans, all speaking the same language, all descended originally from the same stock and connected by similar institutions, enter into an alliance for the attainment of an object common to the whole; that they elect one chief to command the allied forces, which consist of contingents or divisions, each having its own chief or general at its head; that the several states supply—not men only, but also stores and means of transport, more or less extensive according to their respective resources; and that the expedition assembles, sails, and makes good its landing in the enemy's country with as much regularity as a year or two ago the combined fleets of France and England passed the Black Sea and disembarked their armed cargoes on the beach near Eupatoria. Reading on, they discover that the first thing done by the invaders is to secure to themselves, in case of a reverse, the means of a safe retreat; that they draw up their vessels along the shore so as to place them out of danger from the sea, and protect them against assaults from the land, by covering them with entrenchments. Meanwhile, with a view to guard against the failure of provisions, not only are foraging parties sent out to sweep in the enemy's cattle, but arrangements are made for the establishment of regular markets, which are to be supplied by vessels appointed to pass to and fro between the camp at the mouth of the Scamander and the sea-ports in the neighbourhood. Again, when military operations begin, the troops are not let loose to shout and struggle like a mob, but the army is marshalled exactly in such order, as, looking to the weapons which the men carried and the nature of the ground over which they were

to move, appears to competent judges of the present day to have been the best that could have been adopted. There was no cavalry then with a Greek army. The art of breaking and managing horses to be ridden was either not yet invented or had made very little progress, at all events in Greece. But chiefs and officers of rank rode to battle in chariots, which they used more frequently to facilitate their movements from place to place than for any other purpose. You know how the Homeric chariots were managed. Two men rode in each—one to guide the horses, the other to fight. When the proper moment to engage arrived, the warrior descended from his chariot and fought on foot. When the weight of his armour or any other circumstance led him to desire rest, he moved towards his chariot, which the charioteer had withdrawn just out of reach of danger to himself and to the horses. And the charioteer, driving quickly up, took him in and went away with him. It is worthy of remark too that charioteer and warrior never changed places. Indeed it was the last order given by Agamemnon before dismissing his chiefs to their respective commands, that this division of labour should on no account be interfered with—that, if a warrior had the misfortune to have his chariot captured or his charioteer killed, he should not pretend to take the reins, but get into any other which seemed to have room for him, and continue the battle as before.

The chariots, however, though presenting a formidable array, were used only by men of rank. The masses were organised into two, and only two, kinds of infantry—one light and irregular, carrying horn-bows, short darts, and slings; the other regular, and heavy—armed with spears. Short swords or knives seem also to have been worn by all, and the spearmen, besides incasing their trunks in armour, carried shields on their left arms. The shields and armour of the chiefs were gorgeous, as the description of that of Achilles shows. The cuirasses of the infantry were mere plates of brass, from which depended a sort of quilted petticoat reaching to the knee. The feet were shod with sandals, and the legs were bare. No Greek helmet had at any time a visor. The light infantry wore no armour except on the head, but were equipped in jerkins and kilts of skin or leather.

In the plain before Troy, the Greek army seems to have moved to

the attack in three lines. The light infantry covered the advance, but retired behind the line of chariots as the opposing armies began to close. This seems to have been done for the two-fold purpose of affording to them some protection while discharging their missiles, and of keeping them from dispersing; for the heavy infantry, with levelled spears, formed the third line. But it is not necessary to go further into these details, on which indeed I have touched for the single purpose of drawing your attention to the fact, that, even from the pages of a Greek poet, the soldier may learn something, which, if he have been, during pupilage, in the hands of a skilful tutor, shall not prove altogether useless to him when studying his profession.

In times long posterior to that of which I am now speaking, when the patriarchal had given way to other forms of government, every freeman in a Greek state, not incapacitated from age or infirmity, was liable to military service. From eighteen to forty all indeed were obliged to serve, when the occasion arose, and all served gratuitously. But in Athens the youth between eighteen and twenty was, like the man who had passed forty, kept at home to guard the city. After twenty he took his part in the campaign. After sixty he might hang up his arms in the temple of Athenæ if he chose, and pass the remainder of his days in peace. The Spartans, as a general rule, were more chary of the health of their young men. They trained them indeed to habits of great endurance, but never, except when hard-pressed, sent them to take part in operations in the field till they had attained the thirtieth year of their age. Both states, as indeed was the case throughout Greece, branded their soldiers in order to hinder them from deserting; but of such brands, as they were impressed on the arm or on the hand, no man was ashamed; they were honourable distinctions. Hence St. Paul's well known expression, "I bear in my body the marks [that is, the brands, *stigmata*] of the Lord Jesus." They were inflicted upon me to disgrace me; but they are my glory, for they mark me as a soldier even unto death of the sovereign to whom my fealty is pledged. Slaves, on the contrary, were branded on the forehead.

