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On *Odyssey* XXIV 336 *sqq.*

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ON ODYSSEY XXIV 336 sqq.

IN the April number of the *Classical Review* Prof. J. Cook Wilson makes an able and argumentative attempt to prove that a suggestion of mine on *Odyssey* xxiv 336–344 in the current volume of the *Journal of Philology* ought not to be accepted. He admits that at first he was disposed to agree with me, but second thoughts have caused him to be a determined opponent. I have carefully considered his objections, and although I have perhaps some ground to complain of the way in which he so often seems to wish to make me responsible for what is in no wise an innovation of mine, and occasionally ignores what I have said, yet if he had established his case, I should be prepared to pass over these shortcomings, and to thank him not only for enlightening the readers of this paper and myself in particular, but also for real service done to the Homeric text. Unfortunately, I can only thank him for raising the question, for I must confess that the arguments he has brought to bear against me, however ingenious, quite fail of their purpose and, for the most part, can be easily refuted.

With these arguments I now propose to deal, and the reader can judge for himself.

Mr. Wilson tells us that his second thoughts have led him to find two preliminary difficulties, which he duly sets forth before discussing the proposed text taken in itself. They are enough, he thinks, 'to vindicate the text against the argument before us.' If so, I cannot pass them by.

The first he really might have spared us. It is rather hackneyed, quite an old stager, and has often been trotted out. Thus it runs:—'If the story in the text is so absurd, how can we account for the fact that it should have been deliberately substituted' for the supposed original? Now, though in my criticism I did not actually say that the story was 'absurd,' Mr. W. does say that my proposed text—the supposed original—is 'open to graver objection than the old one from the point of view of common sense and from that of philology.' Therefore I would reply:—If what I have proposed be so full of difficulties as he tries to make out—more absurd in fact than its rival—how could the Greeks, who presumably had common sense and knew their own language, do otherwise than accept at once the present text in preference to it, as soon as they got the chance?

This first objection, to use his own words, really seems to defeat itself, and I think my critic is sufficiently answered by this reply. But for those who do not accept his general conclusions, I may add here the answer already given in the *Journal of Philology*, which surely ought not to have been left unnoticed by him. The rhapsodist would think he was improving the passage by making Laertes a generous and free-handed prince. This advantage would outweigh in his mind and in that of the audience the defects which even now Prof. Wilson himself thinks may be overlooked and excused. We have this notable result: my critic, who sees the *absurdity* of the received text will nevertheless accept it, yet he finds fault with the rhapsodists and their audiences for accepting it, though they almost certainly saw a gain of princely generosity in it and, so far as we know, no absurdity at all.

His second preliminary difficulty is less comprehensive, and undoubtedly a little more novel than the first. It seems the guilty rhapsodist ought to have altered *δνόμηνas*, while he was altering *δείξας* into *δῶκας*, etc. Mr. W. is very strong, very insistent, on the duty of the rhapsodist here. He gives him no quarter. He goes so far as to say, 'it cannot be replied that he could not find a word suitable, for he would not on that account have left something which, if the critic is right, is not Greek.' This is a very austere and arbitrary dictum; it is, moreover, an utterly illogical dictum. There is nothing else to be said of it. Mr. W. can be logical enough, when he is using logic illegitimately as the touchstone of poetry. I must challenge this amazing statement. If the rhapsodist could not find a word suitable, I should say he was bound to leave something unsatisfactory, though it might not be so bad as to be 'not Greek.' In such circumstances this is a necessary consequence, and fortunately, being of common occurrence, often enables us to detect these would-be improvers, as in this instance.

I do not really see why I should be charged with saying that *δνόμηνas* *δώσει* is 'not Greek.' My critic should quote me fairly. There is no such violent assertion in my discussion of the passage; neither is it 'part of my case' that *δνόμηνas* 'must' be translated 'didst promise.' I expressly

stated that it might be reduced to 'didst say,' and that would serve my purpose equally well. Mr. W. should remember that, apart from single words, many expressions or combinations of words pass muster and are applauded as triumphs of ingenious locution in later times, which two generations previously would be without appreciation, and in fact could not possibly appear. Much that is right and admirable in the Greek of Sophocles could not possibly have been written or said in earlier days.

