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The Values of the ARME Blanche, with Illustrations from the Recent Campaign

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THE VALUE OF THE *ARME BLANCHE*, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE RECENT CAMPAIGN.

By Captain T. Seki, of the Japanese Infantry; (one of the three best essays in the 17th prize competition on the above subject).

Translated from Nos. 414 and 415 (July, 1910), of the *Officers' Club Magazine*, by Captain F. S. G. Piggott, R.E.

(Continued from page 906).

CHAPTER III.

ACTUAL INSTANCES IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF THE USE OF THE *ARME BLANCHE*.

- (A.) In Night Operations.
- (B.) In Attacks by Daylight, and at Dawn.
- (C.) In Defence.
- (D.) In Pursuit and Retreat.
- (E.) During Rain and Fog.
- (F.) In Fortress Warfare.

(A.) In Night Operations.

THE 5TH DIVISION AT TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

1. On the last day of July, 1904, the Second Japanese Army attacked the Russian Army in the neighbourhood of Ta-shih-chiao. The 5th Division formed the right wing, and before dawn on the 24th July left the line stretching between the high ground east of Lieu-chia-kou and the high ground north-west of Ku-ssu-kou. Establishing connexion with the left wing (the 3rd Division), at about 8 a.m., they occupied the line between the high ground north and west of Yang-tsao-kou. At the same time the 5th Division artillery advanced towards the high ground north of Yang-tsao-kou, where they came under a severe artillery fire from the Russians in the neighbourhood of Ta-ping Ling; apart from this fire our guns were unable to reply, owing to the range and the configuration of the ground, so the infantry and artillery took cover. At 2.50 p.m. the 5th Division decided to deliver an assault with its full force against the high ground west of Ta-ping Ling, and the artillery, at

3.30 p.m., took up a position on the heights north-west of Yang-tsao-kou and opened fire. No suitable path existed for the infantry attack on the already prepared Russian position; the first line of infantry was strengthened by troops from the rear, and, receiving also support from the artillery, began to advance to the assault. They were, however, unable to continue their advance, as they came under a flank fire from the Russian artillery on the heights north-east of Erh-tao Ling, and north-east of Ta-ping Ling. The situation in the direction of the 3rd Division was much the same, and they were only able to occupy the high ground south of Shan-hsi-tou. But the Russian artillery still clung to their position between the neighbourhood of Ta-ping Ling and a point to the west of this mountain, and the battle continued till sundown. The commander of the 5th Division considered that if he stopped his assault now and waited for morning in order to resume it, he would have again to carry out a very difficult advance by daylight under a fierce infantry and artillery fire; further, there were signs that the Russian Army was being reinforced in the neighbourhood of the 3rd Division, which led him to suppose that under cover of night the enemy would bring up fresh troops, and gradually increase his resisting power. He therefore decided to take advantage of the slackening of the Russian fire at dusk, and deliver a determined attack against the high ground west of Ta-ping Ling. He ordered the troops in the first line to advance to the assault at 10 p.m., and the artillery to remain in their present position; further, to safeguard himself against a possible defeat, he halted a portion of his infantry in the valley of Tung-tai Ho, and on the heights north of Yang-tsao-kou. At 9 p.m. the right wing of the Division advanced to the line on the northern extremity of Mao-shan-kou, the first line consisting of the 21st Infantry Regiment, and the reserve being two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 42nd Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Company of the Engineer Battalion (5th Battalion).

The left wing, at 8.30 p.m., attacked and occupied the heights south-east of Pien-kan-kou, in spite of the fierce infantry and artillery fire directed upon them. Continuing, they advanced to the foot of the high ground occupied by the Russian Army; in the first line was the 11th Infantry Regiment, the 41st Infantry Regiment (less two companies), and the 3rd Engineer Company; the reserve consisted of two companies of infantry. Both wings here reformed their troops and prepared for the assault. Meanwhile the Russians kept up a galling fire and hindered their preparations; in addition to this the troops of the first line experienced the greatest difficulty in moving, owing to the dim evening light, the cultivated *kao-liang* fields, precipitous gullies, and walled villages, so that their formation became disordered. In spite of the difficulty of maintaining alignment, and inter-communication between units, they kept up a hot fire for a considerable time, resolutely scrambled up the slope, and, with

a cheer, charged against the Russians' first work; continuing, they captured the second work, at 11.30 p.m. But the Russian Army still held fast to their third position, and showed no signs of retiring; thereupon both wings assaulted, and captured the work at 3 a.m. on the 25th. They at once re-arranged their ranks, and prepared for the possibility of a counter-attack; they remained thus until daybreak. The Russian Army had meanwhile evacuated its position and retired. Knowing that the 3rd Division had advanced to the high ground north of Shan-hsi-tou, the 5th Division again advanced, and strengthened the position occupied by them near that place.

EXAMPLES FROM LIAO-YANG.

