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SECOND PRIZE ESSAY.

Subject:—

"IN THE EVENT OF WAR WITH ONE OR MORE NAVAL POWERS, HOW SHOULD THE REGULAR FORCES BE ASSISTED BY THE AUXILIARY FORCES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE KINGDOM?"

By Major H. R. MEAD, 116th Mahrattas.

"God helps them that help themselves."

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PART I.

An examination of the different tasks which the Regular Forces might be called on to perform in the eventuality of war.

BEFORE commencing to discuss the subject proper of this essay, it is necessary to have a perfectly clear conception of the tasks which would be laid on the Regular Forces as the result of a naval war, and of the extent to which they would be able to secure the accomplishment of these tasks by their own unaided efforts.

It is evident that the nature of the tasks which the Regular Forces might be called on to undertake would vary with the power of the naval combination arrayed against them and the degree of rapidity with which our own Navy could establish its supremacy and secure the command of the sea.

The course of events in any naval war in which we may be engaged may be roughly tabulated under the following heads:—

- a. Where command of the sea after a struggle which may be more or less protracted is definitely secured to us.
- b. Where the command of the sea is locally but definitely lost, and we have to remain on the defensive and gain time to collect our resources.
- c. Where the command of the sea is definitely lost as the result of protracted operations.

If we now carefully examine the work which the Regular Forces will be called on to perform under each of the different circumstances which I have enumerated above, it will then, I think, be possible to come to a conclusion as to the nature and extent of the assistance which would be required from the Auxiliary Forces and the people of the country.

Case A.

The length of time during which contest for supremacy at sea remains undecided is the determining factor as regards the amount of strain to which the Navy will be subjected; but I think it may be assumed that unless this period is so unduly protracted as to render the circumstances more appropriately described under the head of Case B, our natural advantages of position, in power of refitting and repairing ships damaged in action, of construction of new ships and material, and in natural reserves of seamen should be sufficient to pull us through the crisis without special or heroic measures becoming necessary.

Since it would be impossible for us to despatch an expeditionary force during the course of a more or less protracted struggle for the command of the sea, the question of the employment of the Army depends to a great extent on whether a hostile Power could or could not land an expeditionary army on our shores before it had actually secured definite supremacy on the sea. Mr. Balfour has publicly stated that owing to the improvements effected in modern torpedo-boats and in submarines, an enemy would not nowadays be able to land an invading army on our shores. This statement is based on a calculation made by Lord Roberts, that an army of approximately 70,000 men would be required to overcome the resistance which could be offered by the land forces normally maintained in England.

Such a statement made by a Prime Minister, in his capacity as President of the National Committee of Defence, and supported by the professional advice of the leading soldiers and sailors of the country, practically raises this question out of the regions of argument. At the same time, I propose to devote a short space to the consideration of some points connected with the subject.

Presumably, the gist of this argument lies in the fact that the landing of a force of this magnitude is an operation which, under the most favourable circumstances, must occupy such a period of time as to ensure that even supposing we were in the first instance taken by surprise, yet there would be sufficient time to enable submarines and torpedo-boats to attack the flotilla, and, disregarding the presence of the covering vessels, destroy at any rate so large a proportion of the transports as to render the attempt at invasion abortive.

Has it, however, been sufficiently considered that the Power which contemplated an invasion of England would have made a particular study of the difficulties involved in the operation, and might propose to evade them by the expedient of despatching a larger force than that calculated as sufficient for the purpose, and by dividing it up into several separate portions to be landed at different points on our coasts?

Supposing, for instance, 120,000 men were despatched simultaneously to land at 12 separate points, at a moment of profound peace, and when we were off our guard, would our arrangements be found so perfect that the various torpedo flotillas could be told off at once and the requisite information immediately communicated as to the directions in which each were to act? It must be remembered that the landing of 10,000 men from specially prepared barges would not be an operation which occupied much time; that these forces would be almost entirely composed of infantry, with a proportion of cyclists in place of cavalry; that they would be prepared to live on the country (hence no supplies except munitions of war would be required); and finally, that if a little more than half the forces which started managed to get safe to shore, the numbers said by Lord Roberts to be sufficient to break down our normal power of resistance would have actually obtained a footing and accomplished, perhaps, the hardest part of their task.

If reliance is to be placed on our flotillas of torpedo-boats and submarines to entirely prevent the possibility of an invasion, it is clear that the organisation of these portions of our naval forces must be brought to an extreme state of perfection. They must be so distributed as to be immediately available at each of the various points where their presence might become necessary, and there must be the most perfect communication between them and some central station, from which the orders relative to their action would be issued. In addition, our intelligence department must be strengthened and improved, whilst even in time of peace we ought to maintain cruisers fitted with wireless telegraphy apparatus for patrolling along the coasts of those nations which abut on our own shores, and from which invading armies might possibly be embarked.

It is clear that if we are capable of making an approximate estimate of the force which would be required to overcome the resistance we could offer under the present organisation of our forces, that the General Staff of such Powers as contemplate the possibility of an invasion have already made their own estimates, and, moreover, that

these estimates are revised from time to time as the conditions under which they are framed vary. Hence it follows that if at any time we were to greatly alter the effective fighting strength of the forces maintained in this country and available for the defence of the Kingdom, the result would be either (1), in case of a great increase, to compel such a project to be abandoned entirely; or (2), in case of a corresponding decrease, to reduce the risks of such an enterprise to a dangerous extent.

Although, as I have already stated, we should not ourselves be able to despatch an expeditionary force until we had secured the command of the sea, this by no means infers that the preparation of such a force could be postponed till there was an immediate prospect of its being employed; so far from this being the case, it would have to be—at any rate partially—trained, equipped, and organised in peace time, in order that its mobilisation might be carried out the moment war was inevitable, and its training completed during such time as the naval forces were employed in clearing the seas of the enemy's fleets and ships.

The necessity for an expeditionary force, whether destined to defend our distant land frontiers in Asia, Africa, or America, or to carry the war into the enemy's country, being prepared to act as soon as the road for its passage was cleared hardly requires to be insisted on.

In his speech dealing with the possibilities of invasion, to which I have already referred, Mr. Balfour dealt with the subject of our further military needs, and laid down the proposition that the problem of the Army is the problem of the defence of India. The main argument on which this statement rests is the fact that this problem of the defence of India is at once the most pressing and the most difficult that we have to solve; consequently the measures taken to provide and prepare the Army necessary for the accomplishment of this task will *ipso facto* provide for any other contingencies which may occur.

Here again is an authoritative statement which raises discussion on this point above ordinary criticism, and I shall not therefore waste time in speculating upon such possible eventualities as might necessitate the employment of a portion of our strength in other directions simultaneously with the actual performance of the task of defending India.

We will, however, briefly examine such of his propositions as refer to the conditions under which the campaign will have to be carried out, and to the strength of the forces which will have to be employed.

Mr. Balfour admits that the whole question of the defence of India has been placed on an entirely different footing from of old, by reason of the construction of the Russian strategic railways. At the same time he asserts that owing to the intervening territory of Afghanistan it is not conceivable that large bodies of troops should come into collision at an early stage in a war between England and Russia. "No surprise, no rush is possible. India cannot be taken by assault." He regretted he was unable to estimate either (1) in what numbers and within what limits of time Russia can concentrate her armies at her railheads, or (2) with what rapidity the railway can be pushed on to accompany the Russian armies,

The military correspondent of the *Times*, in an article entitled "Parliament and Imperial Defence," dated 15th May, 1905, shows that Russia has delivered 510,000 men, 93,000 horses, and 1,000 guns into Manchuria in the space of 11 months, and points out that these numbers were conveyed by a single line of rail, which, commencing with the delivery of only four trains a day, gradually increased the amount to twelve; further, that at the start Russia was caught *en flagrant délit de concentration*, and was compelled to transport 350,000 tons of stores simultaneously with troops, which should have been collected at the railhead previous to the commencement of hostilities.