So much for the preliminary objections. I now come to the main argument, the difficulties in the proposed text taken in itself.

(1) The first is an important one, and I avoid it, he says, by rendering *ὀνόμασας* and *ὀνόμηντας* inconsistently 'you told me the names of' and 'you counted up.' That there is a difference I freely admit; yet it must not be supposed that I have here introduced any innovation in the rendering of these verbs to support my suggested text. The fact is the difficulty, such as it is, hardly belongs more to my proposed text than it does to the tradition. Mr. Wilson fails to see this or leaves it unnoticed; but it is true all the same. I should certainly have given this rendering without hesitation to the received text, if I had had occasion to translate that text myself. Whether the translation is right or wrong is another question.

A word of explanation may be offered upon the character of the alleged inconsistency. My critic with logical precision treats 'I count' as if it were entirely dissociated from the usual meaning 'I name,' and had become a technical term in arithmetic. Clearly this is not so. *ὀνομαίνω* in Homer means 'I count,' only because one very natural method of counting was by telling over the names of the individuals or items, by naming them in fact. This is all that the Lexicons mean. The two things, counting and naming, are still recognised as one and the same. Otherwise *ὀνομαίνω* (*ἀριθμεῖν κατ' ὄνομα*) does not mean 'to count' at all. *ἀριθμέω* and *πεμπάζομαι* are the proper terms. Consequently I may have erred in using 'count up' to render *ὀνομαίνω*, but the difference is merely one of laying greater stress on one aspect of the same process, and by no means the unqualified and absolute inconsistency that my critic imagines. The trees are named and so counted: the vines are named and counted by rows. In general the method of dealing with vines and trees is the same.

There happens to be more of the naming required for the trees and more of the counting for the vines. My translation indicates this, and that is all.

Division of labour is a gradual development that requires time. It is not confined to industrial production, but touches also the complexities of language. Words are relieved, as time goes on, of double duties. My critic requires that this division of labour should be fully developed at the very outset. He cannot have it so.

However, if my opponent still thinks the translation wrong, as he must do, or his argument is nipped in the bud, I will not dispute it further. Let us adopt instead the consistent translation recommended by himself:—'You named for me and pointed out for me fifty rows of vines.' Against this he launches his logical thunderbolt:—'To point out and tell the name of so and so many objects naturally implies that the objects have different names, or, if they all have the same name, that the name of each has for some reason to be given singly.' He considers this a demonstration of the impossibility of using 'tell the name of' for *ὀνόμηντας* in connection with the vines, and though I do not agree with him, yet I am willing to admit that it was to avoid the possibility of such perverse criticism that I chose the alternative rendering, which for the reason just given I considered I could fairly adopt here without offence.

Now I will leave this argument temporarily triumphant, until I have dealt with an extension of it, which deserves notice, if only because it shows the danger and futility of this purely logical method of examining poetical or even ordinary language. He says, 'the same difficulty exists in the first statement (*ὀνόμασας κ.τ.λ.*), though it may be obscured by an arrangement of the words, as in the translation offered for the new text.' The translation is: 'You told me the names of each and all. You showed me thirteen pear-trees, ten apple-trees, and forty fig-trees.' Then he proceeds fortunately to give his own translation thus, 'you named for me and told me each one; and pointed them out to me, to wit, thirteen pear-trees, etc.'

The 'obscuratation' apparently is that I have not brought out with sufficient clearness that the names have to be given singly. He says it is part of my view that the child must not be supposed to be so young as to make it necessary that the names should be given singly. This is an inference from my statement that the boy is not a prattling

baby, etc., but the inference is unwarrantable. Almost any boy between the ages of four and eight might require that the information should be so conveyed, so that, after all, the explanation, *if I wished*, might reasonably be given, and the difficulty would disappear so far as the first statement goes. My critic indeed seems to have some suspicion that his argument here is rather flimsy; for he proceeds to drag in the vines again, 'and in any case such an explanation would not suit for the vines,' forgetting that he started to prove that the difficulty existed apart from the vines and was only obscured by my translation. So much for this argument, which really seems to bear a strong family resemblance to some of those which Mr. Caudle used to hear from his better half.