2. At the beginning of the Battle of Liao-yang, from August 25th to 26th, the 2nd Division of our First Army (against the high ground of Kung-chang Ling), and the 12th Division (against the high ground between Han-po Ling and Chieh-pan Ling), together carried out a successful night bayonet charge. On this occasion, owing to the light of the moon, the enemy saw our troops advancing; not only did they open a tremendous musketry fire, but they also threw rocks and boulders from the summit of the mountain, which, falling among our men caused a great many casualties. Our troops, however, with the greatest calmness and composure refrained from opening fire, and, with the utmost resolution and determination scaled the mountain, broke into the enemy's position, and captured it.

3. During the Battle of Liao-yang, on the 3rd September, the centre, and left wing, of the right column (in the direction of the Fourth Army), in spite of the enemy's fierce musketry and artillery fire, came to close quarters with the enemy's position, after cutting their way through several lines of powerfully-constructed obstacles, and passing over many dead. At about 7.30 p.m. the 20th Infantry Regiment attacked and captured the enemy's redoubt on the east side of Yu-kung-miao. About the same time another infantry battalion also, joining forces with the left wing of the troops next to them, attacked the same work from both sides. The left wing, owing to the enemy's very stubborn defence, eventually had to halt temporarily about 200 yards in front of the position, but at sundown they charged against the work and captured it.*

EXAMPLES FROM THE SHA-HO.

4. During the Battle of the Sha-Ho, on the 11th October, the enemy, with the intention of recovering Ying-te-niu-lu, which had been occupied by our troops as the result of an attack by the 18th and 33rd Infantry Regiments (on the left wing of

*The meaning of the above passage in the original is somewhat obscure.—Translator.

the 3rd Division of the Second Army), delivered several counter-attacks. At first they relied on heavy musketry fire, but as this method held out no hope of success, they eventually tried a determined bayonet charge, by which they won back the position.

5. During the Battle of the Sha-Ho, on the 11th October, the commander of the Fourth Army assumed the offensive, acting on orders received from the Commander-in-Chief. On this occasion his intention was to drive away the enemy who had occupied Wu-li-tai-tzu, but, being unable to attain this object, he delivered a night attack, which proved successful, with the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment. During this attack three companies of the battalion formed the first line, and the remaining company (No. 10 Company) formed the second line about 150 yards in rear. Throwing out a few scouts a short distance in front to reconnoitre, the battalion advanced very silently, and at about 1.20 a.m. came to close quarters with the southern limits of the village of Wu-li-tai-tzu. As soon as the enemy here knew of our approach they opened a hot fire, and defended their position with great stubbornness; although their strength was not less than two or three companies, our battalion, not wavering for an instant, delivered a fierce bayonet charge, and at 1.30 a.m. finally captured the position. Then, following hard on the heels of the retreating enemy, they reached, and occupied, the northern boundary of the village.

6. At the Battle of the Sha-Ho the 10th Division, co-operating with the 2nd Division, attacked, on October 11th, the Russian Army at San-chia-tzu, and on the heights west of that place, but were not able to occupy the neighbourhood of San-kuai-shih Shan, for the whole line of hills in this neighbourhood was tenaciously defended by a superior Russian force. The 5th Division, forming the left wing, were also unable to progress with their attack as they had hoped.

Should the 10th Division have waited for dawn in order to assault? Not only was the configuration of the ground unsuited to an attack by daylight, but there was also a chance that the Russian Army, under cover of night, might change their dispositions. Further, looking at the matter from the point of view of the whole Manchurian Army, it was essential to break the Russian line here as soon as possible, so as to attack in flank and rear the Russian troops facing the First Army (forming the extreme right of the Manchurian Army); for this reason the 10th Division determined to carry out a night attack.

San-kuai-shih Shan stood up, a solitary hill in an open plain. It was an inaccessible and, at the same time, a very important position; at the time in question it was occupied by a brigade of the 37th Russian Division, and a few field batteries. It was attacked by three infantry brigades of the Japanese 10th Division. The dispositions for attack were as follows (each

"line" being formed from one brigade): The first "line" was in line in two ranks; the second "line" was in line of company columns; the third "line" consisted of two parallel columns, each column formed of a regiment in double line of line of company columns. The distance between the first and second lines was about 200 yards, and between the second and third lines about 500 yards. The troops were forbidden to open fire unless absolutely necessary; the actual ground over which the advance lay, the method of keeping communication between units, and the precise objective of attack, were all carefully explained beforehand. Further, every one was dressed alike, with great coat, and a white band on the left arm. At 12-30 a.m., on the 12th October, the force was drawn up ready, and on the signal (a rocket) being sent up, operations began. The 8th Brigade (the 10th and 40th Regiment) advanced slowly with frequent halts, in order to preserve their formation and communications. Although coming under the Russian musketry fire, they did not reply; when they had arrived at 400 yards from the enemy's position, they received a tremendous fusillade—the flashes from the Russian rifles showing plainly that there were several tiers of fire-trenches on San-kuai-shih Shan.

Even when they had reached 100 yards, the enemy's fire was as heavy as before; owing to the practical impossibility of advancing further, the troops in the first line all opened fire at the same time, and after keeping it up for half-an-hour delivered a determined charge. Although they were able to capture the first line of the Russian position, they came under a cross fire; further, the Russian soldiers on the top of, and half-way up, San-kuai-shih Shan, relying on the inaccessibility of their position, obstinately refused to move. Later on the brigade surrounded the Russian second line of defence, the men crawling and climbing over rocks and boulders, and eventually engaging in a hand-to-hand fight which lasted several hours.