The *Times of India*, in the course of three leading articles, dated respectively 25th, 27th, and 29th April, relates, through the medium of a capable special correspondent who had traversed Russian Central Asia during the course of the previous cold weather, that "whilst the attention of the world has been concentrated on Manchuria, Russia has been quietly, steadily, and persistently pushing forward preparations of an unusual nature in Central Asia."

"Every one of her centres from Sarakhs to Osh is an armed camp. She is steadily accumulating supplies. The trains which run across the Steppes from Orenberg to Tashkend bring soldiers; none ever come back."

Mr. Balfour proceeds to quote Lord Kitchener's views as to his requirements during the first year of the war, which Mr. Balfour acknowledges must be a long and protracted one. These are, in addition to drafts, 8 divisions of infantry with corresponding strength of the other arms. Roughly speaking, this would mean reinforcements totalling approximately 130,000 to 160,000 men; and we may calculate that Lord Kitchener would then have available for operation a force of a quarter of a million, including the Indian garrison, but excluding the obligatory garrisons of stations in India.

I propose for a short space to compare these proposals with the measures actually adopted by the Japanese during the course of the first year of their struggle with Russia.

The legitimacy of such comparison is hardly open to question, for:—

1. Japan's need of Korea for the future development of her trade, and as an outlet for her surplus population, is surely no greater than our need of India.
2. Russian facilities for the invasion of Manchuria along a single line of railway were surely no greater than those she now possesses with regard to Central Asia.
3. The Russian troops which will be set free at the conclusion of this war, the end of which is already in sight, and, indeed, is daily getting closer, will be veterans, who, though they have consistently suffered defeat at the hands of the Japanese, have by now most surely been moulded by their misfortunes and their experiences into a very formidable antagonist for us to tackle.

The following statement gives, as far as I can gather, the number of troops which we actually know that Japan has put into the field during the first year of the war:—

The war commenced on 8th February, 1904.

The strength of the Japanese forces at this time were:—

7,850 officers and 333,000 men, capable of expansion on mobilisation to 530,000 men, 1,400 guns, and 103,000 horses.

Date.	Port of disembarkation.	Commander.	Strength.
1904.			
March 8th ..	Chemulpo ..	Kuroki ..	18,000 with 36 guns.
April 30th ..	Yoghampo ..	Kuroki ..	40,000 " 65 "
May 5th ..	Pitsewo ..	Oku ..	40,000 " 120 "
May 19th ..	Takushan ..	Nodzu ..	50,000 " 120 "
June 26th ..	Port Arthur ..	Nogi ..	35,000 " siege "
July 6th ..	Port Arthur ..	Nogi ..	35,000 " " "

The strength of the Japanese forces in the theatre of war at the termination of different convenient periods may be more clearly shown as under:—

At the end of 1 month	18,000 men and 36 guns.
2 months and 3 weeks	58,000 " 101 "
3 "	98,000 " 221 "
3½ "	148,000 " 341 "
4½ "	183,000 " 341 "
5 "	218,000 " 341 "

Besides these numbers, which we know were landed, other troops must have been brought up at different times and escaped the notice of the *Times* correspondent, from whose statements these *data* have been culled, for we know that at the time of the battle of Liao-yang (August, 1904) the Japanese had 200,000 men and 700 guns opposed to the Russian army under Kuropatkin, whilst there were at least 100,000 men in front of Port Arthur.

Later on, at the battle of Mukden, 19th February, 1905, or just one year from the commencement of the war, they had, according to the *Times* correspondent, in his description of the fight, dated 25th April, 1905, 16 divisions, averaging 25,000 men each, or a total force of at least 400,000 bayonets and sabres; and it must be remembered that although this includes reinforcements from the force released by the capitulation of Port Arthur and the reserves under Kawamura, it does not include troops on the lines of communications.

This statement, which rather minimises than exaggerates the numbers of troops which have been despatched from Japan to the seat of war, shows clearly enough that the whole of the troops which were provided under her military organisation were brought into the field during the course of the first year of the war.

The events of the war are so recent as to render any recapitulation of the great results obtained with them unnecessary; but we may profitably speculate upon the difference in the situation which would now be presented, if the Japanese had confined their efforts to such as would be equivalent to the very moderate proposals of the head of the British Government.

Since Mr. Balfour has given no clue as to the times at which the reinforcements would be despatched, we are compelled to make some assumption; and since there are 8 divisions to be despatched, we will presume that the first division leaves within two months of the commencement of war, and the remainder, division by division, at intervals of one month.

We will also allow that the army available at the start is equal in strength to the field army at present in India, or, approximately, 160,000 men.

Taking each division as 16,000, we should have available at the end of—

2 months	116,000	In 3 months	132,000
4 " 	148,000	" 5 " 	164,000
6 " 	180,000	" 7 " 	196,000
8 " 	212,000	" 9 " 	228,000

We have shown that the Japanese in a little over six months had 200,000 men and 700 guns to oppose Kuropatkin at Liao-yang, at the same time as they were investing Port Arthur with another 100,000, *i.e.*, they had at least 72,000 more troops in their field armies at the end of six months than would have accumulated in a year under the proposals which have been submitted by our rulers. We must also take into consideration that these numbers were exclusive of lines of communication troops, and were available in the field, after deducting the losses which had occurred in the course of six months' strenuous fighting, during which the battles of the Yalu, Nan-shan, Telissu, Tahsi-chao, and the innumerable actions of the Motien-ling, Fenshue-ling, and Tae-ling passes had all taken place.

Surely no further argument is required to prove that the plan of campaign initiated and carried through by the Japanese during the first year of the war would have been impossible with these restricted numbers. Their efforts would have had to be confined to the occupation of Korea and the defence of its frontier; it is even doubtful if the investment of Port Arthur would have been possible. The whole moral effect which has resulted from the offensive character of their campaign would have been lost, and even granting that they had succeeded in holding their own, they could not have made any appreciable advance in the direction of the termination of the struggle, and would now be liable to find their credit and their resources failing under the prospect of an interminably drawn-out campaign.

The defence of India is an almost exactly parallel case. Restriction in numbers means a restricted policy, and a purely defensive campaign.

Are the words of Carnot to Jourdain any less true to-day than when they were written? "What you must do," he writes, "is to induce the enemy to fight a great and decisive battle, in which he will be exterminated—to seize him and press upon his rear. May fortune preserve you from adopting a defensive attitude; the courage of your troops will be weakened, and the audacity of the enemy will increase beyond measure."

Though the last few words are generally applicable to all wars, yet at the same time they have a peculiar weight and force when applied, as we are now proposing to apply them, to a war on the Indian Frontier. This war must, from the very nature of the conditions under which we hold India, be an offensive one,

It is surely unnecessary to labour this point. The Indian Army is a purely mercenary one; they are faithful to their salt as long as we are the undisputed masters of the country and the source from which all their hopes of pay, pension, and reward are drawn. Let doubts of our position assail them, and can we expect them to fight for us and for our Government? They are not actuated by patriotism as we understand it. Centuries of foreign rule have accustomed them to the idea of an alien Government, and why should they discriminate between that of the British and any other Power? We may be sure, then, that the views which have been ascribed to Lord Kitchener have been expressed in relation to certain fixed enquiries from the Prime Minister, and are strictly limited, not to what he would ask for if he had a free hand, but to what could be reasonably guaranteed under our present organisation.

We will accept them, then, as representing the minimum reinforcement which would enable him to hold Russia off during the first year of a war, which must inevitably compel us to change our whole attitude in relation to the methods of raising and training our forces.

In what light, again, are we to consider Mr. Balfour's warning with regard to Afghanistan?

"It ought," he says, "to be considered an act of direct aggression upon this country that any attempt should be made to build a railway in connection with the Russian strategic railways within the territory of Afghanistan. Such action would be the heaviest blow directed at the very heart of the Indian Empire that we can conceive. If Russian strategic railways are allowed to creep closer and closer to the frontier which we are bound to defend, then this country will inevitably pay for its supineness by having to keep on foot a much larger army than anything which any of us can contemplate with equanimity."

Surely the Government, represented by the Prime Minister, do not contemplate such a policy as anything but a temporary expedient.