Greece is not a country adapted for cavalry, and it was long before any of the state mounted any portion of its troops. Neither is it accurately known by whom the art of equitation was introduced

among them. The Amazons, the Centaurs, Bellerophon, and Neptune all get credit for having first broken-in horses for the saddle; if indeed it be admissible to speak of saddles in ages when such things had no existence. For the equipments of cavalry among the ancients were extremely rude, down even to the times of Lucan. That writer describes the Massylians of his day, as not only destitute of saddles, but as guiding their horses by the switches or whips which they carried in their hands.

The Numidians of Jugurtha's time, the Lybians, and the Scythians so late as the Roman Empire, had no bridles, but managed their horses by the mere inflexion of their voices. Virgil tells us that the inhabitants of Pelethronium, a town in Thessaly, were the inventors of bridles. Pliny attributes the invention to an individual called Pelethronius. These are mere traditionary tales, with the accuracy of which we are not much concerned. But whoever may be desirous of tracing the progress of equestration in classic Greece will do well to study the subject at the British Museum, where the marbles which adorn the walls will show him graceful figures, some bestriding bare-backed steeds, others seated upon skins. He will observe also that there are no stirrups; for young men long ago were in the habit of leaping from the ground to their horses, or they trained their horses to stoop while they were mounted. For the aged, accommodation was provided by placing stones at convenient intervals along the sides of the roads.

We read in classic authors of war-chariots furnished with scythes at the axle-trees. These were the invention of the barbarians. The Greeks tried, but soon laid them aside, for they proved as dangerous to friend as to foe. If the nerve of the driver failed, or his horses became unmanageable, they were just as apt to dash round and sweep through the ranks behind as to press on, carrying destruction into the ranks in front of them. And so in after-times it fared with elephants and camels,—with the former especially, which, though very formidable when first seen, gradually lost their terrors. They also were used for a while in the Greek, or rather in the Macedonian, armies; but a short experience made manifest the fact, that in battle they could not be depended upon. When wounded or frightened, they ran wildly over the field; and the Greeks, seeing

this, made use of them at last only as we use them in the East, as occasional beasts of burthen. But I am anticipating.

Among all the Greek states, the most warlike throughout, and the first to systematise her military resources, was Sparta. We find her, about five centuries before Christ, mistress of the whole of Laconia, with a territory which is covered on three sides by the sea, and a capital protected on the north by an almost impassable frontier. She owed her military, not less than her civil constitution to Lycurgus, and it was admirably adapted to the political circumstances of the age. As I have already said, every man from eighteen to sixty was liable to military service. The youth of the various districts and villages were enrolled into *enomoties*, or companies, each consisting of twenty-five, or thirty-two, or thirty-six men. These drilled and practised their military exercises together, under the *enotomarch*, who was promoted to command because of his strength, activity, and skill, and who took his post on the left in the front rank when the company formed line, and moved with the leading file on the march. The line was never less than three, nor more than six, deep; and it changed front by wheeling and counter-marching, very much as a company or sub-division does among ourselves. It was the nucleus of the whole military system of Sparta—for all the additions made to it were but multiplications of itself. For example, the *pentekostos*, the *lochus*, and the *mora*, were,—the first, two *enomoties*; the second, two or four *pentekosti*; and the third, four or more *lochi*; that is to say, four hundred, six hundred, sometimes nine hundred men. So also, while each *enomoty* had its *enomotarch*, or subaltern, each *pentekostos* had, over and above these subalterns, its *pentikoster*, or captain; each *lochus* its *lochage*, or major; and each *mora*, or battalion, its *polymarch*. From the *polymarch* orders were passed on to the *enotomarch*,—just as among ourselves captains take up the word from officers commanding battalions, and execute battalion movements by rightly handling their companies.