The 20th Brigade (the 20th and 39th Regiments) had advanced towards Shuang-tzu Shan, adopting almost the same methods as the 8th Brigade, but as the sounds of musketry fire on San-kuai-shih Shan still continued they determined to co-operate with the 8th Brigade, with the object of destroying the Russian force on San-kuai-shih Shan. Their main body therefore changed direction and, under a fierce fire, reached a position about 200 yards from the enemy, where our men opened fire, and, receiving reinforcements from their second line, delivered a charge which resulted in the capture of the enemy's first line of works. After a time the 20th Brigade surrounded the Russians in the village on the mountain; one part, scrambling up the steep cliff, drove them off after a fight at close quarters, while a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the remainder in the village resulted at length in a hard-won victory, and in the occupation of the place.

AN EXAMPLE FROM MUKDEN.

7. During the Battle of Mukden, on March 10th, the 7th Division was opposed at close quarters by a Russian force north-west of the Northern Imperial Tombs; owing to the very determined resistance of the enemy, advantage was taken of darkness to deliver an attack with a certain brigade (fourteen companies of infantry, with some engineers). The force destined for the night attack at 5.15 a.m. gradually began moving—the first line consisting of seven companies of infantry and the engineers, the second line of five companies, and the third line of two companies; the lines were in echelon, at 100 yards distance, and they advanced slowly, carefully keeping their correct positions. The night was very dark, and, as the advance progressed, the difficulty of keeping connexion between each unit and between the three lines of attack continually became greater; so that the intervals between units widened, and the distances between the echelons decreased. The advance, however, continued without hindrance, and at 5.30 a.m. the northern boundary of the wood to the north of the Northern Tombs was reached. At this moment two or three shots rang out to our front, and also in front of our left wing; immediately afterwards loud shouts were heard in front of our first line. The commander of this line, without losing a moment, shouted out an order at the top of his voice, and our men, responding immediately, dashed into the wood, cheering as they went. The second line also, closing up, joined in the charge. The Russians in the neighbourhood of the edge of the wood resisted stoutly, and in the hand-to-hand fight which ensued casualties increased rapidly, and the place soon presented a terrible spectacle. However, the Japanese infantry eventually drove off the Russians and advanced close on their heels. (5.40 a.m.).

A little before this, when our first line had charged into the Russian position, the commander of the whole night attack force, being nearly certain that the main Russian force lay in the direction of our left flank, and sent two companies forming the third line to guard against a possible attack from this direction. This party, although facing the enemy in this quarter, found a gap between themselves and the first two lines, when the latter began to pursue the retreating Russians. It thus became imperative to close up this interval, but in doing so the two companies were thrown into considerable confusion by the darkness.

As dawn had not yet broken, and as the wood was very thick, it was not possible to see more than ten paces ahead, and all the units of the attacking force naturally fell into great disorder. There was no one to look to for orders, and small groups of soldiers formed in every direction and engaged the enemy in their particular vicinity; in this way we advanced, while casualties on both sides continued to increase with the hand-to-hand combats. Eventually, owing to the exertions of

the various unit commanders and the intelligence of the men, the force gradually regained its original formation (the sound of musketry and the presence of scouts indicating the direction of various units), and at 9 a.m. it finally occupied the enclosure surrounding the Northern Tombs.

THE 10TH DIVISION AT LIAO-YANG.

8. At the time of the Battle of Liao-yang the Russians had constructed two lines of defence to the south of Liao-yang; the Japanese Army attacked these, and during the night of the 31st August captured the first line, the Russian Army falling back to their second line of defensive works.

The Japanese 10th Division formed the right of the Fourth Army, and, pursuing the enemy captured the line from Ta-te-pu-shih-fu to Shih-chia-wa-tzu about noon on September 1st; they were now facing the Russians in the neighbourhood of Yu-kang-miao, and on the 2nd September again advanced. At about noon they arrived at the line stretching from the neighbourhood of Ta-te-pu-shih-fu to the neighbourhood of the village without a name, to the north of Tung-pa-li-chuang; they were, however, unable to continue their advance owing to the Russian infantry and artillery fire. Especially was this the case in the direction of the right wing, who found themselves under a terrible fire from about twenty pieces of artillery on the high ground north of Mu-chang. At 5 a.m. on the 3rd September they again opened the attack, and, in face of a fierce fire, penetrated to within three or four hundred yards from the front of the Russian position; our first line, and the reserves, suffered a great many casualties from infantry and artillery fire, and the village and wood behind which they had with difficulty taken cover were immediately destroyed, so that the movement of even a single soldier at once attracted a storm of bullets.

In spite of the determination of the first line they were not able to fire with any effect against the skilfully-constructed Russian works, and although in great need of artillery assistance they were rendered powerless by the fact that the artillery ammunition was exhausted. The several days' fighting had exhausted the men mentally and physically; and all the time the casualties continued to increase. The commander of the 10th Division, knowing that the artillery ammunition was exhausted and casualties increasing, decided to deliver a determined charge at 6 p.m., in co-operation with the left wing (5th Division).

