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Wundt on the Evolution of Speech *Völkerpsychologie*. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos, und Sitte von Wilhelm Wundt. Erster Band. Die Sprache. Leipzig, 1900. [Erster Theil pp. xviii. + 627. Zweiter Theil, pp. x. + 644.] 29 M. *Grundfragen der Sprachforschung* mit Rücksicht auf W. Wundt's Sprachpsychologie erörtert B. von Delbrück. Strassburg, 1901. [pp. viii. + 180.] 4 M.

E. V. Arnold

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not have occupied much more room than the page now occupied by the Translation, the insertion of which, excellent as it is, seems rather inconsistent with the plan of the book. The notes are brief, almost always to the point, and, I need hardly add, interesting. Dr. Tyrrell's disclaimer (in the Preface) of any attempt to convey 'higher instruction' must be discounted by the excellent notes on e.g. 14. 7; 35. 2; 240 and 246. In critical matters due cognisance is taken of the readings of the new Corpus.

I conclude with a few points that have occurred to me in reading over the Notes.

37. 10 *propter cunam capulum* etc., might have been illustrated by Manilius' *nascentes morimur* (and Seneca and Silius). 38. 23 sqq. are almost an exact versification by Cicero of his own words iii. Cat. § 19. 56 [Casina] 824 *malo suo*, 'to his cost' should be 'to her cost.' Pardalisca tells the pretended bride to be sure to cheat her husband: the latter says she had better not or she will suffer. 181. 58 (Ovid's elegy on Tibullus) *me tenuit moriens* etc., said by Nemesis, is of course a reference to Tib. 1. 1. 60 (given on p. 127). 193. The Seneca to whom we owe this fragment of Pedo is the elder Seneca. 207 [Sen. Med.] 618 'Ancaeus is called *indoctus*, not having been instructed, as Tiphys was, by Artemis.' Artemis is, I presume, a slip for Athena. But *indocto* here is simply used as a relative term: Ancaeus passed as skilful enough when not compared with Tiphys. 230 [Calpurn. vii.] 54. The editor suggests *tortis*, but *torta* is in the previous line. 232 [Sil. i.] 126. The translation implies Heinsius' conj. *stagnantes, flagrantes* stands in the text.

134. The other points of the prophecy are explained by Dr. Tyrrell, but no explanation is given here, where I think it is most needed. The tempest which the prophet foresees is that which was called forth by Hannibal's attempt to take Rome by storm (12. 605 sqq.). 237 [V.F. ii.] 270 *respicit* is surely 'look back to see that': cp. vi. 661. 241 (V.F. viii.) 23 *ferit* in notes, *premit* in text. 242 [Stat. silu. ii. 7] 57 sqq. are curiously misunderstood. *Noster Orpheus* of course means 'my son Orpheus,' not Nero, in Calliope's mouth. At l. 77 a word of caution is necessary to show that V.F. is not the poet referred to (as e.g. Kohlmann thought). 243 [silu. iv. 5] 52 *ensisque vagina quiescit, stringere ni iubeant amici* surely means that 'Septimius will not use his eloquence against anyone, except to defend a friend who seeks his help.' Dr. Tyrrell explains 'his friends are warned that the sword will no longer remain in the scabbard if he is given reason to draw it.' The word '*warned*' here surely implies that S. is threatening his friends, an idea quite out of place here. In 253 [Stat. Ach. ii.] 180 *acclinem* is explained, 'leaning against the wall.' But Statius says plainly enough *acclinem hastas*, leaning against the spear. In 293 [Peruigilium] 9 *gemmis floribus* is rendered 'flower jewels' and ll. 14, 18 are adduced as proofs of its being one of the writer's mannerisms 'thus to couple substantives.' But *virgines papillae* (14), *virgines rosae* (18) present no difficulty to those who have already met *charta anus*, *virgo charta*, etc. *Flòs gemma* is a very much stranger expression.