You need not be told that, in civil life, the frame of the young Spartan was systematically hardened by exercise. The drill of the soldier, likewise, consisted almost more in the practice of gymnastics than in anything else. His lance or spear exercise was very simple.

He extended and closed his files according as the necessity of enlarging or contracting the front of the line presented itself; and he was trained to march in cadence to the sound of a flute, which in war as well as in peace modulated his tread. The other states of Greece did not attain to anything like the same regularity till much later; and, as they proved to be little more than mere copyists from the Spartans, I should but repeat what I have said already were I to speak of them in detail.

A Spartan army was always commanded in the field by the king—or, in the event of his non-age or incapacity, by a lieutenant chosen to act for him. In Athens, where troops were raised by tribes, each tribe furnished its own general, and all the generals were possessed of the same degree of authority. Now, as there were ten tribes—and, therefore, ten generals, this was prone to lead to vacillation and difficulty—for only in councils of war could operations be decided upon. It not unfrequently happened that votes were equal, till at last a *polymarch*, or President of the Board of General Officers, was chosen, who, in cases of this sort, gave the casting vote, and assumed absolute authority over the rest. Such was the conduct of Miltiades in that hour of peril, when the hosts of Darius swarmed upon the Greek shore, and the battle of Marathon, with the rapid march back to Athens at its close, saved Europe from the barbarism with which it was threatened.

Till Greece came into hostile collision with Persia, the wars of her various states were upon the smallest possible scale. Argos, for example, quarrelled with Corinth, or Sparta fell out with her next neighbour—and the army of the one invaded the territories of the other, burning villages, laying waste fields, and fighting battles, when the forces from either side met. This was their summer's occupation, at which season, under a genial climate, there was no great hardship in sleeping out; and it does not appear that their longest marches ever carried the troops more than forty or sixty miles from home. In winter the armies broke up, the men returning to their villages and cities. The preparations for a campaign of this sort were of the simplest kind; no commissariat was organised, because none was necessary, but each soldier, carrying with him a few days' provisions, was ready for whatever might befall. A little

salted meat, cheese, olives, onions, and dried fruit constituted the food of the soldier during the campaign. These he bestowed in a casket of wicker-work, in other words in a basket, which he slung at his back. The basket had a peculiar shaped mouth, and was called the *gulion*—whence men with very long necks got the nickname of *gulionchenes*.

Time passed—and, by a process which is visible in all parts of the world where small states adjoin, Sparta and Athens gradually overshadowed their neighbours, and became rivals in the arts both of peace and war. Sparta continued to the last a strictly military nation. Athens became more a naval than a military power; yet she by no means neglected her army. On the contrary, an Athenian officer proves to be the first great military reformer, prior to the appearance of the Macedonians on the stage. About the year B.C. 390, Iphicrates addressed himself to remedy the defects which up to this time had been apparent in the equipment and evolutions of light troops. Heretofore these people, indifferently drilled, and armed only with knives, short darts, and bows, served rather to distract and annoy than seriously to check or restrain the well-disciplined battalions to which they were opposed. For they were collected in a hurry, and let loose upon the enemy with such weapons and appointments as happened to be available for their peaceful occupation as shepherds. Iphicrates took them in hand, lengthened both their javelins and swords, of which he stored up supplies for them in the city, and protected their legs from scratches and bruises by casing them in leathern leggings.

Gentlemen, it is curious to observe how, in small things as well as in great, the customs of society go round in a circle. We had, some years ago—we still, I believe, have in use among us—boots named after two illustrious commanders, Wellington and Blucher. In Athens, for many days after the time of Iphicrates, leathern leggings were known as *Iphicratides*.

It is not necessary that I should speak of the causes which led to the alternate wars and alliances which connected Greece with the Persian empire, and ended at last in the overthrow of the latter. The Greeks, straitened at home for room, and much addicted to commerce as well as piracy, settled colonies, as you are aware, at a