All ranks at once took heart again, and at dusk began to advance with the utmost gallantry, gladly looking forward to laying down their lives for their country. The terrible fire, the auxiliary defences, and particularly the continually exploding mines, caused our men to halt about 150 yards from the front of the enemy's position. The issue of the fight appeared to be

very doubtful, when, just at this moment (7.50 p.m.), the 10th Regiment of Kobi Infantry and one battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment, who were advancing against Yu-kung-miao, entered the place in face of a terrific fire, and over the bodies of a great number of the killed. At the same time the 20th Infantry Regiment effected an entrance into the redoubt on the east of Yu-kung-miao. One portion of the Russian position was now in our hands, and the troops, with redoubled energy, delivered the charge which resulted in the final occupation of Liao-yang.

9. In addition to the examples given above there were a great number of occasions when the *arme blanche* was used in night outpost fighting, both in attack and defence. For example, the outpost engagement of the First Army at Mo-tien Ling; the various outpost actions of the Third Army at Port Arthur, from the time of the fighting in the neighbourhood of Chuan Shan until the capture of the outer defences; and the many affairs of outposts which took place in front of each army during the time the two forces were confronting each other at the Sha-Ho and Mukden.

(B) In Attacks by Daylight, and at Dawn.

THE 5TH DIVISION AT THE SHA-HO.

1. Let us examine the engagement when the left wing of the 5th Division of our Fourth Army, during the Battle of the Sha-Ho, captured the highest point of Wu-li-tai-tzu with a daylight bayonet charge. At 5.30 a.m. the troops destined for the attack of this hill began an enveloping attack from the south-west, the arrangement of units being as follows:—

No. 2 Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment on the left; No. 1 Battalion of the same regiment in the centre; and No. 2 Battalion of the 42nd Infantry Regiment on the right.

As settled previously, they attacked vigorously, but the enemy on the hill not only stubbornly refused to move, but met our men with a terrific musketry fire. The attacking party, waving their bayonets and cheering loudly, charged forward; but the enemy, taking advantage of the fact that the top of the hill was somewhat confined and not suited to the movements of large bodies of troops, fought with the greatest energy. Sparks sprang from the clashing blades, as swords and bayonets met in this indescribable struggle; casualties rapidly increased and covered the whole mountain side.

Then the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment, establishing connexion with the right wing of the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Regiment, attacked the hill up the south-eastern slope; although the length of the hill which the enemy were holding was considerable, the width from east to west, forming the front of this battalion (No. 2 Battalion 21st Regiment), was comparatively narrow, and a great number of troops could not

be brought against it. The regimental commander, seeing this, only ordered his 2nd Battalion to advance on the right of No. 2 Battalion of the 42nd Regiment. His 3rd Battalion (less one company) was placed in rear between the 2nd Battalion (21st Regiment) and the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Regiment, to assist the charge of the latter. When the result of the fight on the hill was still uncertain, a little before 6 a.m. two or three companies of the enemy's infantry appeared out of the morning mist in a field about 600 yards north-east of the hill. Observing the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Regiment they opened a flank fire upon them, and the battalion found itself very hard pressed. Just at this moment the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Regiment reached the skyline on the right of this battalion (2nd Battalion 42nd Regiment), and, opening a hot fire upon the enemy in the field, rapidly threw them into disorder, so that they fled in the direction of Hsiao-fan-chia-tun.

A little after 6 a.m. the troops in our first line finally overpowered the enemy and captured the highest point of the hills. Although this position was now in our hands, the enemy, who were still firmly holding on to one of the lower spurs of the same hill and to the crest line to the north-east, delivered two counter-attacks against the hill which we had occupied. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued, but when they saw that our men had driven them back, they fled in the direction of Shih-li-ho, leaving over 100 dead on the field. The whole chain of heights east of Wu-li-tai-tzu was now completely occupied by the Japanese Army.

THE 2ND INFANTRY REGIMENT AT THE SHI-HO.

2. During the Battle of the Sha-Ho the 2nd Infantry Regiment (Colonel Ota) was holding the line of hills at Ta Ling, in face of a superior force of the enemy. Before it was light on the morning of October 12th, about three regiments of the enemy advanced to the attack of a small hill which formed the key of our position. The garrison of this hill, consisting of one company, held on tenaciously to the summit, but their position was very perilous. The regimental commander, placing the war-flag in the van, and with an escort of two companies, delivered a determined charge. With flashing steel and undaunted bravery they engaged in a hand-to-hand fight against superior numbers on the slopes of this hill, but owing to the stubborn resistance of the Russians both the first and second charges failed. The regimental commander and the standard-bearer were both wounded, the regimental adjutant was killed, the cloth of the flag was riddled with bullet, and the flag itself was carried by one valiant private soldier. A third charge was now delivered, and finally, at 7.30 a.m., the Russian force was driven off.

During this engagement the casualties in Colonel Ota's

regiment numbered one-sixth of those actually taking part in the fight. The majority of the casualties were from bayonet wounds. The spot where the action took place was called "Gunki Yama" (War-flag Hill), in order to mark the place where the war-flag might almost be said to have engaged in the fight itself. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army presented Colonel Ota, the regimental commander, with a "Kanjo" (certificate of distinguished service in the field).