WALTER C. SUMMERS.

WUNDT ON THE EVOLUTION OF SPEECH.

Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos, und Sitte von WILHELM WUNDT. Erster Band. Die Sprache. Leipzig, 1900. [Erster Theil pp. xviii. + 627. Zweiter Theil, pp. x. + 644.] 29 M.
Grundfragen der Sprachforschung mit Rücksicht auf W. Wundt's Sprachpsychologie erörtert von B. DELBRÜCK. Strassburg, 1901. [pp. viii. + 180.] 4 M.

THE comparative study of language has for a full generation made the effort to keep itself in touch with sound principles of

psychology. The romanticism of the early nineteenth century, in accordance with the tone of which languages were said to be born, grow, and decay, to be related as parent and child, and to be in health or disease, has, in principle, passed out of use. The 'teleological' principles of the 'old school,' which indeed recognised language as a function of human society, but postulated such conscious or semi-conscious activities as 'the effort for ease,' 'the effort to maintain important distinctions,' have also been abandoned. It has become an accepted principle that the essential laws of speech

are the same at all times, and that the changes of the past must therefore be explained by comparison with phenomena which we can observe at the present day, and by laws such as determine our own habits in the use of language. The two older views have thus come to be regarded as extremes almost equally opposed to the truth. Language is neither an organism living its own life independent of men, nor is it the creation of human ingenuity and persistent purpose. Its history is bound up with the unconscious workings of human faculties, partly within the individual, and still more in the continuous play of social intercourse. These human faculties are in themselves the field of the science of Psychology; and, in connexion with social development, of a branch of that science which Professor Wundt calls 'Völkerpsychologie.' For this word we have perhaps no nearer equivalent than 'Anthropology,' which is too wide a term: 'Social Psychology' may serve as a translation for the moment.

In the generation during which comparative philologists have thus sought to base their studies on psychology, the latter science has shifted its ground. The conception of the human soul, as an entity distinct from the body (and perhaps from the 'spirit' also) has ceased to be postulated: in its place 'psychical activities' as distinct from but always associated with 'physical activities' of the man, have become the subject of study: and the 'psychical activities' are increasingly studied in the light shed by these associated 'physical activities,' or, in common language, by experimental research. Of this new school of 'experimental psychology' Professor Wundt is perhaps the most eminent representative: at any rate the undertaking of which the first part lies before us is surely the greatest enterprise to which it has put its hand, namely the tracing of the laws of psychology in the evolution of language, religion, and custom. To us as students of language it presents itself as a systematic testing of our first principles by a superior authority: we are prepared to find that old-fashioned methods which we have inherited from psychologists of a past generation must be abandoned, and that inadequate formulæ produced by our inexpert hands must be redrafted. In return we entertain the hope that here and there at least a practical problem that we have failed to solve will be illuminated by the new methods and more precise diagnoses presented to us.

The short book by Professor Delbrück, the title of which stands second of the two at the head of this article, is practically a review of Professor Wundt's book from this standpoint, written in a style remarkably free from technical difficulties, and representing generally the attitude of the expert student of language to the criticism of the psychologist. Delbrück's intimate association with Brugmann in the Comparative Grammar which has summed up the whole results of modern philological science, and his special familiarity with those problems of Syntax which remain as landmarks of past stages in the higher developments of human thought, are excellent qualifications for his task. Upon all questions which are distinctly psychological he is prepared to submit without question to recognised authority: but that this submission is in no sense a mark of indifference appears from the interesting sketch he gives of the development of modern psychology, and his explanations as to the adaptation of its terminology to the observed phenomena of language. On the other hand he is prepared to maintain the authority of his own science in its proper field. In matters of detail it is unimportant whether or not the psychologist is correct: he may be put right in his Sanskrit paradigm *bhara-mi, bhara-si, bhara-ti* (*Völkerps.* ii. pp. 132, 620) and allowed still to err in his Latin *fer-o, fer-is, fer-it* (ib. p. 132).¹ But in dealing with large questions such as (for example) Grimm's law or Sentence Accent, a precise acquaintance with the facts is essential: and a really precise acquaintance is only to be won by a life-time devoted to historical investigation (*Grundfragen*, p. 175). And, indeed, the idea of a complete harmonisation of Psychology and Comparative Language, which would place them in something of the relation which exists between (say) Pure and Applied Mathematics, is a dream by which practical men on both sides should not be deceived. Between the fundamental principles of human nature and the ancient history of the Indo-European languages lies the unfathomable abyss of the *millennia* of human existence on the globe. The two departments of human knowledge come into contact at several points, but in the main each must go its own way and use its own methods.