very early date, along the shores of Asia Minor, which, supported by the mother-country, maintained through many ages an uneasy independence upon the larger states and provinces which surrounded them. This became a hard task to achieve, after Persia, under the successors of the great Cyrus, had absorbed the vast empires of Babylon and Egypt; and that of Sardis would not have been accomplished at all, had not Athens and Sparta, but especially the former, entered freely into the struggle. Indeed, it was as much by policy as by war that the colonies held their own at all, for they not unfrequently kept the conqueror at a distance by paying tribute, and supplying him, as allies, with troops, which he found of extreme value to him in his operations elsewhere. It was this intercourse with Persia which led to the raising in Greece of corps of cavalry, which seem at first to have been universally equipped with helmets and cuirasses, and to have carried, as offensive weapons, darts and crooked swords. They were divided, like the infantry, into troops and squadrons, and had generals of the special arm placed over them, who, however, took their general orders, as among ourselves, from the *strategos*, or commander-in-chief. But we will, if you please, pass lightly over what may be called the transition state of the Greek armies. If you desire to satisfy yourselves as to what they had become; and what they were able to effect, and did effect, ere yet, under Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, they had attained the perfection of their organisation—read the history of the Peloponnesian war, as Thucydides has recorded it, and the *Anabasis*, or *Retreat of the Ten Thousand*, by Xenophon. Read these narratives, too, not for the mere sake of storing your minds with the knowledge of things passed, but that you may learn lessons which, should it fall to the lot of any of you at any time to command armies, may prove of the greatest possible use to you in the hour of need. For I do not hesitate, even in this presence, to give it as my opinion, that nowhere in military history are more instructive lessons to be learned in the art of war, than in the simple and intelligible story of the movements of the force which, after the fall of Clearchus, came under the guidance of Xenophon, and marched and fought its way from the Zab to Trapesus or Trebizond.

The Peloponnesian war, in its results, broke the strength of Greece. It produced, indeed, its heroes and its statesmen—Tolmides, Simon, Archidamus, and, above all, Pericles, the very model of a wise commander, whose speeches, as Thucydides has preserved them, cannot be too much studied, either by the soldier or the politician. But it ruined Athens, and left Sparta dizzy; while, to the north of both, a people was growing into power, of whom as yet little note had been taken. I refer to the Macedonians—a mixture of Greeks and barbarians—whose history is too much mixed up with that of the surrounding tribes to admit of analysis here; and which the most painstaking writers find it no easy matter to give, except with a perplexity of order which sorely tries the patience of their readers. For, the moment we touch them, we find ourselves compelled to notice Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and many more, to speak of whom, without a carefully executed map before us, would involve us in a perfect labyrinth of words. It will be sufficient, therefore, for our general purpose, to state, that Macedonia proper seems to have been early occupied by a colony of Argives; that by virtue of their descent from the leaders of that colony, Philip, and Alexander, his illustrious son, claimed to be regarded as Greeks; and that, for many generations before the birth of the former, we find Macedon mixed up with Greek affairs, sometimes as an ally, sometimes as an enemy, and still more frequently as a bone of contention. Let us take a rapid glance at its condition, when Philip had established his sovereignty over it; and contrast that with the state of Greece, and especially of Athens and of Sparta, as their fatal intestine strifes had produced it.

The Athenian and Spartan citizens of 430 years B.C. were ever ready to brave danger for their country's good. They served her as soldiers without pay, and served her nobly. The Athenian, and, though to a less extent perhaps, the Spartan citizen of 360 B.C., had entirely changed his nature. He loved ease and the pursuits of literature and philosophy, and stayed at home, trusting the honour and defence of his country to hired mercenaries. These were gathered in from every state throughout the federation; and, like the Condottieri of the middle ages, were ready to transfer their allegiance from one paymaster to another as often as occasion re-

quired. The Ten Thousand, of whose exploits I have elsewhere spoken, partook in some degree of this character, for they were tempted into the service of Cyrus the Persian by the offer of large pay in the meanwhile, and the promise of preferment after he should have dethroned his brother. Philip, on the other hand, found himself sovereign of a people rude, brave, hardy, prompt for war, but destitute of military organization. Himself endowed with military genius of the highest order, he set about remedying this latter defect; and, notwithstanding the pressure of constant war with his neighbours, he accomplished his purpose. Heretofore, the force of the country had consisted either of mounted men — substantial landed proprietors, who took the field incased in coats of mail, and armed with swords or spears, as the case might be—or of the rural population, shepherds and herdsmen, who carried wicker shields, old swords, slings, bows and arrows, and occasionally, not often, short lances. The towns on the sea-coast—having been peopled many of them by Greek colonists — could muster their trained bands, whom they equipped, like the Hoplitæ of Athens, with spears, but these were few in number; and everywhere else foot-service, being accounted little honourable, was taken up only by the poorest of the people.