(c.) In Defence.

GENERAL UMEZAWA'S BRIGADE AT THE SHA-HO.

At the time of the Battle of the Sha-Ho the Mixed Kobi Brigade of Guards (Major-General Umezawa), attached to the First Army, and the 12th Division, were on the extreme right of the Manchurian Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Inouye; this force occupied the chain of hills from the neighbourhood of Pen-hsi-hu to the high ground south of Ying-chang-pu—a length of about $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and checked the attack of the Russian Eastern Detached Force.

A little before this, Major-General Umezawa's Brigade had been defending the neighbourhood of Ping-tai-tzu, but as the main force of the Russian Army advanced southwards they had been ordered to retire to Pen-hsi-hu and the neighbourhood of Tu-men-tzu Ling—eventually arriving at their new position on October 8th. From the 9th onwards they were attacked, and very hard pressed by a superior Russian force. During the night of the 9th the main body of the 12th Division advanced to the assistance of the Mixed Brigade, and Lieutenant-General Inouye took command of both forces. Major-General Shimamura was now ordered to occupy the line of hills on the southern flank of Pen-hsi-hu and drive off the enemy in that quarter; the troops placed under his command were the 14th Regiment of Infantry, three-and-a-half battalions of the Kobi Infantry, who had been with the Umezawa Brigade, one battery of artillery, and one company of engineers. This force on October 10th recaptured the position which had been taken from us a few days before, and occupied a front of about five miles, with five-and-a-half battalions. The chain of heights in this neighbourhood rose between 900 and 1200 feet above the level of the plain, the side of most of the hills being at a slope of as much as $\frac{2}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$. The summit was covered with rocks and boulders, and the slope itself was serrated with chasms. Owing to the extraordinary difficulty of operating here it might be said that the advantages of the configuration of the ground supplemented the scarcity of the defending troops. In spite of this, however, the danger and difficulty of successfully holding the place, against odds of 10 to 1, were very great.

The Russian Army began the attack early on the morning of the 11th; about noon they delivered a fierce charge, having placed several companies in every spot along the entire front

where it was possible to deploy troops. The defending force in desperation concentrated a terrific fire on the attackers; they also hurled stones and rolled down rocks to hinder the scaling of the hill; others defended their posts with the bayonet. The Russian force, regardless of death, delivered desperate bayonet charges; when one party was driven back, fresh troops advanced to the assault, and it seemed as if they would not give up until the position was in their hands. In addition to this, several large bodies of the enemy were seen in rear, so that it is not difficult to imagine the terrible straits in which our men found themselves. A great number of urgent messengers, sent from every unit of the defence, collected at Major-General Shimamura's headquarters, with applications for reinforcements or more ammunition; eventually all his reserves were engaged, and all the ammunition exhausted. All this time the struggle on the hills became more and more fierce, and the position of our men more and more desperate. The charges received by the Japanese in various quarters continued until sundown, some units being charged no less than six times, while none received less than three bayonet attacks. In spite of all this, the dogged determination of the officers, and the undaunted and brave spirit of the N.C.O.'s and men, resulted in not a single inch of the position being given up. They fought with bayonets and stones when their ammunition was exhausted, and in some companies there were only thirty or forty men left. However, against more than three Russian Army Corps they succeeded in holding their ground, and prevented the enemy's plans for the offensive being carried out.

(D.) In Pursuit and Retreat.

THE 3RD DIVISION AT THE SHA-HO.

1. During the Battle of the Sha-Ho, at about 7 a.m. on October 14th, when it was fairly clear that the final victory would rest with us, the left wing of the 3rd Division began a vigorous pursuit of the enemy in their front. The 6th Regiment charged the enemy's artillery position on the west of the Mukden main road, and the 33rd Regiment, the artillery position on the east of the Mukden main road. The enemy's infantry resisted step by step, but our men, in the flush of victory, rolled forward like a wave; when the enemy's infantry finally fell back to their artillery line, our assaulting body suddenly appeared immediately in front of their guns. The enemy were in the greatest confusion; some brought up the horses and tried to limber up, some abandoned their guns and fled, some raised imitation Japanese flags on the gun carriages; in fact, it is almost impossible to describe the situation. Taking advantage of this, our infantry kept up a rapid fire, and then, fixing bayonets, inflicted with them very great losses on the enemy's men and horses. The enemy were thrown into unutterable con-

fusion, and were nearly all put to the sword. We captured seventeen quick-firing field guns on the west of the Mukden road, and seven guns, ammunition wagons, and material on the east of the Mukden road. The 9th and 10th Companies of the 34th Infantry Regiment—forming the division's right wing—had also charged the enemy's artillery on the latter's left flank; then, joining forces with the 33rd Regiment, they charged against the artillery position east of the Mukden road, where they inflicted many casualties on men and horses.

THE YAMADA DETACHMENT AT THE SHA-HO.