With this caution we may proceed with

¹ It is Professor Brugmann who is actually responsible in both cases; see the note to *Völkerps.* ii. 615. But the attitude is Delbrück's own (*Grundfragen*, p. iv.).

interest and expectation to study the material which Professor Wundt has collected as the result of modern investigation and experiment, and to watch the method by which it is analyzed by him. He is first engaged in analyzing human nature as we may suppose it existing before the use of speech. Its primary psychical activities appear to be the emotions, which can be analyzed or resolved in three directions connecting opposite extremes, viz. pleasure and pain, excitement and depression, strain and relaxation. With these are invariably associated physical activities, such as changes in the heart, the blood-vessels, and the lungs. If the emotions are violent, they are usually manifested also in contortions of the body as a whole, which may include such actions as produce the sensation of sound.

In this stage, then, violent emotion is unconsciously expressed in violent gesture: and, in the reverse direction, violent gesture produces the corresponding emotion, not only in the individual, but in his neighbour who watches him. The neighbour in consequence repeats, and appears to imitate the gesture: and the process is repeated till in the course of social development the gesture comes to be recognised as regularly associated with the emotion, and therefore an evidence of it. As soon as it is consciously used for this purpose it becomes part of gesture-language.

For example, a child in low spirits cries. On another occasion it sees its mother cry: this depresses its spirits, and it cries too. After repeating both experiences many times, it becomes conscious of tears as a sign of low spirits. Next day, being in rather low spirits, it cries purposely in order to indicate its low spirits to its mother. The tears are no longer gesture, but gesture-language.

In rising from instinctive gesture to gesture-language both the psychical and physical factors undergo change. The emotions sink into the background, and the phenomena of perception, apperception, memory, purpose, and volition come into play. It evidently occurs to Professor Delbrück, and probably will to most other readers, that such phenomena as purpose and volition are not treated with sufficient fulness in Professor Wundt's picture. I take it that it is a fundamental position with the new psychology not to resort to these activities in explanation except in the last extremity: how far this position accords with the facts of social life seems too large a problem to be discussed here.

On the physical side we notice that gesture-language tends to concentrate itself in the movements of the facial muscles (called mimic gestures), which chiefly indicate the feelings, and the play of the hands and arms (called pantomimic gestures) which indicates objects and actions. This space-restriction we could easily explain upon the assumption of a 'purpose' to confine the gestures to a neighbour's field of view: how otherwise it can be explained is to be seen in the pages of Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and now of Wundt: but the last-named seems to me far more successful in criticising his predecessors than in establishing his own view.