We will now return to the vines. Here Mr. Wilson is kind enough to help me a little. He suggests very reasonably as the real meaning, 'you pointed out the vines to me, told me their name, and that there were fifty of them.' So far so good; but he stops short just when he was becoming interesting and valuable. For he remarks that this could have been said so simply, and when I was expecting to find a beautifully lucid and rhythmical Greek verse, to treasure for ever, behold! there is nothing. Let him produce the verse (*ἕξος τεκέτω*), establish his statement, and acquire fame as a poet at one stroke. He has let slip a golden opportunity. Meanwhile, is he quite sure that the words

ὄρχους δέ μοι ὦδ' ὀνόμηνας
δείξας πεντήκοντα

do not suffice to convey this very meaning?

Suppose his argument were granted, would it not be an extreme measure to press a point like this—that the vines should be named singly—against one whom he condemns as an inferior sort of poet? Moreover, the argument tells not only against my supposed original, but also against the vulgate. What great difference, I would ask, is there between telling the names of the vines and 'specifying' either *each one* of the vines or *each one* of the rows of vines? Taking the most feasible alternative, fifty specifications would be necessary; and my critic cannot eliminate the 'each one' or reduce the process to merely 'counting.' Furthermore, he does not say how you are to specify without 'naming,' and any such specification would not be expressed by *ὀνομαίνω*. Not by pointing, I presume, for that would be to borrow *δείξας* from me and

to give up *δώσειν*. Clearly, if there is anything in this objection at all, it is equally fatal to both the suggested reading and the traditional text.

But now, having discussed these points quite as fully as they deserve, I think I shall surprise my critic by telling him that his argument is naught, and he has simply been floundering in a morass of his own making. His difficulties have arisen simply from the fact that he has made an error, an excusable error perhaps, but still a manifest error in his translation. The Greek affords no basis at all for all the display of dialectics and subtle argumentation about telling the name of each tree singly. If he had attended to the exact words of the text, he would never have advanced this argument at all. Homer says *ἕκαστα*, not *ἕκαστον*, and this twice over: he says in fact 'each kind,' not 'each individual member of each kind.' When in l. 342 he uses *ἕκαστος* of the vines he means 'each single plant': but when he uses the plural, the case is as I have said. There is no occasion to adduce proof, unless the position is contested. It is almost self-evident, and I venture to say it will not be disputed, and if so, my critic's first argument is an utter and irretrievable ruin.

(2) The second is a common sense argument, that the boy would have known the trees in his father's orchard and needed not to be told which were apple-trees, etc. Of course this is very much in the same strain as what I have just replied to. Because the boy is not a prattling baby, he is ever so big and ever so old. So I must reply again. This might be the very first introduction of a boy of five or six years of age to the orchard. Does my critic suppose that in the heroic ages children were released from the charge of their mothers and the women servants earlier than in later times? If so, on what ground? As a common sense argument this seems to me singularly weak.

(3) Now we come to my critic's philological difficulty, and if I can dispose of this, I really hope to make a convert of my opponent. He maintains that *ὀνόμασας* and *ὀνόμηνας* cannot mean 'you told the names of.' Here he sails very near the wind indeed, and in his eagerness to confute me seems quite unconscious that he is running counter to everyone else who has dealt with this passage. Messrs. Butcher and Lang translate l. 339 'thou didst tell me the names of each of them'; and I very much doubt whether Mr. W. can produce the name of any previous writer or critic who is of his opinion that

this translation is wrong. Still, if he be right, he deserves all the more credit for his originality and for his singular modesty, which allows him to confide to the world this great discovery without the slightest hint that it is due to himself alone and was never revealed before to any human being. However, I am perfectly sure no one will ever challenge his title. Mares'-nests are seldom subjects of disputed ownership.