2. During the Battle of the Sha-Ho, on October 16th, the Yamada Detachment of the Fourth Army, facing the enemy at close quarters near Wan-pao Shan, began to retreat. I shall attempt to describe here the circumstances of the terrible hand-to-hand fight with cold steel which occurred when the enemy advanced to the pursuit.

Major-General Yamada, the commander of the detachment—consisting of the 44th Infantry Regiment, the 20th Kobi Infantry Regiment, the 11th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of Field Artillery, and a battalion of Mountain Artillery—acting on orders received from the Fourth Army headquarters, gave the order to retire at 6.15 p.m. At 6.30 p.m. the 20th Kobi Infantry Regiment were engaged in a moderately severe musketry duel with the enemy on the right bank of the Sha-Ho. Soon after sundown, when the colour of objects around could not be clearly distinguished, a large force of the enemy, without firing a shot, suddenly appeared close in front of the Kobi Regiment and the right wing battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division, which was connected with the left wing of the Kobi Regiment. With loud shouts the enemy broke through the line of the right wing battalion of the 18th Regiment, to the rear and flank of the Kobi Regiment. No. 1 Company, forming the left wing of the first line of the 20th Kobi Regiment, at once faced about to the south, and engaged the enemy. Owing to the suddenness of the whole affair, and the disparity in numbers, part of this company was driven back to the northern outskirts of a small village in the neighbourhood; the remainder took to flight and joined the 2nd Company. The enemy, pressing on, charged the 2nd Company, and a hand-to-hand combat took place; the company commander and two section commanders were killed, and the company fled eastwards, a small portion taking refuge in the little village mentioned above. The 4th Company of the 1st Battalion of the same regiment (20th Kobi Regiment) took up a position facing west, on the eastern bank of a sunken road; this force was urged to the greatest endeavours, and brought the enemy, who were advancing east after overpowering No. 2 Company, to a standstill on the western bank of the sunken road.

A little before this, the 3rd, 5th and 6th Companies in the

first line received a flank and rear fire from the direction of Wan-pao Shan; while their casualties were increasing fast they saw the flight of a part of the left wing of the first line; mistaking this for the retreat of the 1st Battalion they themselves retired in a south-easterly direction. The 4th Company, under the commander of the 1st Battalion, was thus left alone on the eastern bank of the sunken road, where it offered a stubborn resistance to the enemy until after 8 p.m. A little before this (6.35 p.m.) the commander of the 20th Kōbi Regiment, at the south-eastern boundary of a village about 1,000 yards north-east of Hou-san-tao-kang-tzu, received, simultaneously, a report of the enemy's attack and orders to retire from the commander of the detached force (see above). However, as circumstances did not permit him to retire then, he determined to drive off the enemy with a counter-attack. Taking his reserves No. 7 Company (War-flag Company), and No. 8 Company he advanced north with the commander of No. 2 Battalion to the cross-roads in the middle of the village about 1000 yards north-east of Hou-san-tao-kang-tzu, where he delivered a flank charge against the enemy who were opposing No. 4 Company, and drove them from the sunken road.

About this time the regimental commander (20th Kōbi Regiment) received a report that the enemy had broken into the temporary dressing station in our rear, from a westerly direction; he at once faced his column about, and, leading No. 8 Company (hitherto the rearmost company), inclined to the right, and advanced westwards from the central cross-roads. A charge was now delivered against a body of the enemy near the temporary dressing station; the enemy's formation was broken, and our men pursued them to the western limits of the village. After advancing north for thirty or forty paces, on the west flank of the village, a large force of the enemy suddenly delivered, with loud shouts, an attack against our front and left flank, and a hand-to-hand combat ensued. The head of our column was decimated, but the remainder delivered a second charge with the greatest bravery.

During this time the enemy who had effected an entrance at the northern boundary of the village, and who were pressing No. 1 Company from the cover of the houses and walls, began to threaten our right flank and rear. In addition to this the enemy in front gradually increased, so that No. 7 and No. 8 Companies were eventually driven back to the neighbourhood of the cross-roads. A body of the enemy now charged along the road from the north towards the cross-roads, but a portion of No. 7 Company, as a result of a desperate fight, drove this enemy out of the village again. (At this time the officers of both companies were already all dead or wounded.) The enemy attempted several charges after this, in order to win back the village, but without success.

The enemy now abandoned the idea of a direct attack on

our front; a part of his force set fire to various places in the west of the village, while the main body advanced southwards and threatened the regiment's line of retreat. Immediately afterwards a portion of the enemy appeared thirty or forty paces to the south of the cross-roads; this force was driven off, and our war-flag planted at a spot about 300 yards south-east of the village. The regiment now came under a rapid musketry fire from the direction of Wan-pao Shan; and as the enemy to the south-west of the village were gradually coming nearer it became impossible to prevent the regiment flying in disorder. An officers' patrol, which had been sent from No. 1 Battalion to establish communication with the 41st Regiment, was fired at from the summit of Wan-pao Shan, and returned; thereupon, the commander of the 20th Kobi Regiment gave orders for a general retreat. It was a little after 8 p.m. when his men began to retire in the direction of Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu.

