

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

GENERAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Instituts Solvay. Institut de Sociologie. Notes et Mémoires. Librairie Misch & Thron, Brussels.

1. *Note sur les formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique.* E. SOLVAY. 1906. Pp. 24. Fr. 2.
2. *Esquisse d'une sociologie.* E. WAXWEILER. 1906. Pp. 306. Fr. 12.
3. *Les origines naturelles de la propriété.* R. PETRUCCI. 1905. Pp. 246. Fr. 12.
4. *Sur quelques erreurs de méthode dans l'étude de l'homme primitif.* L. WODON. 1906. Pp. 37. Fr. 2.50.
5. *L'Aryen et l'anthroposociologie.* E. HOUZÉ. 1906. Pp. 177. Fr. 6.
6. *Mesure des capacités intellectuelle et énergétique.* CH. HENRY. Avec une remarque additionnelle: *Sur l'interprétation sociologique de la distribution des salaires.* E. WAXWEILER. 1906. Pp. 75. Fr. 4.
7. *Origine polyphylétique, homotypie, et non-comparabilité des sociétés animales.* R. PETRUCCI. 1906. Pp. 126. Fr. 5.

The *Solvay Institut de Sociologie*, founded in 1902 by M. Ernest Solvay and situated in Brussels, puts forward the above evidences of vigorous production by the Director, Emile Waxweiler, his collaborators, and others. Several of the various monographs have a certain community of point of view. The effort is made to relate social phenomena in man to corresponding phases of animal life, and in method to find at least a starting point in general biological conceptions. The first brochure, by M. Solvay, founder of the institute, is however of a mathematical character.

The numbers which are of interest from the standpoint of social psychology are (2), (3), (4) and (7).

In (2), *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, the author finds his point of view in the conception of Ethology. This term is taken, not in Mill's sense of science of character, but in the sense for which the term Ecology is also employed, to designate a study of organisms in relation to environment. Disregarding the relation of the individual to his cosmic environment, the sociologist notes among the relations to the

living environment those involved in the facts of species. These facts may be considered as including a threefold specific affinity: sexual, which implies fecundity limited by the species; vegetative, which determines the relations of cells derived by auto-division from another cell, whether these form cell-colonies or a single organism; and social, which leads the individual to establish relations with others in which it finds similarity of organization. Specific affinity may be defined as 'a particular aspect of the physical sensibility, which renders it susceptible of responding, in determinate conditions, to excitation from the other individuals of the same species.' Social affinity will be such a sensibility as 'renders an organism susceptible to the excitations of other individuals of the same species without distinction of sex,' and this is the fundamental fact for sociology. This is similar to the 'like response' which Giddings makes the basis for the 'consciousness of kind,' but the author regards it as more fundamental, since it might exist without there necessarily being a like response. It has also the decided advantage that it centers emphasis upon the interdependent relation rather than upon a perception of similarity. Sociology may then be called "the science of the phenomena of reaction due to the mutual excitation of individuals of the same species without distinction of sex."

The analysis of these phenomena of social affinity which occupies the larger part of the volume is sketched in outline, rather than worked out in detail, and seems hardly as fruitful as the central conception would lead the reader to expect.

In the third monograph M. Petrucci has given a very instructive study of the relation of property to the individual and to the group—family, clan, or people. Instead of the abstract discussions often found as to private or group ownership, we have an effort to relate forms of property to biological and psychological conditions. It is thus in some respects correlative to the admirable study made some years ago by Grosse of the relation of the various forms of the family to economical and industrial conditions.

Premising that individual and collective possession have their roots in the two fundamental sets of instincts, those for individual needs of support, attack, defense and protection, and those for the maintenance of the species and its interests, the author is led to examine the sub-human manifestations of these instincts and the forms of possession, if not of property in the full legal and moral sense, which arise from them. Even plants show the two forces at work in their methods of exploiting the soil and storing nutritive reserves. Mollusks and worms

show predominantly individual types; the corals, however, afford an interesting example of colonial structure, with individual tubes, joined by transverse supports. Insects, of course, furnish in the ants and bees the extreme evolution of collective property where certain members are employed as store-houses for nutriment. Birds with their family life have in their nest a family property, although the social species in their exploited territory assert a collective rather than an individual or family control, and some of them in their nesting colonies have rather group than family nests. And on the other hand, in some species individuals have their own permanent dwellings. The three types, individual, family, and group property, are thus all foreshadowed in bird life, and mammals repeat these three types with various degrees of emphasis.

The principal factor which marks property among primitive man, as in any way distinct from the animal types, is the making and use of permanent tools and arms and clothing. These maintain their individual character. Family property is more likely to appear in the dwelling, and group or collective property in the territory exploited, although we find here also collective property in dwellings, and on the other hand in some cases families exploiting each its own territory. No such extreme of collectivism as that among the hymenoptera appears in human societies.