"We are bound," as the correspondent of the *Times* remarks in an admirable article of 15th May, "to consider that the isolation of India from Central Asia, which must result from this policy, will practically have the effect of shutting India out from avenues of trade which may, and indeed must, become of increasing importance as times goes on. Is this policy of seclusion, this shutting down of the Indian oyster, a policy which is desirable, or even possible, if we have regard for the best interests in the future of a Continent containing 300 millions of people?"

"As a purely temporary measure, an expedient to bridge over a period during which we should reconstruct our Imperial forces on modern lines, this monastic impulse offers advantages which we neither deny nor decry. . . . But that it can be long-lived as a policy, or stand as a fundamental axiom for the Government of India, we venture to doubt. There is nothing in the theory of reclusion on a level with the grandeur of the Empire, with its needs or its resources."

The various measures which we could take with the object of reasserting our supremacy, after the infliction of a local defeat, would consist of:—

Case B.

1. Bringing in squadrons or ships from distant localities, where for the time their presence would be less urgently needful.
2. Bringing our reserves of ships and men into use.
3. Repairing ships damaged in action.
4. Building new ships.
5. Training and entering fresh men.

These measures divide up naturally under the respective heads of:—

1. Those connected with the renewal of the *matériel*.
2. Those connected with the renewal of *personnel*.

In the May number of "The Nineteenth Century and After," Sir William White discourses on the subject of whether our reserves of war-ships are sufficient. His view is that the latest orders of the Admiralty, relative to the disposal of the majority of our battle-ships and cruisers, as soon as they become through the ordinary lapse of time obsolete as regards the requirements of modern war, have been carried out to excess. He states that all naval Powers retain and keep in repair their old ships, and instances Germany as an example. He points out that both Russia and Japan were at the termination of the first period of the war glad to avail themselves of the services of obsolete vessels to replace such as had been lost in action.

The question as to whether the *matériel* or the *personnel* will suffer most in the naval wars of the future is an important one, as on the correct solution of it depends whether our present naval reserves are adequate to supply all our possible needs.

At the same time, it is not an easy one to decide, since there is no case in modern naval warfare—if we except the present Russo-Japanese conflict—where the struggle for naval supremacy has been so drawn out as to test the relative importance of reserves of men and ships.

Although for all practical purposes the naval war between Russia and Japan is definitely concluded, and we are at last in a position to grasp the main facts of the struggle, and to estimate the losses in *matériel* and *personnel* which have occurred during the course of it, yet it is too early to attempt any elaborate or detailed summary, with the idea that the solution of this problem will become clear to us in the process. At the same time, a rough examination of the results of the fighting and of the main factors which contributed to them may, if we remember to make due allowances for such special circumstances as are peculiar to this particular campaign, afford us some sort of a clue to the answer we are seeking.

In the case of Russia, it is comparatively easy to gauge the damages. Stated quite baldly, they amount to (1) the total loss of two complete fleets, ships and crews; (2) the loss of one of her only two bases in the Pacific; (3) the certainty of the eventual loss of the other. It is much more difficult to appraise what losses the Japanese have sustained owing to the strict and successful censorship which they have maintained. It might be imagined that, now the naval power of Russia has been irretrievably broken, it would be no longer neces-

sary for the Japanese to maintain secrecy regarding the main facts of the struggle; yet it would be wrong to imagine that the statements which are now being issued with such apparent candour can be implicitly relied on.

One of the fruits of victory which the Japanese are not likely to throw away is the power of more or less accurately determining the chief lessons of the war, and of retaining this information for their own exclusive use. If, however, all details are allowed to become public property, no particular advantage will accrue to the Japanese, since other Powers will then be equally capable of deducing these lessons from a basis which has become common to all.

The comparative losses in *matériel* and *personnel* is a case in point; hence, though in the absence of other information we are compelled to accept the Japanese statements, we can only do so with a certain amount of mental reservation.

The following ships have been reported as lost:—

First Phase (up to capture of Port Arthur).

Battle-ships.—“Hatsuse,” “Yashima.”

Protected cruisers.—“Yoshino,” “Saiyen,” “Miyako.”

Gun-boat.—“Kaimon.”

Second Phase (battle with Baltic Fleet).

Destroyers.—“Akatsuka,” “Ashama,” “Hayatari,” “Atago.”

Cruiser.—“Takasago.”

Three torpedo-boats.

Though it is not likely that the Japanese have been able to conceal the loss of battle-ships or of large cruisers, it is almost certain that many of the smaller craft, such as destroyers, gun-boats, and torpedo craft, have been left out in the above list.

As regards *personnel*, it is very difficult to estimate the losses with any degree of accuracy.

The losses of ships in the first phase were all—with the exception of the “Yoshino,” cruiser, sunk in collision—occasioned by mines. The sudden nature of this form of catastrophe would, it may be presumed, invariably cause a large loss of life. Hence we shall probably be rather under than over the mark if we estimate that 50 per cent. of these vessels' crews, or some 2,500 men, were lost.

In addition, we have to reckon the losses in the operations connected with the attempts to block up Port Arthur (unknown), the casualties which occurred in the naval actions:—(1) Battle of Port Arthur, estimated as 191; (2) Admiral Kamimura's action with the Vladivostok squadron (not stated, but necessarily insignificant); (3) Battle of Sea of Japan, given as 800.

On the whole I am inclined to guess that the loss in *personnel* may possibly have amounted to the equivalent of the loss in *matériel*, i.e., that we may estimate the total Japanese losses as represented by the wiping out of a fleet of the strength of that given above.

We must not, however, forget to take into consideration the fact that the Japanese have already succeeded in salvaging the “Varyag” and the “Bogatyr,” that they are fairly confident of recovering some at least of the ships from Port Arthur harbour, nor that they made

several captures in the fight off Tsushima Straits. The *Times* gives: 2 battle-ships, "Orel" and "Imperator Nikolai I.," 2 coast-defence ships, "General-Admiral Apraxin" and "Admiral Senyavin."

Unquestionably they will in a short time be in a stronger position as regards *matériel* than they were at the commencement of hostilities. If, therefore, there was a prospect of the struggle having to be continued, their prime necessity would be for additions to the *personnel*.

Before we can accept any conclusions based on the experiences of this naval campaign as capable of general application, we must note the special conditions under which it took place, and mark how far they differed from the normal.

Russia throughout laboured under the disadvantage of having to wage war at the greatest possible distance from her home naval base. She was inadequately provided with bases in the actual theatre of war, and possessed no coaling stations on the lines of communication. The immediate result of these disabilities was that she was incapable of bringing the whole of her naval strength to bear at one time, and was consequently liable to be beaten in detail.

The Russian naval service had few traditions behind it, it was regarded more as a luxury than as a necessity. Though vast sums were spent on the *matériel*, the *personnel* was neglected. Since there was no sea-faring population to draw on, the crews were composed of landmen, who, under the terms of conscription, were forced to serve their country on the sea, in place of the land; they had no natural aptitude, and were wanting in zeal and knowledge of their duties.

No naval manœuvres ever took place, so the senior officers were without experience.

Russia had not developed her manufacturing powers sufficiently to be able to build all her own ships; she therefore resorted to foreign builders, who undoubtedly provided her with a number of individually powerful vessels; but as they all differed widely in design, her fleets were wanting in homogeneity.

On the other hand, the Japanese had the benefit of actual war experiences to guide them. It is true their ships were built abroad; but they did not commit the mistake of entrusting their construction to several different sources, but gave the whole of their orders to the great shipbuilding firms of Great Britain, thus securing uniformity in design.

The *personnel* were drawn from a true sea stock, their training was thorough, and their *morale* excellent.

Lastly, circumstances favoured them to the extent that the war took place in the immediate vicinity of their home waters.

In short, the Russo-Japanese War teaches us clearly what to expect when efficiency is pitted against inefficiency, and the results are only surprising in so far as they are even more decisive than we should have expected.