Let us see how he tries to establish his position. He says the two verbs have normally two main meanings, (1) to give a thing or person a name, *i.e.* impose a name upon it, call it so and so, or (2) to mention by name, and then he forbids any one to say that 'to call a thing so and so' or 'to mention by name' is practically the same thing as 'to tell what the name of a thing is.'

This Thrasy-machean attitude is disconcerting, for 'to call a tree an apple-tree' certainly seems very like 'telling what the name of a thing is', unless the thing happens to be a gooseberry bush or something else. And the same may be said of 'mentioning a tree by name.' Does Mr. W. intend to maintain that the use of the verb by the speaker depends upon whether the hearer knows the name beforehand or not? Apparently he does; for in the case of δ 551 he says that σὺ δὲ τῶνδ' ἀνδρ' ὀνόμαζε 'may be rightly enough translated "tell me the name of."' But yet, strange to say, no one must translate it so, for ὀνομάζω does not mean to tell what a person's name is—to inform anyone what is a given person's name. Menelaus knows that already: he knows that the son of Laertes is named Odysseus.

Let him try to apply this curious reasoning to Hym. Aph. 291:—

σὺ δ' ἴσχειο μὴδ' ὀνόμαυε

where Aphrodite forbids Anchises to tell her name. The supposed hearer in this case would certainly not know that the given person, the mother of Aeneas, who corresponds to the εἰς δ' ἔτι πον ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐρέι πόντῳ, was named Aphrodite. Very similar is λ 251, where, however, the case is not quite so clearly apparent, and it would be possible to say that ὀνόμαυε does not explicitly refer, as in the other passage, to the name, *i.e.* Poseidon. The fact of the matter is that δ 551 proves the case against Mr. W. up to the hilt. Conf. Hdt. iv 47 τούτους οὐνομανέω· Ἴστρος μὲν κ.τ.λ. 'I will tell the names of them.'

But even if it did not, his philological difficulty collapses like a pricked bubble. I

have another surprise in store for him. He has failed to notice that neither Messrs. Butcher and Lang, who are older offenders, *i.e.* earlier offenders, than myself, nor indeed any one else, except my critic himself, have been guilty of the supposed enormity of translating ὀνόμασας, 'you told the names of' in this passage at any rate. What we did so translate was the combination

ὀνόμασας καὶ ζεῖπες,

a very different matter, as is obvious at a glance.

So, although I think it is fairly certain that ὀνόμαζε in δ 551 does mean 'tell me his name'; yet they might grant him his argument and still maintain in security that ὀνόμασας conjoined with, and qualified by ζεῖπες, is a legitimate poetical equivalent of οὐνόματα ζεῖπες.

That this explanation is reasonable and will commend itself to scholars I feel assured, and shall therefore leave it without further illustration, only remarking that the strictly logical method of examining words is here again carried too far by my opponent. He would deprive language of all its flexibility and confine it in a strait-jacket. Strict logic must be tempered with common sense, otherwise the most astonishing results are attainable. For example Ψ 90 καὶ σὸν θεράποντ' ὀνόμηνεν undoubtedly means, 'called him thy henchman', as Mr. W. sees, and logic would warrant us in concluding that K 522 φίλον τ' ὀνόμηνεν ἑταῖρον must mean, 'called him dear comrade.' Common sense tells us the meaning is 'he called, or shouted the name of his dear comrade,' *i.e.* Rhesus, and no logic in the world can avail to convince us that it is not so.

I now submit to the impartial reader that I have fully and fairly met all the objections taken to my proposed reading.

It only remains to make a few remarks on the defence offered by Mr. Wilson for the vulgate. He seems to argue that ὀνομάζω, being 'common form,' as he calls it,—Yet how can just three instances, two of them in the same book, constitute 'common form'?—for the specification of intended gifts, may mean 'I promise.' Now I cannot for a moment admit this unwarrantable assumption. In connection with gifts the explanation of this verb, which he quotes from Eustathius, is simple and satisfactory, ἀριθμῆν κατ' ὄνομα. Let my critic adopt 'specify' for these passages and be satisfied with it: but he must remember that you can 'specify' unpleasant things, punishments and penalties, as well as pleasant things,