Although gesture-language is common to man and the brutes, it seems to call into play every faculty that is employed in speech, which is but a very highly specialised form of gesture. The whole psychology of speech may therefore be studied, and best studied, by the observation of gesture-language. Professor Wundt gives a rich collection of material from the latest authorities, dealing in turn with the language of the deaf and dumb, the North American Indians, the Neapolitans, and the Cistercians: and illustrations from picture-writing are also given. All this matter is in itself of the greatest interest. As evidence of the early stages through which speech has passed it is however open to the criticism that all existing gesture-language is or may have been largely modified by speech itself. This objection does not seem to hold good as against those features which are common to all gesture-languages, as for instance, pointing with the finger to denote an object: and there is some ground for the claim that here we have the essential features of a universal language. We may notice that the animal world is soon left behind by its failure to acquire the gesture of pointing—much less can the brutes make use of the 'pantomimic' gestures of imitating an object in outline or an action in its general effect. On the other hand, gesture-language makes little progress towards the complexity of powers possessed by oral speech. A gesture represents rather a complete sentence than a word; the parts of speech can only be roughly indicated, and the more highly developed forms of reasoning cannot be in any way expressed.

Instinctive gesture includes certain sounds, such as the cries that are associated with hunger and rage: and gesture-language develops these further, most elaborately in the song of birds, in which the fierce cry of the male fighting for his partner is gradually

transmuted into the modulated notes by which he seeks to entice her from her hiding place. In gesture-language also sounds have their place: the contraction of the lips represented by 'mum' is a pantomimic suggestion of silence, and the imitation of a bird's note may similarly suggest the bird itself. Wundt lays particular stress on the first of these expedients, the unconscious imitation of an object by the vocal organs themselves: it requires no element of 'purpose.' From these various elements it is a tempting task to construct the elements of a primitive universal speech. For this purpose all the languages of the globe, except the Celtic, are placed under contribution. But it must be admitted that the result is not convincing. It is satisfactory to the Englishman to learn that in his use of 'pa' and 'ma' he is giving expression to the universal instinct: but after all the complete divergence of even child-language in every separate race is a far more striking fact than its occasional coincidences. What we lack in this discussion is some hint of the evolutionary forces which have led mankind to discard so largely (though of course the exceptions are important) the catholic system of gesture-language in favour of the particularist systems of speech. Is it possible that concealment has always been as important a part of social development as self-revelation? We can at any rate constantly observe a tendency to create fresh linguistic forms which convey meaning only to members of a limited circle, even where distinctive terms are already in general use.

Gesture-language has in its way a syntax, and at any rate gestures are to some extent capable of classification. We are thus led to hope for some kind of psychological explanation of such grammatical categories as the Parts of Speech, the Cases of Nouns, or the Voices of Verbs. Yet we look in vain for any systematic treatment of this subject in Wundt's book. That gestures express directly the Sentence, and only secondarily the Word is a highly important principle which we may accept without hesitation as an ultimate truth in all language. But if we ask by what process the Sentence or complete mental picture has become resolved into parts corresponding to Noun and Verb, or the Noun again into Subject and Object, Indirect Object and Possessor, we meet with little more than the stale repetition of those grammaticological definitions which have never explained anything, although by constant

iteration they have come to serve as opiates to the spirit of enquiry. Only in the discussion of gender do we get some real light. The languages of natural peoples shew us endless distinctions of dignity, as between living and dead, human and animal, male and female. Gesture-language is also rich in expressions of honour and contempt, haughtiness and subservience. Such distinctions as those between the master and his slave, the purposeful fingers and the inert clay, we can conceive to have been practically familiar to man in his first experiments at constructive thought. They suggest a basis not only for the parallel distinctions between animate and inanimate (masculine and neuter), male and female (masculine and feminine), but also for the distinction in another category between conqueror and conquered (nominative and accusative). Thus Wundt himself would, I imagine, accept the sentence 'man killed bear' as a typical use of the cases: whilst the sentence 'manna fed Israelites' only has the same form through a series of changes in which the original force of the cases has been lost. But these points are not followed up, although in such matters linguists would gladly sit at the feet of a philosopher. Instead we have some elaborate discussions on the less essential developments of the cases in the Indo-European and other languages, from which, as Professor Delbrück rightly remarks, nothing of fundamental importance emerges.