Philip entirely revolutionised this state of things. He enrolled the poor and hardy Macedonian landwehr into sections, companies and battalions, brigades and divisions, and, by the armament which he gave them, rendered them superior even to the Greek Hoplitæ. These latter, you will recollect, carried pikes sixteen feet in length, which they wielded with the right hand, while on the left arm hung a square and heavy shield. Philip equipped his heavy infantry with pikes, measuring not less than 21 feet in length, which they were trained to wield with both hands, and which, on ground fitted for their use, proved irresistible. The defensive arms of the *phalangite* consisted of a light circular shield, about two feet in diameter; of a breast-piece, leggings of tin, and a broad-brimmed hat, called the *causia*. A man so equipped could of course do little acting singly,—a dense column of such men, on open ground, could scarcely be broken. It is worthy of remark, that each phalangite wore also a short sword.

The telling-off of the Phalanx appears to have differed very little from that of the heavy infantry of Athens and Sparta. The *lochos* in Macedon mustered 16 men; the *syntagma*, 16 lochi, or 256 men; the *pentekosiarchy*, of 2 lochi, or 512 men. This latter represents a battalion, of which the strength was doubled by Alexander, when he reorganized his army at Suza. But the entire tactics of the force depended upon the unit whence it sprang. On the march, the column increased or contracted its front so as to adapt itself to the width of the road. It could form for battle only on an open space, and then it stood in a line of sixteen deep. The five front ranks levelled their spears; the three next interlaced theirs over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them; the eight in rear stood with shouldered pikes, prepared either to give the weight of their pressure to the advance, or to face about and meet danger, should it threaten from behind. When the hour of trial came, the Greek hoplitæ, with all their courage, found the sixteen-foot lance useless, when opposed to the Macedonian pike—the formidable *sarissa*.

An army composed exclusively of phalangi would, however, have proved unwieldy; so Philip supplied what was wanting, by adding to it two sorts of infantry besides, and two sorts of cavalry. The supplementary infantry consisted, first, of regiments of *hypaspists*, who carried one-handed pikes and shields, like the Greeks; and, next, of light troops—bow-men, slingers, javelin-men—all carefully drilled to skirmish, and inured to the severest exercise. His cavalry were either heavy or light. The heavy wore coats of mail, and brass or tin leggings. Their weapon of attack was the *xyston*, or short thrusting-pike, and the sword. The light cavalry carried lances, about sixteen feet long, and, like the Cossacks of modern Russia, were employed chiefly at the outposts, or to scour the country. The organization of both was as perfect as that of the infantry, and started from the same unit, viz. the *lochos*. The squadron appears to have numbered sometimes 180, sometimes 250, horses.

A Macedonian army, thus arranged, proved, under Philip's guidance, irresistible. But Philip's wars, like those of the Athenians and Macedonians, were, comparatively speaking, on a small scale;

and hence, though we discover the beginnings of other and not less important arrangements in his military system, we must look to the reign of his successor in order to satisfy ourselves fully as to their nature and extent.

When Alexander came to the throne, he found a school established for the training of officers, which he enlarged and perfected. The sons of the chief men of the country came to the capital as soon as they had reached military age, and were taken into the personal service of the king. They discharged the duties of page, gentleman-usher, and master of the ceremonies. They mounted guard over the palace. They had the ablest masters to instruct them in the arts, and especially in the art of war. They rode with the king when he went hunting, and formed his body-guard in war. He was accustomed to employ them one by one on services the most delicate as well as the most hazardous; and, according as they acquitted themselves to his satisfaction, they were promoted.