The true moral to be drawn from the experiences of this war, for our own particular application, is the absolute necessity of making efficiency the first consideration. We can be satisfied with nothing less than the very best *matériel* which our workshops can produce; whilst as regards the *personnel*, we must clearly recognise the fact that numbers cannot possibly compensate for want of training; that train-

ing to be of any value must be carried out in time of peace and cannot be effective if left till war has broken out, in the manner attempted by the squadrons under Admiral Rojdestvensky.

Case C.

The occurrence of *Case C* would necessarily bring about the loss of our Indian Empire, the secession of our over-sea dependencies and colonies, and the decline of Great Britain to the position of a third rate Power. We are here concerned with the measures which should be taken to prevent the possibility of these disasters happening, hence we need not pursue this unsavory topic further.

PART II.

A Summary of the Tasks Examined in Part I., and a determination of the Amount of Assistance that will be required by the Regular Forces.

Our next task is to sum up the various duties which we have lightly sketched out above, to work them out in greater detail, and to consider how far the Regular forces can be relied on to carry them out. It will be convenient to deal with the two great divisions of the Regular forces separately, and to consider the duties which they will each be called to perform in the order in which they are likely to occur.

As regards the senior service, the outbreak of war may well prove a most critical period. It is then that there is most chance of our being surprised; our fleets may possibly be attacked in harbour before they are mobilised; and it is then, if at all, that there may be danger of an invasion being attempted.

Some of the measures which should be taken on our part have already been detailed in the early part of this essay. These belong to the province of the Navy proper; and it is only reasonable to suppose, that in accepting the decision of the Defence Committee, the Admiralty will, if they have not already done so, provide the organisation required to enable our torpedo and submarine flotillas to deal effectively with any attempt at landing.

Meanwhile, the mobilisation of the fleets will be proceeding; all reserves of ships will be brought into commission as rapidly as possible, for it will be vitally necessary to develop our naval strength as quickly as we can, so as to carry the war into the enemy's waters. It is probable that at this time there will be a certain number of war-ships built or building in this country to the orders of foreign Powers. These, together with our reserve squadrons, improvised cruisers, hospital-ships, mine, repair, and other auxiliary vessels, will require to be manned.

Sir E. R. Fremantle, in his lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, the report of which is contained in the August, 1902, number of the JOURNAL of that Institution, asserted that:—

In case of war with a maritime Power, we should, in a few months, "have at least 250,000 men afloat, and at the present time we have, including all the reserves, but excluding boys in training-ships, etc., roughly 150,000 available."

This referred, of course, to the state of affairs as they were some 2½ years ago, but there has not been much appreciable improvement in the meantime.

The statement of the First Lord explanatory of the Navy Estimates for 1905-06, gives the following details regarding the strength of our reserves of all sorts at the end of 1904:—

Class of Reserve.	Ex-Officers.	Eng. Officers.	W. Officers.	Men.	Total
Royal Naval ...	1,586	352	25	29,538	31,501
Colonial ...	—	—	—	—	—
Newfoundland ...	—	—	—	511	511
Malta ...	—	—	—	314	314
Australia ...	—	—	—	148	148
Naval Vols. ...	—	—	—	3,053	3,053
Total	—	35,557

These added to our active service ratings give a total of approximately 160,000. If Sir E. R. Fremantle's estimate of our requirements is not an exaggerated one—the fact that it was generally accepted by the distinguished audience collected in the theatre of the R.U.S.I. is sufficient to guarantee its correctness—it is clear that some provision must be made for supplying the 100,000 extra *personnel* which will be required at the outbreak of war, and in addition such reserves as will be necessary to keep up the strength during the course of the struggle.

Sir E. R. Fremantle's proposals for obtaining the extra men consist of: (1) Establishing a royal fleet reserve of 50,000; (2) Enlisting 25,000 Naval Militia gunners; (3) Procuring 25,000 Royal Naval Volunteers. The establishment of a Royal Fleet Reserve implies an alteration in the conditions of service of the whole of the present *personnel*; and since this proposal was unanimously vetoed at the discussion, on the grounds that quality is even more important than quantity, an argument the truth of which we have shown to have been firmly established by the experiences of the Russia-Japan War, we are compelled to eliminate this source of supply, and to look around for some other.

If we examine the various proposals put forth by different naval officers and speakers who took part in the discussion which followed the lecture, we shall find the main sources of supply suggested come under one or other of the following heads:—

1. Training young boys for the Mercantile Marine, as well as for the Navy; the Navy to have a lien on their services in time of war. (Advocated by Sir Charles Dilke, Admiral Sir J. C. Dalrymple Hay, and the Hon. T. A. Brassey.)
2. Volunteers, from the industrial centres and sea coasts, should be organised and registered in time of peace. Also Colonial Volunteers. (Advocated by Admirals Sir D. Morant and Sir N. Bowden-Smith.)
3. Army to be called on to assist, as its services on land could not be required so long as the Navy was employed in gaining the mastery of the sea. (Advocated by Mr. Thursfield.)

4. National service. (Advocated by Admiral Sir N. Bowden-Smith and Hon. T. A. Brassey.)

Special stress was laid by several of the speakers on the special difficulties regarding the supply of executive officers, engineer officers, stokers, and other special ratings.

This much at any rate appears clear enough, that the Navy will, at outbreak of war, require assistance to secure the augmentation of the *personnel* to the extent of some 100,000 men, and that a certain proportion of this number will necessarily consist of specialists. I do not propose at this point to examine the various sources enumerated above; it is probable that no one particular method would of itself completely satisfy our needs, and that the best results would be obtained by a judicious combination of them.

As soon as the fleet has been mobilised it will be required to put to sea; and in order to permit of this, it is essential that the defences of the coaling stations and naval stations should be provided for; in the cases of foreign stations the garrisons will necessarily be drawn from the Regular forces, but in the case of home ports, auxiliaries will be required to supplement them.

As regards *matériel* for the Navy, our position is undoubtedly a strong one.

We maintain the largest Navy in the world, and the system we employ for the division of the work of construction, partly amongst Government yards, and partly amongst private establishments, is an excellent one, for it ensures that the latter have always a sufficiency of work on hand to make it worth while to maintain the expensive machinery in a thoroughly up-to-date condition. In addition, these private manufacturers are encouraged to tender for the supply of *matériel* of war to such foreign nations as have not the power to manufacture the whole of their own requirements, and thus secure for ourselves (1) The power of enhanced output, whenever a sudden call may demand it; and (2) The certainty of being able to take over at any critical moment a number of ships, and a quantity of other war *matériel* which is always under construction to the order of other Powers.

The foresight of our progenitors has secured to us the most complete communications with our foreign possessions, and our rulers have not neglected to fortify coaling stations and bases in proportion to our needs. Our fleets in time of war will, therefore, have the advantage of always acting within reasonable distance of their sources of supply; whilst if damaged in action, the means of repair will be close at hand.

We may, then, reasonably leave the question of *matériel*, with the assurance that our position is a sound one, and that the nation is alive to its responsibilities.

Accepting Mr. Balfour's dictum that the problem of the Army is the problem of the defence of India, we will now proceed to enquire how far the Regular forces we maintain will be able to help towards its solution, and to what extent the Auxiliaries can be relied on to co-operate.

The numbers of the Regular forces are shown in the statement relating to the Army Estimates of 1905-06, presented to Parliament

by the Secretary of State for War as 221,300, exclusive of the Army in India. Allowing, however, for a reduction of 17,000, which was contemplated, and adding 70,000 for the British garrison in India, we get a total of approximately 275,000.

The distribution of the above is not given in this statement, but the following is correct enough for our purpose:—

In Ireland	30,000
In Colonies (including South Africa)	80,000
In India	70,000
At Home	95,000

In addition there are some 90,000 Army Reserves, which would join the colours on declaration of war.

The proportion of the above, from which an expeditionary force based on the United Kingdom would be drawn, would consist of the 95,000 men at Home, plus the 90,000 reserves.

From these, however we must deduct recruits, young soldiers, harbour defence troops, such as garrison artillery, submarine miners, etc., or, at a very moderate computation, 30 per cent, say 35,000 men, leaving a force of approximately 150,000 men.