After the regimental staff had retreated, the commander of No. 2 Battalion, who was still vigorously defending himself near the cross-roads with sixty or seventy men, hearing that there were some wounded men still in the temporary dressing station, attempted to rescue them with his whole force. Although they were able to send twenty or thirty wounded to the rear, the enemy hindered their operations, and again set fire to the village. Owing to this the party retired, abandoning several of the dead and wounded.

The main body of the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Companies, who were falling back towards the south-east, met the regimental adjutant near a pine wood, about 500 yards north of Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu, where he was rallying our routed men. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 41st Regiment now suggested that an attempt be made to retake Wan-pao Shan. With this object the above three companies reached this hill, when they found that the summit was already in possession of the 41st Regiment. They therefore came under the orders of the acting-regimental commander (Major Inouye), and assisted in the defence of the hill.

The commander of the field artillery battalion received the orders to retire with the rest of the Yamada detachment at 6.40 p.m. He at once gave the order himself to limber up, and for the first line wagons to retreat towards Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu. The guns themselves he entrusted to a captain, while the adjutant took the first line wagons; No. 4 Battery, on the left wing, now evacuated its position, and a mounted orderly was sent to instruct No. 5 Battery to withdraw from its position. The battalion commander, knowing that the road crossing the sunken road on the left of the line of guns, had already been prepared for the passage of artillery, determined to make use of it for his line of retreat. Another reason for this decision was his knowledge that the enemy were gradually crossing the Sha-Ho from the direction of Wan-pao Shan, and pressing

upon our right wing—whereas the left wing had a covering party of infantry, and was thus in a safer condition for retiring.

As soon as No. 4 Battery began to advance along this road in the direction of Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu it suddenly came under a fierce musketry fire; and drivers and horses suffered many casualties. The battery increased its speed, but the enemy almost immediately appeared on its right flank and delivered a charge, which was directed against the off horses, and particularly the wheelers. Eventually the column was brought to a standstill. A portion of our infantry, and the engineers, who were near the spot at this time, opened fire upon the enemy, while the artillery officers and men, with the weapons they were actually carrying, joined in the fight. However, owing to the odds against them, they at last realized that they could not save the guns, so, unhooking the horses, and removing the breech mechanisms and sights, they retreated to Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu.

As soon as he became aware of the sudden halt of the head of No. 4 Battery, the commander of No. 5 Battery, which was following in rear, sent the leading section commander at once to the headquarters of No. 4 Battery to find out what was the matter. On ascertaining the condition of affairs (as described above) he changed his line of retreat and passed by the left flank of No. 4 Battery. During the retreat, the first line wagons in the van had already suffered very great losses, and the battery was unable to continue its advance; eventually the two rearmost guns were just able to make good their retreat to Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu.

As soon as No. 4 Battery found themselves in the desperate straits described above the battalion commander sent an officer to report the fact to Major-General Yamada. After a little time one company from the 40th Kobi Infantry Regiment came to cover the retreat; with this force the battalion commander attempted to retake the guns. But the enemy's strength had for some time past been gradually increasing, so that not only did the Kobi Company suffer very great losses and fail to achieve its object, but it was itself forced to retire.

The commander of the mountain artillery battalion received his orders to retreat from the detachment commander at 6.20 p.m. At 6.30 p.m. he ordered each battery to bring up its pack horses from the rear of its position, and be prepared to retire in the following order:—No. 5 Battery, No. 4 Battery, No. 6 Battery. The enemy's bullets now began to whistle over the positions of No. 5 and No. 6 Batteries, and No. 4 Battery in particular found it almost impossible to carry out any movements. The battalion commander, fearing that the order to retire had not reached No. 4 Battery, sent the following message to the battery commander by the battalion orderly-room clerk:—“No. 6 Battery will fire six rounds in rotation, under cover of which No. 4 Battery will retire.” On receipt

of these orders No. 6 Battery prepared to fire their six rounds, but being uncertain whether the orders had actually reached No. 4 Battery or not, delayed the actual firing for a short time. A few minutes later shouts were heard to their right front, which the battalion commander took to be the cheers of our infantry delivering a counter-attack.

Most of No. 5 Battery had, at this time, already begun to load their pack horses; No. 6 Battery now brought up the pack horses to the firing line; and were on the point of firing their six rounds when they heard the shouts in the direction of No. 4 Battery, mentioned above. The battalion commander, fearing that he would cause casualties among our men if he opened fire for the purpose of helping No. 4 Battery, gave orders for No. 6 Battery to retire at once without firing. At the same time he sent an orderly to No. 4 Battery, informing them that No. 6 Battery would not fire, and directing No. 4 Battery to retreat immediately.

This orderly, however, returned without ever reaching No. 4 Battery's position, and reported that the battery had already fallen into the enemy's hands. A little before this, at 6.35 p.m., No. 4 Battery had received the orders to retire under cover of six rounds from No. 6 Battery from the battalion commander, and were making the necessary preparations, when, at about 6.40 p.m., the Japanese infantry in their front began to fall back in disorder. The battery commander learnt from these men that the hill in front had already been occupied by the enemy. This eminence was only about fifty or sixty yards from the right wing of our position, and the walls of the village prevented shrapnel fire being directed against the hill; for this reason orders were given to load the pack horses as fast as possible. When the pack horses were actually being brought into the position, the enemy delivered a charge against the right wing and rear of the position, cheering as they came. Thereupon three or four infantrymen who were falling back fixed bayonets and halted; No. 1 gun had hardly been loaded up when the enemy, increasing in numbers, rapidly rendered further resistance impossible, and the battery retreated, abandoning the remaining guns.