Philip had raised Pella from the rank of an obscure town to that of a first-rate city. Here stood the war-office, with its staff of administration, working at least as busily as the gentlemen in Pall Mall, and at the Horse Guards. Here were the great arsenals, wherein arms, carriages, and wagons were fabricated, and everything necessary to render an army efficient in the field stored up and ready to be issued. The barracks were commodious and extensive, with drill-grounds, and spaces for training convenient to them. Into these, recruits were introduced as they came up from the country—cavalry on one side of the arsenal, infantry on the other. They were instructed in their duty as members of *depôt* battalions, and thence sent off by draughts to fill up vacancies in the ranks that were in the field. Moreover, Philip had begun, and Alexander perfected, a complete ordnance corps. He had not only his battering rams, but ballistæ and other engines for throwing stones and darts; some heavy, and therefore suitable for siege purposes; others light, which accompanied cavalry and infantry into the field. Besides all these, he had his land-transport corps, with its train of carts, pack-horses, and beasts of burden, over which military officers presided. In a word, Macedon had been rendered by Philip some-

thing very like a large camp. Alexander took it over in this condition, and rendered perfect whatever his father had left even slightly incomplete. But it was not upon the resources of his own country alone that this extraordinary man relied. Greece stood towards him very much in the relation in which the Confederation of the Rhine stood, in 1811, towards the first Napoleon. Though nominally independent, the states supplied him with troops when required, and adopted his policy both in peace and war, however distasteful to their feelings might be the tone in which they were expressed.

Let us content ourselves with a brief glance at the early career of Alexander. He found himself, on acceding to the throne, the heir of a policy which suited well with his adventurous character. His father had begun to make preparations for the invasion of Persia, and he determined to go on with it. But difficulties met him. Greece, instigated by Persia, and herself impatient under the yoke, endeavoured to free herself from her Macedonian connection. Thrace, Illyria, Thebes, openly rebelled. He overcame all the opposition; he crossed Mount Hemus, defeated the Triballi, passed the Danube, overthrew the Getæ, carried Thebes by assault, and completely overawed Athens. It is in one of these campaigns,—in his operations against the Illyrians, that we find him for the first time making use of his siege train; driving the defenders of a town from the parapets, with stones and darts, and assailing the walls with his battering rams. But more important operations had been determined upon, and for these the mistaken contempt of his youth, entertained by Darius king of Persia, enabled him at his leisure to make ready.

It was in the winter of 335-334 B.C., that Alexander made his final preparations. His grand dépôt he of course established at Pella, the situation of which was admirable, on two rivers, both navigable for light craft, and within fifteen miles of the Ægean. He appointed 12,000 regular infantry, with 1,500 cavalry, under one of his best officers, to overawe Greece during his absence, and to guard the coast from descents on the part of the enemy. He selected to follow him on his great expedition only 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry;—

wisely considering that mere numbers do not constitute the strength of armies, which ought always to be proportioned to their probable means of subsistence. But his troops were complete in everything that tends to render an army efficient, and a fleet of 160 triremes, with many vessels of smaller size, prepared to move parallel with them as long as circumstances would allow; for he had wisely determined to move by the coast road. How Darius came to overlook or neglect these preparations, warned as he had been by his Greek general Memnon, it is difficult for us to conceive. He was immeasurably superior to Alexander by sea, having the whole Phœnician fleet at his disposal. He might have blocked up the Hellespont and swept the Ægean had he been so disposed, and the entire coast-line both of Macedon and Greece lay open to perpetual attacks and alarms, against which Alexander's army of reserve could have offered but ineffectual opposition. But there was jealousy between his Greek and Persian officers, which produced its customary results. The foreigners were suspected of seeking ends of their own, and the more cautious policy of the natives was adopted.

Alexander distributed his 30,000 infantry into six divisions, or *taxeis*, adopting in this respect an organisation almost identical with our own. His cavalry he distributed into four brigades, of which the light or lancer-brigade numbered 900 horses. The rest made up two heavy brigades and a corps of Greek auxiliaries. I cannot quite make out whether at this stage of his career he had established a bridge equipment. I am strongly inclined to believe that he must have done so, because he had several rivers to cross ere the campaign could be opened, which would probably require bridging. However this may be, it is certain that at a later date a bridge-train attended upon all his movements. Read Arrian's account of his advance upon India, and if any doubts upon this matter should have rested upon your minds they will at once be dispelled. Alexander moved upon the Hydapses, carrying with him light vessels mounted upon carriages, which, for the sake of convenience upon the march, were divided, some into two, others into three pieces. Now what were these vessels but pontoons? When he approached the banks of the river, he halted the carriages under the screen of a thick wood, put