For the moment we will have regard merely to the reinforcements which Lord Kitchener has estimated as necessary during the first year of a protracted war on the Indian Frontier.

These we have shown to consist of 8 divisions, plus the ordinary yearly drafts, or in other words, from 130,000 to 160,000 men. Hence we are compelled to acknowledge that if the Regular Army is to be relied on exclusively to supply these reinforcements, it will be completely used up, together with the whole of its reserves, during the first year, and that the possibility of a continuation of the struggle will depend entirely on the numbers, efficiency, and organisation of the Auxiliary Forces. We will now turn to an examination of these sources of supply.

The strength of the various component parts of the Auxiliary Forces are given in the Statement of the Secretary of State for War, which I have already referred to as:—

	Men.
Militia - - - - -	88,282
Volunteers, 245,217; but these are to be shortly reduced to - - - - -	200,000
Yeomanry - - - - -	25,217
Grand Total - - - - -	313,499

With regard to the efficiency of the Militia, the Secretary of State for War remarks:—

“It is obvious that if the Militia is to be used for service abroad it must undergo a longer period of training than at present, and must be provided with a larger number of trained officers.”

Volunteers and Yeomanry.

It must be remembered that the men composing the Volunteer forces are drawn from various classes of the population, many of which would not be available for service out of the United Kingdom. In the event of war we should not therefore be able to rely on

them as organised bodies. ~~“GRAN”~~ the case in the South African War, numbers would doubtless volunteer for service as individuals, but they would have to be organised into fresh units before they could be sent out.

Organisation thus initiated at the last moment has already proved inadequate to the stress of war, as is shown in the Report of the Commission on the South African War, p. 75, para. 138, where it is stated that:—

“The Yeomanry did not in any case act in the field as the regiments in which they were originally formed. In many cases they did not arrive in South Africa as regiments, and the squadrons thus parted did not come together again. Squadrons belonging to different regiments, with officers strange to each other, were mixed together, and in fact, the whole force was used as a mass of mounted troops of a plastic character, who might be distributed in squadrons in any way that appeared most convenient. In the case of the second contingent, all idea of county organisation was lost. . .”

Another and even more serious defect arising from this same composition of the Volunteer forces is the uncertainty that must always exist as to the numbers which could be relied on for service out of the United Kingdom.

The only indication we possess to guide us in this respect is contained in a statement in the Report of the War Commission, which shows the numbers which were actually obtained during a crisis in our history which called forth a large amount of the latent patriotism of the people:—

Composition	Officers	Infantry & M.I.	Total
Yeomanry . . .	1,393	34,127	35,520
Scottish Horse . . .	15	818	833
Volunteers . . .	589	19,267	19,856
South African Con- tingent (Colonial)	19	7,275	7,254
Grand Total - - -	-	-	63,463

Of these, approximately 17,000 comprised the second and third contingents of the Imperial Yeomanry, who were only induced to serve by the grant of a rate of pay which would be absolutely prohibitive in any war of the magnitude of that we are considering.

The total numbers which we could absolutely rely on obtaining out of a paper force of approximately 275,000 works out then at the low figure of 50,000.

The author of the “*Times History of the War*” has a foot-note in the 3rd volume which gives the following significant figures:—

“Of the Militia and Yeomanry one man in five, of the Volunteers one man in fifteen, of the untrained and unorganised bulk of the male population of fighting age one man in a thousand came forward.”

Colonial Contingent.

The question of what resources might be obtained from our over-sea Colonies and dependencies at such a time of stress lies actually outside the limits imposed in the subject of this essay, and since the like uncertainty as regards the amount of dependence we can place on securing the services of any settled proportion of the forces they maintain exists in the same degree as with our own Volunteers, we will confine ourselves to the mere statement that, excluding the South African Colonial contingents, the actual number who took part in the Boer War was 30,328.

This much is clear enough, that we have no guarantee as to the numbers which the Auxiliary Forces would provide for service over-sea, and would be liable to suffer bitter disappointment if we counted on obtaining any greater numbers than came forward on the last and only occasion of which we have any experience. Hence with our present organisation, or rather in our present state of disorganisation, the utmost aid we could look for from the Auxiliary Forces would be some 170,000 men, composed of 80,000 Militia, 50,000 Volunteers, and 40,000 Colonials.

When we consider that no radical changes have been effected since the Boer War, that the defects which then came to light still exist, and that these forces will be deficient of artillery and transport, we must acknowledge that the Auxiliaries would prove but a broken reed to rely on in time of trouble, and that their potentialities bear altogether too small a proportion to their paper strength.

Up to now we have regarded the estimate furnished by Lord Kitchener as defining the extent of his requirements; but it is highly probable, to say the least of it, that the numbers he has given are based, in the first place, on our present capacity to furnish troops, and in the second place on the supposition that the first year of the war would, in consequence of this want of resources, have to be conducted on the defensive. If this supposition is correct, the total inadequacy of our preparations for war becomes *even more* painfully apparent. I do not propose to usurp the functions of the General Staff at home or in India, and attempt to work out the details of the operations which a war with Russia would entail. It will suffice for my purpose if I may assume that under somewhat similar conditions, similar efforts to those put forward by the Japanese will be required.

Working on these general lines, I append a statement which shows how a suitable programme of reinforcements could be arranged to provide a force at the termination of periods of 6 and 12 months respectively, approximately equivalent to those which were disposable by the Japanese commander at similar intervals.

It must, however, be borne in mind that the distances which these forces have to be transported to the seat of war are considerably greater than from Japan to Korea, or to the Liao-Tung peninsula, and that in the event of any naval opposition being offered, it would not be possible to adhere to any fixed dates for the despatch of the various contingents. This, however, would not affect the question of the preparation of the men, who would be trained, mobilised, and got ready to start according to the fixed time table:—

Within 2 months	32,000	Regulars.		
" 8 "	32,000	"		
" 4 "	16,000	"	32,000	Auxiliaries.
" 5 "	16,000	"	32,000	"
" 6 "	16,000	"	32,000	"
" 7 "	16,000	"	32,000	"
" 8 "	16,000	"	32,000	"
" 9 "	nil.	"	48,000	"
" 10 "	nil.	"	48,000	"
" 11 "	nil.	"	48,000	"
" 12 "	nil.	"	48,000	"
Total ..	144,000	"	352,000	"

A scheme drawn up primarily with reference to our requirements on the Indian Frontier would have to be somewhat modified, if at a later period it became necessary to utilise it with reference to an expedition involving changes either in the times at which reinforcements were to be despatched, or in the relative strengths of the different contingents. Thus in case of the land forces being required to supplement the successful action of the fleet by the investment of the enemy's naval bases on the land side, or in the case of their being employed in a Continental war, to act in support of a Continental Power—our allies for the time being—against the communications of another Power, it is obvious that owing to the absence of any covering force of the nature of that we possess on the Indian Frontier, we should have to greatly increase the strength of the earlier contingents. At the same time we should be able to allow ourselves a greater margin of time in which to make our preparations, for within limits it would rest with us to decide when the blow should fall. In these cases the original programme would hold fast as far as the authorities concerned with the training, organisation, and mobilisation of the expeditionary forces were in question; the difference would be that the troops would be retained in the country until circumstances determined the most convenient periods for their despatch. The numbers which would be ready at any particular intervals can be easily determined; as an example the numbers available at the end of 6, 9, and 12 months are given in this subjoined table:—

		Regulars.	Auxiliaries.
After 6 months.	- -	112,000	96,000
" 9 "	- -	32,000	112,000
" 12 "	- -	Nil.	144,000
Total	-	144,000	352,000

SUMMARY.

We are now in a position to lay down definitely and in detail the extent to which the Auxiliary Forces and the people of the Kingdom should be prepared to assist the Regular Forces.

Our requirements are:—

Naval Forces.

1. At the outbreak of war, 100,000 men to expand the Navy to full war strength and to man the various auxiliary vessels which will be required to act with the fleets.

2. Militia and Volunteers are required to supplement the Royal Garrison Artillery for the defence of our home naval bases.

Land Forces.