In dealing with the development of the system of sounds Professor Wundt goes over the ground that is most familiar to comparative philologists. He first brushes aside the supposed principle of 'the invariability of phonetic laws.' Such a principle is impossible: no one can mean that there are laws which are observed in each individual case, no matter what may be the counteracting forces. Yet that, as Professor Delbrück points out, is exactly what observation sometimes shews: thus a final *m* becomes in Greek *n* without exception. On the other hand the principle formerly called 'false analogy,' and now generally termed 'analogy' only, is not only welcomed by Wundt, but accepted by him as typical of almost all sound-change. Here alone, he points out with emphasis, have we law with reason behind it, here we have evolution that can be explained. Unhappily the *a priori* theories of Wundt correspond very little with observed fact. The great generalisation known as Grimm's law is a natural test of the adequacy of Wundt's

postulates. He discusses it at some length, and endeavours to shew that it may be the necessary result of the growing rapidity of enunciation amongst civilised peoples. We need feel no surprise that, in Delbrück's opinion, he would have done better to leave the subject alone. It has never been suggested that Grimm's law represents a universal tendency of speech: yet only on this supposition could we look for a purely psychological explanation. What could come of the discussion but that the psychologist should blunder in his facts, and even so fail to suggest any explanation that linguists have not long ago tried and found wanting? On the other hand the working of psychological principles such as 'analogy' or, as the psychologist terms it, 'association' can be fitly and interestingly illustrated in the history of changes of a simple kind and within the range of one man's lifetime and observation. Still it can hardly be said that the working of any such principle has yet been shewn to possess that degree of uniformity with which in common speech we associate the name 'law.'

The concluding chapter of Wundt's work deals with the evolution of meanings, or as it is now called, Semantic. This science is yet only in its beginnings: but several prominent philologists have endeavoured to draw out its general plan and secure its foundations: and it may be well to remember that G. Curtius laid stress on this side of the subject many years ago, in particular laying down the sound principle that all words have originally a meaning corresponding to some particular and concrete phenomenon. The title of the last important work on this subject (*La Vie des Mots*, par M. Bréal) has a slightly romantic tone which perhaps indicates the difference between the points of view of the French and the German professors. Professor Wundt lays it down as a fundamental postulate that the evolution of meanings is subject to a strict principle of law, dependent upon the necessary conditions of the development of the human mind. But as these conditions are often too complicated to be fully traced, we cannot expect to find a complete account of the changes that actually occur. Changes are regular, if they are such as occur simultaneously in a considerable number of individuals: sporadic (singular) if their origin can be traced to one or two. In regular change purpose should never be postulated; the unconscious associations which are always at work

between our ideas and the words that correspond to them being sufficient to explain all the facts. The most important, and on the whole, the most primitive class of words is that which denotes objects: yet objects are frequently named from some attribute or activity which characterises them permanently or temporarily. In such cases the origin of the name soon ceases to be remembered; it is identified with the object itself, and if some other feature of the object come in turn into prominence in the mental conception, the name may come first to include, and finally to be used exclusively for, objects which do not possess the feature from which the name was originally drawn. Associative processes of this kind are of many kinds, and Wundt proposes a classification which in its general features wins Delbrück's approval. Probably the most interesting class of associations to most readers is that which is bound up with the changing conditions of human society in successive ages, a class so important that it has suggested to some an 'historic method' for the treatment of Semantics as a whole: as for instance the word 'bride' first meant 'daughter-in-law,' then 'young wife,' and now describes only the status of a day, owing to the gradual break-up of the patriarchal system. Professor Wundt does not look upon such changes as a fundamental feature of language, but rather as themselves requiring psychological investigation. But whatever point of view we may adopt, there can be no doubt that there is in these directions a rich field still open for the scientific investigator. With regard to singular change, this seems more doubtful. The naming of newly discovered parts of the globe by their first visitants is only typical of the thousands of new names assigned every year by scientific men and inventors to describe newly discovered elements or machines. Doubtless the namers are subject, like other men, to psychological conditions, and some more or less adequate explanation of the name chosen may often be found: yet only a determinist can admit that the process is strictly one of natural law.