the vessels together and launched them raft-wise—pretty much as our own engineers launch their pontoon-bridges on the waters of the Medway, or wherever else they may be called upon to make rivers passable for troops. In like manner Alexander's engines for throwing stones and darts took their places on the flank of columns, or in the intervals between one brigade and another, where the nature of the country would not admit of parallel movements. His battering rams, wagons, and baggage-horses marched in the rear of his columns on the advance—in their front, if he was practising a retreat. And besides that, the drivers were all armed; a regular guard protected them. Will any body say that lessons in the art of war are not to be learnt from the history of men and of times which seem to have left no point that is necessary to the organisation and management of armies unattended to, which provided not only for the maintenance and support of forces in the field, but cared for all necessary means of supply—in their recruiting—in their treatment of recruits—in their wise establishment of depôts and magazines—in the staff of officials which they kept to manage the accounts of the army, and held personally responsible for the due performance of the duties which the government had assigned to each—which had their military records carefully preserved, and books illustrative of tactics and strategy elaborately compiled? But we will return to Alexander.

Having completed his operations both for offensive and defensive war, Alexander began his march from Pella. He moved leisurely, in order that there might be time for the fleet to meet him at the mouth of the Hellespont. He made a brief halt at Amphipolis, establishing his head quarters in the town. He arrived next at Abdera, and there passed the river Nestus. He then entered Thrace, crossed the Hebrus and Melas, and traversing the Chersonese arrived at Sestos. The Strymon, the Nestus, the Hebrus, and the Melas are none of them very large rivers; but, as Alexander moved with carriages of various kinds, and as the banks of some of them are steep, we may fairly assume, that if he did not find them bridged he bridged them.

The Macedonian fleet had already arrived at Sestos, and the troops were commanded to embark forthwith. While this was doing,

Alexander paid his well-known visit to the site of Old Ilium. He accomplished this feat, so to speak, alone; crossing the strait in the admiral's trireme, which he steered with his own hand. He was ambitious to be the first of the Macedonians to tread the Asiatic shore, and he succeeded. But, though full of romance, he was, at the same time, one of the most far-sighted and sagacious generals that ever lived. Having offered his sacrifices, as a hero, to the manes of the dead, he hurried back to Abydos, where his army had begun to assemble, that he might resume the occupations of a great commander. Here a grand review took place, at the close of which the army was distributed into two wings or columns. Of the right column, Alexander himself took command; the left he placed under the immediate orders of his friend Parmenio. The muster-roll showed that the army was thus composed: Of the Macedonians, partly Phalangi, partly Hypaspists, there were present under arms 12,000. Of Greek allies, armed and equipped like the Hypaspists, 7,000. Of mercenaries, 5,000. All these were fit for close combat. The light troops, chiefly Triballi and Illyrians, armed with slings, darts, and short spears, mustered 5,000, and there were 1,000 archers. Of cavalry, two brigades were heavy Macedonian horse each 1,500 strong. Two others, one of Grecian horse, 600, the other of Thracians and Pæonians, 900. The most perfect gradations in the order of command prevailed everywhere.

Meanwhile the Persians had not been wholly regardless of the storm which threatened. They declined indeed to be guided by the counsels of Memnon the Greek, and so threw away their superiority by sea; but, under Arsytes, a Phrygian satrap, they collected a considerable army at a place called Zeleia, and waited the issue of events. They were greatly superior to Alexander in cavalry, which the lowest estimate puts down at 20,000. And Memnon, who served under Arsytes, strongly urged that advantage should be taken of this circumstance. He recommended his chief to avoid a general action, to retire before Alexander, laying waste the country as he went; to beat up the Macedonian out-posts, harass their convoys, and strike at their baggage; and to attempt more serious diversions from the sea by landing in Macedon, and compelling Alexander to

return for the defence of his own country. But Arsytes was the civil governor, or pasha, of the district. His personal assets depended on the amount of produce which it reared, and he refused to sacrifice his own resources for the sake of the empire. He accordingly advanced to the Granicus, along the right bank of which he took post. Here he determined to give battle, having, as Arrian states, under his command 20,000 excellent horse, and 20,000 or 25,000 good infantry, all of them mercenaries, chiefly Greeks.

The Granicus, though famous in story—first because it is commemorated in the *Iliad*, and next as the scene of the battle which I am going to describe—is an inconsiderable stream. It takes its rise in Mount Ida, and flows northward into the Propontis, or Sea of Marmora. It is fordable in many places; but the right bank is steep, and therefore offered considerable advantages to the force by which it was that day occupied. It was to cover these fords that the Persians drew up with their left resting upon the declivities of Mount Ida and their right *en l'air*.