The analogies found show therefore that the social fact (in this case, the fact of property) is not bound up with the biological evolution in such a way that the biological perfecting gives at the same time the social laws (p. 218). The phenomena of property may be summarized in the following six principles: (1) Property appears as a phenomenon attaching to the first manifestations of life. (2) It is at first the expression of an individual structure and an adaptation. It takes (3) the individual form when it is determined by the biological law of the protection of the individual; (4) the family form when determined by the law of protection of the species, realized on the basis of the sex instinct; (5) the collective form when determined by the law of protection of the species, realized by the phenomena of association, considered generally and abstracting from the family group. (6) The individual, family and collective forms of property are specifically distinct, and are characterized respectively, (*a*) by reflecting the proper structure and activities of the animal considered in isolation; (*b*) by the predominance of the associative tendency limited by the parental group, (*c*) by the unrestricted predominance of the associative tendency. An excellent chart shows the facts with reference to the three

kinds of property in the three cases of food reserves, exploitation of territory, shelter and dwelling.

The 'errors of method in the study of primitive man,' to which M. Wodon's discussion is devoted, are those committed in the author's opinion by Karl Bücher. The doctrine of a non-industrial and non-economic primitive condition, the doctrine of the differentiation of the work of the sexes, and the view that play and art precede serious production are criticized. The postulate that dispositions or modes of conduct which do not harmonize with the conditions of life at a given stage may be regarded as survivals of a previous stage and therefore used as data from which to construct that previous stage, is easily shown to be unsound. There is not, however, an adequately supported discussion of the views presented in opposition to those of Bücher.

In the seventh number of the series M. Petrucci examines the various types of social life among animals with the purpose of discovering (1) whether these forms can be regarded as forming a linear series of development, corresponding in evolution to the biological 'higher' and 'lower'; (2) how much of the human social instinct may be regarded as hereditary. These questions involve, moreover, (3) some suggestive queries as to how far certain peculiarities of human societies found in tabus, in totem groups, in separation of groups of unmarried males, etc., are really as purely instinctive and without rational explanation for their origin as are the corresponding phenomena among animals.

The conclusions under (1) and (2) may be briefly stated. The social forms of animal life cannot be arranged in a serial order of lower and higher corresponding to biological development; they are of polyphyletic origin. The successive appearance of similar forms is homotypic, not hereditary. The only hereditary factor is the tendency to group. But this takes on the form of maternal societies, or of paternal groups, of polygamous or monogamous groups, of flocks or colonies, not by any single serial law, but under the stimuli of varying circumstances, such as those of supply, defense, migration, or mating, and the care of young.

Some of the problems suggested under (3) are the following: We find among primitive peoples such facts as the separation of the adolescent into classes or groups apart from the families, or again the separation of males and females into distinct bands. These phenomena are found also among various animals. Woman in pregnancy is frequently regarded as unclean, and is among some peoples isolated. The isolation of females at the season of pregnancy is observed among rumi-

nants and birds. The aged females occupy a dominant position in many animal and human societies. We cannot say that these specific customs are inherited by man from the animal species which have them. The instances that crop out along various branches of the biological tree are not found in a consecutive line. But, on the other hand, does not the homotypy suggest strongly a similar cause? It wears now among human societies the appearance of religious custom. "The truth is that with man, as with the animal, the fact may depend on many other causes. The explanations given are constructed after the phenomena; they should be rejected. I confess, for my part, that the real cause remains for me unknown. I do not even see how investigation should be directed in order to discuss it." In the case of æsthetic phenomena the author draws a conclusion adverse to their alleged social origin. The bird decorates the bower; the primitive man decorates his cave with shining objects or gathers a store of bright stones. Sometimes this serves sexual ends, sometimes it merely affords pleasant sensations. "The æsthetic phenomenon is in nowise social in its origins; like property it is a something brought by the individual animal to the group to which he joins himself as integrant part. It becomes social with him; it is not such by its proper nature or by its origins." On this three comments may be made. (1) M. Petrucci draws very sweeping inductions from data in a single art. Song, music, dance, myth, story, are not reckoned with. (2) Few if any advocates of the social origin of art would wish to maintain this in a sense that excludes sex relationship from social factors. (3) What the present writer, for example, has maintained is, not that man as individual has not sensations pleasantly stimulated by color, sound, smell, and touch, nor that he does not adorn his person to provoke the passions of sex. It is rather that the detachment and the objectivity characteristic of the æsthetic, as compared with appetite and passion, is strongly aided if not entirely caused by the social as *versus* the individual attitude; and further that in the profounder æsthetic consciousness the idea of expression, of communication, of sharing, is an important factor.

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L'échange économique et l'échange affectif. F. PAULHAN. *Revue Philosophique*, 1906, LXII., 358-399.

The chief difference, as found by the author, between the economic exchange and the exchange of feeling, lies in the definite character of the one and the vague, indefinite nature of the other. In the economic exchange, the values are easily appreciable in numbers, the obligation is fulfilled by one act of a highly specialized kind. On the