It is hardly too much to say that a book such as Wundt has written is almost an education in itself to persons trained in linguistic studies: it enriches their memory with a large collection of facts culled from a dozen cognate sciences, and stimulates their reasoning power by the example of bold and skilful methods of thinking that are prob-

ably new to them. But there appears to me to be a corresponding danger, in the temptation to select those facts which suit a preconceived theory, and to reject others which are inconsistent with it as 'impossible': and in an unwillingness to recognise in the records of history those phenomena which we classify, however imperfectly, under the rubrics of free-will and individuality. Delbrück does well in exhorting us to be always at work, observing and defining facts,

arranging and rearranging them: and to be satisfied if now and then we can explain them. This is indeed the position of the new psychology itself, as compared with its predecessor. For the friendly contact into which the two sciences have been brought they owe a great debt to the enterprise of Professor Wundt, and we may hope that each will reap increasing profit by a fuller study of the methods of the other.

E. V. ARNOLD.

ABBOTT'S SONGS OF MODERN GREECE.

Songs of Modern Greece, with introductions, translations, and notes. By G. F. ABBOTT, B.A. Cambridge: University Press. 1900. 5s. net.

THIS dainty little book meets the need, long felt by classical scholars, of a selection that will enable them to see what the Modern Greek Ballads are like, without the necessity of much preliminary study of the modern language. Fauriel's excellent '*Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne*,' is too large and too expensive to serve this purpose, and moreover is not always to be obtained; Passow's '*Τραγούδια Ῥωμαϊκὰ*' does not offer sufficient help to those who approach Modern Greek through Ancient. A selection from either of these works, with translations and notes, would have served the purpose; but Mr. Abbott has done better. He has, as he states, avoided including any poems previously published in Western Europe; the sources from which his collection is derived are partly various local Greek publications, and in two or three instances, oral tradition. In the latter case, additional interest is given by Mr. Abbott's picturesque description of the blind minstrel at Salonica from whose dictation they were taken down. His

suggestion, that the alternation of instrumental prelude or interlude and vocal chant or recitation may throw light on the methods of the ancient rhapsodes and on the expression *φορμίζων ἀνεβάλλερο καλὸν αἰδεῖν*, is certainly worth considering.

Mr. Abbott's introductions are interesting; if, as especially in that to the Romantic poetry, he perhaps underestimates Western influence, and sometimes seeks too far for ancient analogies to modern Greece, the fault may readily be pardoned. The translations are literal and accurate, and the notes, for the most part, are just what is wanted to help a classical scholar to recognise familiar words in their modern disguise. Sometimes a step is omitted, e.g., '*πηγαῖνω*' (= *ὑπάγω*) is hardly intelligible without the explanation that the new present is formed by a mistaken analogy from '*πῆγα*' (*ὑπῆγα*). And the association of the notions *swift* and *slow* with *early* and *late* is too general and obvious to need the fanciful explanation from the rapidity of the Greek dawn or the slow advent of darkness. However, such details do little to mar the attractiveness and usefulness of the volume.

E. A. GARDNER.

KUMANUDES'S HISTORICAL VOCABULARY OF LITERARY MODERN GREEK.

Συναγωγή Νέων Λέξεων ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πλασθεῖσάν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλώσεως μέχρι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνων ὑπὸ Στεφάνου Ἀθ. Κουμανοῦδη Ἀδριανοπολίτου. Ἐν Ἀθήναις, 1900. 8vo. pp. i' + 1166. 15s.

PERHAPS few scholars outside Greece know

that the author of the above work—who died recently at Athens—had been for over half the century just elapsed Professor of Humanity in the National University of Greece, and that well-nigh every educated Greek, beginning with his Majesty the King of the Hellenes, has been a pupil of