3. At the end of 3 months, a first contingent of 96,000 men to be mobilised and trained to take part in over-sea operations.
4. At the end of 6 months a further contingent of 112,000.
5. At the end of 9 months, a further contingent of 144,000.
6. In support of these contingents, the power to draw on the trained manhood of fighting age, in order to keep the field armies up to strength and to provide for any further contingencies.

This conception of our requirements may at first sight appear to be an exaggerated one, but it is based on the unquestioned fact that times have altered since special circumstances permitted of an English army of the old type holding its own in the Iberian Peninsula; and it may be conceded materially affecting the issues of a Continental war.

At the present day we are ourselves a Continental Power, and the responsibilities attaching to this position cannot be shaken off. The military correspondent of the *Times*, in a series of articles dealing with modern war, sums up aptly for our purpose in the following words:—

“Alliance or dalliance may stave off the evil day, but history shows those who refuse the sword must renounce the sceptre, and that nothing can save a country from defeat at the hands of an ambitious neighbour save the power, and general acknowledgment of the power, to defend itself with vigour.”

PART III.

PROPOSALS.

We have now arrived at what we must candidly admit is by far the hardest part of our task. It is comparatively easy to point out that our present system is inefficient; it is a much more difficult matter to show how its faults can be remedied, or how it can be altered to suit our needs.

We have devoted a certain space to an examination of our Auxiliary forces, and have come to the conclusion that neither the Militia nor the Volunteers can be relied on to effectively supplement the action of the Regular forces.

It is important to differentiate between them, as regards the reasons why they respectively fail to furnish us with what we need.

The Militia fail for want of sufficient training, and of sufficient trained officers. Its failure is really more due to want of encouragement and supervision than to any defects in its organisation.

On the other hand, the Volunteers have in times past received their full share of encouragement; it is only since the Boer War that official coolness has begun to be manifested. Their failure to justify their existence as a substitute for a national army is due to defects

inherent in their constitution; and to the failure of the authorities to realise their limitations, until the test of war brought them so prominently forward that they were patent to the man in the street.

It has before now been suggested, notably by the Earl of Wemyss, in an article entitled, "The Military Situation," which appeared in the January number of the *United Service Magazine*, that "the enforcement of the ballot for the Militia would solve all difficulties, place our military forces on a solid foundation, and save the War Minister the further toil of building military castles in the air."

There are, however, objections to the enforcement of the ballot for the Militia in its entirety, the chief of which are:—

1. That the ordinary life of the people would be unnecessarily interfered with.
2. That the burden of military service would be unevenly distributed.
3. That it would be conducive to militarism.

Accordingly the Earl of Wemyss advocates the modified form, which would make every youth on attaining the age of 20, liable for that one occasion to the ballot, if he were not at the time serving in the Volunteers, or in some branch of the King's service.

No doubt this modified form of the ballot would be successful in filling the ranks of the Volunteers, and possibly of the Militia; and doubtless the conditions of service as regards training might be made more strenuous, and more conducive to efficiency; but the inherent defects of the Volunteers would not be eradicated, their organisation would still be unsuited to our requirements, which we have conclusively proved to include liability to service in any quarter of the globe, and an organisation adapted to these conditions.

I have spoken of the failure of the authorities to grasp the limitations of this force, viz.: that they are incapable of furnishing any organised body of troops. Their *raison d'être* is to provide a school of arms where the citizen may acquire a knowledge of drill and shooting, without being compelled to abandon his ordinary occupation. It is only by bearing these limitations in mind that we can hope to make use of this force, and yet avoid falling into the mistake of allowing it to usurp a position for which it is radically unfitted.

The form in which the subject title of this essay is worded distinctly implies that the intention of the framers was to elicit schemes for the improvement of our present organisation for creating a reliable reserve from our existing resources, rather than by the abolition of such as might be considered unsuitable to our present requirements, and the substitution of other methods. Besides this, the Volunteer force undoubtedly furnishes a convenient alternative method of imparting instruction in military duties, an important consideration which cannot be lightly discarded.

Hence we are induced to consider whether it is not possible to eliminate the defects whilst retaining the advantages which its existence affords.

The following rough outline of a scheme will show how I should propose to secure the assistance required from the Auxiliary forces and the people of the Kingdom in such a manner that implicit reliance could be placed on its being available when required:—

1. The liability of the citizens of a State to give their services in return for the benefits they enjoy as citizens must be fully recognised.
2. To fit them for the performance of these military duties they are bound to undergo a course of military training.
3. Under our constitution, the normal training would consist of a period of service in the old constitutional force, the Militia. But it is recognised that if this liability were universally enforced, a large proportion of the population would be violently divorced, for the time being, from their normal occupations, with consequent dislocation of trade, etc.

Our insular position gives us an advantage over our continental neighbours, in that we should have a greater margin of time in which to complete our organisation and training, and we may legitimately take this into consideration in forming our scheme for national defence.

4. It is important to minimise, as far as possible, the dislocation of civil life, and it is quite possible to do so by the adoption of two measures:—
 - a. By arranging that a portion of the military education should be given concurrently with ordinary education, before entry into civil life.
 - b. By granting all citizens the option of obtaining the further proficiency and knowledge of their duties which it is considered they should possess, either by a course of consecutive training in the Militia, or, if this is found to be inconvenient, and to interfere unduly with their civil life, to secure an equivalent amount of instruction in the Volunteers.
5. In any case, whether the training has been carried out with the Militia or the Volunteers, the citizen must be borne on the strength of the Militia Reserve for the whole of the period during which liability extends, and must join them on mobilisation being ordered.

It is clear that the War Office does not possess the machinery which would enable it to control either the education of the youthful citizen, or the business of his enrolment and subsequent training. As regards the first, control must be exercised by the same authority as that which at the present time secures attendance and instruction at Board Schools. Its scope will have to be somewhat extended, so as to secure that the voluntary schools, public schools, and other institutions, which at present are outside its influence, may be brought within it. This should not be difficult; the establishment of licences for all classes of schools would provide the means by which the inclusion of a fixed standard of proficiency in drill, physical training, and musketry could be made compulsory in the upper, upper middle, and lower middle, as well as in the lower classes.

The business of enrolment would naturally be placed in the hands of the local authorities; at the head would be the County Council; under them the various District, Urban, and Parish

Councils. The latter would be charged with the preparation of lists of all the young men as they became of an age to serve.

We might well adopt a similar plan to that which is in force in Germany: Annual local boards, composed of one or two of the more prominent citizens, the vicar, and the medical officer of the parish, with one military officer deputed by the War Office might be assembled at fixed dates to examine all young men and to settle definitely whether they were fit to serve.

Those selected would be called on to state what branch of the Service they had a fancy for:—(1) Army and its branches; (2) Navy or Marines; (3) Naval Volunteers or Harbour Defence Volunteers; (4) Militia or Yeomanry; or whether they would do their compulsory course of training with the Militia or Volunteers. As far as possible, subject to the report of the Board as to their qualifications for particular branches and to the needs of the State, the selected recruits would be eventually posted according to their inclinations, and in due time would receive notification of the place and date of joining. These measures, it will be observed, secure us the inestimable advantage that all recruits, whether for the Regular Forces or the Auxiliary Forces, would all commence their training at a fixed period. The connection between the Regular and Auxiliary Forces would be strengthened, and there would no longer be that want of sympathy between the people and the Regular Forces which unhappily exists at present.

A scheme of this nature could naturally entail some changes in the constitution of some of our established forces; but except in the case of the Volunteers, they would not be of a radical nature.

The Navy should be unaffected by the changes, as its recruits would still be taken as boys, and would therefore be quite separate from the other levies, even though they might be conveniently brought before the same Board.

As regards the Army, the principal results of the scheme that we can make sure of consist in a general improvement in the class of recruit, improved facilities for training, since they would all join at the same time, and, in short, a great improvement all round.

The Militia would benefit in like manner. Its staff of instructors would of course have to be enormously increased in order to cope with the addition to its numbers.