Alexander having reviewed his troops at Abydos, rested there that night, and at an early hour next morning began his march. His scouts had made him aware of the proximity of the enemy; he therefore moved with caution, and slowly. He halted the first day at a place called Perkote; the next beside the little river Praktiüs, and the third at Hermotus. Clouds of light cavalry covered his movements, which he supported with heavy horse in the proportion of one squadron of cuirassiers to four of lancers. His last march from Hermotus to the Granicus he performed in perfect readiness to engage on the first alarm. He appears to have come in sight of the Granicus about two in the afternoon. Parmenio, desirous that the troops should enter fresh into battle, advised a halt till next morning. But Alexander, satisfied that a general action was all in his favour, and against the Persians, refused to listen to the advice. He was apprehensive that the enemy might withdraw from their position in the night, and resolved to deliver battle immediately.

Now observe the skill with which his dispositions are made. While he is arranging his columns of attack, archers, supported by

light horse, push on to the river, skirmish with the enemy, and try the fords. An attempt is also made to clear the opposite bank by shooting stones and darts from ballistæ, and so far succeeds that the Persian cavalry fall back behind the shelter of the high ground of which they are masters. Meanwhile, the Macedonian army forms: the Phalangi take post by double battalions, each 1000 strong, in the centre, keeping an interval between each double battalion. The Hypaspists, or lighter infantry, form to the right and left of the Phalangi, somewhat in advance. These are flanked by the light cavalry or lancers, supported by squadrons of heavy horse; and on the right of the whole line, opposite the principal ford, is the mass of the heavy cavalry. The light infantry, consisting of slingers, bowmen, and javelin men, extend up towards the base of Mount Ida, and threaten the enemy's left.

It is not necessary to describe the battle or to speak of its results. The country was open, and there was no smoke, as among us, to confound the vision. All these formations were therefore clearly seen by the Persians; and the Persian horse, as soon as the Macedonians began to move, closed up to their own front again and stood ready to receive the shock. It was given by Alexander's heavy horse, a squadron of his body-guard leading, which the light cavalry or lancers supported, and beside whom, and therefore sheltered in some degree from the force of the current, a division of Hypaspists pushed forward. The resistance was very determined—so great indeed that for a while no man could succeed in forcing his way up the bank—for Memnon was there with the flower of the Persian cavalry, of which a portion rode down to meet the Macedonians in the water, while the rest plied them with javelins from the heights above. But all this while the Macedonian slingers and bowmen were pushing round among the rocks of Mount Ida; and by and by volleys of stones and arrows fell upon the Persians who covered the nearest ford. Then Alexander himself plunged in at the head of a second squadron of the body-guard. Then by sheer strength of man and horse the Persians were pushed aside, and steady, yet rapid, the phalanx descended into the river, crossed, and made the opposite bank its own.

The Persian horse was repulsed; but it was still numerous; and

there were 20,000 excellent infantry in line, which had suffered no loss. Against these, Alexander at once led his whole strength. While the phalanx took them in front, the cuirassiers fell upon their flanks, and entirely routed them; for the lancers and Greek allies sufficed to keep the Persian cavalry from rallying. And here was manifested the immeasurable superiority in an open plain of the Macedonian two-handed pike over the one-handed lance of the Greeks. The Greek line could make no impression whatever upon the dense forest of pikes which breasted it; and the slaughter which ensued, when the Hoplyti broke and endeavoured to flee, was terrible.

Alexander's loss was computed at about 1,200 killed and wounded. It is said that of the Persian infantry scarce 2,000 escaped. The speed of their horses carried the mass of their cavalry out of danger.

Such is the page of military history which I proposed to unroll for your consideration to-day. I think that it is wanting neither in interest nor in substantial value. It shows that war has been treated as an art, not by moderns only; that there are other fountains whereat the military student may drink, with refreshment to himself, besides the despatches of the Duke of Wellington and the Commentaries of Jomini and of the Arch-duke Charles. And hence that he who recommends the foundations of a profession to be laid on a broader base than any cramming-school can furnish proposes to the youths who may be ambitious of achieving military renown no useless labour.