gifts and presents, and in itself 'specify' is no nearer to 'promise' in connection with gifts, than it is to 'threaten' in connection with penalties. I look upon such an idea as contrary to both logic and common sense. It is, however, not improbable that it was this fortuitous conjunction of *ὀνομάζω* and *ὀνομαίνω* with *δῶρα* in these three passages (I 121, 515, Σ 449) that first suggested to the mind of the reciter or rhapsodist the bright idea that gifts might be introduced into our passage with advantage, the supposed advantage which I have already pointed out. The improver thus goes one better, in common parlance, than the original poet. Perhaps he was the very same enterprising gentleman, who on similar principles introduced a line of his own, γ 94, into the description of the palace of Alcinous.

The further suggestions, that *παιδὸς ἐών* intimates that the request was childish, though the gift was in earnest, or that the gift was not in earnest, or that because the Greeks in the islands now spoil their children, therefore in this passage Odysseus represents himself as a spoiled child (Mr. J. L. Myres), or that a bad poet was here exhibiting a want of taste, or that ten apple-trees are not enough of the kind for an orchard, all seem to me mere trifling, destitute of every element of probability. If I were to hazard a counter suggestion to all this, it would be to this effect:—The occasion was probably one of importance, marking a stage in the boy's life. It is the 'beating of the bounds' of the orchard. The boy is the human document used for recording facts. He is the schedule of the trees; he is *μνήμων ἀλώης* (cf. θ 163).

Some of the greatest critics have differed from Aristarchus in his condemnation of the concluding part of the *Odyssey*, notably Sainte-Beuve: but leaving that question aside I should think there are few—and until I see that remarkable verse, I shall be constrained to believe that my critic is one of the few—who can fail to see that the passage in which Odysseus reveals himself to his father is of the highest poetic quality. In it the inferior poet, if we are to speak of him as such, has quite risen to the level of the writer he was supplementing, and save for the one blemish, which I argue has been superinduced later, has produced a strikingly beautiful and interesting picture, a picture that almost deserves the eulogium of Thiersch:—*Sprache Schilderung und die ganze Seele des Gedanken macht die Stelle zur seelenvollsten der ganzen Odyssee.*—Ich wollte lieber die Hälfte der Ilias und Odyssee verlieren als diese Scene.

It seems to me distinctly unfair to Dr. Monro, whose sudden death we have now to deplore as an irreparable loss to Homeric scholarship, to quote his criticism on the concluding battle, as if it specially referred to this particular scene.

Finally I would like to assure Prof. Wilson that, although in controverting his arguments I have been obliged to treat them polemically without much respect, I am very far from intending to be in the least degree discourteous to himself personally. On the contrary I tender him my best thanks for his remarks, and say in all sincerity:—

εἰ πέρ τι βέβηκται
δεινόν, ἄφαρ τὸ φέροιεν ἀναρπάξασαι ἄελλαι.

T. LEYDEN AGAR.

NOTES ON HERODOTUS, BOOKS IV—IX.

Book IV.

1. 4 The words *Κιμμερίους . . . Ἀσίην* seriously interrupt the sequence where they occur, as *καταπαύσαντες* cannot be joined to them. It must go with *ἤρξαν*. They cannot very well be made parenthetical, nor can they be put anywhere else, and finally they hardly do more than repeat *ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι . . . Μηδικήν*. Ought they not then to be omitted?

11. 3 In this troublesome passage it seems to me pretty certain that something like Herwerden's *μηδὲν πρὸς πολλοὺς δεομένων*

should be accepted. See his text, and his argument in *Μνημος*. N.S. 12. 419. *δεομένων* or even perhaps *δεομένην* would also be possible. I desire only to add that he makes out a less good case than he might for his own view, because he fails to point out that *δέομαι* comes often to = *βούλομαι*. Just as in English we say *I want* or *I don't want* instead of *I wish (to do so and so)*, so with *δέομαι* in Greek. The use is not recognised in Liddell and Scott, but it is not uncommon. [I find it now illustrated in Wyse's *Isaeus*, p. 261.]

18. 1 *ἀτὰρ διαβάντι τὸν Βορυσθένα ἀπὸ*