The Volunteers alone would be radically altered; the mere recognition of its *métier* being limited to the provisions of a school of arms would do away with the desirability or necessity for its possessing any further organisation beyond that of the company. Its development in the future would be along the lines of a number of local clubs, all affiliated to one another and all providing the means of securing military instruction and fostering emulation in rifle shooting.

It is now time to define with a little more exactness the details of the liability to military service which we should propose should be exacted. These are (in addition to the compulsory military training undergone as a portion of the early education at school):—

1. During the first year: To undergo three months' training with the Militia, or to carry out an equivalent number of drills and musketry with the Volunteers, and to be borne on the roll of the Militia Reserve as the third contingent of troops for service.

2. During second year: To undergo six weeks' training with the Militia, or the equivalent with Volunteers, and to be borne on the roll as the second contingent for service.
3. During the third year: To undergo same training as in the second year, and to be borne on the roll as the first contingent.
4. From the fourth to the tenth year: To be borne on the strength of the general reserve for the Militia, not to be liable to be called out till the three contingents above referred to have been previously mobilised, and then to come up in batches according to the year of entering this reserve; also to fire an annual course of musketry.

The proceedings of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Services has shown that the numbers annually arriving at a fighting age are, roughly, 190,000. Allowing 40,000 as the number annually required for the Army and Militia, 15,000 for the Navy and Marines, and 5,000 for the Naval Volunteers and Harbour Defence Volunteers, we find that there are, approximately, 130,000 available as recruits for the National Army.

After this system had been in force for 10 years we should have in addition to the Regular Army and its reserves, and the Militia as it at present exists:—

130,000 as a first contingent.
 130,000 as a second contingent.
 130,000 as a third contingent.
 910,000 as general reserve.

The scheme would of course entail the provision of very large numbers of rifle ranges, and also of large numbers of officers and subordinate ranks as instructors to supplement those at present available.

As regards the provision of rifle ranges, it must be borne in mind that many of the difficulties which at present exist would be modified, or disappear, when it was a case of the local authorities arranging for the ground and rights to fire over it, for the use of the local people themselves, and no longer that of an alien War Office, with an imaginary purse of Fortunatus behind it, to be bargained with and got the better of. Probably the maximum length of range required would be 300 yards, whilst in exceptional circumstances, such as in restricted areas, miniature ranges would be permitted.

The liability to fire an annual course of musketry up to the tenth year of service would probably have the effect of inducing many to join the Volunteers, or to retain their connection with it, between the 4th and 10th years, in order to secure the privileges of the club life and comradeship, in addition to the use of the range, to which, of course, they would in any case be entitled. In this case it would be worth considering whether it might not with advantage be made a condition of membership to attend a certain number of drills, whereby the State would secure extra proficiency at but little extra cost.

The provision of an ample number of men of good quality with sufficient training, and knowledge of their weapons, to ensure their

rapid conversion into efficient soldiers when necessity demands it, is, however, only one step towards the solution of the problem of a National Army. We have yet to consider how they are to be officered, how they are to be organised, and how provided with the due proportion of artillery, cavalry, and non-combatant branches.

OFFICERS.

Officers who are to command Englishmen in the field, who have to gain and hold their respect, must be what we call gentlemen, but in these days of modern war they must also possess a real knowledge of their duties, and be capable of imparting instruction. It would be impossible to provide professional officers in such numbers as will be required for these additions to our military strength.

The burden of compulsory service must be laid on all classes alike, but all are not required to shoulder the musket. Those who by birth and education should naturally lead provide the raw material from which the officers of the national army should be drawn; but social position is not sufficient of itself; they must be satisfied to accept *noblesse oblige* as their motto, and qualify themselves by study and hard work before they can hope to be allowed to serve as leaders of their fellow citizens.

Either nominations to commissions by the Lord-Lieutenants of the counties, or some such system of boards as has been lately introduced into the Navy, with a preparatory qualifying—not competitive—examination, to eliminate those whose education proved defective, would secure candidates of the right sort. A course of six months' training at the Militia Dépôt, where a special staff of instructors should be maintained, would, if they gained satisfactory certificates, be a sufficient qualification for a commission in the Militia or the Volunteers. They would be required to serve for a term of 10 years, 6 years as lieutenant and 4 years as captain. The numbers of commissions granted would be in strict proportion to the numbers of men raised, say 3 per cent.

Although this National Army would be completely divorced from the control of the War Office, the department of the Inspector-General of the Army would be charged with the task of its inspection, whilst the officers of the instructional staff, as well as all the higher ranks above that of captain, would have to be drawn from the Regular Army.

The need for a large reserve of officers has always been recognised; but the difficulty of providing employment for them in peace time has, up to the present, proved a barrier to its establishment which we have been unable to surmount. There are many signs, nowadays, which point to the fact that the class of professional officer is changing. The calls on the professional officer are daily getting more severe, both as regards the actual work and also as regards the obligations to foreign service. Numbers leave the Service at an age when they are still capable of work, because they are unlucky in promotion, or unwilling to go abroad, or have sufficient private means to permit their early retirement. Many of the above would be glad to get employment; they have stayed too long in the Army to successfully start any fresh

way of earning their livelihood, and are often wanting in resources within themselves for pursuing a life of ease. The services of many could be obtained at a very small expenditure of money for the duties of instructors or inspectors of Volunteers, the certainty of fixed employment at home being a sufficiently powerful incentive to attract them.

These inspecting officers of Volunteers would have the supervision of the local Volunteer Clubs within a specified area. They would require to be more or less permanent, in order to obtain the local influence necessary to the efficient performance of their duties.

The following scale might be found workable:—

1. After 6 years' service, commission as junior major in Volunteers and an appointment as second-class district inspector.
2. After 12 years' service, commission as senior major and appointment as first-class district inspector.
3. After 18 years' service, commission as lieut.-colonel and appointment as second-class county inspector.
4. After 24 years' service, commission as colonel and appointment as first-class county inspector.

Officers might be appointed to this department at any one of the periods above specified, i.e., they might come in at 6, 12, or 18 years' service; they would all be retired at the age of 50.

For the Militia force, the system of seconding officers would probably be found more convenient. There would be two classes of officers required: (1) Instructional Staff at the depôts for the recruit officers and men; and (2) A number of majors to command double companies, and lieut.-colonels to command groups of four double companies. Appointments to the Instructional Staff might be made from lieutenants and captains, whilst the regimental appointments might be given to seconded captains and majors respectively for periods of 5 years at a time.

The Army would also have to furnish a large number of subordinate instructors for both the Militia and Volunteers; these would be taken from reservists and pensioners, as also would the men required to look after the various ranges and appliances, and to teach elementary drill and shooting in the educational establishments, so that the problem of giving employment to old soldiers would be in a fair way to solution.

Provision of a Proportionate Strength of Cavalry and Artillery.

Mounted services are always popular; there should not therefore be any particular difficulty in procuring sufficient numbers to volunteer for training with the Yeomanry. These would form the cavalry of the National Army. The Yeomanry are, generally speaking, organised on a county basis, and the addition of the annual levies formed into separate squadrons would expand the force without deranging it. Each 3 or 4 extra squadrons would be made a separate regiment of the County Yeomanry.

Riding schools would have to be established in each county where aspirants to the cavalry branch could learn equitation.

The system by which the Swiss cavalry are provided with horses would be an ideal one for our adoption. It is thus described in a Report on the Militia of Switzerland, which was prepared in 1900 and presented to President M'Kinley, of the United States of America :—

"A man wishing to serve in the cavalry must bring a certificate from an official of his commune setting forth that he is financially able to buy and take care of a horse, or he must bring from some responsible persons a guarantee that the necessary charges and expenses will be paid.

"The horses which are bought by the Government for the use of the cavalry are valued by a Commission. . . .

"The cavalryman buying a horse pays one-half the sum thus set as the value of the horse, and receives each year from Government one-tenth of the sum thus paid, so that at the end of 10 years he has received back all that he has paid, and is owner of the horse.

"When not engaged in military service he takes the horse to his home, and is permitted to use him for riding, driving, or working."

Artillery.—Such a highly technical body of troops as those required to man our field or heavy batteries could not be obtained from the national levies alone.