At this time No. 5 Battery had already retired; No. 6 Battery was still engaged in loading up their pack horses, when the enemy appeared about fifty yards from the front of the position, and with loud shouts pressed on to close quarters. The rear of No. 6 Battery was thrown into considerable disorder, but they succeeded in safely carrying out their retreat.

As described above, the field and mountain artillery retired to Chien-san-tao-kang-tzu, the field artillery having lost nine guns, and the mountain artillery five guns. Later on the retreat was resumed, the field artillery battalion falling back to the south of Ku-chia-tzu (Tang-chia-pu-tzu), and the mountain battalion to Chien-huang-chia-tien.

3. Example No. 3 (which is omitted owing to considerations of space) describes a hand to hand combat, which took place during the Battle of the Sha-Ho, in and round the village of San-Tao-Kang-Tzu. The incidents of the fighting, which are narrated in great detail, were generally similar in character to those described in Example No. 2.—Ed., R.U.S.I.

THE RUSSIAN RETREAT AT THE YALU.

4. During the Battle of the Yalu, at noon on May 1st, General Zasulich received reports that our army had made a turning movement round his left wing, and also that the Russian casualties were very heavy. He considered that he had no option but to retire with his whole force to Feng-huang-cheng; and for the purpose of covering his retreat he placed two battalions of infantry and one battery of artillery on a position north of Chuang-shan-tzu. The two infantry battalions occupied some high ground which had an excellent field of fire, but as the surface of the ground was very broken, the artillery were unable to come into action, and retired to the rear.

Our army now pressed hard upon the 12th Russian Regiment, which was preparing to retire northwards with some artillery and a machine-gun battery; and at about 1 p.m. we came to very close quarters, with the 11th Russian Regiment's position. At this time a battery of artillery, which was retreating from the latter position, came under a cross fire from our force, and being unable to advance along the road, halted. The machine-gun battery also halted near here, and opened a fierce fire upon our troops; but in spite of this the battery itself suffered very great losses. The 12th Russian Regiment, guarding their standard, broke through the surrounding Japanese troops; the 11th Russian Regiment remained for a further two hours in their position, in order to cover the retreat of the 12th Regiment. On account of this they were themselves surrounded on both flanks and in rear, and in order to break through the ring of the enemy were compelled to deliver several determined bayonet charges, which caused our advance to waver. The Russian regimental commander was killed in one of these charges, and No. 3 Battalion was almost annihilated. Eventually, at about 4 p.m., the 11th Regiment finally evacuated their position, and passing through Chuang-shan-tzu, continued their retreat through the narrow valley towards Feng-huang-cheng, which place they eventually reached.

5. When the result of the Battle of Te-li-ssu was almost beyond doubt, the enemy's first line showed signs of wavering and began to retreat. Thereupon the commander of our right wing called up his last reserve (No. 6 Company of the 18th Infantry Regiment), deployed them on the high ground south of Wa-fang-wo-peng on the left of his position, and directed them to open a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy. The latter, fired at and hard pressed from every direction, were in desperate straits, and as a last resort decided to assume the

offensive with about one-and-a-half battalions. This force, flourishing their bayonets, suddenly charged against our position, climbing up the steep slope of the hills south of Wa-fang-wo-peng from every direction. Our infantry resisted the attack with a fierce fire, and in conjunction with No. 1 Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment (forming the centre of our line), subsequently joined in a bayonet combat; the enemy's men and our troops were mixed together in indescribable confusion. A flank fire from other directions was now brought to bear upon the enemy on the slope, who were eventually nearly all shot down. Although this counter-attack met such a terrible fate, yet it enabled some of the enemy to make good their escape from the Japanese bayonets.

(E.) **During Rain and in Fog.**

During the early part of the Battle of the Sha-Ho, on October 10th, our army in the direction of Pen-hsi-hu, taking advantage of a thick mist which had continued since dawn, recaptured by means of a bayonet charge some high ground east of this place. They then also won back the hill to the east of the interval between Pen-hsi-hu and Hoa-lien. The enemy advanced again to the charge against the latter position, and were eventually driven off after a hand-to-hand bayonet fight.

The fact that both sides used cold steel on this occasion was due to a heavy mist which rendered the attack similar to a night engagement, and so caused both forces to rely upon the *arme blanche*.

(F.) **In Fortress Warfare.**

Throughout the whole of the siege of Port Arthur the *arme blanche* was used without exception in every engagement. The following may be cited as being the most desperate and terrible of the numerous general assaults carried out by the Japanese Army—viz., the capture of Fort Kuropatkin; the attacks on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan; and the fearful struggles on 203 Metre Hill. During the siege of the fortress it was absolutely necessary to make use of cold steel in order to dislodge the enemy, owing to his strength and to the obstinacy with which he defended his earthworks and fortifications.

(To be concluded.)