The only feasible plan would be to increase the establishment of the Regular artillery, and to maintain sufficient cadres of batteries, which could be rapidly expanded on mobilisation by the addition of large reserves and of specially selected men from the national levies. These last would have selected this branch of the Service at the time of their enrolment and have been trained yearly with batteries of the Regular Army.

Organisation.

Organisation would be naturally on a purely territorial basis. The Regular Army would, as regards infantry, gradually become territorial, in fact as well as in name, and would gain enormously as a result; county *esprit de corps* would be firmly established, and would have great influence in the direction of securing a good class of recruit and in providing a healthy supervision over their behaviour whilst in the ranks.

The Militia would have to be distributed amongst counties in proportion to the population; but since it is already established on a county basis, this would not probably involve any very radical changes. The yearly levies which joined the Militia as 1st, 2nd, or 3rd contingents would be separate from the ordinary Militia, and would be organised into companies under the National Army officers, whilst, as already explained, there would be one major to each double company and one lieutenant-colonel to each group of four double companies, obtained from the Regular Army.

The Militia Artillery contingent would join the batteries of the Regular Army to which they had been assigned for training.

The organisation of the Yeomanry would be practically unchanged, but might be extended so far as to include the formation of brigade commands and staff from the Regular Army.

No attempt would be made to give the Volunteers any organisation for war.

Naval and Coast-defence Volunteers.—The organisation of these forces would be under the orders of the Admiralty, and quite distinct from that of the land forces.

As a general rule, the *personnel* would be drawn from the coast population, and inland counties would be only affected to the extent that some of the special ratings, such as mechanics, electricians, and possibly engineers, would probably have to be drawn from the great manufacturing districts in the Northern and Midland Counties. Special arrangement would have to be made by the Admiralty for securing their services at the time when they became liable to service. For these special districts a naval member could be appointed as an additional member to the Boards convened for the examination of youths on arrival at the age of liability.

It is further likely that the Admiralty would find it necessary to establish schools in these centres for naval engineering and the other special branches.

Mobilisation.

Mobilisation would proceed along the same lines as the organisation; the levies who had been trained with the Volunteers would proceed to the county dépôts, together with the Militia-trained levies, and would be furnished with arms, accoutrements, and uniforms from the supplies stored there. They would have their own company officers and would be accompanied by certain of the district and county inspectors for the higher commands (D.C. and battalion commanders).

Three months' training would be at once commenced; one month would be devoted to company drill and musketry under the orders of the D.C. commanders, and one month to battalion work; they would then be formed into brigades, under the brigade commanders and staff, which would have been previously appointed by the Army Council; and at the end of another month should be fit for embarkation or for whatever duty they might be required.

Non-combatant Services.

Transport and Supply.—If the argument I have used at the commencement of this essay in respect to the possibility of invasion is based on correct principles, it stands to reason that the existence of a National Army would of itself do away with the entertainment of any idea of invasion by foreign Powers. In any case, the network of railways in the United Kingdom would enable troops and supplies to be concentrated in any part of the country where they were required. Hence only first line transport would have to be arranged. This would all of course have been settled beforehand by the Army Council, who would have the preparation of all the schemes, both for home defence and for over-sea expeditions.

If the defence of India was in question, the transport and supply would be the care of the Indian Government as soon as the troops had landed. In all other cases the Army Service Corps would be

expanded and worked on the lines which have already proved so generally satisfactory in South Africa.

Medical Services.—Qualified medical practitioners and other of subordinate positions could be secured by excusing these classes from the obligations of military service in consideration of their professional services being placed at the disposal of the nation for the period of, say, 10 years.

General Remarks.

I have not up to the present touched on the question of the expense involved in the working of the scheme which I have put forward. Mr. Arnold-Forster produced figures which purport to prove that any scheme of compulsory service would add so enormously to the Army Estimates as to render the idea impracticable.

Mr. H. W. Wilson (author of "Ironclads in Action"), in an article in the *National Review*, of September, 1904, shows conclusively that many of the assumptions on which this statement is based will not bear examination. For instance:—

1. Mr. Arnold-Forster put the numbers of the annual levy at 380,000, whilst the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces showed that the numbers of physically fit men who would annually become liable to service is only 190,000.
2. Mr. Arnold-Forster assumed a rate of pay of one shilling a day an extravagant amount.
3. He arbitrarily assumed that the pay of the Foreign Service Army would be doubled.

In the absence of any clue to the numbers of men who would elect to do their annual training with the Militia and Volunteers respectively, it is impossible to make any accurate forecast as to the cost of the scheme I have put forward. I therefore confine myself to putting forward certain considerations which tend to show that the cost would in reality be within reasonable limits.

In the first place, the essence of this idea of compulsory service is that it is due to the State for value received. Hence there is no question of the State being in competition with the labour market, or, indeed, of being required to provide pay as opposed to subsistence during the actual period of training.

The Militia levies would receive rations and be billeted or put under canvas, and a subsistence allowance of 3d. to 6d. a day would probably be ample.

On the other hand, the Volunteer-trained levies would be serving in a manner which suited their own particular needs; they would receive the usual capitation allowance in aid of club expenses, and would be refunded any expenses they might be put to for travelling, but would not receive any pay.

In addition, I would propose that that portion of the male population which did not contribute their personal services should pay a capitation fee, as is done in the case of the Swiss Militia; this would go towards paying the expense of the training of the remainder.

So far from the expenses of the Regular Army being increased by the adoption of compulsory service, it is safe to assume that once it was accepted and in working order, the establishment of the Regular Army might be safely reduced. There would be no longer any necessity for keeping a large standing Army at home; its duties will be

confined to supplying the drafts for the Foreign Service troops, to providing a nucleus on which the National Army would be formed, and to carrying out minor expeditions, strictly limited in scope.

It must be admitted that the establishments of officers and of the artillery would have to be greatly increased; but it is reasonable to assume that the economies would more than counter-balance this extra expenditure.

In presenting this scheme I have found it necessary for the sake of clearness to introduce a certain amount of detail on such points as (1) The length of the period during which the liability to service should extend; (2) The amount of training which should be given. Strict adherence to these details is not of course either expected or desired. They might be varied to a considerable extent without affecting the general principles on which the scheme is founded. These principles, with the possible exception of that which relates to the abolition of a war organisation in the Volunteers and the substitution of a club basis, are none of them new. At the same time, I am not aware that there has previously been any attempt made to combine the convenience of the Volunteer system of training during spare moments with Militia organisation.

The retention of the Volunteers in the general system of military education of the nation is absolutely dependent on the adoption of this or some similar plan, otherwise they will in the future, as in the past, prove to be a stumbling-block in the path of progress. Under these circumstances, although these innovations may have effects which we cannot clearly foresee, yet we may at the same time assume that the patriotism and common-sense which brought the Volunteers into being, and which has since guided its influential leaders, will induce them to afford their support to its gradual adaptation to suit fresh circumstances.

That ugly word "conscription" is responsible for much wild talk in connection with the subject of national defence.

Conscription is taken to mean that the youth of the country will be torn from their homes and their occupations, herded together in barracks, and deprived of any feeling of individuality.

The institution of compulsory service on the lines I have advocated does not imply the infliction of any of these hardships, whilst it equally secures the advantages which the adherents of conscription would claim for it. Yet it is freely said that the people would not stand it. The truth is, that the pros and cons of this subject have never been laid before them by any responsible Government of the day, and they have never yet been called on to vote for or against the adoption of the principle of compulsory service.

The adoption of a system of compulsory training by the people of the United Kingdom would in time naturally lead to its adoption by our self-governing Colonies. Then follows the possibility of federation in respect to Imperial defence and the application of the principle of mutual support in the defence of our interests in every quarter of the globe.

Then also the Committee of Defence and the General Staff of the Army, freed at last from the "interminable labour of building military castles in the air," will be able to prepare for all eventualities with clear understanding of the resources which they will have at their disposal, and the nation will be able to rest assured that

"GOD HELPS THEM THAT HELP THEMSELVES."